We vs. Them: Terrorism in an Intergroup Perspective
Pages 35 to 64
Cite this article
- PASSINI, Stefano,
- PALARETI, Laura
- and BATTISTELLI, Piergiorgio,
- Passini, Stefano.,
- et al.
- Passini, S.,
- Palareti, L.
- and Battistelli, P.
Cite this article
- Passini, S.,
- Palareti, L.
- and Battistelli, P.
- Passini, Stefano.,
- et al.
- PASSINI, Stefano,
- PALARETI, Laura
- and BATTISTELLI, Piergiorgio,
1The idea of “terrorism” has changed our everyday lives as well as our ideas and representations about the personal and national security, about a possible culture clash or interethnic relationships (Amico & Villano, 2007; Roncarati & Ravenna, 2006). However, what is terrorism? What do people think about the specificities of terrorism? Besides, who are the terrorists? Have they some specific and recognizable characteristics or are they an invisible entity that promotes a culture and a politics of fear? What differentiates war from terrorism? What do people think about the specificities of war and terrorism? Our interest of research is about the representation of terrorism versus the representation of war.
2Since the attacks on the United States of America on September 11, 2001, a new interest in terrorism has been growing in psychology (Breckenridge, Beutler, Bongar, Brown, & Zimbardo, 2007; Kruglanski, 2006; Kruglanski, Crenshaw, Post, & Victoroff, 2007; Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006; Martin, 2006; Moghaddam & Marsella, 2004; Post, 2007; Richardson, 2006; Silke, 2003; Smelser, 2007; Stout, 2002). Nevertheless, no single agreement exists as to the actual definition of terrorism. For instance, back in 1988, Schmid and Jongman (1988) listed no fewer than 109 different definitions. According to Cooper (2001), the problem with the definition of terrorism is that one person’s terrorist may well be another’s revolutionary freedom fighter. Thus, some people can defend terrorism as a necessary “bad” action aimed against other people enacted to prevent or deter the latter from doing worse things to them. According to Cooper (2001), a possible solution may be to shift the focus away from the reasons and the actors involved in an action to the characteristics of the same action. In that way, even if fighting for freedom can be the purpose underlying a specific action, if this purpose is undertaken through the deployment of terrorist means, this action remains a terrorist act. However, also if we focus on the action – and not on some specific characteristics of the actors involved – a question remains unanswered: what indeed are the characteristics of a terrorist act? A possible solution may be found in the definitions of Townshend (2002) and Wagner (2006). The two scholars define terrorism as violent acts directed deliberately at innocent or non-combatant people, designed to achieve a certain political, ideological, or emotive goal. Focalising on the target of the action, this definition reveals that the war vs. terrorism antinomy, abused by the media, is alleged and constructed to define a distinction between “good” and “evil.” Indeed, some recent analyses (Barnaby, 2003; Chappe, Verlhiac, & Meyer, 2007; Furedi, 2002; Giroux, 2003; Greer & Jewkes, 2005; Huddy, Khatid, & Capelos, 2002; Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006; Mythen & Walklate, 2006; Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004) have pointed out that the issue of terrorism has been constructed upon a cultural climate of fear and uncertainty. In this way, as Altheide (2006) maintained, terrorism becomes an instrument for the control of law and order and a way to curb dissent as being unresponsive to citizens’ needs.
3In our opinion, from a psychosocial perspective, the war vs terrorism antinomy is consistent with the ingroup vs. outgroup antinomy. According to Tajfel’s Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; see Brown, 2000), ingroups strive not only for differentiation from outgroups but for positive distinctiveness (Turner, 1975), seeking ingroup-outgroup comparisons that favour the ingroup over other groups. Indeed, various studies on intergroup relations have been focalized on the tendency for ingroup favouritism, that is to favour ingroup members and discriminate against outgroup members (Brown, 1995; Levine & Campbell, 1972; Tajfel, 1981). These studies have shown that ingroup favouritism may be linked to negative attitudes toward the other groups, as ethnocentrism (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Whetherell, 1987), referred to perceive outgroup as inferior and less valuable (Aiello & Areni, 1998; Levine & Campbell, 1972).
4On the grounds of these theoretical perspectives, the research performed by our group over the past few years has focused on the representation of terrorism versus the representation of war. Indeed, when we started our research, Italy itself was engaged in several military interventions abroad (namely, Afghanistan and Iraq) and it was commonplace – both in the everyday discourse and in media information – to use the term “terrorism” to denote outgroups’ military action and reactions and the term “war” to denote ingroups’ military action and reactions. Thus, our first two studies were aimed at identifying this antinomy – ingroup/war, outgroup/terrorism – and verifying whether this antinomy was influenced by various socio-political attitudes, such as ethnocentrism, political affiliation and trust in the media. In particular, ethnocentrism was chosen as it is a variable connected to ingroup favoritism. Then, in the context of the Italian media and the current Italian political situation, political affiliation was considered to be relevant in relation to the social categorization of the topics analyzed. Lastly, trust in media was chosen as an indicator of attitudes – either against or in favor of – information.
Assuming that war can be legitimized from the ingroup perspective, the third study aimed to verify the level of agreement with military (versus humanitarian) strategies as a form of intervention towards foreign countries in situations of humanitarian and democratic emergency. In particular, we sought to identify the cluster of socio-political attitudes that influence the endorsement of different strategies.
In all three studies, participants were recruited at the end of lectures delivered at the University of Bologna and the subjects chose voluntarily to fill out the questionnaire.
Study 1
Hypothesis
5The aim of the first study is to understand how people define terrorism and how they differentiate it from the concept of war. Specifically, we are interested in identifying the dimensions on which definitions of terrorism and war are organized and their anchoring to socio-political attitudes.
Method
Participants
6A total of 251 University students (88 males, 156 females; 7 individuals of undisclosed gender) of four faculties (31.3 % Education; 30.2 % Law; 25.7 % Engineering; 12.8 % Postgraduate School) at the University of Bologna (Italy) served as participants. The mean age among the participants was 23.83 years (SD = 5.47).
Measures
7Definitions of war and terrorism. In two open-ended questions, the participants were asked to define what, in their opinion, terrorism is and what war is.
8Ethnocentrism. To assess the level of ethnocentrism, we asked the participants to respond to 12 items from the ethnocentrism scale (Aiello & Areni, 1998; De Grada et al., 1975). All the items were measured on a 7-point scale, anchored at “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree” and showed good reliability (? = .88). Some sample items of the scale are: “multi-ethnic societies will bring to the destruction of our culture”, “more civilised and advanced nations must guide less advanced countries”, “actual laws that regulate immigration in our country are too much permissive”.
9Socio-political indexes. We asked the participants to state their political affiliation (on a 7-point scale, from 1 = far Left to 7 = far Right) and their trust in newspaper and TV news information (both on a 7-point scale, from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much).
Results
10Each definition of terrorism and war was categorized by the three authors into some keywords (from 2 to 4 for each definition) according to the concepts that emerged. On the whole, 168 distinct categories emerged for the definitions of terrorism and 132 for the definitions of war.
11First, the most frequently used categories were examined (see Table 1). In the main, war is defined as a “violent” and “military” “conflict” “between States” (but also “between populations” and, more generally, “between groups”) that in some case have “repercussion on civilians”. It has “preconceived aims,” mainly of an economic, political and conquering kind, but also of “defence.” War is “legitimate”, it is “declared”, “organized” and “rule-managed.” However, for some subjects, it causes “destruction,” it may be considered “immoral” and it may be an expression of “supremacy,” “power” and “ideology.”
Categories Most Frequently Used in the Definitions of War and Terrorism
Categories Most Frequently Used in the Definitions of War and Terrorism
12On the contrary, terrorism is mainly defined as “terror” and “violence” “against civilians.” It stems from an “ideological” and “religious” “fanaticism/extremism” and is finalized to “psychological pressure” on people, to the “subversion of the State” and, more generally, to some “political aim.” Terrorism is enacted by “civilian people” or “paramilitary organisations.” These actors may be considered as “idiots or ignorant” and what they do is “criminal” because implemented “in times of peace”. Indeed, terrorism is “not declared” and is “not rule-managed.” For some subjects, terrorism has “no apparent reason” and may be considered “unpredictable.”
13The results presented so far have only concerned words as such, independent of the co-occurrence of the categories within each subject’s definition. By analysing the lexical associations (Lebart & Salem, 1988), it is possible to study the representations of each subject and organise the shared knowledge into a factorial plan. To do this, we used the correspondence analysis by the ASPAR procedure of the SPAD-T software. This analysis shows the structure of the shared knowledge regarding the two stimulus words “war” and “terrorism.” By means of this procedure, the factorial axes are defined by the contributions of the categories obtained from the definitions (i.e. active variables). Moreover, ASPAR procedure enables us to project onto the factors plan some illustrative variables (in this case, sex, political affiliation, trust in media and ethnocentrism). These variables are “passive” in the sense that they do not participate in defining the factorial axes, but their relationships with the factorial axes can be analysed, giving some information (such as sex, political affiliation, etc.) about the group of subjects that share a representation.
14A correspondence analysis was carried out after the selection of those categories with a minimum frequency of 5, thus reducing the original 300 categories to 45 (22 categories on terrorism and 23 on war). Two factors were extracted. To determine which categories were significant in a factor, categories with an absolute contribute (ac) ? 2.2 following the formula 100 / N categories (in this case, 100 / 45 = 2.2) were considered.
Figure 1 shows the factorial plan originating from the two axes. On the negative side of the first factor, the categories are referred to the war as “managed by rules” (ac = 10.7), “declared” (ac = 3.4), with “preconceived aims” (ac = 3.3) and made by “military” (ac = 6.8) armies. Terrorism is characterized by the total lack of rules (“not rule-managed”, ac = 2.5), it is “undeclared” (ac = 7.9), takes place “in times of peace” (ac = 2.3), even if it can be directed “against a military target” (ac = 3.9).
Correspondent Analysis (Aspar Procedure): Factorial Plan
Correspondent Analysis (Aspar Procedure): Factorial Plan
15Instead, on the positive side of the first factor, war is defined as being focused in particular on the reasons and the underlying motives (“ideology”, ac = 3.0, “economic aims” ac =, 3.7 “defence” ac = 2.7, “supremacy” ac = 4.3, “conquering aims” ac = 3.5). Terrorism is considered as incomprehensible (“no reasons”, ac = 7.9) or defined just in ideological and religious terms (“ideology”, ac = 4.1, “fanaticism/extremism”, ac = 3.5, “religious aims”, ac = 3.1). On the whole, we defined the first axis “structural vs. motivational aspects” (explained variance = 4.78 %) since these two dimensions seem to illustrate two alternative approaches through which participants define and, above all, differentiate war from terrorism.
16About illustrative variables, general means showed that participants tend to be politically situated in the current Italian Centre-Left political sphere (M = 3.27, SD = 1.23), consider media information as not very trustworthy (Trust in newspaper: M = 3.82, SD = 1.24; Trust in TV news M = 3.18, SD = 1.32) and do not have high ethnocentric attitudes (M = 3.63, SD = 1.12). Observing how illustrative variables were positioned on this factor, we can say that the reference to motivational aspects is more distinctive of the female gender (V-Test = 3.3 [1]), people with ethnocentric attitudes (V-Test = 4.2), politically affiliated to the Centre (V-Test = 2.2) and to the Right-wing (V-Test = 2.7) and people with a low level of trust in newspapers (V-Test = 2.5). On the contrary, males (V-Test = -2.7), with low ethnocentric attitudes (V-Test = -2.4), define war and terrorism as being more focused on structural aspects.
Analysing the categories that contribute to defining the second factor (explained variance = 4.46 %), we can observe that the two sides are differentiated by the focus on the victim’s experience (positive side) or to the social dynamic – in terms of interpersonal vs. intergroup – that drives the aggressor (negative side). Indeed, on the positive side, both war and terrorism are considered to be the expression of extreme “violence” (ac = 10.2, ac = 3.8). However, it appears more difficult to be protected from terrorism because it is considered “unpredictable” (ac = 3.8) and incomprehensible (“no reasons”, ac = 11.5). War is more predictable (“preconceived aims”, ac = 4.3) and is defined as a form of “imposition” (ac = 9.0) and as the expression of ”power” (ac = 22.7). It has to be noted that, in this representation, war, like terrorism, is neither justified nor legitimized (as, instead, happens with representation focused on motivational aspects). Regarding illustrative aspects, this representation is shared by women (V-Test = 3.5) and by people who do not trust the information provided both by newspapers (V-Test = 2.0) and the TV news (V-Test = 2.1).
Instead, on the negative side of the second factor, war appears to be explained and, in some way, naturalized and justified within an intergroup dimension (“conflict”, ac = 3.2, “between States”, ac = 2.2, “between populations”, ac = 2.4, “conquering aims”, ac = 2.8). Moreover, terrorism is placed on an individual vs. group dimension, as a deviation from norms and institutions (“criminal”, ac = 2.2, “fanaticism/extremism”, ac = 2.5, “psychological pressure”, ac = 2.6). Regarding illustrative aspects, this representation is shared by men (V-Test = -3.4) and by Right-wing oriented people (V-Test = -3.0).
Discussion
17In this study, we found confirmation of the definitions of terrorism provided by Townshend (2002) and Wagner (2006). As most frequently used categories show, participants identified the military or civilian nature of the target as the main difference between war and terrorism. However, the opposition between the semantic areas of war and terrorism concerns other aspects as well. In particular, war is defined as destructive and violent but also as justifiable and legitimate. On the contrary, terrorism is seen as violent but also as criminal and unjustifiable. War is motivated, while terrorism is gratuitous. War is rational, terrorism is emotional and primitive. In general, war is defined as something that can be less ambiguous and comprehensible, whereas terrorism appears to be something incomprehensible, and for that reason something more threatening. Moreover, there appears to be a clear distinction between the actors involved: war seems to be inserted by participants in an intergroup dynamic – it occurs between States, populations, groups – whereas terrorism concerns a person or extremist groups against a nation or a population.
Besides, people with strong ethnocentric attitudes and politically affiliated with the Centre and Right-wing define war and terrorism focusing on motivational aspects. That is, they do not consider the targets and the formal conditions that characterize and differentiate war from terrorism, but they define the two concepts on the basis of ideologies behind the acts. Thus, war is to conquer and to defend, whereas terrorism is mostly the effect of religious fanaticism and extremism, or else it has no rational reasons. Furthermore, Right-wing leaning people define war and terrorism also focusing on the “interpersonal/intergroup” social dynamic. Indeed, they share a representation that enhances the juxtaposing between war and terrorism on the basis of the actors involved, focusing on an idea and a labelling of terrorism simply as being criminal and deviant from ingroup norms. This tendency of Right-wing leaning people to focus on the actors involved as criminal and deviant may be linked to cognitive complexity. Indeed, some scholars (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Sidanius, 1985, 1988; Tetlock, 1983, 1984) have pointed out the relevance of Left-wing and Right-wing differences in cognitive complexity to explain the distinction between political conservatism and liberalism. In particular, people might embrace Right-wing ideologies under some circumstances to reduce fear, anxiety, dissonance, uncertainty, or instability (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003). As Jost pointed out, “The idea is that there is an especially good fit between needs to reduce uncertainty and threat, on the one hand, and resistance to change and acceptance of inequality, on the other, insofar as preserving the status quo allows one to maintain what is familiar and known while rejecting the risky, uncertain prospect of social change” ( Jost et al. 2007, p. 990). In this sense, in agreement with those studies on the influence of fear on the evaluation of terrorism (Furedi, 2002; Giroux, 2003; Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006; Mythen & Walklate, 2006), terrorism may be considered as being criminal and a threat to the status quo and ingroup’s values; hence, this climate of fear may support the tightening-up of national law and order measures. Thus, the use of the term terrorism might lead people to seek protection within the symbolic order of the so-called ‘politics of fear’ (Altheide, 2006).
Study 2
Hypothesis
18The aim of the second study is to deepen how some specific variables affect the definition of terrorism. Specifically, we hypothesize that, as the definition of terrorism of Townshend (2002) and Wagner (2006) suggested and how results of the previous study pointed out, terrorism is distinguished from war on the basis of the military or civilian nature of the target. However, we hypothesize that a second criterion exists, linked to the aggressor’s identity; in particular, in this study we hypothesize that the identification of the actor as an outgroup member enhances the likelihood of considering him/her as a terrorist and this is particularly true for people with negative attitudes towards outgroups and an elevated trust in media information.
Method
Participants
19A total of 325 University students (121 males, 195 females; 9 individuals of undisclosed gender) of four faculties (29.5 % Law; 28.7 % Education; 27.3 % Engineering; 14.5 % Postgraduate School) at the University of Bologna (Italy) served as participants. The mean age among the participants was 23.60 years (SD = 5.19).
Measures
20The respondents completed the following measures:
21War-terrorism scale. We asked the participants to evaluate some events presented as having occurred in the Middle East (i.e., “a Palestinian blew himself up on a bus filled with civilians” or “an American threw a grenade against a military base”). Using a 7-point scale (from 1 = war to 7 = terrorism), the participants had to indicate whether the action perpetrated is closer to their idea of war or terrorism. In each event, we varied the target of the action: civilian target (? = .91), such as a bus or a marketplace, or a military target (? = .92), such as a military unit or a base. We also varied the identity of the actors: American, Arab, Israeli, Palestinian. These actors were chosen according to the fact that they were the terms most commonly used in media, international debates on terrorism and by the public at large to identify groups involved in the international political scenario of terrorism. On the whole, the scale was made up of 16 items (2 items × 2 targets × 4 actors, all within variables).
22Ethnocentrism. The same scale was used as in the previous study.
23Social closeness scale. On the basis of the Bogardus social distance scale (Bogardus, 1933) – which measures people’s willingness to participate in social contacts of varying degrees of closeness with members of diverse social groups – we asked the participants to respond to 4 items for each of the 4 actors of the war-terrorism scale (Arabs, Americans, Palestinians and Israelis): (1) there are no problems having an [actor] as co-worker in the same occupation; (2) there are no problems having an [actor] as neighbour in the same apartment building; (3) there are no problems having an [actor] as a close personal friend; (4) there are no problems marrying an [actor]. All the items were measured on a 7-point scale, anchored at “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree.”
24Socio-political indexes. We asked the participants to state their political affiliation (on a 7-point scale, from 1 = far Left to 7 = far Right) and their trust in newspaper and TV news information (both on a 7-point scale, from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much).
Results
25General means (see Table 2) showed that participants do not have high ethnocentric attitudes. About social-closeness, they perceive a medium-high closeness with all the four actors. However, by a 4 within ANOVA, a significant Actor effect (F3, 972 = 55.54, p < .0001, ?2 = .15) was found. Newman-Keuls post-hoc comparisons showed that American and Israelis actors are considered closer than Arabs and Palestinians (always with p < .0001). Instead, differences between American and Israelis and between Arabs and Palestinians were not significant. Thus, with reference to the context of the war-terrorism events analyzed (Middle East), we think that these results can be interpreted as a tendency to assimilate Americans and Israelis to the ingroup versus the outgroup made up of Arabs and Palestinians. Finally, participants tend to be politically situated in the current Italian Centre-Left political sphere and consider media information as not very trustworthy (in particular TV news information).
General Means on all the Research Variables
General Means on all the Research Variables
26Concerning the war-terrorism scale, means show that participants consider terrorism as those acts carried out against civilians, and as war those actions against military targets. This is confirmed by a 2 within (target) × 2 within (actor) ANOVA. As hypothesized, the main criteria for the classification of the actions used by the participants was actually the distinction between targets as military and civilian (Target effect: F1, 324 = 974.95, p < .0001, ?2 = .75). Moreover, we also found a significant Actor effect (F3, 972 = 26.80, p < .0001, ?2 = .08) and a significant interaction Target × Actor (F3, 972 = 17.93, p < .0001, ?2 = .05). Thus, there is a general consensus towards considering the actions against military objectives as war and the actions against civilian objectives as terrorism. However, Newman-Keuls post-hoc comparisons showed that there is also an Actor effect and that this is significant for Arabs and Palestinians; this means that the actions against military targets of these two actors are considered more terrorist than the actions of all the other actors.
As a confirmation, bivariate correlations between variables (see Table 3) show that the attribution of terrorism to the actions of Arabs and Palestinians against military targets are correlated positively with ethnocentrism, political collocation, and trust in TV news. As hypothesized, Palestinians’ and Arabs’ actions against military target are considered more terroristic by people with elevated ethnocentric attitudes, Right-wing affiliations and with a high level of trust in TV news. No correlations exist between actions against civilian targets and all the variables considered in this research. No correlations exist between trust in newspapers and actions against military targets, either.
Correlations between Variables
Correlations between Variables
27Regarding social-closeness with the four actors considered in this research, the less people perceive themselves closer to Arabs, Palestinians and Israelis, the more they consider Arabs’ and Palestinians’ actions against military target as terrorism. In the same way, people who do not perceive themselves close to Americans, consider their action against military target as more terrorism.
Discussion
28As hypothesized, this study confirms that participants distinguish between war and terrorism on the target of the action, as Townshend (2002) and Wagner (2006) suggested: war refers to actions against military targets, while terrorism concerns innocent and non-combatant targets. Besides, as hypothesized, some people classify actions as war or terrorism also referring to the ethnic-cultural identity of the aggressor. As the interaction Actor × Target revealed, this criteria concerns only Arabs and Palestinians. In that sense, when these two actors hit a military target they are considered to be more terrorist than the others. As correlations between variables show, this tendency is associated to ethnocentrism, to political attitudes and to the trust in TV news. In particular, people who have more trust in TV news information tend to evaluate Palestinian and Arab military actions as terrorism. This correlation does not exist as concerns trust in newspapers.
Another important result concerns closeness to actors. Indeed, when participants state that they feel close to one actor, they tend to evaluate his/her action as being less terroristic. These results suggest that the Actor-effect decreases when people are willing to get in touch with other groups. This result is consistent with SIT. Indeed, the findings supported the existence of an ingroup bias according to which the actions of people perceived as ‘closer’ are considered as less ‘terroristic’ than the actions of people perceived more ‘distant.’
Study 3
Hypothesis
29The first two studies confirmed that war can be legitimized from an ingroup perspective. The third study seeks to verify the level of agreement with a military versus humanitarian strategy as form of intervention towards foreign countries in conditions of humanitarian and democratic emergency. The aims of the third study are the following: to assess the degree of agreement towards two different strategies proposed (military/humanitarian intervention); to understand how the use of pictures can influence the agreement; to verify the role of some psychosocial variables, such as ethnocentrism, consensus versus norms of positive/negative reciprocity, along with other socio-political indexes.
30Specifically, we hypothesize that the approval of military intervention is influenced by high levels of ethnocentrism, negative reciprocity attitudes and an elevated trust in media information. Then, we also hypothesize that when the reference to terrorism is stressed later on by a photo of a terrorist group, people will be more approving of the military intervention. Instead, when the news is presented with a focus on the population’s economic situation – shown by means of a photo portraying poor people – the subjects will be more approving of the humanitarian intervention.
Method
Participants
31A total of 240 postgraduate students (120 males and 120 females) of four faculties (38.7 % Education; 22.7 % Postgraduate School; 20.3 % Engineering; 18.3 % Law) at the University of Bologna (Italy) served as participants. The mean age among the participants was 25.03 years (SD = 7.12).
Measures
32The respondents completed the following measures:
33Intervention News Article. The participants were asked to read a short news item that had presumably come out in a newspaper. Adapted from a description of the growth of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, the article concerned the rise of a radical Islamic terrorist movement in a made-up country (named Arjabadan). The article stated that this movement was supposedly connected with other terrorist movements (such as Al-Qaeda) and that Amnesty International had raised concerns over human rights’ violations in Arjabadan itself. Then, the article reported that the United Nations (UN) had asked for 200 billion dollars to put an intervention in place to create democracy in Arjabadan. Some participants (n = 120) were asked to indicate how much they approve a military intervention to restore democracy in Arjabadan (Intervention = Military), while others (n = 120) were asked to indicate how much they approve a humanitarian intervention to help the civil population of Arjabadan (Intervention = Humanitarian). Besides, in both conditions, the article was presented along with a photo of a terrorist group (Photo = Terrorism) or a photo of some poor people (Photo = Poverty). Gender was balanced in each of the four conditions [?2(3, N = 240) = .27, p = ns]
34Ethnocentrism. The same scale was used as in the previous study and showed a good reliability (? = .89).
35Negative reciprocity norm. The negative reciprocity norm (NRN) is the personal moral code specifying retaliation as a proper response to wrongdoing (Eder, Aquino, Turner, & Reed, 2006). Belief in the NRN was assessed using the 14-item negative reciprocity norm scale developed by Eisenberger, Lynch, Aselage, and Rohdieck (2004). Participants responded to the statements by expressing their agreement on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). A sample item is: “If someone treats you badly, you should treat that person badly in return.” The NRN scale had high reliability (? = .93).
36Positive reciprocity norm. The positive reciprocity norm (PRN) refers to a general norm encouraging the return of favourable treatment (Eisenberger et al., 2004). Belief in PRN was assessed using the 10-item positive reciprocity norm scale developed by Eisenberger et al. (2004). Participants responded to the statements by expressing their agreement on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). A sample item is: “If someone does me a favour, I feel obligated to repay them in some way.” The PRN scale had a reliability of ? = .79.
Socio-political indexes. We asked the participants to state their political affiliation (on a 10-point scale, from 1 = far Left to 10 = far Right) and their trust in newspaper and TV news information (both on a 7-point scale, from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much).
Results
37General means (see Table 4) showed that participants accept more the humanitarian intervention than the military one, even if the values do not differ so much as it can be expected. Indeed, in a 2 (Intervention: Humanitarian versus Military) × 2 (Photo: terrorism versus poverty) ANOVA controlled for gender, an Intervention effect was found (F1, 240 = 4.85, p < .05, ?2 = .02). Instead, both Photo effect (F1, 240 = .16, p = ns) and interaction Photo × Intervention (F1, 240 = .03, p = ns) were not significant. Besides, participants do not have high ethnocentric attitudes, they give high importance to PRN and low importance to NRN, tend to be politically situated in the centre and consider media information as not very trustworthy.
General Means on all the Research Variables
General Means on all the Research Variables
38Bivariate correlations between variables (see Table 5) show that ethnocentrism, NRN and PRN are positively correlated with intervention’s acceptance in the two military conditions. That is, the more the subjects have ethnocentric attitudes and the more they regulate their interaction with the others on reciprocity – both positive and negative – the more they approve the war as a way to restore democracy. Instead, these variables do not influence the approval of humanitarian intervention. In this sense, when the article news is about a military intervention to restore democracy, there is a strong influence of the variables more related to intergroup relationships.
Correlations between Variables
Correlations between Variables
39About trust in media information, trust in TV news is positively correlated with intervention’s approval in both the two military conditions. Instead, trust in newspaper is positively correlated to acceptance of military intervention only when the news was presented along with the terrorists’ photo. The photo condition has some influences also on the acceptance of humanitarian intervention. Indeed, there is a positive correlation between acceptance and trust in media only when the article appears with the poverty photo. That is, the more the subjects trust in media, the more they accept a humanitarian intervention when this is presented along with a photo focused on poor people and not on terrorists. At the same time, we found a negative correlation between political affiliation and intervention’s acceptance, only when humanitarian intervention is presented along with terrorists’ photo. That is, people affiliated to the Right-wing tend to approve less the humanitarian intervention when this is presented along with a terrorists’ photo.
40Then, following the procedure advocated by Aiken and West (1991), to deepen the influence of ethnocentrism on the evaluation of interventions a multiple regression analysis was conducted with intervention’s acceptance as dependent variable and intervention condition, photo condition, ethnocentrism and their interactions as independent variables (see Table 6). The analysis revealed an Intervention effect (Wald ?2 = 15.41, p < .0001), an Ethnocentrism effect (Wald ?2 = 15.53, p < .0001) and the interaction Intervention × Ethnocentrism effect (Wald ?2 = 11.871, p < .001).
Regression Weights from Multiple Regression of Intervention Acceptance on Intervention Condition, Photo Condition and Ethnocentrism
Regression Weights from Multiple Regression of Intervention Acceptance on Intervention Condition, Photo Condition and Ethnocentrism
41Simple slope analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) revealed that ethnocentrism led to a higher probability of intervention acceptance in the military intervention condition (t = 4.42, p < .0001), but this tendency disappeared in the humanitarian intervention condition (t = .68, p = ns, see Figure 2).
Ethnocentrism as a Moderator of the Effect of the Intervention Condition on Intervention Acceptance
Ethnocentrism as a Moderator of the Effect of the Intervention Condition on Intervention Acceptance
Discussion
42The third study’s main objective was to understand the impact of some variables related to intergroup relationships, along with trust in media information, on the approval of either humanitarian or military intervention on a country having links with terrorist groups.
43First of all, the results showed that the subjects declared they rather approved of the intervention of either kind (i.e. military vs. humanitarian), even if the ANOVA showed that, in general, the subjects approved more of the humanitarian option. Nevertheless, as expected, we found a strong ethnocentric influence and NRN and PRN in the approval of the intervention. In other words, the more the subjects held ethnocentric attitudes and beliefs concerning the appropriateness of positive and negative reciprocity norms in regulating interactions between people, the more they approved of military intervention. In regard to reciprocity norms, it should be noted that beliefs in reciprocity norms may be linked to a world-view based on the Old Testament principle of lex talionis (i.e., an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth). In that sense, in agreement with so-called ‘deservingness theory’ (Feather, 1999) and just-world belief theory (Lerner, 1977), relationships between people are probably seen as being regulated by the notions of deservingness and blame. Thus, we may suppose that this ethical moral code drives one to behave in a humane manner only because it is deserved by the target and not because it is just “per se.”
44Secondly, trust in media influences the approval of intervention in a more complex way. Indeed, it appears that trust in media affects approval only when there is congruence between the designated intervention and the picture: that is, humanitarian vis-à-vis poverty and military vis-à-vis terrorism. We may suppose that the media will nurture a passive reception of information and that, for this reason, while there is congruence between news and image, the subjects do not debate the appropriateness of the message.
In regard to the image effect, in general the picture does not have a significant effect on intervention approval, even if the subjects accept the humanitarian intervention slightly more when it is presented along with the photograph of poverty and accept the military intervention slightly more when it is presented along with the photograph portraying a terrorist scene.
General discussion
45The main aim of our studies is to understand what people are indeed referring to when they discuss terrorism and what people think of the differences between war and terrorism. In particular, our first two studies have found that when people read about or listen to events concerning the so-called ‘war on terror,’ they discern war from terrorism by focusing on the sort of target involved. Thus, as previously discussed, we found confirmation of the definitions of terrorism provided by recent literature (Townshend, 2002; Wagner, 2006) about a target difference between terrorism and war, by which terrorism is against civilian targets, while war is against military targets. As also suggested by Kruglanski and Fishman (2006), this criteria could lead to consider that some events that are usually defined as war (such as the bombings of German or Japanese cities during World War II or the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki) may be also seen as terrorism. In the same way, some attacks against military forces (such as the suicide attack against the Italian military police headquarters in Nasiriyah, Iraq on November 12, 2003), usually represented as terrorism, may be considered as war.
46Otherwise, some subjects effectively use the term terrorism to define some specific actors’ actions, emphasizing the antinomy ingroup/war – outgroup/terrorism. Indeed, results show that the antinomy between war and terrorism may be analyzed in an intergroup perspective. That is, even if, in some way, the definitions of war and terrorism coincide with some specific realities (as the target issue and other specific characteristics of war and terrorism), they also enhance the antinomy of the war as right and the terrorism as criminal. In this view, as also suggested by Cooper (2001), the definition and representation of terrorism may hide an implicit ideology on the notions of war and terrorism that enhances the ingroup/outgroup opposition, according to which “we do the war, they do terrorism,” where war is considered as more legitimate and justifiable and terrorism as more illegitimate and criminal. This is confirmed by the data on ethnocentrism: the more the subjects have ethnocentric attitudes, the more they use the term terrorism to enhance this antinomy. In the same way, the third study confirms that the most ethnocentric subjects tend to approve more a military intervention to restore democracy on a nation subdued by terrorist groups.
47Ingroup-outgroup antinomy is also supported by social distance findings, by which the actions of people perceived closer are considered as less terroristic than the actions of people perceived more distant. In accordance with SIT, this result suggests that a way of promoting positive attitudes between groups should pass through a reduction of the social distance with outgroup members and through the development of a common identity. Indeed, based on the premises of SIT, some alternative models for contact effects have been developed and tested with the basic assumption that reducing the salience of the original ingroup-outgroup category distinctions is a critical factor in reducing intergroup prejudice (Brewer & Gaertner, 2003; Brewer & Miller, 1984; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993; Nadler, Malloy, & Fisher, 2008). In particular, a model based on a process of decategorisation – based on personalised interaction between members of the respective social groups – and one based on a process of recategorisation – i.e., uniting groups in a common (superordinate) identity were proposed. In this sense, from the analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Kelman (1999) considers that the exclusiveness of each group’s identity is embedded in a pattern of negative interdependence of the two identities that derives from a view of the other’s identity as a direct threat to one’s own identity. An indicator of this negative interdependence is the systematic effort to delegitimize the others by placing them outside of the bounds of what the world community can tolerate. Kelman (1999) suggests that the coexistence between different ethnic groups can be enhanced by the development of a transcendent identity that does not threaten the particularistic identity of each. In the Israeli-Palestinian case, developing a transcendent identity means shaping an Israeli identity, a concept of national citizenship, which fully includes Israel’s Palestinian citizens. It is important to stress that this transcendent identity does not replace the particularistic identity of each group. Rather, it develops alongside it. As suggested by Huo, Smith, Tyler, and Lind (1996), identification with a superordinate group does not require relinquishing strong ties to one’s subgroup. Thus, developing a transcendent identity means shaping each group identity and expanding the concept of citizenship to fully include each ethnic identity. In this sense, contact between groups may lead to positive attitudes towards other cultures’ memberships if a common identity is activated.
Besides, results show also the importance of media influence. In agreement with studies that analyze the influence of fear on evaluation of terrorism (Furedi, 2002; Giroux, 2003; Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006; Mythen & Walklate, 2006), people who have more trust in media – in particular in TV news information – tend to give support to a worldview that tend to oppose the good (“we”) from the bad (“the others”). Nevertheless, as we are drafting this article, the change in United States leadership appears to represent a radical change in foreign policy; let’s take – by way of example – the proposals for dialogue and negotiations with the so-called “rogue States.” This change may suggest that the “war on terror” – as previously defined – might have been tantamount to an alibi for implementing a political strategy of world dominance, as many scholars have hypothesized (Chomsky, 2002, 2003; Hersh, 2004; Zinn & Arnove, 2002). In the near future, even if the war on terror stays in place – as ineluctable matter of fact – a key objective for democracies, we may suppose that this change in political orientation will lessen the ideology of a fear-inspiring cultural clash. Nevertheless, the economic crisis currently affecting the world could increase the emergency conditions and the climate imbued by threats and conflicts that normally typify inter-ethnic interactions. Further studies can shed light on the impact of these recent events on the representation of terrorism and war, and on the regulation of ‘our’ interactions with ‘others’ – especially when the ‘others’ are culturally different.
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Publisher keywords: ethnocentrism, media information, political attitudes, social representations, terrorism, war
Uploaded: 01/01/2011