1 – Introduction

1In classic political science definitions, the core function of politics is defined as the making of collectively binding decisions (Easton, 1965; Scharpf, 1997). Therefore, one should expect that modes of collective decision-making, as well as the practices and procedures that lead to these decisions, are a well-examined area in political science. However, there are still modes of decision-making in politics that have not been analyzed in detail – although they can be found in various contexts and at different levels of the political process.

2To a large extent, political decision-making takes place in face-to-face group meetings, i.e. in gatherings of groups with between three or four up to 20 or 30 participants. Typical political meetings are, for example, working group meetings, briefings, cabinet meetings or committee meetings. Participants in these kinds of meetings negotiate and deliberate with each other face-to-face, and they reach a decision that manifests itself in a way that differs from the result of open or secret voting. In the case of a committee meeting, the decision-making process may proceed in the following way: After a period of deliberation on the respective matter – which may include the presentation of several proposals, slight variations or modifications of the proposals, as well as individual utterances that signalize acceptance or rejection of the proposal – one member of the committee, usually the chair of the committee meeting, expresses a statement like the following: ‘I take it we all agree on that’, while the other participants of the meeting write down the result, nod, join in collective laughter (Kangashiro et Nikko, 2009) or do something else that signalizes verbally or nonverbally that they consider the decision process to be completed and that they are ready to move on to the next item on the agenda. [2] Another variation might proceed in the following way: After a period of deliberation, the chairperson presents a proposal and asks whether there are members who are against the presented proposal or would prefer to abstain. He doesn’t ask for an open show of hands from the members who support the proposal. He then states a sentence like the following: ‘This is not the case, so the proposal is adopted’.

3In both cases, what can be observed here is obviously neither actual voting, in the sense of an open show of hands in favour or against a proposal that reveals the distribution of individual preferences within the group, [3] nor is it a form of explicit unanimous approval. What we are dealing with may rather be characterized as a stage within the decision-making process at which nobody openly disagrees with the proposed collective decision. Or, to put it differently, a proposition is accepted in the case of “an absence of contestation or counter-propositions” (Urfalino, 2014: 321). But what exactly does this absence of open disagreement tell us about the individual positions within the group and about the position of the group as a whole?

4Furthermore, possible questions related to these kinds of decision-making practices – to this specific way of “bringing deliberation to a close” (Urfalino, 2010: 127), are: What are the reasons why committee members often seem to prefer this way of reaching an agreement?, and: Is the result of this process a consensus, or is it something else?

5Following Christopher F. Karpowitz and Jane Mansbridge, the results of these decision-making processes can be characterized as reaching common ground (Karpowitz and Mansbridge, 2005: 247). Practices that lead to the establishment of common ground, although they may look like a form of unanimity or consensus, are not necessarily based on the idea of a “singular solution or a singular point of unity” (Maeckelbergh, 2009: 105). According to Karpowitz and Mansbridge, the conception of common ground “recognizes the need for joint action but does not overemphasize either the potential for conflict or the potential for commonality” (Karpowitz and Mansbridge, 2005: 247).

6If one draws this distinction between common ground and consensus, the background assumption is that the term consensus designates a state in which a singular solution is reached in the sense of “a unanimously agreed-upon position, considered necessary by all” (Manin, 1987: 340). Common ground, on the other hand, need not rest on a unanimously agreed-upon position in the strong sense. Or, to put it differently: The idea behind the above-cited term of consensus would be that when asked about their position on the matter after the joint decision is made, the individual members of the deciding body would articulate a position very similar or identical to the joint decision being reached. By contrast, if one considers a joint decision to be a practice of reaching common ground, this idea would include that when asked about their individual position on the matter, there would be sufficient overlap between the positions articulated by individual group members, but there would also be differences and variations.

7Therefore, what can be observed in the above-described sequence in which the chairperson utters the phrase that ‘I take it we all agree on that’ may actually rest on a composite of individual positions that is as similar to the composite of positions expressed by a majority decision as it is to a position expressed by unanimous assent. It is something in between. The fact that nobody disagrees openly is not identical with – or may not even be similar to – a situation in which everyone in the room shares an identical position regarding the matter at hand. It may be the case that participants disagree with parts or aspects of the decision being reached, but do not consider it worthwhile to express open disagreement at this stage of the decision-making process. It may also be the case that the decision process itself generates forms of group pressure that lead to an increased reluctance to express open disagreement (Nullmeier and Pritzlaff, 2009: 369; Novak, 2015).

8While it is rather difficult to find evidence for this possible proximity between ‘common ground’ and majority vote when studying actual committee meetings, evidence can be found in face-to-face group experiments. In an experimental design that focuses on unanimous decision-making in groups of five participants, it can be observed that participants split up the decision procedure into sequences of unanimous decision-making and sequences of majority vote – and still consider the result as a whole to be a unanimous decision.

2 – Consensus, Common Ground and Majority Vote

9If one takes a closer look at the literature on existing consensus practices, like for example studies on consensus building in the context of social movements, it becomes clear that the term consensus doesn’t necessarily characterize a process that leads to unanimity in the strong sense, i.e. to a state in which a single solution – considered necessary by all – prevails. In order to get to a decision process that embodies “the most open, participatory, and democratic space possible” (Sitrin, 2011: 9), a lot of social movements rely on forms of consensus building that are not necessarily directed towards finding a single solution. Marianne Maeckelbergh, for example, presents a model of a consensus process that highlights the importance of conflict and the importance of creating “conflictive spaces” (Maeckelbergh, 2013: 30). This conflictive form of consensus and horizontality attempts “to replace consensus as unanimity with a form of consensus that makes many outcomes possible for any given decision” (Ibid.: 31).

10Furthermore, what can be observed from the use of the term consensus in social movements – and from the performance of consensus building practices – is a difference in the “perceived legitimacy” (Warren and Mansbridge et al., 2016: 145) of consensus building in contrast to direct voting and the use of majority rule. [4] This finding can be identified in reports from activists who, for example, heavily criticize instances in movement practice in which there is a switch from consensus mode to voting – even if a 9/10ths vote is used (Appel, 2012: 116).

11In The Democracy Project, David Graeber argues against an understanding of democracy that focuses on majority voting. He writes: “Democracy, then, is not necessarily defined by majority voting: it is, rather, the process of collective deliberation on the principle of full and equal participation.” (Graeber, 2013: 186). Graeber points out that “there are good reasons why counting has often been avoided as a means of reaching group decisions. Voting is divisive.” (Ibid.: 184).

12In his study on the rule of non-opposition, Philippe Urfalino hints at findings that suggest that “the practice of decision by consensus often tends to be considered more democratic than majority rule by both social movements and democratic theorists” (Urfalino, 2014: 321). In fact, in a similar vein than activists in social movements, classic writers on deliberative democracy, like Joshua Cohen, James Fishkin or Jürgen Habermas, argue for the need to reach consensus – and for a kind of ‘normative superiority’ of consensus if compared to voting. Joshua Cohen, for example, makes it very clear that voting is considered the second best solution:

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“Finally, ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus – to find reasons that are persuasive to all who are committed to acting on the results of a free and reasoned assessment of alternatives by equals. Even under ideal conditions there is no promise that consensual reasons will be forthcoming. If they are not, then deliberation concludes with voting, subject to some form of majority rule.”

14In most writings of early theorists of deliberative democracy, the “classic ideal of deliberation to consensus on the common good” implied a conception of the common good that can be characterized as “relatively unitary” and “contested but discoverable through reason” (Mansbridge, 2015: 38). In these contexts, therefore, “consensus means a shared conception of what the common good requires” (Weinstock and Kahane, 2010: 5), i.e. an actual transformation and convergence of individual preferences that lead to a “mental consensus” (Haug, 2015: 563). According to Christoph Haug, these assumptions made by at least some scholars of deliberative democracy created “an image of consensus decision making as a very high and rarely achievable ideal” (Ibid.: 564). On that account, it has been pointed out even within the debate on deliberative democracy that “even ideally the giving of good reasons and other considerations in a setting characterized by mutual respect, freedom, equality, and the relative absence of power will not always lead to a consensual result” (Mansbridge, 2015: 38). Hence, more recent studies on deliberative democracy hint towards the need to include disagreement and a “relative openness and disclosure about interests, needs, and constraints” in conceptions of mutually acceptable agreements (Warren and Mansbridge et al., 2016: 152). Based on this revised understanding, a final result is perceived as legitimate that is not identical with a singular solution and a unanimously agreed-upon position.

15The perceived legitimacy of democratic procedures, like deliberation or direct voting, has recently also been studied experimentally (Persson, Esaiasson and Gilljam, 2013). In fact, Persson et al. conclude – at least in the context of their experimental design – that direct voting generates a higher level of legitimacy beliefs than deliberation. [5] Therefore, if one discusses the perceived legitimacy of practices that lead to consensus, common ground or majority vote, one may become skeptical about the “democratic value that has been attached to decision by consensus” (Urfalino, 2014: 337).

16In order to find empirical evidence for or against the suggested superiority of consensus over voting, it may be useful to study face-to-face interactions at the micro-level of the political process. This can be done using the classical ethnographic approach of participant observation. But in order to achieve a detailed analysis of the entire process that leads to a joint decision, it is particularly helpful to analyze audio-visual recordings of decision-making processes in meetings.

3 – Political Micro-ethnography and Experimental Research – Collecting and Analyzing Audio-visual Data

17During the last decade, video-based ethnography, also referred to as “micro-ethnography” (Streeck and Mehus, 2005; LeBaron, 2008), has become a growing field of research, especially in communication studies. According to Jürgen Streeck and Siri Mehus, the term micro-ethnography denotes “the microscopic analysis of naturally occurring human activities and interactions” (Streeck and Mehus, 2005: 381). In contrast to traditional ethnography, micro-ethnography uses audio-visual recordings of human activities and interactions that are transcribed and analyzed on the basis of detailed and systematic coding schemes. As in conversation analysis, a number of micro-ethnographic studies focus on issues of power and social interaction, and on the link between power and knowledge (p. 393-394). Unlike classic conversation analysis, micro-ethnographic studies also include the analysis of “gesture, the manipulation of material resources, and the organization of bodies in space” (p. 394). Curtis D. LeBaron sums up the essence of micro-ethnographic studies in the following way:

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“Micro-ethnography, sometimes called video-based ethnography, addresses ‘big’ social and organizational issues through careful analysis of ‘small’ moments of human activity. […] Although researchers may avoid explicit claims about the generalizability of site-specific findings, micro-ethnographers assume that patterns and practices in one place will have relevance to other contexts.”

19The research method used here rests on similar assumptions. The objective behind a microanalysis of face-to-face decision interactions in meetings is to identify patterns and practices that can be characterized as typical forms of political decision-making practices. Political micro-ethnography aims at a systematic analysis of the dynamic processes that occur in the context of political decision interactions. Unlike the micro-ethnographic approach, the approach presented here relies not only on an analysis of naturally occurring interactions. It also includes the analysis of audio-visual recordings from group experiments. One of the reasons for doing this kind of experiments is the ability to obtain a larger sample size than would otherwise be the case. At least in the context of an average research project, a study based on audio-visual data from actual political committee meetings usually stays at the level of small-N studies. In order to produce a larger sample of data focused on actual decision interactions, the real-world data is supplemented with material from group experiments.

20One advantage of video-based ethnography – as opposed to classic ethnography based on participant observation – lies in the ability to engage in a systematic analysis of the dynamics of face-to-face interactions at the micro-level of the political process.

21A method for analysing decision interactions at the micro-level has to include a complete mapping of the communicative events that occur during a decision process. This kind of data cannot be collected by a single participant observer, or even by a group of researchers doing classic ethnography as bystanders in a committee meeting. Moreover, the underlying assumptions about the importance of nonverbal utterances and the associated need to capture all participants’ actions and gestures equally, simultaneously, and in enough detail, call for an approach that uses audio-visual recordings filmed from various perspectives, as well as for detailed transcriptions of the interaction processes.

4 – Empirical Findings

22The empirical findings to be presented stem from two research projects. The first addressed the establishment of bindingness in real committee meetings. In the course of the research project, meetings of eight different political committees at the local and the federal state level as well as of two faculty board meetings at a university were documented and analyzed. [6] In the context of the second project, 50 face-to-face group experiments with a total of 210 participants were conducted in order to study processes of collective decision-making in small groups. [7]

5 – Conclusion

43In face-to-face meetings, like for example committee meetings or faculty board meetings, a type of decision making can be found that has been characterized as “non-opposition rule” (Urfalino, 2014: 333). It leads to “apparent unanimity” (Ibid.). However, the result of this decision-making practice is not unanimity in the strong sense of “…a unanimously agreed-upon position, considered necessary by all” (Manin, 1987: 340). Rather, the result can be characterized as reaching common ground (Karpowitz and Mansbridge, 2005: 247).

44In the context of actual committee meetings as well as in the context of group experiments, the participants themselves refer to their decision as unanimous. In the committee meeting described above, the chairperson stated: “I take it we all agree on that”, and nobody disagreed. In the context of the faculty board meeting, the chairperson stated “Are there any negative votes? Any abstentions? Then it’s unanimous”, and the other participants seemed to accept this qualification of the outcome. In the context of the group experiments, the subjects presented their final decision on the issues at hand as a unanimous decision. However, in all three cases, there is evidence for the conjecture that we are dealing with a more or less hidden form of majority vote. In the experiment, this became apparent in 62 percent of the groups, where participants split the decision procedure into sequences of unanimous decision-making and sequences of majority vote and still deemed the outcome to be a unanimous decision. However, it is not as easy to detect evidence for the ‘hidden majority vote’ in the two real committee meetings. Because the opportunity to express a negative vote or minority position were suppressed, at least in these contexts, it is very unlikely that members can make use of it. Therefore, we can conclude that there is a minority that simply remains silent when the chair of the committee states ‘I take it we all agree on that’ or when the chair of the faculty board meeting asks for negative votes and abstentions.

45In summary, while it is rather difficult to find explicit evidence for a proximity between apparent unanimity and common ground on the one hand and majority vote on the other hand when studying actual committee meetings, evidence can be found in face-to-face group experiments. Therefore, it can be concluded that the “democratic value that has been attached to decision by consensus” (Urfalino, 2014: 337) cannot easily be transferred to the way actual unanimous decision-making works in political committees.