1The global freshwater resources amount to approximately 1,4 billion cubic metres. Only about 2.5 per cent of this water is sweet and drinkable ; moreover, the majority of these 2.5 per cent are difficult or impossible to reach. 69 per cent of the global sweet water resources are bound in glaciers and perpetual ice ; about 30 per cent are subterranean resources. Only about 0.3 per cent can be accessed relatively easily in lakes and rivers. The remaining 0.7 per cent consists of soil humidity, basal ice, permafrost and everglades.

2Water consumption is continually increasing worldwide. Population growth, industrialisation, growing overuse and pollution as well as the consequences of global warming result in a constantly increasing pressure on the global water resources : The list of regions which are suffering from insufficient water supply is growing steadily. [1] At the same time, water is essential for the maintenance and development of every national economy, and thus for the overall standard of living. If the access to water is limited, for instance through overuse, pollution, or for political reasons, the societal standard of living may decline sharply, leading to considerable inner-societal tensions. These tensions are articulated in allocation conflicts between, for instance, agriculture and industry, urban and rural populace, or between different ethnic groups. The degree of these tensions, the political constitution of a state and the particular climatic and hydrological conditions of a region influence the degree to which such water conflicts are prone to the use of violence.

Water and violent conflict

3The question of conflict escalation has been thoroughly researched with regard to international river basins, which cover approximately half of the earth’s surface and accommodate 40 per cent of the world’s population. Forecasts predict that such international watersheds will give rise to increased controversies in the coming years, since the riparians often disagree on water allocations. The ensuing water conflicts generally involve numerous actors with differing, often vital, interests. Their causes differ structurally and can be categorised according to territorial, economic, military, demographic and comparable determining factors ; their course depends on the sociocultural context and the capacities of the stakeholders involved.

4The risk for conflict is commonly considered especially high in international watersheds that are located in areas in which the political atmosphere is dominated by confrontation rather than cooperation, like the Middle East. Since in such a political climate, economic independence and self-sufficiency are usually perceived to be key to national security and regarded as a means to reduce a state’s dependence on hostile neighbours to an absolute minimum, the logical conclusion seems to be that opposing claims to shared water resources by different states result in a zero-sum game which potentially leads to violent international conflict. This is not, however, backed by scientific evidence.

The ‘water war’ myth

5It is a common and often-expressed assumption that “the next war in the Middle East will be about water” (contended, for instance, by former UN general secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali). The neo-malthusian [2] reasoning behind this supposition—growing population plus scarce and decreasing water resources equals violent conflict over water—has proven both exceptionally powerful and empirically untenable. It is one of the fundamental findings of the academic studies on the topic of ‘water—conflict or cooperation’ of the last thirty years that international water wars and ensuing global repercussions are not to be expected : “International wars about renewable resources like water are not very likely, since the utilisation of renewable resources can neither easily nor quickly be converted into power.” [3] Wendy Barnaby recently contended in an essay in Nature that “countries do not go to war over water, they solve their water shortages through trade and international agreements.” [4] Barnaby’s explanation is that global trade in “virtual water”—the water embedded in food products—allows arid countries like those in the Middle East to meet their water requirements without resorting to conflict. And Avraham Tamir wrote as early as 1988 : “Why go to war over water ? For the price of a weeks fighting, you could build five desalination plants. No loss of life, no internal pressure, and a reliable supply you don’t have to defend in hostile territory.” [5]

6These statements are backed up with ample evidence. The “International Freshwater Treaties Database” [6] of Oregon State University lists more than 400 water agreements, among them more than one hundred post-1945. Of 1,831 documented interactions between river adversaries, the large majority, namely 1,228, were cooperative. [7] In addition, water agreements tend to be very durable : Even military conflicts often cannot harm them. One illustration of this is the agreement between India and Pakistan on the Indus, which has survived numerous, in part violent, disputes between the two parties.

No water wars, no problem ?

7Does this mean that water and conflict are unrelated ? By no means. Water-related conflicts are causing suffering throughout the world. To name only a few examples : Southern Iraqi farmers are being forced into overcrowded urban centres, as multiple dams on the Tigris River within Iraq, Syria, and Turkey reduce the river flows to the ebb and tide of Gulf seawater. [8] Syrian farmers both from the Dar’a and the Hama areas have lost their livelihoods due to an on-going drought which has reduced the amount of arable land through desertification and put enormous pressure on the already scarce natural water resources. [9] The drought contributed to a rural exodus, which, with large numbers of unemployed farmers flowing into urban centres, might even have been a factor in the current political unrest in Syria. In the Palestinian territories, Palestinian farmers barely survive based on highly variable rain-fed farming, while industrial farms run by Israeli settlers in their direct neighbourhood receive state-subsidized irrigation water.

8Arguably, the wide-spread preoccupation with whether an outright war (i.e., military conflict) between nations will erupt over water has overshadowed the much more pressing issues which are connected to decreasing water resources and growing water scarcity. While the risk for water conflict has proven to be rather low between states—the mechanisms of diplomacy and negotiation are rather well developed and efficient in reducing the risk of conflict—, on the sub-state level, water-related disputes have become rather common. After all, water is still finite, and with increasing demands, competition for water is continuously intensifying between farms and cities, states and provinces, ethnic groups, and economic interests. The escalation of these tensions poses a much greater threat of civil unrest, humanitarian crises, and loss of life than do international wars over water. Consequently, the most urgent questions today are whether the risks of such conflicts are growing, and how we can both reduce the risks leading to such conflicts and resolve those that have already erupted.

9The following article first outlines the different theoretical approaches to environmental (water) conflicts. It then illustrates the differences between and complexity of water conflicts by analysing the two most prominent examples for international water conflicts in the Middle East : the Jordan and the Euphrates-Tigris basins. It will show that while an international ‘water war’ between the riparians in the two basins is unlikely, the issue of water allocation conflicts still poses one of the fundamental challenges to the local actors and needs to be addressed effectively. Finally, necessary steps to be taken in order to prevent future water conflicts and protect the global water resources in the long term are outlined.

State of the art

10The theoretical and methodological works of environmental conflict research can be divided into four consecutive generations. [10] The first generation developed based on new findings about the consequences of environmental degradation. Its main representatives are Mathews (1989), Myers (1993), Kaplan (1994), Connelly and Kennedy (1994) as well as Westing, who stood for a selective, but nevertheless powerful relation between politics and the academic sphere. This first generation focused on the question whether and if yes, how environmental issues could be included in security studies. It coined the term ‘ecological security’ (as denoting the conflictive relationship between underdevelopment, environmental problems, growing poverty and security-threatening military tensions.

11This outlook was challenged early on by critics who considered such a ‘national’ interpretation of the thus expanded term ‘security’ to be misleading : Environmental problems cannot be solved by single states, since they are not spatially or socially limited, but global phenomena. The second generation primarily criticised the first generation’s lack of empirical proof for the relevance of the concept of ‘ecological security’. This second generation’s critique is part of the still continuing debate about disadvantages and benefits of the so-called ‘broadening of security’. [11]

12The researchers of the second generation implemented large empirical studies ; main representatives are the Toronto Group around Thomas Homer-Dixon as well as the Environment and Conflicts Project (ENCOP) at ETH Zürich around Günther Bächler, who were characterised by their focus on specific conflicts and renewable resources like water. In addition to this, the 1990s saw the creation of the Global Environmental Change and Human Security Project (GECHS) at the Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington D.C. By means of process tracing [12] based on ex-post-analyses, its goal was to define the relevant independent (ecological scarcity), intervening (social effects) and dependent (conflict) variables in the hypothesised causal chain between environmental degradation and conflict. Based on this methodological framework, large case studies, mainly in developing countries, were implemented. From them, different research groups developed conflict typologies [13] in a quest to define the circumstances that lead from resource scarcity to conflict. This causality in itself, however, was not questioned. In addition, the second generation developed the concepts of environmental scarcity and environmental discrimination.

13The researchers of this generation were accused of neo-malthusianism, since the global population growth played a key role in their analyses of resource scarcity and conflicts. They highlighted that ecological scarcity were inevitable due to the growing world population. This would lead to migration and poverty, which again would result in violent conflict.

14The one-dimensional causality of this scarcity argument was criticised by the third generation of environmental conflict researchers. The ‘cornucopians’ broadened the analysis by introducing more independent variables as well as cases of peaceful resolution of resource conflicts and emphasised that environmental and resource conflicts usually have more than one cause. The agents of this approach, like Aaron T. Wolf from Oregon State University and Nils Petter Gleditsch of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), assume that there is enough water on earth ; the problem is mainly water utilisation and governance. [14] Consequently, agriculture and related irrigation techniques are considered a key problem. According to this approach, water is only one issue of many ; there is no automatism between water scarcity and conflict.

15This third generation introduced new ecological and sociopolitical variables in their control studies, integrated the transnational dimension of ecological scarcity and analysed case studies with large data collections quantitatively. On this basis, this generation painted a different and clearer picture of the geographical and diachronic frequency and distribution of water conflicts. It greatly innovated the empirical analysis of environmental conflicts, since it produced significant theoretical and methodological input. In addition, it connected environmental conflict research with the overall framework of peace and conflict studies. [15]

16The third generation did not, however, come up with a new model for the hypothesised causal relationship between resource scarcity and conflict or a well-founded explanation for the extreme endurance of water conflicts in areas where sufficient water resources or technical solutions are available—like the Jordan Basin.

17The last decade has seen the unfolding of a fourth generation of environmental conflict researchers, of which this text forms a part. It postulates—starting from the inability of its predecessors to answer central questions—the necessity of new approaches. For instance, the fourth generation criticises the hitherto dominant concentration on international resource conflicts to the disadvantage of acute violent sub-state conflicts over water. In addition, it points out that the concept of ‘scarcity’, which plays a role in most studies, remains ambiguous and at times even hinders the analysis of specific conflicts. Thomas Homer-Dixon alone identifies three types of scarcity : demand-induced, supply-induced and structural scarcity. The fourth generation therefore questions whether the term is useful at all, since scarcity is always relative : The concept would only be useful if and when the social constructedness of ‘wealth’ and ‘scarcity’ were finally taken into account, i.e. if the value given to a resource were understood to be a social rather than a natural process.

18Moreover, the current generation emphasises that environmental conflict research has been defined by differing normative positions, which have played a major role for the different approaches while remaining mostly implicit. An environmentally pessimistic view is opposed by an environmentally optimistic view. [16] The latter is based on a belief in practically unlimited technological progress and feasibility. This can, however, result in negative side effects in the practical dealing with developmental problems, especially with regard to water : hydro-politics which are based on an anthropocentric world view are prone to inconsistency and short-term decisions. Water is seen as a technical good that gains its value through its relation to food, agriculture and human settlements. When problems occur, the method of choice is usually to increase water availability (supply management). This approach, however, hinders an effective control of the long-term destruction of a resource, often resulting in growing scarcity and environmental degradation. [17]

19Moreover, there has been a tendency to apply natural scientific methods to social phenomena like conflicts in the environmental sector. [18] A large part of the relevant publications still wrongly assume that by defining a problem as environmental, one could achieve sustainable solutions through technical programmes. This is based on the assumption that contentious political issues could be degraded to administrative issues and then managed by highly qualified experts [19] without noticeable conflict. [20]

20Such a rationalisation of the approach to environmental conflict does not, however, lead to a rationalisation of the actual conflicts—on the contrary. While it is true that a more rational approach to resource conflicts generates growing (expert-) knowledge about the respective resource, the stakeholders involved etc., and thus seemingly aims at objectifying the situation, the broadening of cognitive knowledge always entails a broadening of narrative constructions. [21] Put differently : Instead of a more rational approach to nature, in this case to a natural resource, increasing ‘objective’ data engenders a process of emotionalisation, politicisation and securitisation [22] which entails new, competing constructions of nature. This leads to a competition between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ knowledge, between different constructions of reality, between that which is ‘sayable’ and that which is ‘unsayable’. This has yet, however, to be taken into account in conflict resolution efforts in the environmental sector.

21‘Objective knowledge’, compiled by experts, is the basis on which an agreement about future water needs, risks, potential conflicts etc. is built. In this context, Klaus Eder speaks of the social construction of nature, which refers to objective knowledge about nature. [23] He states that our perception of nature is always dependent on the limited knowledge we have at a specific point in time. Eder calls this ‘realistic knowledge’, which is also constructed : According to him, observations referring to the outer world are actively constructed as objective incidents. These observations, or ‘incidents’, are the material from which the social construction of nature is made up and embodied as knowledge. [24]

22This ‘constructivist turn’ in studies about environmental (water) conflicts has opened up new ways to look at the question why water remains an issue of conflict between long-standing adversaries even though there is no shortage of proposals to solve it. In Israel and Palestine, the final solution of the ‘water question’ has been postponed to the final status talks, and there is no sustainable solution of the water conflict in sight, regardless the benefits it may bring for all parties involved : The water resources in the Jordan basin would be sufficient for households and light industry of Israel, the Palestinian Territories and Jordan, if only they were managed differently. In the Euphrates-Tigris-basin, stakeholders are still a long way from a comprehensive agreement about water allocations, too. Uncovering the constructedness of seemingly objective data is one way of finding new ways out of such environmental conflicts.

The Jordan basin

23Due to its climate and geography as well as the region’s political situation, the Jordan basin is one of the most frequently cited examples for international water resources with the potential for conflict or even outright ‘water war’. It is one of 261 international rivers and river basins that are divided between two or more neighbouring states. Usable freshwater comes from the Jordan and its tributaries (directly : Hasbani and Banias in Syria, Dan in Israel, Yarmuk in Jordan ; indirectly : Litani in Lebanon), the Sea of Galilee and different aquifers (mainly the Mountain and Coastal aquifers, but also a number of less developed groundwater reservoirs). The regional climate is dry to semi-dry, with frequent droughts putting increasing pressure on the natural water resources. This relative natural scarcity is exacerbated by inefficient water use, relatively high population growth and growing industrialisation and urbanisation.

24The water issue between Israel and the Palestinians as well as between Israel and its other Arab neighbours (with the exception of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan) remains unresolved on the one hand because water is deeply related to other contentious issues like land, refugees, and political sovereignty. As a result, a sufficient supply with fresh water has become a security interest for all riparians and is being managed according to political and ideological goals rather than pragmatic considerations. On the other hand, water is often considered subordinate to what is perceived as ‘high’ politics, which results in cooperation in the water sector on a low technical level, but also hinders the central and ‘hard’questions of a joined water management of being addressed. As a result, water remains one of the issues in the Middle East conflict that have been postponed to the final status talks.

Conflict history

25The Jordan River flows between five riparians : Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, two of which rely on the basin as the primary water supply. [25] The initial issue of conflict was the equitable allocation of the annual flow of the Jordan watershed between its riparians—Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. For decades, the Palestinians were excluded from any negotiations due to their lack of state territory and representation. Due to its pre-eminence in the Arab world, Egypt was also included.

26In the early 1950s, several states announced unilateral plans for the Jordan watershed, even though at the time, little room remained for unilateral development without impacting on other riparian states. While the Arab states planned to exploit two northern tributaries of the Jordan (the Hasbani and the Banias), Israel published its “All Israel Plan”, which envisaged draining the Huleh Lake and swamps, diverting the upper Jordan River and constructing what would later be called the “National Water Carrier” to the coastal plain and the Negev Desert. Jordan planned to tap the Yarmuk in order to irrigate the East Ghor of the Jordan Valley.

27In reaction to this announcement, Israel closed an existing dam south of the Sea of Galilee and began draining the Huleh swamps, thereby infringing on the demilitarised zone with Syria. This resulted in border skirmishes between Israel and Syria which escalated over the summer of 1951.

28The conflict flared up again in 1953. In March, Jordan and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) signed an agreement to begin implementing the “Bunger Plan”, which envisaged two dams on Jordanian territory in order to open land for irrigation, to provide power to Syria and Jordan and to offer resettlement for 100,000 refugees. Three months later, Jordan and Syria agreed to share the Yarmuk, while Israel protested that its riparian rights were being ignored. In July, Israel began to work on its National Water Carrier in the demilitarized zone north of the Sea of Galilee. Syrian armed forces were then deployed along the border and artillery units opened fire on the construction sites. The ensuing UN resolution, which allowed Israel to resume work, was vetoed by the USSR. In consequence, Israel moved the construction sites away from the demilitarized zone. The Johnston negotiations, named after U.S. special envoy Eric Johnston, unsuccessfully attempted to mediate these water disputes in the mid-1950s.

29In the early 1960s, the competing water claims flared up again when Israel continued its work on the National Water Carrier, which diverts the Jordan river from the north of the Sea of Galilee to the Negev, while Syria did the same with regard to the Hasbani and Banias rivers. Violent clashes ensued in the years preceding the Six-Day-War. Due to the territorial gains that Israel achieved in its overwhelming victory over its adversaries in June 1967, approximately 80 per cent of the region’s water reservoirs have since been under Israeli control.

Map 1

Surface Water in Palestine

Surface Water in Palestine

30During the Oslo process of the 1990s, bilateral bodies (the so-called “Joint Water Committees”) were set up between Israel and Jordan and Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The latter continues to convene and cooperate regardless of the deadlocked political conflict surrounding it. The committee cooperates on a technical basis, however ; it does not touch upon the ‘hard’ issues like water rights. Still, a genuine ‘water war’ seems much less likely today than it had been in the 1960s, since desalination has become relatively affordable, thus rendering a war about water resources extremely uneconomical.

The Euphrates-Tigris-basin

40The Euphrates-Tigris-basin has been a reason for conflict between Turkey, Syria and Iraq for decades. The two rivers originate in Turkey ; from there, the Euphrates flows towards Syria, where it is met by the two tributaries Balikh and Khabur. With 3,000 kilometres, the Euphrates is the longest river of Western Asia, and flows through Turkey (1,230km), Syria (710km) and Iraq (1,060km). The Tigris-basin lies in Turkey (12%), Syria (0,2%), Iraq (54%) and Iran (34%). [29]

41For 39 kilometres before it flows into Iraq, the Tigris forms the border between Syria and Turkey. Close to Qurna in Iraq, Euphrates and Tigris meet to form the Shatt-al-Arab, which flows into the Persian Gulf. Before the two rivers’ confluence, the Euphrates flows for about 1,000km and the Tigris for about 1,300km within Iraq. The Karun River, originating in Iran, flows into the Shatt Al-Arab, adding to it a mean annual flow of 24.7km³ just before reaching the sea.

Map 2

Catchment areas of Euphrates and Tigris

Catchment areas of Euphrates and Tigris

42The average annual runoff of the Tigris is estimated at 21.33km³ as it enters Iraq, that of the Euphrates at 30km³, with a fluctuating annual value of between 10 and 40 km³. Unlike the Tigris, the Euphrates receives no tributaries during its passage through Iraq.

43About 90 per cent of the total annual flow of the Euphrates stem from Turkey, while the remaining 10 per cent originate in Syria. Very little is added in Iraq. Turkey also contributes 38 per cent directly to the main Tigris River and another 11 per cent to its tributaries. Most of the remainder of the Tigris water comes from three tributaries originating in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

44For Syria, the Euphrates is the most important water source (much more so than the Jordan headwaters in the Golan Heights), while Iraq mainly relies on Tigris water and possesses other, national water resources. Current estimates calculate 2,400m³ of water per person per year for Iraq, which means that with the exception of Turkey, Iraqis have more water available to them than their neighbours.

45In 2003, 87.9 per cent of Syria’s water allocations flowed into its agricultural sector, especially the large irrigation plants in the North. Compared to 1993, the total water withdrawal increased by almost 31 per cent. Agricultural water withdrawal followed the same trend but municipal and industrial withdrawal increased by 39 and 89 per cent respectively. [30] In Iraq, 79 per cent are utilised for agricultural purposes, 6.5 per cent for domestic supplies and 14.5 per cent for industrial use. [31]

Summary : What needs to be done

63The case studies outlined above have illustrated two things : Even in a very difficult political climate, international ‘water wars’ are very unlikely. Internal water conflicts, however, are acute issues which need to be resolved in order to avoid social unrest. These findings need to be taken into account when asking the question “Water : Reason for conflict or cooperation ?” It is high time for the international community to focus on internal, local water conflicts instead of concentrating all efforts on international water conflicts on the basis of the deceiving thesis of international ‘water wars’. As stated above, the most pressing questions today are not whether the next war in the Middle East will be about water, but whether the risks of water conflicts on the sub-state level are growing, and if yes, how we can both reduce the risks leading to such conflicts and resolve those that have already erupted.

64With global warming well under way, a blatant lack of comprehensive and efficient water management in places which are already suffering from water stress, as well as with a global water use which has been growing at more than twice the rate of the population increase in the last century, it is to be expected that although there is no global water scarcity as such, an increasing number of regions will be chronically short of water rather sooner than later. The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) envisages that by 2025, 800 million people will be living in countries or regions with absolute water scarcity, and two-thirds of the world population could be living under water stress conditions. The rapidly increasing urbanisation will exacerbate this situation, which means that the risks of water conflicts on the sub-state level are indeed growing.

65How can these risks be reduced and acute conflicts be resolved ? First of all, it is necessary to employ pre-emptive strategies for water allocation conflicts especially in those states which experience a high population growth and whose water supply is already scarce. Among them are both measures to increase the empowerment of women, as well as measures which increase the efficiency of water utilisation. As the Rio Declaration of 14 June 1992 already stated in its Principle 20 : “Women have a vital role in environmental management and development. Their full participation is therefore essential to achieve sustainable development.” In many regions of the world, women carry the main responsibility for water supply and crop production. Based on tradition and experience, they choose crops and irrigation techniques ; they also suffer most when wells dry up, resulting in a lengthening of the way to the next water source. Having to spend hours carrying water to supply their families often keeps girls and young women from attending school. Educating them about strategies to increase water efficiency and productivity as well as using their knowledge about traditional methods of cultivation, which often are much more sustainable than industrial agriculture, could help reduce the effects of water stress.

66Moreover, the lack of adequate legal instruments exacerbates the already difficult conditions and needs to be amended urgently. An international, joined effort will be necessary to put a legal framework in place which secures the basic human needs for water. The ratification of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention is one step in the right direction ; the increasing pressures from population growth and the anticipated consequences of climate change make its ratification not only urgent, but obligatory for anyone respecting the basic human rights. An international legislative framework for global water allocations (including ground water) could achieve at least some semblance of equity ; in addition, fair and binding water-sharing principles could counteract the power asymmetries which are currently hindering equitable water allocations in the Middle East and elsewhere.

67In order to solve current, long-standing water conflicts as well as to avoid future conflicts about water, we also need to develop a better understanding of the way in which water is instrumentalised politically. It is necessary to uncover conflictive discourse structures which perpetuate a water conflict by reinforcing conflictive viewpoints which cater to primarily nationalist interests ; continuing to base hydro-political decisions on static political boundaries will not do in the middle or long term.

68Negotiations about water allocations also need to focus not only on supply management, but also on demand management ; it is particularly important, if extremely contentious, to take into account internal economic structures, especially the size and structure of the agricultural sector. The water-food nexus needs to be met head on, most importantly by helping agricultural sectors to adapt to a warming, increasingly water-stressed world, and by expanding affordable, small-farm irrigation to alleviate food insecurity. After all, with less and less water available for food production in the years ahead, one of the potentially most destabilising global water-related threats are rising food prices and increasing hunger.

69In any case, there should be a greater focus on the peaceful sharing and management of water at both the international and the local level. Internal, sub-state conflicts about water are endangering the livelihoods of millions of people, and therefore deserve the international community’s full diplomatic, scientific, and financial attention.