Notes

• [1]
  For a more detailed description of Italy’s international monetary policy in the 1960s, see E. Cavalieri and J. C. Martinez Oliva, “Between national interest and international cooperation: Italy and the Bretton Woods System in the 1960s”, in H. James. and J. C. Martinez Oliva (eds), International Monetary Cooperation across the Atlantic, European Association for Banking and Financial History, Frankfurt am Main, Adelmann, 2008, p. 59-77.
• [2]
  For a short biography of Carli and Ossola, see A. Gigliobianco, Via Nazionale. Banca d’Italia e classe dirigente. Cento anni di storia, Roma, Donzelli, 2006, p. 261-308 and 334-339.
• [3]
  In this chapter we do not examine the proposals of the Bank of Italy to regulate the euromarkets. On this subject, see G. Carli, “Eurodollars: a paper pyramid?”, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, June 1971, p. 95-109.
• [4]
  G. Carli, Cinquant’anni di vita italiana, Roma, Laterza, 1993, p. 240-242.
• [5]
  For a comprehensive analysis of the cyclical and structural causes of the Italian economic crisis in the early 1970s, see Mi. Salvati, Alle origini dell’inflazione italiana, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1980.
• [6]
  See M. Fratianni and F. Spinelli, Storia monetaria d’Italia: lira e politica monetaria dall’Unità all’Unione europea, Milano, Etas, 2001, p. 566-616 and A. Gigliobianco, op. cit., p. 304-305.
• [7]
  A. Burns, The Anguish of Central Banking, Belgrade, Per Jacobsson Foundation, 1979.
• [8]
  For an estimation of Italian capital flight in the period, see A. Biagioli, “La posizione finanziaria dell’Italia verso l’estero dal 1945 al 1994: una ricostruzione”, in Studi per il cinquantenario, Ufficio Italiano Cambi, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1995, p. 128-129.
• [9]
  E. Cavalieri and J. C. Martinez Oliva, op. cit., p. 69.
• [10]
  National Archives at College Park (henceforth NACP), General Records of the Department of State (henceforth RG 59), Subject Numeric Files, 1967-1969, b. 780, FN 10 IT, Tel. 5990 from Rome (Stabler) to the Secretary of State, “Foreign Exchange Situation”, 19 September 1969.
• [11]
  NACP, General Records of the Department of Treasury (henceforth RG 56), Entry 138, Classified Executive Secretariat Files, 1966-1974, b. 2, Background paper from Assistant Secretary Petty to the Secretary of Treasury, “Italian Economic Situation”, 29 June 1970.
• [12]
  Of the total, $250m took the form of an increase in the existing Federal Reserve swap line to $1250m and the other $250m was made on an ad hoc, three-month renewable basis by the Treasury Exchange Stabilization Fund. NACP, RG 59, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-73, b. 907, FN 6 IT, Tel. from Washington (Rogers) to Bonn, Paris, OECD, Rome, the Hague, Brussels and Usec, 11 March 1970.
• [13]
  Archives de la Banque de France (henceforth ABF), 1397199802, b. 19, compte rendu de la 137^e réunion du Comité Monétaire de la CEE, 10 March 1970. In early February 1970 during a meeting with the US ambassador, Carli said that EC short-term credits were “better than nothing”, but acknowledged that, since the dollar was the vehicle currency, swap lines with the Federal Reserve were “much more useful in practice”. NACP, RG 59, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-73, FN 6 IT, b. 907, Tel. 0619 from Rome (Martin) to the Secretary of State, “Conversation with Bank of Italy governor Carli”, 5 February 1970. See also L. Segreto, “L’Italie et le plan Werner”, in Le rôle des ministères des Finances et de l’Économie dans la construction européenne (1957-1978), Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France, Paris, 2002, p. 46-47.
• [14]
  ABF, 1489200801, b. 32, Lettre du Conseiller Financier de l’Ambassade de France en Italie à Monsieur le Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances, 18 March 1970.
• [15]
  See M. Garritsen de Vries, The International Monetary Fund, 1966-1971. The System under Stress. Volume: Narrative, Washington (D. C.), IMF, 1976, p. 500-516; G. Toniolo, Central Bank Cooperation at the Bank for International Settlements, 1930-1973, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 430-434.
• [16]
  G. Carli, “Problemi dell’adesione della Gran Bretagna al Mercato Comune relativamente alle questioni monetarie”, Bancaria, 6, 1969, p. 768-772.
• [17]
  G. Carli, Cinquant’anni di vita…, op. cit., p. 227-230.
• [18]
  NACP, RG 56, Entry 138, Classified Executive Secretariat Files, 1966-1974, b. 7, Memorandum of Conversation (Carli, Gradi, Kennedy, Volcker, Korp), 23 June 1969.
• [19]
  Archivio Storico della Banca d’Italia (henceforth ASBI), Segreteria Particolare, Pratt. 1471, Fasc. 2, Memorandum by R. Ossola, “Progetto di dichiarazione dell’on. Ministro sul punto 2 (a) dell’ordine del giorno (flessibilità)”, undated (presumably July 1971).
• [20]
  ABF, 1397199802, boxes 19-23.
• [21]
  For an analysis of French opposition to flexibility, see E. Bussière, “La Banque de France et les débats monétaires à l’époque de la première union économique et monétaire: la difficile émergence d’une identité monétaire européenne (1968-1973)”, in O. Feiertag and M. Margairaz (eds), Politiques et pratiques des banques d’émission en Europe (xvii^e-xx^e siècle), Mission Historique de la Banque de France, Paris, Albin Michel, 2003, p. 706-709.
• [22]
  NACP, RG 56, Entry 138, Classified Executive Secretariat Files (1966-1974), b. 18, Memorandum from P. A. Volcker to Secretary Connally, “Briefing for Meeting with Bank of Italy Governor Guido Carli”, 29 June 1971. The Italian proposals were summarized in a paper prepared by the Italian Ministry of Treasury for the EC Council of Ministers meeting of 23 June 1971 (ABF, 1397199802, b. 23, Aide mémoire du Ministre du Trésor italien, M. Ferrari Aggradi, “Considérations sur les différents points de la lettre de M. le Ministre Witteveen en date du 10 juin 1971”).
• [23]
  ABF, 1397199802, b. 23, compte rendu de la réunion du Comité Monétaire du 20 Juillet 1971.
• [24]
  NACP, RG 56, Entry 138, Classified Executive Secretariat Files (1966-1974), b. 18, Memorandum of Conversation (Carli, Gradi, Connally, Volcker, Willis), 30 June 1971.
• [25]
  G. Carli, Cinquant’anni di vita…, op. cit., p. 5-9 and passim.
• [26]
  See L. Segreto, “L’Italie et le plan Werner”, op. cit., p. 39-51; I. Maes and L. Quaglia, “France and Italy’s policies on European monetary integration: a comparison of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states”, European University Institute Working Paper, RSC 10, 2003, p. 19-20; A. Verde, “Carli e l’economia internazionale dei primi anni Settanta”, Nuova Storia Contemporanea, 2, 2005, p. 69-75.
• [27]
  G. Carli, “The world’s money now”, Euromoney, March 1970, p. 4-6 (quotation on p. 5).
• [28]
  ASBI, Direttorio Carli, cart. 65, fasc. 2, sfasc. 2, Memorandum from G. Carli to E. Colombo, 15 February 1971.
• [29]
  See G. Toniolo, op. cit., p. 444-452.
• [30]
  Memorandum from G. Carli to E. Colombo, 15 February 1971.
• [31]
  On the position of the Italian government, see M. E. Guasconi, “Italy and the Hague Conference of December 1969”, Journal of European Integration History, 2, 2003, p. 101-116.
• [32]
  ASBI, Direttorio Carli, cart. 68, fasc. 1, sfasc. 27, Memorandum from G. Carli to G. Saragat, 11 May 1971.
• [33]
  On the Italian reaction to the Nixon announcement, see: G. Carli, Cinquant’anni di vita…, op. cit., p. 245; E. Ortona, Anni d’America. La cooperazione: 1967-1975, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1989, p. 310-337.
• [34]
  Archivio Centrale dello Stato (henceforth ACS), Archivio Moro, b. 142, Memorandum from R. Ducci to A. Moro, “Conseguenze politiche della crisi del dollaro”, 26 August 1971, riservatissimo.
• [35]
  See, for instance, G. Carli, “Intervento del governatore della Banca d’Italia alla giornata mondiale del Risparmio, 30 ottobre 1971”, in Scritti e Conferenze, Vol. V, Roma, Centro Stampa della Banca d’Italia, 1975, p. 440-459.
• [36]
  ASBI, Direttorio Carli, cart. 60, fasc. 4, sfasc. 12, Memorandum from G. Carli to M. Ferrari Aggradi (26 pp.), 2 September 1971.
• [37]
  Ibid.
• [38]
  For the expression “American-European partnership” (partnership europea americana), see ACS, archivio Moro, b. 142, Memorandum from R. Ducci to A. Moro, “Conseguenze politiche della crisi del dollaro”, 26 August 1971.
• [39]
  For instance, the Treasury representative in Rome, Ralph Korp, wrote in a report to Washington: “The Italian government has been very understanding of our economic problems and has responded very rationally to our NEP.” NACP, RG 56, OASIA 5675101, b. 65, Quarterly Report of US Treasury Representative at the American Embassy in Rome, 29 October 1971.
• [40]
  NACP, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Security Council Files, Country Files, b. 695, Tel. 5336 from Rome (Martin) to the Secretary of State, 24 August 1971.
• [41]
  ABF, 1397199802, b. 23, compte rendu de la 154^e réunion du Comité Monétaire, 2 septembre 1971; ibid., note de M. Ossola, “Système transitoire de taux des changes à suivre par les pays de la CEE, jusqu’au rétablissement de la convertibilité monétaire”, 2 September 1971.
• [42]
  L. Segreto, “États-Unis, Europe et crise du système monétaire international (1968-1973). Vers le flottement général des monnaies”, in E. Bussière (ed.), Georges Pompidou face à la mutation économique de l’Occident, 1969-1974, Association Georges Pompidou, Paris, PUF, 2003, p. 31-42.
• [43]
  Italy’s objectives regarding the general realignment were revealed by the Italian Minister of Treasury Ferrari Aggradi in a bilateral conversation with the British delegation in late November 1971: “In relation to the dollar he [Ferrari Aggradi] expected a 15% revaluation of the yen, 10% for the Deutschemark, and up to 5% for the French franc. The lira was now at a rate that represented a 2.5% average depreciation, and Italy would need to preserve a moderate devaluation in relation to the average, at say 2 to 2.5% above the new rate for the dollar.” Bank of England Archives (henceforth BoE), OV53/63, Memorandum of the Bank of England (Mr. Bailey), “Note of a meeting in the Italian Treasury at 9:30 a.m.”, 30 November 1971, confidential.
• [44]
  R. Frank, “Pompidou, le franc et l’Europe”, in Georges Pompidou et l’Europe, actes du colloque 25-26 novembre 1993, Bruxelles, Éditions Complexe, 1995, p. 357-361; G. H. Soutou, “L’attitude de Georges Pompidou face à l’Allemagne”, in Georges Pompidou et l’Europe, op. cit., p. 291-292; P. Gerbert, “Le président Georges Pompidou et les institutions européennes”, in M.-T. Bitsch (ed.), Le couple France-Allemagne et les institutions européennes, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2001, p. 370; D. J. Howarth, The French Road to European Monetary Union, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001, p. 30-31.
• [45]
  R. Frank, “Pompidou, le franc et l’Europe”, op. cit., p. 357-358.
• [46]
  At the EC Council of 11 December 1971, the French Foreign Minister Schumann explicitly reassured his colleagues that Pompidou was not going to the Azores to negotiate on behalf of Europe: “Le Président Pompidou rencontrera le Président Nixon pour écouter et pour pouvoir contribuer à définir une position européenne qui permette un accord, et non pour essayer d’élaborer, entre la France et les États-Unis, une solution globale. Ni la France ni aucun autre pays n’a qualité pour parler au nom de la Communauté dans les différends actuels avec les États-Unis”. Historical Archives of the European Union, EN 156, 181^e réunion du conseil (séance restreinte du samedi après-midi), 11 December 1971.
• [47]
  For this research I used the two versions of the memoranda of conversation of the Azores Meeting: one prepared by the French and the other by the Americans. For the US version, see NACP, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Security Council Files, H. A. Kissinger Office Files, Country Files – Europe, b. 55, memoranda of conversations of the Azores meeting, 13-15 December 1971. For the French version, see Archives Nationales de France, Archives de la Présidence de la République sous Georges Pompidou, 5AG2/1022, Entretiens des Açores.
• [48]
  NACP, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Security Council Files, H. A. Kissinger Office Files, Country Files – Europe, b. 55, Secret agreement signed by Nixon and Pompidou, “Framework for monetary and trade settlement”, undated (presumably 15 December 1971).
• [49]
  R. Ducci, Le speranze d’Europa (carte sparse 1943-1985), Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2007, p. 217. On the German critical reaction to the Franco-American deal at the Azores, see W. G. Gray, “Floating the system: Germany, the United States and the breakdown of Bretton Woods, 1969-1973”, Diplomatic History, 2, 2007, p. 314; H. Zimmermann, “Preaching the German way: the Federal Republic and international monetary cooperation”, in H. James and J. C. Martinez Oliva (eds), op. cit., p. 51.
• [50]
  BoE, OV53/63, Memorandum of the UK Treasury, “Ministerial meeting of the Group of Ten in Washington 17/18 December 1971”, 22 December 1971, secret.
• [51]
  BoE, OV53/63, Memorandum from Sir Jeremy Morse to the governors, “Group of Ten meeting Washington, December 17-18”, 20 December 1971, secret.
• [52]
  NACP, RG 56, NN3-056-94-005, Records relating to the International Monetary Fund, b. 8, “Remarks by President Nixon”, 18 December 1971.
• [53]
  ACS, Archivio Moro, b. 142, Tel. 076/26662/C from Rome (Moro) to the Diplomatic Posts, “Le decisioni del ‘gruppo dei dieci’ e il futuro dell’integrazione europea”, 22 December 1971 [translated by the author].