Introduction

1The annexation of Crimea marked a turning point and serious rupture in the European Union’s relations with the Russian Federation. This fundamental crisis in their relationship caused confusion and disbelief. How could the EU’s important strategic partnership with Russia suddenly turn out to have completely failed? The EU had long been strongly criticized for the internal divisions and inability of its member states to speak with one voice to Russia. Indeed, the EU’s difficulties in the full range of policy sectors on which they cooperated were frequently attributed to national governments’ propensity to prioritize their special relations with Russia, without considering their effect on the EU. At the same time, Russia had regularly been criticized for pursuing a divide-and-rule policy towards the EU, deliberately driving a wedge between the member states. Critics claimed that the member states’ bilateral relationships ultimately weakened the EU’s common policy as they undermined the EU’s resolve and the effectiveness of EU policies, to the benefit of Russia. Russian negotiators could capitalize on divisions by blocking unfavourable policies and could obtain concessions from some member states that put pressure on EU negotiators to concede ground on issues that mattered to Russia. [1]

2It is undeniable that it can have a detrimental effect when twenty-eight national governments pursue their foreign policies in parallel with the EU’s relations with Russia as the EU’s ability to capitalize on its strengths in negotiations is weakened by the diversity of interests that have to be reconciled within the EU. It is however debatable if the EU’s internal divisions and special bilateral ties with Russia can explain the EU’s failure to develop mutually beneficial cooperative relations with Russia. In fact, this article argues that national foreign policies have acted both as a divisive force and as a catalyst in the EU-Russian relationship. But it is not member states’ relations with Russia per se that help explain the EU’s failure to anticipate and respond effectively to Russia’s aggression against its Western neighbours. Rather, it is the failure of governments and EU officials to take the views and experiences of those experts and countries seriously that had been most exposed to Russian military and foreign policy, and had warned about the Russian strategy and tactics of deception (maskirovka).

3In addition, the profound—and arguably misplaced—belief in the positive transformative power of cooperation, held by many in the EU, combined with a deep-seated fear of a possible military confrontation with Russia, help explain how twenty-five years of sustained engagement with Russia could result in a complete breakdown of relations, despite the EU’s best efforts. What is more, the EU’s trust in the strength of its ties with Russia contributed involuntarily to an escalation of the EU-Russian conflict. Together with the EU’s particular toolbox and nature as a different kind of international actor and the (excessive) faith placed by EU actors in the power of diplomacy and ‘mutual benefits,’ it accounts, at least to some extent, for Russia’s unresponsiveness to the EU’s demands, and even Russia’s increasingly belligerent actions against its Western neighbours.

Bilateral relations—obstacles and catalysts for the EU-Russian relationship

4EU policy-making towards Russia has always been characterized by the push and pull factors of diverse national (i.e. domestic) and EU-level incentives and constraints. Two points are important to make, and which are important to understand the way in which the EU’s common policy towards Russia has developed. First, different domestic priorities and differences in power between the member states have, since the EU’s eastward enlargement, resulted in internal conflicts about the most appropriate course of action to be taken regarding Russia. Second, the large member states, in particular Germany and France (but also the UK), have often been most influential in the EU-Russian relationship, but they do not share the same history with Russia as the Central, East European and Northern member states. Germany’s relationship with Russia is also very different from the French-Russian relationship, due to historical, economic and domestic political reasons. The same is true for the Central, East European and Northern states: different incentives and constraints have produced a range of different approaches and responses to Russia, despite many similarities that they share due to their comparable historical experiences with Russia. The point is therefore that it matters which EU countries take the lead on a specific issue concerning Russia, how their bilateral relations with Russia have developed, and how the other member states’ interests align with theirs.

Russia’s preferences matter

5An additional factor is Russia and the strategies pursued by the Russian government. Differences between the EU’s member states were actively reinforced by the different approaches that the Russian government pursued towards each of the twenty-eight member states. The states of particular importance to Russia receive a more favourable treatment, concerning trade opportunities, but also the manner and frequency of political contacts. Meanwhile, the states of little consequence to Russia receive only very limited attention at the political level. The three Russian Foreign Policy doctrines (2000, 2008 and 2013) adopted since President Putin came to power in Russia all made clear that only a small group of EU member states, notably Germany, France and Italy, are deemed to be a particular “resource for advancing Russia’s national interests in European and world affairs” and that cooperation with these states contributes to the stabilization, growth (2000 & 2008) and modernization (2013, par. 60) of the Russian economy. [2] In addition, the Foreign Policy Concept of 2008 made special mention of Spain, Finland and Greece. Among the twenty-eight member states, Germany and Italy are the two that maintain by far the largest trade volumes with Russia. [3] France, and to a lesser extent the UK and the Netherlands (which also received a special mention in the Foreign Policy Concepts) are important strategic partners for Russia concerning the transfer of modern technology in the energy sector. Despite distinct differences in their relations with Russia, these countries have in common that they—on occasion—prevented or slowed down the EU’s policy making on difficult issues, advocating a ‘softer’ approach to Russia and concessions, rather than a harder line.

6In 2000, the UK was listed in Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept among the small group of countries deemed to be of primary importance for Russia, but from the mid-2000s, it enjoyed no longer that status as political relations worsened and British Council offices were forced to close in Russia (as part of a crack-down on ‘foreign agents’). In addition, two suspicious deaths of Russian regime critics resident in the UK increased tensions between the UK and Russia: former KGB officer Alexandr Litvinenko, who became British citizen in October 2006, was poisoned with radioactive Polonium-210 in November 2006 and businessman Boris Berezovski, who had been granted political asylum in the UK in 2003, was found hanged in his home in 2013. The UK remained an important source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for Russia and with the influx of Russian investors and investment deals in London City, the UK-Russian relationship retained a special status. [4] But in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the UK Home Secretary announced on 22 July 2014 the establishment of an Inquiry into the death of Aleksandr Litvinenko. [5] The troubles in the UK-Russian relationship explain, to some degree, why the UK had a rather low-key role in the diplomatic efforts regarding Ukraine.

7The Netherlands were granted the status of important partner after bilateral relations recovered from tensions caused by vocal Dutch criticism of Russia’s handling of the Beslan school siege in September 2004 (which followed the also very strongly criticized (mis)handling of the ‘Nord-Ost’ Moscow Dubrovka theatre hostage crisis in October 2002). A Dutch energy company, Gasunie, owns shares in the controversial German-Russian Nord Stream pipeline and Gazprom International has its head office in Amsterdam. That the downing of the Malaysian airplane MH17 in July 2014 killed a large number of Dutch citizens and that Russian state media and officials voiced strong criticism against the Dutch investigation [6] had a significantly negative effect on Dutch-Russian political relations. But the economic importance of Russia for the Netherlands, not least in the energy sector, has made it difficult for the government to take a consistently hard line on Ukraine.

8The Russian view of these relationships as ‘special’ and ‘a resource for advancing Russia’s national interests,’ and the fact that EU member states with privileged access to Russia were in most cases very happy to reciprocate the special treatment they received, has hampered the EU’s ability to pursue a strong common policy. It made it also difficult for the EU to exert pressure on Russia regarding human rights violations, problems with judicial practices and to address discriminatory Russian trade practices more effectively (as many member states chose to settle these bilaterally). [7] It is certainly no coincidence that the countries that have most frequently been blamed for the EU’s inability to punch its weight in relations with Russia include Germany, France, Italy and Greece. Their support for a ‘softer’ EU policy on Russia used to be attributed to their ‘special’ bilateral relations.

Special relations as a driving force for the EU-Russian ‘partnership’

9However, rather than just being a hinder to the EU’s relations with Russia, the countries that were considered special partners of Russia played also a productive role in the development of the EU’s Russia policy. At key junctures in the evolution of the EU-Russian relationship, and often together with France, Germany set the tone and agenda of EU initiatives towards Russia. [8] This concerned in particular trade and political cooperation in the form of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement adopted in 1994 (in force since 1997) where even the UK played a crucial role, but also the Common Strategy on Russia that was developed and launched in 1999 under Germany’s EU Presidency. [9] The Northern Dimension, a regional initiative to address problems in the Baltic Sea and in particular soft security issues in Russia’s North West was launched under the Finnish EU Presidency in the second half of 1999. France under its Presidency in 2000 gave then, in turn, impetus to EU-Russian cooperation in the security sector and initiated an EU-Russian energy dialogue. It was also France and Germany, together with Greece, who were the driving forces behind the Four Common Spaces initiative that was designed to develop the EU’s relations with Russia in parallel with the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) that Russia had opted out of.

10Despite all of these efforts, a comprehensive review of EU-Russian relations that was presented by the European Commission and the Council in February 2004 was pessimistic; it described the EU’s many failings and lack of progress in areas of crucial importance to the EU. [10] After the EU’s Eastern enlargement, the EU-Russian relationship continued largely as ‘business as usual,’ due partly to the fact that problematic issues concerning the new member states had been addressed in a joint EU-Russia statement ahead of 1 May. [11] Attention focused instead on the Common Spaces initiative and development of the four ‘roadmaps’ [12], promoted in particular by the large member states. [13] The Common Spaces roadmaps were adopted in 2005, including a Common Economic Space. Subsequently, efforts concentrated on completing negotiations for Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which depended principally on Russia’s willingness to complete the necessary final steps.

11In addition, it was decided to launch negotiations for a comprehensive New EU-Russia agreement to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Negotiations started in summer 2008, but were briefly interrupted in response to the Georgian-Russian War in August 2008 that resulted in another comprehensive internal review of the EU-Russian relationship that sketched—again—a bleak picture of the progress made by the EU since 2004. [14] As a way of reinvigorating the EU-Russian relationship, a Partnership for Modernization was launched in 2010. It grew out of a German-Russian agreement but other member states were quick to conclude their own Modernization Partnership agreements with Russia under this new EU umbrella. 2010 saw also the German-Russian Meseberg initiative, to develop cooperation with Russia on civil and military crisis management operations—an important Russian interest.

12A new phase in the EU-Russian relationship seemed to have started with the conclusion of Russia’s WTO accession treaty in December 2011 and Russia’s accession to the WTO (August 2012) but even the adoption, also in December 2011, of Common Steps towards short-term visa-free travel, an important Russian interest. [15] In March 2013, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso argued that the EU-Russian partnership should be regarded not just as a partnership of necessity, but as a partnership of choice and in June 2013 he emphasized that Russia is “a strategic partner with whom we have been building a solid and mutually beneficial relationship”. [16] The thought that Russia might build on its experience from the war against Georgia, and go as far as to invade Ukraine, did not cross any decision-maker’s mind.

Russian actions as a trigger for greater EU unity

13An increasing number of incidents and the deterioration of some member states’ bilateral relations with Russia started to affect the EU after the EU’s eastward enlargement. Many of the disputes with Russia involved the Northern, Central and Eastern European states: Russia’s import embargo against Polish meat on the grounds of Sanitary and Phytonsanitary (SPS) issues, the interruption of oil supplies to Latvian port Ventspils [17] and, following Estonia’s decision to relocate a Soviet monument (the Bronze soldier) in Tallinn, disruptions caused by Russian cyber attacks on the Estonian government and banking servers, attacks on the Estonian and Swedish Ambassadors in Moscow as well as the harassment of the UK Ambassador which, together with the riots in Tallinn was attributed to the Kremlin-friendly Russian youth group Nashi. [18] In addition, Sweden and Finland were affected by a Russian decision to significantly raise export taxes on timber with a damaging effect on national paper industries. But even Germany’s Lufthansa was briefly embroiled in a dispute with Russia concerning overflight rights across Siberia. [19] The poisoning of Alexandr Litvinenko in central London at a meeting with two former Russian KGB-agents, Andrei Lugovoy and Dmitri Kovtun, [20] indicated that these bilateral problems with Russia were more than just ‘grievances’ of the smaller member states in Russia’s proximity, and they contributed to a better understanding of Russia as a potentially troublesome partner.

14These diverse bilateral disputes did not result in a convergence of member states’ assessments of Russia, nor did the many different incidents, despite their severity, have any accumulating effect on the EU’s approach to Russia. Engagement with Russia with the aim of developing closer cooperation in many different sectors remained the EU’s goal. However, at the EU-Russia Summit in May 2007, representatives of the EU for the first time voiced publicly their concerns about Russia’s treatment of EU member states, acknowledging that not all is well in the relationship. This perception was reinforced by the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008. Although the war did not directly affect the EU’s member states, it nevertheless had an impact on the EU’s internal unity in that Russia’s traditional special cooperation partners joined the traditionally more critical member states in condemning Russia’s role in the conflict. The French President Nicolas Sarkozy in his capacity as EU President took a clear stance, and the other member states rallied around the immediate freezing of negotiations for the new EU-Russia agreement that had just been launched. But shortly after the ceasefire was implemented, a re-engagement with Russia was pursued under the French leadership, and negotiations were re-launched. [21]

15Another important focusing event for EU member states’ assessment of Russia and also a catalyst for the gradual development of a more concerted EU response was the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute which escalated as Russian Gazprom cut off entirely the supplies of natural gas to Ukraine in January 2009. The cut-off affected quite a number of EU member states that receive their natural gas from Russia via the transit country Ukraine. But national governments drew different conclusions from the supply crisis. Despite strong protests by Poland and the Baltic States, the construction of Nord Stream, a German-Russian natural gas pipeline across the Baltic Sea that circumvents any transit states and delivers Russian gas to the most important buyer, started in 2010 and was completed in 2011-12. [22] Meanwhile, the EU-Russian relationship was also characterized by continuing struggles over Russia’s non-implementation of economic and legal reforms, required as a consequence of its WTO accession. As a result, in 2013, the European Commission filed a first case against Russia at the WTO for investigation. [23]

16In parallel with the rising tensions between the EU and Russia over the Euro maidan protests in Kiev from late 2013 onwards, a significant trade dispute erupted in early 2014 over Russia’s import embargo against EU pork meat as isolated cases of African swine fever were detected at the Lithuanian and Polish border with Belarus. [24] Partly as a consequence of the long-standing struggles with Russia over an ever growing number of trade disputes, the European Commission—with the full support of the member states—referred several more trade disputes with Russia to the WTO. [25] That one of the cases concerned Italy and Germany, whereas another case concerned specifically Poland and Lithuania [26] indicated that the previously pronounced differences between the member states and how they resolved bilateral problems with Russia, were decreasing. This was certainly also due to the European Commission’s push for a more unified approach in dealing with Russian breaches of common rules. On the other hand, the awareness had certainly increased that their individual problems with Russia were part of a more systematic rule infringement by the Russian authorities, and that these, as such, could better be tackled by the EU than individually, at the bilateral level.

The annexation of Crimea as the final unifying straw

17Russia’s strong opposition to the EU’s engagement with Ukraine in the framework of the Eastern Partnership association process and Russia’s pre-meditated annexation of Crimea (22 February-16 March 2014) caused a rupture in the EU-Russian relationship. [27] But it also acted as a catalyst for greater unity among the EU’s twenty-eight members. All were in agreement that the annexation was completely inacceptable and that the EU should react with measures that went beyond the usual diplomatic statements expressing ‘deep concern.’ Long-standing critics of the EU’s Russia policy were surprised at the unity demonstrated by the member states as targeted sanctions were adopted in close succession, and the EU’s initial response on 6 March 2014 to the Russian Federation Council’s authorization of the use of force on the territory of Ukraine was scaled up in response to the annexation of Crimea (17 March 2014, 21 March 2014, 14 April 2014, 28 April 2014, 12 May 2014, 11 July 2014). [28] In parallel, the German Chancellor and German Foreign Minister took the lead in the EU’s diplomatic efforts towards Russia, supported by their French and Polish colleagues. [29] But neither the diplomatic efforts, nor the targeted measures bore any fruit.

18In the absence of any positive change from the Russian side, calls from the Central and Eastern European states for more powerful sanctions increased. Russia’s traditional partners in the EU were however keen to avoid a further escalation in their relations with Russia. This did not mean that cracks were appearing in the EU’s unified front, but it became clear that ‘diplomatic caution’ would prevail in the EU and that Russia’s violations of Ukraine’s integrity were, contrary to the EU’s rhetoric and facts on the ground, not severe enough for all EU countries to endorse a harder approach. The lack of any noticeable change in Russian behaviour and the persistent distortion of the facts (in line with maskirovka), increased however the readiness of those governments that both doubted the utility and feared the costs of additional sanctions of the need to adopt additional measures against Russia. When the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 was shot down over Donetsk, Eastern Ukraine on 18 July 2014, the EU’s member states agreed more wide-ranging and more hard-hitting political and economic sanctions (adopted on 31 July 2014). [30] That the downing of MH17 had killed many Dutch citizens increased also the willingness of the Netherlands to support addition sanctions, despite the risk of being hit hard by a Russian retaliatory embargo. [31] And indeed, a few days later a Russian import embargo was imposed by Federal Decree on EU food and agricultural products. It had, as feared, a noticeable effect in a number of member states that were still struggling in the aftermath of the financial crisis. [32] In early September, another set of sanctions against Russia was adopted and implemented, despite the conclusion of a Russian-Ukrainian ceasefire accord a few days earlier (Minsk I), in order to put pressure on the warring parties to fulfill their commitments. [33] New sanctions were added to the existing packages in early February 2015, as the attacks on Ukrainian territory escalated again, but their entry into force was deliberately delayed (from 9 until 16 February 2015) in order to provide flexibility for the German-French brokering efforts for a second ceasefire agreement (Minsk II, 11 February 2015).

19A particular driver of EU unity was the willingness of the German and French governments to risk their special relationships with Russia as they lent unequivocal political support to restrictive measures against Russia. A strong signal was also that the French government suspended the delivery to Russia of the first of two Mistral amphibious assault ships, despite the considerable potential costs associated with the non-delivery. [34] But at each step of the sanctions debate, concerns were voiced about their detrimental and uneven effects on national industries and the lack of any tangible result on the ground in Ukraine. It also became clear that disagreements among the member states remained about how far the EU’s restrictive measures should go, specifically how much harm they were prepared to inflict on the Russian economy, considering the risks associated with more punitive measures, and even the extent of the costs national governments were prepared to inflict on their own country. Despite strong misgivings and few, if any, signs of a positive change, many national governments continued to pursue political relations with Russia, including the negotiation of new contracts (albeit in a more restrained form than before).

20When also the second, EU-brokered ceasefire agreement (Minsk II) did not bring about a significant change, and Russia’s hybrid warfare against Ukraine and other neighbours continued, disagreements about the appropriateness and effectiveness of the EU’s measures against Russia increased. But it became increasingly evident that some of the ‘internal divisions’ that emerged in the EU were actively fostered and even engineered by Russian officials and by Russia’s state-controlled news media (especially Tass, Sputnik and RT). This was particularly significant since Russia’s important cooperation partners—first and foremost Germany, but also France and the UK—no longer regarded Russia as a trustworthy political and trade partner. [35] In response, the tried-and-tested Russian tactic of driving a wedge between the member states included both a strategy of providing tangible incentives and rewards to those governments ready to pursue cooperation with Russia bilaterally, and a strategy of intimidation and discrediting of the other governments, designed to stop more outspoken critics in the EU and force them to tone down their criticism of Russia’s multiple violations of international law.

21A group of member states, among them also Hungary, Cyprus, Italy and Greece, received increasingly positive attention by Russia, with a state visit by President Putin to Budapest in February 2015, [36] a state visit of Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi in Moscow in early March 2015, at President Putin’s invitation, [37] and a state visit by Cypriot President Anastasiadis to Russia. [38] On these occasions, the Russian President offered to strengthen, inter alia, energy and trade relations with these countries but he also pledged to help these member states to get back on their feet in the aftermath of the financial crisis that had hit them very hard. In addition, Russia declared its readiness to look into the ‘possibility of lifting the embargo on food and agricultural products’ for just Greece, Hungary and Cyprus, but none of the other EU member states (reported in state-controlled Russian media on 11 March 2015). [39] That these states are the ‘weaker links’ in the EU—in view of their economic struggles (since the financial crisis hit them hard) and their long-standing trade relations with Russia—is significant to understand, as this is part of the broader Russian strategy towards the EU.

22Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, among many others, reported in contrast numerous incidents of Russian misinformation and destabilization campaigns against them. [40] Estonia worked also hard to ‘back up’ all digital content relevant to state security and stability and normal functioning of the government in order to increase its resilience in the event of further cyberattacks. [41] Even Sweden became subject to an unending series of aggressive negative smear campaigns by the Russian government and state-controlled Russian news media which included a ridiculing of Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt on RT and even a ridiculing of Sweden’s Armed Forces after the intrusion of a (suspected Russian) submarine in Swedish territorial waters, near the capital Stockholm. [42]

23However, these numerous negative and positive symbolic acts and Russian divide-and-rule tactics were not able to break the EU’s resolve concerning the sanctions. Rather, it increased the awareness in the EU that a return to ‘business as usual’ was not an option. When the first renewal of sanctions from 2014 came up, none of the states that Russia had targeted vetoed the decisions, and the twenty-eight states agreed unanimously to prolong the duration of the sanctions by another half year, until September 2015. [43] But whereas Russia’s aggression against its Western neighbours united EU member states in their response, in spite of the uneven spread of costs for them, it also became clear that the EU had no real influence over Russia, as nothing much changed in Russia’s actions and rhetoric towards Ukraine.

EU unity—the ‘wrong end of the stick’

24The most prominent argument about the EU’s many failures regarding Russia is that divisions among the member states undermine the EU’s credibility, bargaining position and effectiveness. If the member states just managed to speak with one voice, the EU’s policy towards Russia would be much more effective. Arguably, much EU unity has been achieved as a result of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Germany’s strong leadership and the willingness of Chancellor Merkel to take decisions that are costly to Germany, but necessary for the EU, helped unite the twenty-eight member states behind the policy of restrictive measures towards Russia. However, with the benefit of hindsight, developments in 2014 give a clear indication that EU unity is only one factor and internal divisions do not explain the EU’s failure to anticipate and address the fundamental crisis in its ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia. Greater EU unity, in and of itself, will not significantly affect what Russia does in the shared neighbourhood, nor will it fundamentally change Russia’s approach to the EU and how Russia deals with the different member states. [44]

The EU’s inbuilt weaknesses

25The EU’s failures can be attributed to its special structure, composition and nature which is neither conducive to quick decision-making nor to the adoption and pursuit of fast and powerful responses. The Russian President has central control over the Russian state apparatus, its intelligence services and key economic actors and he has the capacity and willingness to quickly take decisions and implement them. This places the EU, as a different kind of actor, in a difficult position. The EU’s member states could be blamed for not having empowered the EU to become a federal state with strong military capability, for not having appointed a real EU Commander in Chief, and for not having provided the High Representative for Foreign and Security policy with a strong European intelligence service, copious resources, long-term strategic planning capabilities and real rapid reaction capacity, that is, first and foremost, a political readiness to take decisions and implement them quickly, in a matter of hours, rather than days or weeks.

26Six EU member states, including Sweden, located in the proximity of the Russian exclave Kaliningrad, and Russia’s direct neighbour Finland, are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). What is more, NATO includes non-EU members and states that have different interests and relations with Russia. This fact (and a number of other unresolved issues) prevents a more effective coordination between NATO and the EU regarding Russia. There are many good (and many lamentable) reasons for why the EU’s member states are not willing to empower the EU to become a strong federal state actor, and why the High Representative has neither the powers nor the resources of a Commander in Chief. That the EU’s capacity in foreign and security policy has remained weak is however only a partial explanation for why the EU’s relations with Russia have gone so very wrong. Another reason is the effectiveness of Russia’s strategy of maskirovka—the art of deception—which characterizes Russia’s diplomatic relations and its public diplomacy. The EU requires therefore, in addition to greater resources and more efficient and effective structures, a much greater knowledge of Russian intentions and a better understanding of the logic of action to engage more successfully with Russia.

Lacking intelligence, or disregarding expertise on Russia?

27The EU learned the hard way that it apparently drew the wrong conclusions about Russia, its trust in the EU and the power of ‘Europeanization’ through cooperation and integration. Explanations provided in a much-cited British House of Lords report on the UK’s and EU’s relations with Russia, suggested that the failure to correctly predict and assess Russian actions regarding Ukraine stems from the downgrading of British intelligence operations in Russia since the end of the Cold War. [45] It is a credible claim that the downgrading of national intelligence services’ operations in Russia had a negative impact also on the EU’s capacity to correctly understand and effectively respond to Russian developments and actions. A fundamental challenge limiting the capacity of the EU to assess and effectively react to developments in Russia is arguably the extent to which national intelligence from the twenty-eight member states is shared with the EU institutions, and between the member states. As national governments still guard much of their sensitive intelligence for reasons of national security, it is reasonable to assume that the EU institutions were lacking some of the ‘bigger picture,’ despite the regular consultations that were taking place on Russia in the Council working groups and at higher political levels.

28Another contributing factor is arguably the limited extent to which assessments of Russia by the direct neighbours (Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) fed into the EU’s evaluation of Russia as a cooperation partner. The 1995 enlargement and the eastward enlargement (2004 and 2007) brought states into the EU that had experienced a rather different kind of relationship with Russia. They did not share the ‘old’ member states’ more positive assessment of Russian domestic and foreign policy developments in the post-Cold War era. [46] Indeed, many officials from the Central and East European member states argued for greater caution in the EU’s engagement with Russia and explained, based on their own experiences, that trade and energy were being used by the Russian government as a pressure tool and that Russian actions, not words, should guide the EU’s assessment of cooperation with Russia in different sectors and on different issues. [47]

29Whereas decision-makers in the ‘old’ EU member states held a profound belief in President Putin’s willingness to turn Russia into an open, liberal Western democracy, and whereas they believed in his professed commitment to cooperation and integration with the EU, the conclusions drawn by Russia’s direct geographic neighbours were—in accordance with their own historical experience—much more pessimistic, but (in hindsight) also more accurate. [48] However, since the experiences of Russia’s privileged partners—Germany, France and Italy, in particular—did not match those of the Central and East European states, and since the difficult relations of the latter countries with Russia could be attributed also to unresolved bilateral issues with Russia, greater emphasis was placed on the established views and EU policy line. Another reason for the predominance of a skewed view of the actual developments in Russia are the asymmetric power relations which impact both the member states in the EU and their position vis-à-vis Russia. When more credence is given to the views of the larger member states who are strong and desirable cooperation partners for Russia, and whose experience of dealing with Russia is consequently very positive, the EU’s assessment of Russia is necessarily biased, and does not reflect the complete story. In this sense, the EU’s problem has been less one of disunity and more of not listening sufficiently to the voices of the smaller, more exposed member states.

The failed Europeanization of Russia

30The EU’s failure to both anticipate and respond effectively to the Russian government’s domestic and foreign policy, has its roots arguably in the conclusions that were drawn by Western actors from the two World Wars; in particular their belief in the transformative power of close cooperation, and specifically the development of the European integration project. Russian domestic developments were closely watched and reform efforts were supported by EU member states, representatives from EU institutions as well as national industries over a twenty-five year period. They all had been in regular contact with their Russian counterparts in different forums, at the political and at the working level, including civil society exchanges. But none of these contacts and institutionalized cooperation structures made a real difference. Why were the common rules and trust-building efforts not able to ‘Europeanize’ Russia and change how Russian elites view the EU? [49]

31One of the problems is that the EU’s assessment of the relationship was based on a scenario that assumes that there is a level playing field, which there never was. The highly asymmetric nature of their relationship fuelled suspicions and resentment in Russia, especially against the EU’s acquis communautaire. That Russia would need to adjust and align (some of) its own legislation to that of the EU in order to gain full access to the EU’s markets, but not vice-versa, is strongly resented. Mistrust of the EU—and just about any national and international actor—is also deeply ingrained in the way in which Russian decision-makers engage with their European counterparts. This has less to do with EU member states’ foreign policy choices than it has to do with the nature of the EU as a post-war integration project designed to prevent war through the functionalist logic of cooperation.

32The conviction that close cooperation will necessarily generate deep and lasting trust and a level of interdependence that will make military conflict impossible became so entrenched in the EU, that the possibility that cooperation could lead to conflict was no longer considered as a possible or credible alternative scenario. However, cooperation does not make international actors immune to conflict if they do not share the same long-term goals and do not share an understanding of the value of cooperation. Actors in the EU assumed, in good faith, that Russian policy-makers share their own assessment and put great trust in their relationship with Russia, while the Russian government, meanwhile utilized its relationship with the EU instrumentally, opting for cooperation when it appeared opportune, and disregarding past agreements, when they constrained Russia’s freedom of manœuvre or harmed Russian interests.

33In addition, we cannot disregard the fact that any actor, even the EU, is limited in its ability to control another international actor’s domestic processes and external actions. There is no guarantee that a smarter, more effective and better endowed actor than the EU would have been more successful in dealing with contemporary Russia. The external environment, alternative cooperation and trade partners and markets for Russia can only be influenced, but not controlled by the EU. In the absence of full control over all other variables, the EU and its member states cannot really be held responsible for the whole chain of events that was unleashed in 2013. Under different circumstances, things might well have turned out differently.

The fear of (nuclear) war

34An even more fundamental problem is that of the shadow of history and the fear of a major (nuclear) war that has affected Europe ever since the end of the Second World War. It has characterized the EU’s approach of doing everything possible to avoid a military confrontation. The emphasis placed on the argument that ‘there is no military solution’ to the Ukrainian-Russian war stems from the understanding that Russia is a nuclear power, and that a war with Russia would consequently end badly for everyone involved. That a military confrontation is a possibility—at least in theory—cannot be denied. And that the diplomatic route, combined with targeted sanctions as a pressure tool, is the only conceivable alternative for the EU, as EU High Representative Federica Mogherini indicated at the start of her term in office, [50] and which German Chancellor Merkel and others repeatedly underlined, is understandable since it is arguably also the only option that the EU has, in view of its (somewhat limited) capabilities.

35The struggle in the EU between vocal supporters of helping Ukraine increase its defensive capacity and those insisting that only a political agreement can create the preconditions for durable peace and stability in Ukraine, is linked on the one hand to the practical problem of the radical reduction of EU member states’ military capabilities since the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, it is related to the fear of triggering a major war in Europe. The assumption is that arming Ukraine and supporting Ukraine militarily would provoke a powerful military reaction from Russia, which must be avoided at all cost. [51] However, there is no guarantee that diplomatic tools and sanctions against Russia will deliver the desired outcomes. Haukkala, in his assessment of past developments in EU-Russia relations, argued that Russia’s weakness actually gave it considerable power vis-à-vis the EU. [52] Indeed, the fear of pressurizing Russia too much and alienating Russian decision-makers, as well as the fear of Russia’s economic and political collapse, has been ever present in the minds of EU decision-makers. Gentle pressure and dialogue rather than force was therefore the preferred means of engagement, and repeatedly advocated by leading politicians. [53]

36The ‘shadow of the past’ sets clear limits to the EU’s willingness to apply coercive pressure on Russia, further motivated by an awareness of the likely effects a major Russian domestic crisis would have on stability on the European continent. [54] But whereas the EU’s ultimate aim is that of establishing a mutually beneficial strategic partnership with Russia, President Putin’s declared aim is to defend Russian interests, with all possible means and at all cost, and to re-instate Russia as a great power on the world stage. [55] Under these circumstances, the EU’s diplomatic approach is insufficient to re-establish a peaceful order in Europe, even with the twenty-eight member states’ full support.

37On a practical level, the EU’s vulnerability to military threats provides an additional explanation. The general move in Europe, and particularly in the European Union, of prioritizing social welfare and prosperity at the expense of military capabilities has created new vulnerabilities. The underinvestment and downgrading of their Armed Forces is a common problem in virtually all of the EU’s member states, although to varying degrees. The fact that EU member states are no longer ‘armed to their teeth’ to defend their territorial borders, has created an environment in which trust has been fostered through the regular and close cooperation in the EU, to such an extent that national governments can assume that their conflicts with neighbours can be addressed by non-military means. On the assumption that it would be irrational to engage in war with a close trade and political partner, as it would be very costly in the short and long term, investing in trade and limiting military expenditure to an absolute minimum is certainly a sensible decision when the state is surrounded by cooperation partners that have made a similar assessment and limited their own military spending. But that was not the case with Russia.

38The EU’s assumption that Russia has ‘nothing to win’ with aggression against the EU (or any of its member states) since it is its closest trade and cooperation partner, was a legitimate view given the EU’s own post-war development, and the shared experience of two major wars. But it assumed flawed premises, namely that Russian decision-makers had drawn the same conclusions from their shared historical experience, which was certainly not a given, considering historical experiences. After the turn of the century, it became increasingly obvious that cooperation with Russia did not preclude the possibility of renewed military aggression, at least not from the Russian perspective. Decision-makers in the EU assumed that Russian decision-makers would share their understanding of the ‘new European order’ and take the EU’s commitment to peace and security face value. They also assumed that Russian decision-makers would act in a spirit of solidarity and cooperation towards the neighbours, simply because it is the ‘right,’ and ‘logical’ thing to do—from the EU’s point of view. But clearly, this logic of action, and the understanding of the (assumed) positive implications of cooperation and integration was not shared by key Russian decision-makers.

Concluding remarks

39As this article has argued, it is a fallacy to assume that the EU’s internal divisions are the decisive factor in its relations with Russia. A more nuanced assessment of national foreign policy choices and their effects is necessary. The approach towards Russia that governs the EU’s and different member states’ engagement with Russia, and the political and practical difficulties associated with the EU’s nature as a special kind of international actor, help explain why and how the EU-Russian relationship hit ‘rock bottom’ in a way that many policy-makers in the EU did not anticipate. What is more, the global financial crisis and the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, in addition to the rise of extreme parties and the renewed threat of populism in Europe, drew attention away from threats in the European neighbourhood. National governments were required to address a multitude of domestic challenges and global threats at the same time, and the challenges posed by Russia did not stand out as particularly threatening, among the many other critical developments that posed a more obvious threat to the EU.

40More fundamentally, Russia’s view of the EU and of how international relations are conducted, and the regional and global geopolitical conditions, help explain why the EU’s approach of engagement and close cooperation with Russia did not yield the desired results. Finally, what the article sought to illustrate, is that EU unity as such is not sufficient for the EU to have any effect on Russia, nor on Russian actions towards its neighbours. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linkevičius described the challenge as follows: “We need to be united, but our unity must yield results and not become a unity without actions, which is disastrous for Ukraine and European security.” [56]