1With the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the European Union has embarked on a new venture with countries to the east and south of its member states. From an American perspective, the fundamental questions are: will the European Union be able to spread stability without the prospect of membership and will the EU do so in ways that are complementary to U.S. interests? Addressing these questions requires not only an examination of technical points, but reflection on Europe’s conception of its role in the world. The European Union is deciding how to approach countries nearby. At this time the EU uses the ENP as one of the vehicles. [1] How the EU relates to its neighbors has implications for transatlantic relations because the U.S. has global interests.

2Recent initiatives within the ENP may enrich and enhance Europe’s approach to its adjacent regions in unexpected ways. Initially the ENP appeared to be an effort to combine policy towards two different regions into a post-enlargement package. This marriage of convenience looked set to please neither east nor south. The EU asserted that ENP was more than a hodge-podge, presenting the policy as a quest for a circle of security provided by stable neighbors. Yet as the EU creates more policy instruments within the ENP it could evolve into a more complex and innovative program than originally planned. Along with other proposals, the ENP may help recast regional relationships in the western portion of the Eurasian continent. Originally envisioned as a way to manage relations with countries “out there” at the edges of Europe, the ENP could develop an unexpected vitality. Are these areas Europe’s fringes; or Russia’s near-abroad; or the separate regions of North Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, or something else? Will the European Union consider itself as a zone of solidarity merely seeking an external ring of stability? Or will Europe see itself as the intersection of several maritime worlds: the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Baltic? Is the “neighborhood” a buffer against transnational threats or a conceptual connection linking Europe to other regions in an increasingly interdependent world? Which narrative will prevail and what might be the implications for transatlantic relations?

Marriage of Convenience or Circle of Stability?

3The European Neighbourhood Policy developed from the EU’s understanding that it needed to address “wider Europe” in the wake of a new wave of enlargement. In 2003-2004 EU watchers on both sides of the Atlantic focused on the coming EU enlargement scheduled for 2004. The enlargement expanded EU borders farther east and south. The accession of Poland, Slovakia and Hungary brought a direct land border with Ukraine and Belarus. The entry of Cyprus and Malta introduced member states that were islands in the Mediterranean. European leaders were also aware that the expected inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania would bring the EU to the Black Sea, an area with less stable post-Soviet states and so-called “frozen” conflicts.

4From a transatlantic perspective the European Neighbourhood Policy initially appeared a convenient way to combine programs for two different regions into an uncomfortable juxtaposition that fit neither one. It was a way to address the regions beyond the 2004 enlargement. However, the only connection among countries in the “neighborhood” seemed to be geographical proximity to an EU member state and not being an accession state on the path to full EU membership. Creating a policy to address non-EU states in different regions looked like a marriage of convenience. After all, they have different histories, cultures and religions. Moreover, the ENP countries stand in very different relation to the EU. The Eastern European states could someday apply for membership. The southern Mediterranean states could not. [2]

5Both the European Council and the European Parliament called for consideration of relations with neighboring states after the 2004 enlargement. As the 2002 Copenhagen European Council noted:

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“The enlargement will bring about new dynamics in the European integration. This presents and important opportunity to take forward relations with neighbouring countries based on shared political and economic values. The Union remains determined to avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union.” [3]

7The objective was to avoid “new dividing lines in Europe;” indeed, the emphasis was placed on Eastern Europe, even though the “southern Mediterranean countries” are mentioned later. [4] The objective was to avoid pushing residual Cold War-era political, economic and social cleavages eastward with enlargement. This approach was not discordant with American approaches. The Administrations of George H.W. Bush, George W. Bush and of Bill Clinton all supported a Europe “whole and free.” Americans tend to consider “Europe” to include more than just EU members. Many American observers appreciate the importance of the EU enlargement process in solidifying democracy in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War. In principle, Americans would be sympathetic to EU efforts to help spread stability beyond its borders into its “neighborhood.” (Figure 1 illustrates this vision of Europe and ENP.)

8Helping the nearby regions means not only cultural and economic ties, but political and security links too. Transnational threats including crime, contagious disease, and illegal migration can flow across borders easily. Combating these threats requires international cooperation. The European continent already benefits from a web of complementary organizations, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, which reinforces human rights standards and the rule of law. Despite the good work of these organizations, the EU has been drawn deeper into the politics of Eurasia by the accession of countries farther east. The enlargements brought the EU closer to zones of instability. In March 2003, the Commission posited that the EU could not bolster security inside its new members without stability in the regions beyond its borders:

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“The accession of the new member states will strengthen the Union’s interest in enhancing relations with the new neighbours. Over the coming decade and beyond, the Union’s capacity to provide security, stability, and sustainable development to its citizens will no longer be distinguishable from its interest in close cooperation with the neighbours.” [5]

Figure 1

Circle of Security

Circle of Security

10The December 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) also linked security to improved relations with adjacent countries:

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“Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.”
“The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.” [6]

12For the United States as well, ensuring stability in the region was important. American analysts understood that the EU’s tradition of functional integration enabled it to engage with its neighbors in ways that the U.S. could not. Practical, technical cooperation could draw societies closer together. Over time the technical cooperation being developed within the ENP could help improve the dialogue between the “West” and Islamic countries of the Mediterranean.

13While American observers recognize the important role of the EU in its region, not surprisingly, they tend to see distinct regions rather than a “neighborhood.” (Figure 2) As in most foreign ministries, the bureaucratic divisions in the U.S. Department of State reflect policymakers’ conceptions. The ENP countries fall into two separate bureaus. For example, relations with Ukraine and Moldova are covered by the Bureau of Europe and Eurasian Affairs, while relations with Israel, Jordan and Morocco are in the purview of the Bureau of Near East Affairs.

Figure 2

Separate Regions or Neighborhood?

Separate Regions or Neighborhood?

14The Administration of George W. Bush has focused on “the broader Middle East and North Africa” emphasizing connections among North Africa, the Levant and the rest of the region including Iraq. Its post-September 11 policies largely addressed the Maghreb and Levant as part of the Islamic world rather than the Mediterranean one. The difference in perspective between the U.S. and Europe reflects deep historical and geographical realities. Six EU member states border the Mediterranean, two of them are islands within it. The U.S. is thousands of miles away and, as a global hegemon, tends to analyze issues in a global context.

15The prospect of the accession of Turkey also affected the development of ENP. The EU opened negotiations with Turkey in late 2003. In 2003-2004 accession discussions were going well making the eventual admission of Turkey a factor in considerations of the EU’s “neighborhood.” An enlargement to Turkey would bring a land border with Syria, Iraq and Iran.

16Even without the accession of Turkey, the 21^st century enlargements to date mean that EU has greater concerns about borders. The external border takes on additional significance because of the lack of internal borders. The free movement of people in the Schengen area and the free movement of goods facilitated by the Single Market are great achievements, but they could allow criminals and contraband to move more easily too. Significantly, the EU created European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX), which is based in Warsaw and began operations in October 2005. Meanwhile, the Council maintains the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM). Both countries border new EU member Romania. Created in 2005, in 2007 EUBAM’s initial two-year mandate was extended until 2009. After September 11, U.S. has placed greater emphasis on improving customs standards and monitoring as part of the fight against terrorism. The EU’s moves to improve border control procedures are just the kind of practical, technical measures for which American observers praise the EU. Such technical collaboration can help transatlantic relations. Indeed, policymakers have heralded improved U.S.-EU law enforcement cooperation in recent years.

17The United States considers the ENP and other EU programs to be compatible with its own regional policies. At the 2007 U.S.-EU summit the parties agreed:

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“We will continue to support reform in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East and will promote greater participation of civil society in the reform process through our respective efforts, including the Barcelona Process, the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Middle East Partnership Initiative, and our joint actions through the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative and the Foundation and Fund for the Future.” [7]

19Transatlantic approaches are complementary, but based on different conceptions of the region. Where the U.S. sees North Africa and the Middle East and Eastern Europe; the EU perceives its “neighborhood.” Interestingly, the ENP provides for bilateral Action Plans within a multilateral framework. This structure could provide the flexibility for effective policy implementation with various countries or it might create fissures that undermine policy coherence. In 2007, the Commission highlighted differentiation as a positive feature, noting, “The further the policy evolves, the more pronounced this differentiation will become.” [8]

20Tension between bilateral relations and multilateral policy goals are evident in the development of the ENP. One of the most important aspects of the ENP is policy towards Ukraine and the related issue of whether inclusion in ENP precludes accession to the EU. Ukraine is a large country, politically important to both the U.S. and the EU (and its member states.) The EU already had a Common Strategy towards Ukraine before the ENP. However, the 2004 Orange Revolution created exciting new vistas for Ukraine’s relations with the world. Inspired by the actions of the Ukrainian people, American leaders began to envision Ukraine moving closer, and possibly joining Euro-Atlantic institutions in the future, including the EU and NATO. EU members Poland and Lithuania were instrumental in gaining EU support for the popular movement and the nascent Ukrainian government. While some EU leaders were circumspect about Ukraine’s prospects, advocates foresaw a time when Ukraine might accede to the EU. Russia became increasingly concerned about the tug of western institutions on the Kiev new government that had defeated Moscow’s preferred presidential candidate. During 2004 Ukraine went from a country bordering new EU-state Poland to being a prospective accession candidate in the minds of some. Supporters of eventual Ukrainian accession did not want participation in the ENP to preclude Ukraine from becoming an accession country. Yet the premise underpinning the ENP was connection to the EU without the prospect of membership. After all, Turkey was not an ENP country because it was in the accession channel.

21Initially it appeared that ENP and accession were parallel tracks with countries on one path or the other. Supporters of eventual Ukrainian membership in the EU were concerned about the implications of inclusion in ENP. ENP countries might be discouraged from switching from one track to the other. However, the European Parliament has asserted that the perspective of membership is not foreclosed for certain ENP states. In the preamble to a November 2007 resolution, Parliament noted “…whereas participation in the ENP does not preclude, for the eastern neighbours which are clearly identifiable as European countries, any perspective related to possible EU membership in the long term …” [9] Therefore, the development of the ENP need not necessarily be hampered by debates about additional enlargement. This point may help reduce some reticence about the program at a time when it might gain greater relevance.

22The ENP provides another channel for bilateral engagement with countries important to both the EU and the U.S. Ukraine attracts much of the attention, but the Rose Revolution in Georgia has strong transatlantic support. Americans would view positively mechanisms that bring Georgia closer to the Euro-Atlantic community. The United States has expressed support efforts to engage ENP countries as a way to draw them closer to Euro-Atlantic institutions. Georgia provides a useful example. Europe is interested in good governance in its Black Sea neighborhood, while the U.S. is concerned with the spread of democracy internationally and the rule of law in the Black Sea region. American policymakers would be less concerned about which mechanism the EU used, but would support EU engagement in the region. As U.S. Assistant Secretary for Europe and Eurasia, Dan Fried, commented in October 2006:

23We support Georgia’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognized boundaries. And we support, frankly, Georgia’s aspirations to draw ever closer to Europe and Euro-Atlantic institutions. There is no question about that. We are working with our European friends, with the UN and with the OSCE to help resolve the frozen conflicts. [10]

24The ENP may also benefit from negative and positive national initiatives. Russia’s more assertive tone and policies have encouraged its neighbors to look for solidarity and support mechanisms from Europe, possibly making the ENP more attractive. In 2006, the preexisting cooperative framework among Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova was renamed the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-GUAM. The emphasis on economic cooperation may complement the EU’s engagement through ENP. Initiatives from EU member states could also affect the ENP. French President Nicholas Sarkozy’s proposal for a Mediterranean Union might enhance or undermine the ENP. Although he may advocate the idea as an alternative to EU membership for Turkey, it could promote the very old idea of a Mediterranean world. Conversely, a new Mediterranean Union might supersede existing EU regional mechanisms.

25Recent developments may make the ENP even more relevant to transatlantic relations. In late 2006, the Commission presented new initiatives that may give added weight to the ENP. These ideas were further elaborated in 2007. The Commission has highlighted the Governance Facility, the Neighbourhood Investment Facility and the related programs including the “Black Sea Synergy.” From the transatlantic perspective it is beneficial for the EU to develop additional mechanisms for dealing with transnational security issues including migration. This approach builds on the EU’s strengths. Many Americans and Europeans appreciate the EU’s “soft power” to spread stability and norms. EU accession helped cement democracy and the rule of law in Central and Eastern Europe; the ENP builds on this success to try to spread stability farther. Technical assistance weaves the threads of western-oriented, rules-based, international cooperation into relations with certain sensitive regions. As an outsider to these regions, the U.S. cannot always play this role; maybe a neighbor could. Thus, the ENP enhances the EU’s ability to work in areas of interest to both the U.S. and the EU using the EU’s expertise in functional integration.

Functional Issues and ENP Vitality

26The individual country Action Plans are the core of the ENP. Each plan details a different mix of mechanisms and provides for EU review of the recipient’s progress. Although the EU stresses partnership and ownership within the ENP, the EU remains the dominant partner in each relationship. After all the EU provides the funds and conducts the evaluations.

27The importance of functional cooperation infuses new technical elements in the ENP with even greater significance. One proposal is to encourage economic integration shaped by “[t]ailor-made deep and comprehensive free trade agreements (DFTAs)” [11] These could facilitate economic integration, but raise questions for the wider world. Would such agreements be detrimental to non-EU, non-ENP (i.e., U.S.) companies? Would DFTAs add to the proliferation of bilateral trade agreements at the expense of global mechanisms?

28Another proposal concerns the movement of people. Illegal and legal migrants flow across the continent and over the Mediterranean drawn to Europe by economic opportunities. The EU may use the ENP channel as a way to facilitate short-term travel and long-term “managed migration.” [12] From the U.S. perspective, the ENP would be even more useful if it could bolster EU tools for addressing this complex and sensitive topic. After September 11, the U.S. has been very concerned about the movement of people into and within Europe, because in the past terrorists have used European venues to organize attacks on the U.S. The U.S. would hope to see ENP improve management of migration without reducing standards or vigilance.

29The U.S. is also interested in the EU’s ability to help ameliorate the “frozen conflicts” and support good governance and the rule of law. The Commission acknowledges that “[t]he EU is already active in preventing and resolving conflicts, but more should be done.” [13] The U.S. remains concerned about the conflicts in the Caucasus that could thaw into hot conflicts from their politically “frozen” state. Greater EU engagement could be beneficial. Here again, focusing on technical cooperation could advance conflict resolution without encountering as much disapproval from Moscow as more blatant democracy programs.

30Perhaps the most salient issue is energy security. The Commission notes that “[t]he ENP brings together producer, consumer, and transit countries, which have much to gain from closer cooperation and integration.” [14] Other mechanisms will be more important in the EU’s efforts to forge an energy policy. The EU is trying to build energy solidarity among member states and will announce a comprehensive energy policy in early 2008. The complicated issue touches on economic, environmental and political considerations, relations with Russia which supplies gas to many European countries, as well as relations with the United States and the Middle East. Internal EU politics will determine how the EU implements a proposed comprehensive energy policy. Still, in a modest way, the ENP might provide a way to discuss issues of regional security of supply and transport.

31American analysts welcome the EU’s progress in funding the programs it proposes. Among American observers there is a strong perception that the EU is slow to allocate and disperse money in its assistance programs. Timely appropriations tend to boost the image of the EU among expert observers. In this regard the ENP has made good progress. In 2007, the Commission funded the new Governance facility with € 50 million per year for the years 2007-2010, with the first allocations going to Morocco and Ukraine. The Commission has begun to fund the Neighbourhood Investment Facility at € 50 million, but plans to spend € 700 million over seven years 2007-2013. Under ENP and other technical cooperation programs, countries in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean can improve transportation links and harbor management – the infrastructure of interaction. Having participated in these programs may make the ENP countries better able to function in Euro-Atlantic or other multilateral organizations even if they do not join the EU.

32The ENP also provides a framework in which Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Arab states participate. The program’s bilateral character means that each ENP country’s activities are oriented towards the EU rather than to each other, which may make it easier for Arab states and Israel to be included together. Each country works at its own pace on deeper relations with the EU. Under the ENP, the EU will grant access to certain European agencies to ENP countries. In 2007, the Commission began negotiation with Israel, Morocco and Ukraine in this area. [15] Israel is on course to be the first ENP country to participate in the Competitiveness and Innovation Programme.

The ENP in European policy

33The ENP is not the EU’s only policy framework for countries in its region. The EU already has a Common Strategy on relations with Ukraine and one with Russia as well. Nor is the ENP the EU’s first foray into the Mediterranean region. The EU had already created the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process). For European analysts a key distinguishing feature is the idea that for Mediterranean countries the Barcelona process is a multilateral mechanism in which all parties work together; whereas the ENP is a framework for bilateral Action Plans. In contrast, in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region the ENP provides a multilateral aspect to bilateral policies. The Commission explains that

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“The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership remains a cornerstone for the EU’s interaction with its southern neighbours. The ENP and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are mutually reinforcing: the bilateral frameworks of the ENP are better suited to promoting internal reforms, while the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation framework provides regional context.” [16]

35This flexibility may be a virtue, but it also reinforces the perception that the ENP is divided into two sections. In 2007, while endorsing ENP, the European Parliament noted the tensions, declaring that it “[e]xpresses doubts about the meaningfulness of the ENP’s geographical scope, as it involves countries which geographically are European together with Mediterranean non-European countries…” [17]

36Indeed, the EU has several programs operating in ENP regions. The Black Sea Synergy is another regional arrangement “launched to complement the EU’s mainly bilateral policies in the region: the ENP, the Strategic Partnership with the Russian Federation and the accession negotiations with Turkey.” [18] The EU will need to ensure that its overlapping instruments complement rather than compete with each other. With many Ukrainians, Georgians and others straining to find a new place beyond Russia’s “near abroad,” there may be greater interest in the ENP. Also, the accessions of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU make Black Sea politics even more salient for the EU at time when European and American leaders are concerned over the security of energy supplies to Europe.

37The proliferation of mechanisms could be seen as wasteful and duplicative, or it could be indicative of a new conception of the EU’s role in the world. From a transatlantic perspective, the real contribution of the EU’s numerous regional policies may be to make Europe the center of a new space where different regions meet. The European Union could facilitate the emergence of a new model of Europe: secure in its own identity, but also open to connecting the Mediterranean, Black Sea, Baltic and transatlantic areas. In this conception, Europe is about connections not divisions. (Figure 3) This vision transcends a dialogue of separate civilizations divided by mountains and seas, history and religion. Instead it creates an interdependent framework of links and flows. Politics can shape these links just like geology. As Fernand Braudel wrote of the currents in the Mediterranean sea,

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“The sea does not act as a barrier between the two great continental masses of Spain and North Africa; but rather as a river which unites more than divides. Making a single world of North and South…” [19]

Figure 3

Crossroads and Connections

Crossroads and Connections

39This connective conception reframes the European Neighbourhood Policy, making the “neighbourhood” not a juxtaposition of two different regions, but a vital component of the EU’s international presence.