Tenth Anniversary of the Lancaster House Treaties, 2 November 2020

1Ten years ago, on 2 November 2010, France and the United Kingdom signed the Lancaster House Treaties. The Treaties were designed to establish a unique bilateral, long-term partnership between the two nations on defence and security matters. They represented an unprecedented ambition and created mutual dependency in the industrial field and with the TEUTATES Treaty went as far as establishing cooperation on nuclear issues—ones that lie at the very heart of state independence.

2The Lancaster House Treaties marked a far-reaching development in Franco-British defence relations and were effectively a continuation of the Treaty of Dunkirk, which in the aftermath of the Second World War affirmed the will of our two countries to intensify their cooperation through the signature of a mutual assistance treaty. These treaties represent a fundamental element in the historical cooperation between France and the United Kingdom, stretching from the 1904 Entente cordiale to the 1998 Saint Malo declaration. They are clear confirmation of mutual confidence, and bear witness to the closeness of the links that unite the two nations.

3Above all these Treaties reflect shared global vision and an age-old strategic similarity.

4Our countries have developed a strong and deep defence relationship, founded on innumerable points of agreement, common interests and values, and shared responsibilities. Our partnership was established on common attachment to preservation of multilateralism and was built upon universal democratic values for the defence of peace and stability in the world.

5Its strength comes also from a shared, unique model of power in Europe based on geographical proximity and numerous strategic similarities. Our two countries are permanent members of the UN Security Council and founder countries of NATO’s Atlantic Alliance, and are the only two nuclear powers in Europe. It is for the latter reason that the Treaties included a nuclear aspect that covered the sharing of installations, and therefore their costs, in order to guarantee maintenance of the French and British deterrents in the long term. Together with the United States they are essential guarantors of security of the continent via NATO in particular and, moreover, are two major European investors in defence.

6France and the United Kingdom are the only European countries that have both worldwide commitments and the tools that allow them to face up to a very wide range of threats. In this they share an appreciation of the threats that confront us: terrorism, increasing proliferation, weakening of the security architecture in Europe, growth in strategic competition and the multiplication of contested theatres and areas.

7Our operational similarity is founded on a common expeditionary culture and fully capable forces which allow us to conduct all types of operation up to the very highest level. Furthermore, this operational capability is supported by a top-ranking defence industrial base whose competences, expertise and complementary capabilities make possible the development of the equipment and material our countries need in order to respond to technological challenges.

8It is upon this deep strategic proximity that we sought to create the Lancaster House Treaties. Since 2010, we have achieved some major objectives: in improving our national capabilities, we have also achieved hitherto unknown levels of integration of our armed forces.

9We have demonstrated time and again that France and the United Kingdom were able to deploy and conduct operations across the world alone or with our allies and partners whenever our interests were threatened. Operation HAMILTON, conducted jointly with the United States against Syrian chemical weapons installations in April 2018, is an illustration of our capability to intervene in high-intensity operations when necessary, and of our commitment to defend the rules that underpin international law and order.

10Our armed forces are at present committed together in several theatres. First, in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, where the United Kingdom has supported French operations by supplying a strategic transport aircraft in Mali since 2013 and has continued to deploy three Chinook helicopters for Operation BARKHANE since August 2018, and also in the Levant, where we have both been contributing to the international coalition against Daesh since 2014 and where today we need more than ever to continue with our efforts. We are also committed to security in Europe: in Estonia, in the framework of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, where France deployed with the United Kingdom as framework nation in 2017 and 2019, and will be there again in 2021, and on missions for policing the skies over the Baltic. We are also committed on a broader, global scale to ensuring maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and the Indo-Pacific zone, as well as in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

11In a similar manner, we have since 2010 been establishing unprecedented levels of integration of our forces with the launch of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF). The CJEF, which is the background to these significant advances in interoperability, is a further arrangement that will facilitate the capacity of the French and British armed forces to conduct operations jointly and at very short notice across the full range of threats. This hitherto unseen degree of integration illustrates the special nature of our relationship.

12Additionally, our two countries have continued with developing common capability projects by drawing on those areas of mutual dependence agreed in en 2010. Although some of these have been reoriented (FCAS, for example), other projects that structure our cooperation are on the way to consolidation. The Maritime Mine Counter Measures (MMCM) project, which aims to develop a new strategic maritime mine warfare capability based on surface, naval and submarine drones, and the future cruise and anti-ship weapon (FC/ASW) programme, both symbolic of our cooperation, are progressing. The latter, so crucial for our forces, will determine the future capacity of the European missile sector. Based on the One MBDA project, that is, the decision to interweave our armament structures, FC/ASW is a manifestation of the willing interdependence that is at the heart of the Lancaster House Treaties and bears witness to the confidence and friendship between our two countries.

13These successes encourage us to continue with the momentum of strengthening our cooperation that was given ten years ago. Today we face a very different context from that in 2010, marked by internal political and economic challenges and by the multiplicity and simultaneity of threats, in which our defence partnership remains more essential than ever. We must now be committed to continuing our cooperation and jointly to outlining its objectives for the coming decade so that we can face up to these challenges together.

14Even if that does not come down to a fundamental redefinition of the bilateral cooperation, there is no doubt that Brexit has been and will remain a challenge for the EU, as it is for our two countries. The Lancaster House Treaties are sufficiently robust to spare our cooperation the consequences of the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU but we cannot deny the existence of a number of underlying risks.

15Brexit remains a source of concern and serves only to increase the uncertainty that is resulting from the economic effects of the health crisis and of their possible repercussions on defence budgets. Our ministers have also to bring post-Covid-19 matters into consideration by emphasising the challenges of resilience and strategic independence. It remains more than ever essential to maintain fully capable armed forces that have a full range of competences and capabilities, including the most critical among them, in order to achieve the desired military effects that will allow us to continue to ensure all the strategic functions that we do today.

16That requires us to acknowledge our responsibilities—top of the list being those for maintaining a strong defence partnership to protect our interests and our values, and those of Europe. Preservation and development of our bilateral cooperation constitute a priority objective. Current and future political uncertainty must not lead us to reducing the level of ambition of our defence relationship, which is so crucial to our two countries and, more broadly, to the continent.

17In this regard we need to maintain unity in the face of our common challenges. To reach this objective, strong political will is needed on both sides of the Channel.

18To retain its dynamism, this privileged relationship must also continue to be punctuated by tangible results and joint operational commitments. We should as of now follow the gradual and pragmatic approach that was defined ten years ago and work together on consolidating the operational and capability results of our cooperation, and more broadly on joint adaptation of the shape of our forces to the new strategic environment.

19Though our objectives for the coming decade need to be defined in a realistic manner if they are to serve and protect our citizens, our interests and our independence as best they can, they should nevertheless be far-reaching and exacting. Only a closely coordinated approach will allow us to define accurately our strategic needs and the capabilities that we will require to respond to them. At stake are the power and sovereignty of our two nations and, more broadly, of Europe.

20This tenth anniversary gives us the opportunity to reaffirm the high level of ambition of our defence partnership and also to give the necessary impetus to lay down the bases of our future partnership. We must continue to intensify our strategic dialogue on common defence and security issues, including the challenges associated with cyber and space domains. We should also pursue close coordination on matters of arms control and strategic stability in Europe.

21That will also involve the nuclear aspects of our cooperation, within which framework we should intensify our dialogue on the implications to our deterrence of strategic changes and of technological developments.

22It will also be crucial to continue our cooperation in multilateral forums, primarily within NATO to ensure our collective defence and the security of the European continent, but also in the European Union once the arrangements for the future relationship with the United Kingdom have been defined.

23This anniversary is also the occasion to encourage continued strengthening of our cooperation in crisis-stricken theatres or where there is regional tension, such as Africa, the Levant and the Indo-Pacific region, where the multiplicity and simultaneity of threats demand unity and robust partnership. That is why we must continue to deploy on operations together or in a complementary manner. In this regard the CJEF is a unique asset which, when our strategic interests converge, will serve to boost the military credibility of our two nations. Its full operational capability has been announced: now is the time to think about the framework of how it will first be deployed, if and when circumstances demand it. In the longer term, we will need to examine in good time what the conditions need to be for possibly opening it up to other allies and partners, such as members of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) with whom we have already established links, as well as how it will fit in with the European Intervention Initiative (IE2). Participation of our two nations in the latter is a valuable lever, which works towards favouring development of a common strategic culture among a limited group of countries that have the military capabilities and the political will to commit to operations.

24Moreover, we must continue to develop our cooperation on arms issues in order to conclude the FC/ASW and MMCM structural programmes launched in 2010 by taking full advantage of the unique competences we each possess. Our ability to honour our commitments over the long term and to preserve the format of our forces depends on it.

25In parallel, it will be essential to identify new areas of cooperation to support our respective defence industrial bases.

26In conclusion, whenever necessary we need to show the unity and solidity of our partnership more widely among Europeans. It is essential that we independently protect our sovereignty and interests. That will of necessity be done through development and strengthening of our bilateral defence cooperation. Close coordination with our European partners through ad hoc arrangements will also be essential.

27In the face of a deteriorated security environment only preservation of solid and ambitious cooperation made strong by our similarities and complementarities will allow our two nations to offer a response equal to the challenges which lie before us, and for Europeans to bring their weight to the international scene.