Notes

• [1]
  Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Piero Ignazi, “The silent counter-revolution. Hypotheses on the emergence of extreme right-wing parties in Europe”, European Journal of Political Research, 22(1), 1992, 3-34.
• [2]
  Hanspeter Kriesi, “The transformation of cleavage politics. The 1997 Stein Rokkan Lecture”, European Journal of Political Research, 33(2), 1998, 165-85; Hanspeter Kriesi et al., West European Politics in the Age of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
• [3]
  Herbert Kitschelt, in collaboration with Anthony J. McGann, The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).
• [4]
  Simon Bornschier, “France: the model case of party system transformation”, in H. Kriesi et al., West European Politics in the Age of Globalization, 77 –104; Simon Bornschier, Romain Lachat, “The evolution of the French political space and party system”, West European Politics, 32(2), 2009, 360-83.
• [5]
  Nonna Mayer, “Comment Nicolas Sarkozy a rétréci l’électorat Le Pen”, Revue française de science politique, 57(3-4), 2007, 429-45.
• [6]
  Jean-Luc Parodi, “Les élections ‘intermédiaires’ du printemps 2004: entre structure et événement”, Revue française de science politique, 54(4), 2004, 533-43.
• [7]
  Florence Haegel, Gérard Grunberg, La France vers le bipartisme? La présidentialisation du PS et de l’UMP (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2007).
• [8]
  Gérard Grunberg, “Vers un espace politique bipartisan?”, in Pascal Perrineau (ed.), Le vote de rupture. Les élections présidentielle et législatives d’avril-juin 2007 (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2008), 253-70; Florence Haegel, Gérard Grunberg, “Le bipartisme imparfait en France et en Europe”, Revue internationale de politique comparée, 14(2), 2007, 325-39.
• [9]
  Pierre Martin, Comprendre les évolutions électorales. La théorie des réalignements revisitée (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2000).
• [10]
  Pierre Martin, “Les scrutins de 2007 comme ‘moment de rupture’ dans la vie politique française”, Revue politique et parlementaire, 1044, 2007, 167-75.
• [11]
  Within this framework, the theory of tripartition has been heavily criticised. Robert Andersen, Jocelyn Evans, “Values, cleavages and party choice in France, 1988 –1995”, French Politics, 1(1), 2003, 83-115. This analysis of a simple bipartition of French political life is confirmed in Robert Andersen, Jocelyn Evans, “The stability of French political space, 1988 –2002”, French Politics, 3(3), 2005, 282-301. Our article does not enter directly into this debate, but sees itself as more in sympathy with the conclusions of Gérard Grunberg and Étienne Schweisguth.
• [12]
  Vincent Tiberj, “L’électorat trotskyste: votes extrêmes ou vote de gauche? Une analyse par les systèmes de valeurs et leurs recompositions”, in Dominique Reynié (ed.), L’extrême gauche, moribonde ou renaissante? (Paris: PUF, 2007), 129-51.
• [13]
  Gérard Grunberg, Étienne Schweisguth, “French political space: two, three or four blocs?”, French Politics, 1(3), 2003, 331-47.
• [14]
  P. Martin, Comprendre les évolutions électorales.
• [15]
  Local alliances with the FN were tolerated by the RPR and the UDF (Union pour la démocratie française) until 1988 (agreements were reached in seven regions during regional elections in 1986, reciprocal drop-outs happened in the Bouches-du-Rhône department during legislative elections in 1988).
• [16]
  This dynamic accelerated after the regional elections crisis in 1998, when the moderate right-wing party was shown to have benefited from the FN’s support in order to conserve presidencies in five different regions.
• [17]
  Florent Gougou, “La droitisation du vote des ouvriers en France. Désalignement, réalignement et renouvellement des générations”, in Jean-Michel De Waele, Mathieu Vieira (eds), Une droitisation de la classe ouvrière en Europe? (Paris: Economica, 2012), 142-72.
• [18]
  Pascal Perrineau, “La dynamique du vote Le Pen. Le poids du gaucho-lepénisme”, in Pascal Perrineau, Colette Ysmal (eds), Le vote de crise. L’élection présidentielle de 1995 (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1995), 243-61.
• [19]
  A summary of election results from 2002 to 2012 can be found in Table 9, Annex 1.
• [20]
  This percentage becomes even more significant when we consider that it was obtained despite the fact that the majority of UDF elected officials broke with Bayrou after the first round of the election and rallied around Nicolas Sarkozy by forming the Nouveau Centre.
• [21]
  Florent Gougou, Simon Labouret, “The 2011 French cantonal elections: the last voter sanction before the 2012 presidential poll”, French Politics, 9(4), 2011, 381-403.
• [22]
  What’s more, it is likely that the FN was hindered during the cantonal elections by low levels of participation, its working-class electorate being more likely to abstain than other segments of the population.
• [23]
  The linear correlation coefficients for the departmental level for Nicolas Sarkozy alone were 0.34 compared to 2002’s Chirac-Barre total, 0.37 compared to 1995’s Chirac-Balladur total and 0.43 compared to 2002’s Chirac-Bayrou-Madelin-Boutin total (0.40 for Chirac-Madelin-Boutin alone).
• [24]
  These coefficients were, respectively: 0.96 for Chirac-Barre 1988/Chirac-Balladur-Villiers 1995; 0.95 for Chirac-Balladur-Villiers 1995/Chirac-Bayrou-Madelin-Boutin 2002; 0.89 for Chirac-Barre 1988/Chirac-Bayrou-Madelin-Boutin 2002. They fell sharply to 0.68 for Sarkozy-Villiers 2007/Chirac-Barre 1988; 0.67 for Sarkozy-Villiers 2007/Chirac-Balladur-Villiers 1995; 0.72 for Sarkozy-Villiers 2007/Chirac-Bayrou-Madelin-Boutin 2002.
• [25]
  This coefficient was 0.91 at the departmental level and 0.94 at the cantonal level, if we consider only Nicolas Sarkozy’s scores.
• [26]
  At the cantonal level, the correlation coefficient was likewise very high: 0.95.
• [27]
  The construction of these three immigration zones is outlined in P. Martin, Comprendre les évolutions électorales, 270-8. Each zone is composed of 32 departments, according to the proportion of foreigners of North African or Turkish origins present during 1982’s general census. For a discussion of the pertinence and topicality of this indicator, see, by the same author: “L’immigration, un piège pour la droite?”, Commentaire, 132, 2010, 1027-36.
• [28]
  This record deviation can in part be explained by the smaller number of candidates in zone 3’s departments, hence a score of only 7.5% (the far right was present in 90% of cantons in zone 1, 85% of cantons in zone 2 and only 48% of cantons in zone 3).
• [29]
  The decrease in the interzone deviation with regard to FN votes in the presidential election went hand in hand with better results in zone 2 compared to zone 1 (as in 2007). From this perspective as well, 2007’s elections marked a break with the past: until then, the far right always obtained its best scores in zone 1.
• [30]
  The transformation of the right’s electoral map between Chirac and Sarkozy also reflects, albeit more marginally, differences in personal involvement and implantation, revealing a “friends and neighbours” effect in the Corrèze region and its environs for Jacques Chirac.
• [31]
  These two value axes refer directly to the issues at the heart of 1984’s electoral landscape: immigration and insecurity on one hand, and unemployment and the role of the state with regard to the economy on the other. For an empirical analysis of their decisive role in structuring the French ideological landscape, see Jean Chiche, Brigitte Le Roux, Pascal Perrineau, Henry Rouanet, “L’espace politique des électeurs français à la fin des années 1990. Nouveaux et anciens clivages, hétérogénéité des électorats”, Revue française de science politique, 50(3), 2000, 463-88.
• [32]
  Vincent Tiberj, “La politique des deux axes. Variables sociologiques, valeurs et votes en France (1988 –2007)”, Revue française de science politique, 62(1), 2012, 71-106 (published online in the RFSP (English) as “Two-axis politics: values, votes and sociological cleavages in France (1988-2007)”, 62 (1), 2013, 67-103); and “Values and the votes from Mitterrand to Hollande: the rise of the two-axis politics”, Parliamentary Affairs, 66(1), 2013, 69-86.
• [33]
  For more details concerning the construction of these axes, and more specifically concerning the questions used in the analyses, please see Annex 2.
• [34]
  For more on this issue, already well covered in the existing literature, see Nonna Mayer, Ces Français qui votent Le Pen (Paris: Flammarion, 2002). In general, the results of our analysis confirm and expand upon the results presented in Tiberj, “La politique des deux axes”.
• [35]
  A slight dip can be seen on the economic axis starting in 2007: the tendency to vote for the FN among the most ethno-authoritarian voters increased alongside hostility towards economic liberalism (except for the most anti-liberal deciles), whereas it had a tendency to decrease in 2002. The variations produced remain minor, however.
• [36]
  The presidential election of 2007 also marked an important change with regard to the economic dimension, with Sarkozy voters clearly more strongly polarised than Chirac voters in 2002. It is likely that this situation was partially influenced by the absence of Alain Madelin in 2007. Nevertheless, the Sarkozy vote reflects the two-pronged radicalisation, both economic and cultural, of the moderate right-wing voter in general.
• [37]
  Jean-Marie Le Pen never managed to secure hegemonic influence in this segment of the electorate: in 1988, 1995 and 2002, the moderate right was already attracting a significant part of the most xenophobic electorate. The moderate right’s ability to attract an ethno-authoritarian population should be likened to the influence exerted on FN votes by the presence (or absence) of immigrants. As Pierre Martin and then Nonna Mayer have shown, those hostile to immigrants only overwhelmingly vote for the FN when they live in a department with a high concentration of foreigners. Cf. P. Martin, Comprendre les évolutions électorales, 277-8; N. Mayer, Ces Français qui votent Le Pen, 274-5.
• [38]
  From this point of view, the basis of 2007’s Bayrou vote sheds light on the rationale behind the empowerment of a portion of the centre-right electorate: unlike the Sarkozy vote and the Le Pen vote, the Bayrou vote decreased with the level of ethno-authoritarianism (which was much less the case in 2002, and not at all the case in 1995 for Balladur or in 1988 for Barre).
• [39]
  The refusal to call for the defeat of the Front National was still provoking heated disputes during 2011’s cantonal elections, when the Prime Minister François Fillon called on people to “vote against the FN” in the case of a duel between the left and the FN. In 2012, the “neither-nor” (neither voting for or against the FN) strategy adopted by Sarkozy and Jean-François Copé was accepted and adopted by all UMP political players.
• [40]
  Hanspeter Kriesi et al., Political Conflict in Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
• [41]
  Florent Gougou, Simon Labouret, “The 2010 French regional elections: transitional elections in a realignment era”, French Politics, 8(3), 2010, 321-41. Florent Gougou, Simon Labouret, “Revisiting data on the 2012 French legislative elections: political supply, party competition and territorial divisions”, French Politics, 11(1), 2013, 73-97.
• [42]
  For a detailed discussion of this point, see F. Gougou, S. Labouret, “Revisiting data on the 2012 French legislative elections”.
• [43]
  For a similar approach, and a more nuanced discussion of the methodological assumptions, see V. Tiberj, “La politique des deux axes”.
• [44]
  For an exploratory use of specific MCA, but also for a presentation of its statistical principles, see J. Chiche, B. Le Roux, P. Perrineau, H. Rouanet, “L’espace politique des électeurs français à la fin des années 1990”.
• [45]
  This process does not guarantee the substantial comparability of the axes, in the sense that they were not established using the same questions. Comparability is thus hypothesised.