Notes

• [1]
  See in particular Hans-Georg Betz’s seminal work Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, New York, Saint Martin’s Press, 1994. For a recent overview of the political impact of gender, see the special issue “Gender and Populist Radical-Right Politics”, Patterns of Prejudice, 49(1-2), 2015.
• [2]
  Terri Givens, “The Radical Right Gender Gap”, Comparative Political Studies, 37(1), 2004, 30-54.
• [3]
  See in particular Nonna Mayer, “The closing of the Radical Right Gender Gap in France?”, French Politics, 13(4), 2015, 391-414, and “Les électeurs du Front national (2012-2015)” in Florent Gougou and Vincent Tiberj (eds), La déconnexion électorale: Un état des lieux de la démocratie française, Paris, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, 2017, pp. 69-76; Réjane Sénac and Maxime Parodi, “‘Gender Gap à la française’: recomposition ou dépassement?”, Revue Française de Science Politique, 63(2), 2013, 225-48.
• [4]
  For an introduction to the use of personality traits in analyzing political behavior, see Alan S. Gerber, Gregory A. Huber, David Doherty, and Conor M. Dowling, “The Big Five personality traits in the political arena”, The Annual Review of Political Science, 14, 2011, 265-87.
• [5]
  Two attitudes at the heart of the radical right-wing vote, as shown by Cas Mudde in Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 23.
• [6]
  See in particular Daniel Oesch, “Explaining voters’ support for right-wing populist parties in Western Europe: evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway and Switzerland”, International Political Science Review, 29(3), 2008, 348-73; Simon Bornschier and Hanspeter Kriesi, “The populist right, the working class, and the changing face of class politics” in Jens Rydgren (ed.), Class Politics and the Radical Right, Abingdon, Routledge, 2012, pp. 10-29; Dennis Spies, “Explaining working-class support for extreme right parties: a party competition approach”, Acta Politica, 48, 2013, 296-325.
• [7]
  On the complex relations between French workers and immigrants in factories, see the investigation by Stéphane Beaud and Michel Pialoux, Retour sur la condition ouvrière: Enquête aux usines Peugeot de Sochaux-Montbéliard, Paris, La Découverte, 2012.
• [8]
  Pascal Perrineau, Le Symptôme Le Pen: Radiographie des électeurs du Front national, Paris, Fayard, 1997, 105-7.
• [9]
  On the issue of the gendered education of girls (and boys), see Barrie Thorne, Gender Play: Girls and Boys in School, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1993; Anne Dafflon Novelle (ed.), Filles-garçons: Socialisation différenciée?, Grenoble, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 2006; Muriel Darmon, La socialisation, Paris, Armand Colin, 2006.
• [10]
  On the greater conformity of women with anti-racist norms, see Eelco Harteveld and Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, “Why women avoid the radical right: internalized norms and party reputations”, British Journal of Political Science, 48(2), 2018, 369-84. On their lower inclination to vote for socially stigmatized parties, see the experiments carried out by Eelco Harteveld with Wouter Van Der Brug, Stefan Dahlberg, and Andrej Kokkonen, “The gender gap in voting: extremity, ambiguity and social cues”, ECPR conference, Bordeaux, 5-7 September 2013.
• [11]
  Tim Immerzeel, Hilde Coffé, and Tanja Van der Lippe, “Explaining the gender gap in radical right voting: a cross-national investigation in 12 Western-European countries”, Comparative European Politics, 13(2), 2015, 263-86.
• [12]
  Ibid.
• [13]
  Thomas Amossé and Olivier Chardon, “Les travailleurs non qualifiés: une nouvelle classe sociale?”, Économie et Statistique, 393-4, 2006, 203-29. See also Martin Thibault, Ouvriers malgré tout: Enquête sur les ateliers de maintenance des trains de la Régie autonome des transports parisiens, Paris, Raisons d’agir, 2013.
• [14]
  Amossé and Chardon, “Les travailleurs”, 222-4.
• [15]
  Nonna Mayer and Guy Michelat, “Les transformations du rapport à l’autre: le rôle des identités politiques et religieuses” in Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme: La Lutte contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme et la xénophobie, Paris, La Documentation française, 2007, 122-38; Guy Michelat and Claude Dargent, “Système catholique symbolique et comportements électoraux”, Revue française de science politique, 65(1), 2015, 27-60. However, since the 2013 election of Pope Francis, who embodies a more open kind of Catholicism, this correlation has disappeared.
• [16]
  Alexandre Dézé, “‘La dédiabolisation’: Une nouvelle stratégie?” in Sylvain Crépon, Alexandre Dézé, and Nonna Mayer (eds), Les faux-semblants du Front national: Sociologie d’un parti politique, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2015, pp. 27-50.
• [17]
  On the feminization of the immigration issue for these parties, see Sarah de Lange and Liza Mügge, “Gender and right-wing populism in the Low Countries: ideological variations across parties and times”, Patterns of Prejudice, 49(1-2), 2015, 61-80. On the FN, see Sylvain Crépon, “La politique des murs au Front national” in Crépon et al. (eds) Les faux-semblants, pp. 185-205.
• [18]
  Susi Meret, “Charismatic female leadership and gender: Pia KjÒrsgaard and the Danish People’s Party”, Patterns of Prejudice, 49(1-2), 2015, 81-102. The author shows that party positions on gender issues remain underexplored in studies of the impact of gender on the populist radical right vote, as do the impact of the rhetoric, style, charisma, and discourse of female populist leaders.
• [19]
  According to the 2016 Insee Job Survey, the population aged 15 years and older includes 76% women in non-manual jobs, a proportion rising to 86% in the service sector, and 80% men in manual labor, rising to 87% among skilled manual workers (“Population selon le sexe et la catégorie socioprofessionnelle en 2017”, https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2381478, last accessed 13 August 2018).
• [20]
  Mariette Sineau, “Vote/comportements politiques” in Catherine Achin and Laure Bereni (eds), Dictionnaire: Genre et science politique, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2013, pp. 526-7.
• [21]
  Marine Le Pen, “contre flots, Paris, Grancher, 2006, 188. Her feminism is however entirely relative, as shown by Catherine Achin and Sandrine Lévêque, “‘Jupiter is Back’: gender in the 2017 French presidential campaign”, French Politics, 15(3), 2017, 279-89.
• [22]
  See Achin and Lévêque, “‘Jupiter is Back’”, 284.
• [23]
  See her “144 presidential commitments”, including commitment no. 9, https://www.rassemblementnational.fr/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/, last accessed 13 August 2018.
• [24]
  Sylvain Chazot, “Karine Le Marchand, la féminité et des oublis… ce tract un tout petit peu surprenant de Marine Le Pen”, https://lelab.europe1.fr/karine-le-marchand-la-feminite-et-des-oublis-ce-tract-un-tout-petit-peusurprenant-de-marine-le-pen-2969387, last accessed 13 August 2018.
• [25]
  Eelco Harteveld, Wouter Van Der Brug, Stefan Dahlberg, and Andrej Kokkonen, “The gender gap in populist radical-right voting: examining the demand side in Western and Eastern Europe”, Patterns of Prejudice, 49(1-2), 2015, 103-34.
• [26]
  On the impact of gender and generation on electoral behavior in France, see Mariette Sineau, “Effets de genre, effets de génération? Le vote hommes/femmes à l’élection présidentielle 2007”, Revue française de science politique, 57(3), 2007, 353-69.
• [27]
  See Alexandre Dézé, “La construction médiatique de la ‘nouveauté’ FN” in Crépon et al. (eds), Les faux-semblants, 455-504.
• [28]
  Harteveld and Ivarsflaten, “Why women avoid the radical right”. On the indicator of “implicit motivation to control prejudice” (IMCP), see Scott Blinder, Robert Ford and Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, “The better angels of our nature: how the antiprejudice norm affects policy and party preferences in Great Britain and Germany”, American Journal of Political Science, 57(4), 2013, 841-57.
• [29]
  Dans Shang E. Ha, Seokho Kim, and Se Hee Jo, “Personality traits and political participation: evidence from South Korea”, Political Psychology, 34(4), 2013, 511-32, particularly 512.
• [30]
  Markus Freitag and Kathrin Ackermann, “Direct democracy and institutional trust: relationships and differences across personality traits”, Political Psychology, 37(5), 2016, 707-23, particularly 710.
• [31]
  Gerber et al., “The Big Five”.
• [32]
  Ha et al., “Personality traits”.
• [33]
  Gerber et al., “The Big Five”; Lewis R. Goldberg, “The development of markers for the big-five factor structure”, Psychological Assessment, 4(1), 1992, 26-42.
• [34]
  This is also sometimes referred to as “neuroticism”, its opposite. See Gerber et al., “The Big Five”.
• [35]
  On the issue of the different facets of each personality trait and their translation into French, see: Odile Plaisant, Julie Guertault, Robert Courtois, Christian Réveillère, Gerald A. Mendelsohn, and Oliver P. John, “Histoire des ‘Big Five’: OCEAN des cinq grands facteurs de la personnalité. Introduction du Big Five Inventory français ou BFI-Fr”, Annales médico-psychologiques, 168(7), 2010, 481-6.
• [36]
  Gerber et al., “The Big Five”, 267.
• [37]
  Harald Schoen and Markus Steinbrecher, “Beyond total effects: exploring the interplay of personality and attitudes in affecting turnout in the 2009 German federal election”, Political Psychology, 34(4), 2013, 533-52, here 535.
• [38]
  For more detail on use of the Big Five in analyzing political behavior, see Gerber et al., “The Big Five”. See also Matthias Fatke, “Personality traits and political ideology: a first global assessment”, Political Psychology, 38(5), 2017, 881-99.
• [39]
  The study was led by Nicolas Sauger at the Sciences Po Center for European Studies and Comparative Politics, and conducted by Kantar TNS using face-to-face interviews, from a national sample built on quotas (gender, age, education level, profession of the reference person, and regions) of 1,830 individuals representative of the registered electorate residing in mainland France, carried out in the two weeks following the run-off of the 2017 presidential election. Tables showing the votes are adjusted based on the actual results for each round and the sociodemographic structure. Regressions were however carried out using unweighted data. The data were made available in July. The results presented here are therefore the very earliest available. See Florent Gougou and Nicolas Sauger, “The 2017 French Election Study (FES 2017): a post-electoral cross-sectional survey”, French Politics, 15(3), 2017, 360-70.
• [40]
  Mayer, “Les électeurs”, 75.
• [41]
  “You did not go and vote, you thought about going to vote, but in the end you did not go, you usually vote, but this time you did not go/you voted” (only one individual refused to answer this question out of the 1,830 individuals in the sample).
• [42]
  See the appendix for information on these scales.
• [43]
  For a comparison of previous elections with the same variables based on binary logistic regressions, see Mayer, “The closing of the Radical Right Gender Gap”, and Mayer, “Les électeurs”.
• [44]
  For reasons of space this is not included in the article, but is available upon request.
• [45]
  In all our regressions gender was used as a proxy for the gender variable. For a more general discussion of the handling of gender in statistical surveys in the social sciences, see Laurel Westbrook and Aliya Saperstein, “New categories are not enough: rethinking the measurement of sex and gender in social surveys”, Gender & Society, 29(4), 2015, 534-60.
• [46]
  Mayer, “The closing of the Radical Right Gender Gap”, 405-6. For reasons of space, sympathy for Marine Le Pen is not included in the multinomial logistic regression model for 2017 (table 4). The results are available upon request. The inclusion of this variable increases the explanatory power of the model (the Nagelkerke R2 increases to 0.66), strongly increasing the likelihood of voting for the FN candidate, all other things being equal, and conversely reducing the likelihood of voting for Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Emmanuel Macron, and in particular François Fillon.
• [47]
  Even where longitudinal data is available, no regression model can handle these three variables together (age, period, and cohort), as they are strictly collinear. It is therefore formally impossible to model their respective effects without imposing restrictions on the model. On the issue of so-called “APC” analyses, see Anja Neundorf and Richard Niemi, “Beyond political socialization: new approaches to age, period, cohort analysis”, Electoral Studies, 33, 2014, 1-6.
• [48]
  French electoral surveys 1988, 1995, 2002, 2007 (Cevipof); FES 2012 and 2017 (CEE).
• [49]
  Yang Yang and Kenneth C. Land, Age-Period-Cohort Analysis: New Models, Methods, and Empirical Applications, Boca Raton, CRC Press, 2013.
• [50]
  This recoding is necessary due to the low number of observations in this category.
• [51]
  Various media stories, including for example the attack on Paul Voise, marked the background to this election. See Nonna Mayer, Ces Français qui votent Le Pen, Paris, Flammarion, 2002, 351-5.
• [52]
  Nonna Mayer, “Comment Nicolas Sarkozy a rétréci l’électorat Le Pen”, Revue française de science politique, 57(3), 2007, 429-45.
• [53]
  Ibid.
• [54]
  Proportions calculated based on adjusted data.
• [55]
  For the significance threshold and methods of calculating the Big Five from the Ten Items Personality Inventory (TIPI) used in the FES 2017, see the appendix.
• [56]
  The reference category is women.
• [57]
  We checked to see whether there were any multicollinearity issues, i.e. strong correlations between personality traits and ethnocentric and authoritarian attitudes, but this was not the case. All the “tolerance” coefficients for the attitudinal variables and the Big Five of the model were greater than 0.70, i.e. well above the threshold of 0.10 that would indicate multicollinearity. We also explored possible interactions between personality traits and attitudes, which were inconclusive and not shown here due to lack of space. They require further testing using more in-depth statistical methods.
• [58]
  Additional tests show that openness to experience and conscientiousness also influence levels of ethnocentrism and authoritarianism, even after controlling for age, gender, education, and religiousness. In other words, these personality traits would appear to have an indirect impact on attitudes through an effect of intermediation in line with our initial hypothesis. The results of these tests are available from the authors upon request.
• [59]
  Results of the “age-by-period” tables for the other right-wing and left-wing political parties are available upon request.
• [60]
  Vincent Tiberj, Les citoyens qui viennent: Comment le renouvellement générationnel transforme la politique en France, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2017, in particular 236-41 on the values driving the FN vote in new cohorts; Florent Gougou, “Comprendre les mutations du vote des ouvriers: vote de classe, transformation des clivages et changement électoral en France et en Allemagne depuis 1945”, PhD. diss., 2012, Sciences Po Paris; Florent Gougou and Nonna Mayer, “The class basis of extreme right voting in France: generational replacement and the rise of new cultural issues (1984-2007)” in Jens Rydgren (ed.), Class Politics and the Radical Right, Abingdon, Routledge, 2012, pp. 156-72.
• [61]
  This article owes a great deal to its anonymous reviewers, to whom we offer our thanks. We would also like to thank Florent Gougou for providing us with access to his cumulative data files of the French Electoral Surveys.
• [62]
  On the problematic issue of using the coefficient alpha for ordinal scales, see Anne M. Gadermann, Martin Guhn, and Bruno D. Zumbo, “Estimating Ordinal Reliability for Likert-Type and Ordinal Item Response Data: A Conceptual, Empirical, and Practical Guide”, Practical Assessment Research & Evaluation, 17(3), 2012, 1-13.