Notes
-
[*]
Institut National d’Études Démographiques, Paris.
Translated by Godfrey I. Rogers. -
[1]
This text is an updated extract from a paper given at the Chaire Quetelet (November 2003) and intended for publication in the proceedings of that symposium. We are grateful to the organizers for granting permission to publish it in Population.
-
[2]
These countries are characterized by a mean length of life less than 70 years or a rate of infant mortality over 30 per 1,000 during the 1960s.
-
[3]
The population pyramids for each of the 25 member countries of the European Union can be consulted in issue 398 (February 2004) of Population & Societies available on-line on the INED web site (http:// www. ined. fr/ publications/ pop_et_soc).
1 The accession of ten new countries on 1 May 2004 constitutes a crucial stage in the construction of the European Union. This enlargement is the biggest ever in absolute terms — adding 74 million inhabitants to the population of the Union, which now totals 455 million — and involves countries whose demographic regime differs markedly from that of the fifteen existing member countries. In eight of the ten new member countries — those of central and eastern Europe — population growth is negative or very low, and their fundamental demographic characteristics are a reminder that these countries belong to a region of the continent which was long regarded as “different”. In some respects this is a novel situation. Hitherto, the countries that joined the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Union (EU) had, even before their accession, reduced the difference relative to the existing member countries. The immediate effect of this enlargement of the Union will be to rejuvenate the Community population but also to slow down its growth [1].
I – Demographic construction of the European union: from six to twenty-five
2 The European Union developed from an initial core of six countries, to which a further nine countries were added over the years, plus ten more in 2004 (see box). The population of the EU has also increased as a result of specifically demographic change, whose magnitude has varied in different countries and at different times during its short history.
The construction of Europe
- 1957: Belgium, France, Germany (Federal Republic), Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands;
- 1973: accession of United Kingdom, Republic of Ireland and Denmark;
- 1981: accession of Greece;
- 1986: accession of Spain and Portugal.
(created by the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty, on 1 November 1993):
- 1995: accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden;
- 2004: accession of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
3 When the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, the EEC comprised six countries with a combined population of 167 million inhabitants. This core of founding members has gradually been joined by a further nineteen countries. After these successive enlargements, plus German reunification in 1991 which raised the population of Germany from 64 to 80 million, the European Union counted 455 million inhabitants in 2004, an increase of 288 million inhabitants since 1957.
4 This increase results essentially from successive enlargements (Figure 1). The accession of the United Kingdom, coinciding with the transition from six to nine members, had the largest impact. Its 56 million inhabitants accounted for most of the 64 million people added to the EEC in 1973, producing a 33% increase in the population of the Nine relative to the Six (Table 1). The entry of Spain and Portugal in 1986 produced a substantially smaller relative increase (18%). Finally, the accession of ten new members in 2004 represents the most important enlargement in absolute numbers (74 million people), although in relative terms, compared with the population of the Europe of Fifteen, it was only the second largest, with an increase close to 20%. In all, if we sum the population of the new member countries at the date of joining the European Community, the growth in the number of inhabitants from successive enlargements (and from German reunification) equals 235 million between 1973 and 2004, after accession of the ten new members.
Population of the European union (millions of inhabitants)
Population of the European union (millions of inhabitants)
From the Europe of Six to the Europe of Twenty-Five. Population change (millions of inhabitants)
From the Europe of Six to the Europe of Twenty-Five. Population change (millions of inhabitants)
5 Alongside this “political” component, however, there is a properly demographic component of growth, representing an increase of 53 million inhabitants. The largest share of this demographic growth originates in the six founding states, whose total population increased by 45 million inhabitants after 1957, partly for the obvious reason that these have been members of the Union longest but also because the early years of the EEC were a time when population growth was still strong. In the 16 years between 1957 and 1973, the population of the Six increased by 25 million inhabitants, which is more than in the following 27 years up to 2000, when the increase was only 18 million. In recent years, the population of the European Union has grown annually by around one and half million, compared with almost two million recorded in the Six in the early 1960s.
6 This population growth is based on natural increase (difference between births and deaths) and net migration (difference between those entering and leaving the Community’s territory). In absolute numbers, natural increase has never been as high as in the Six: it exceeded one million per year until 1970, and even reached 1.4 million in 1965 (Figure 2a). Since the mid-1970s, i.e. for nearly thirty years, natural increase has changed little, remaining below 400,000 per year, save for a recovery around 1990, even though over the same period the European Union expanded from nine to fifteen members and from 257 to over 370 million inhabitants. In all, cumulative natural increase since 1957 stands at 32 million.
Annual increase in the population of the European union (3-year moving averages)
Annual increase in the population of the European union (3-year moving averages)
7 Net migration, positive but on a downward trend from the late 1950s to the mid-1980s, registered a strong upturn around 1990, linked notably to the changes in eastern Europe. For recent years it stands at around a million people per year and is currently the main factor driving the growth of the European population.
8 Calculation of rates involves taking into account the changes in the population size resulting notably from enlargements, which has the effect of accentuating the falls and attenuating the upturns (Figure 2b). In recent years, the annual rate of population growth has been tending towards 4 per 1,000, whereas it went over 10 per 1,000 in the first half of the 1960s.
9 The original Six comprised three “large” European countries — Germany (FRG), France and Italy — which together accounted for nearly 90% of the total Community population, plus three smaller states. Two states each with several tens of millions of inhabitants subsequently joined the European Union — the United Kingdom and Spain — but even before the 2004 enlargement the EU member countries included ten states with far smaller populations, mostly well below ten million. Enlargement to twenty-five reinforced this characteristic, since with the exception of Poland the new members are all “small” countries.
10 The relative weight of the founding countries has decreased considerably as a consequence of the enlargements, irrespective moreover of their individual population growth (Table 2). France, for example, had just over a quarter of the population of the Six in 1957; in 2004 it accounted for only 13% of the population of the Union of twenty-five members even though its own population had increased by a third. Germany (in the boundaries of the FRG) represented a third of the population of the Six in 1957; in its current boundaries it has only 18% of the population of the Twenty-Five. In 2004, the six member countries with the largest populations (Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Poland) together had 75% of the population of the enlarged EU; nineteen countries thus represented only a quarter of this population, and eight of them each accounted for less than 1%. This imbalance in demographic weight between countries does not fail to create problems for decision-making procedures, as can be seen in the discussions over the European Constitution.
Commerce vertical (y compris consommation du capital) par pays et secteurs
Commerce vertical (y compris consommation du capital) par pays et secteurs
11 What is the context for this demographic construction of the European Union, and what will be the impact of the accession of the new members ? To answer these questions it is useful to review some key themes in European demography.
II – A demographic history between convergence and difference
1 – Two Europes separated by a secular but variable frontier
12 Europe was divided in two demographically throughout the twentieth century. To begin with, this division resulted from cross-national differences of timing in the onset of the demographic transition. Then, from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s, the demographic division between eastern Europe and western Europe appeared as one of the manifestations of the geopolitical division of the continent between two socio-political systems (de Beer and van Wissen, 1999).
13 The demographic transition took place in the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, except in France where the fertility decline had started in the late eighteenth century (Festy, 1979; Coale and Watkins, 1986). Because the fertility and mortality declines did not occur simultaneously in the different European countries, highly diverse situations prevailed up to the Second World War. To schematize, the countries of northern and western Europe were the furthest on in this process, trailed by those of southern and central Europe (Chesnais, 1986). In the first half of the twentieth century, this temporal lag defined a geography of European population characterized by a division between two Europes: northern and western Europe recorded lower fertility and mortality than southern and central Europe.
14 Concerning mortality and fertility, there were very clearly two Europes at the beginning of the twentieth century (Figures 3a and 3b). From the point of view of mortality, a group of countries where life expectancy at birth was above 50 years — northern Europe (56 years) and western Europe (51 years) — can be contrasted with the rest of Europe, where it was appreciably lower, with life expectancy of 42 years in southern Europe and 40 years in central Europe. Between the most favoured group (northern Europe) and the least favoured (central Europe), the gap was of 16 years, which is considerable. But the cross-national differences were larger still. Life expectancy in Denmark was 20 years higher than in Greece, Portugal, and the countries of central Europe. An examination of period fertility reinforces the image of this initial division of Europe: around 1910, the average number of children per woman in the northern and western countries was in the region of 3.5 whereas it exceeded 4.5 in the rest of the continent. The difference was even larger between France (2.4 children per woman at the start of the twentieth century) and Italy or Spain (4.3).
15 The division between the two Europes became less marked in the years after the Second World War, notably because Europe was relatively homogeneous by the mid-1960s with respect to overall mortality, the differences having been levelled out by the introduction of antibiotics after the war. Between the regions defined in Figure 3 the gap in life expectancy narrowed, and by 1970 stood at only 3 years. But this “reunification” of Europe proved short-lived, since the countries of central Europe subsequently fell behind in mortality improvements, causing the gap between this group of countries and the other European countries to widen (Meslé, 1991). This East-West divide, in the Cold War sense of the term, was also observable in family formation behaviour. A longstanding pattern of near-universal and early marriage characterized the East, where modern contraception made slow headway faced with extensive recourse to abortion, and fertility levels remained higher than in the West. In eastern Europe, the total fertility rate did not fall clearly below 2 children per woman until the 1990s, except in Slovenia where this had already happened. Overall, the division of Europe has thus endured, but from the mid-1960s the frontier between the two Europes has followed the geopolitical demarcation between the countries with command economies and those with market economies, and thus corresponds approximately to the famous “Hajnal line” running from St. Petersburg to Trieste, which has acted as a kind of barrier to the second demographic transition (Monnier and Rychtarikova, 1992).
16 Another factor distinguishing the different countries of Europe is their migration history. Between the wars and for a long time after the Second World War, a number of countries (Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Poland, Slovakia) were sources of emigration while others (France, Germany, Belgium, United Kingdom, in particular) were immigration countries. At present, all the countries of the Fifteen are net immigration countries, while those of central and eastern Europe mostly have a negative or very small positive migration balance.
17 Of the ten new member countries, eight belong to the part of Europe which in the past appeared as a “different” Europe. They still differ today from the countries of western Europe by a demographic regime that appears all the more specific as a relatively homogeneous regime is observed in the Fifteen.
2 – Old and new members: two different demographic regimes
18
The fifteen countries that made up the European Union before the last enlargement are subject to a single demographic regime, in which three fundamental characteristics can be observed:
- a very low or even negative rate of natural increase, resulting from low fertility and population ageing;
- an increasing importance of migration, which in most of the countries is now the main determinant of population growth;
- a high proportion of elderly people, as a consequence of the long-term decline in fertility and, over the last twenty years, the decline in mortality at old and very old ages.
Population (1 January 2004) and demographic indicators of the European Union countries (2002)
Population (1 January 2004) and demographic indicators of the European Union countries (2002)
19 The main reason for the weakness of the natural increase is low fertility: the total fertility rate for the Fifteen stood at 1.5 children per woman in 2002. Unless this situation is reversed, the years ahead will see deaths outnumber births throughout the Union, as is already observed in some countries. The second factor responsible for the weakness of natural increase is population ageing — 16% of people aged 65 and over in the Fifteen as a whole — which tends to increase the number of deaths even when mortality is not actually rising. This ageing is scheduled to continue, notably because of the decline in mortality at older ages. The major mortality improvements, initially obtained by a reduction in infant mortality, now come from a reduction in mortality among elderly people. These new improvements account for the high levels reached by life expectancy at birth: 75.7 years for men, 81.8 years for women, in 2002.
20 The member states present differences in relation to this general model. We must first distinguish three countries — Germany, Greece and Italy, which together account for 40% of the population of the Fifteen — where natural increase is negative. The shortfall of births relative to deaths is offset by immigration—amply in Italy, less so in Germany. In these countries, the proportion of people aged 65 and over is above the average for the Union, especially in Greece and Italy, while fertility is particularly low. Other countries are in a similar position, with a natural increase that is only just positive, barely exceeding 1 per 1,000 in the best cases: Sweden, Austria, Belgium, Portugal, Denmark, United Kingdom and Spain. In Portugal and Spain, however, high levels of immigration are responsible for total growth rates among the highest in the Union.
21 In contrast, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Ireland (just over 20% of the total population of the Union) show a natural increase close to 4 per 1,000, to which is added a net migration balance of varying size: small for France (1.1 per 1,000, the lowest in the EU after Finland), large for Luxembourg and Ireland. All in all, France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg have a higher than average population growth. In this group of countries, population ageing tends to be less marked than elsewhere, while fertility tends to be higher.
22 Most of the new members of the European Union are subject to a different demographic regime (Table 3). Excepting Cyprus and Malta, where natural increase and the migration balance are positive, the eight countries of central Europe are characterized firstly by very low — negative in five of them — total growth, the only exceptions being Slovakia, Slovenia and Estonia. There is a substantial shortfall of births to deaths, except in Poland and Slovakia, where it is small (– 0.2 and – 0.1 per 1,000 respectively), while the migration balance is negative in three countries (Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) and only slightly positive in the others. Overall, for the group of eight countries of central Europe, the average rate of natural increase stands at – 1.0 per 1,000, the average net migration rate at – 0.1 per 1,000, and the total growth rate at – 1.1 per 1,000. Fertility in these countries is on average lower than in the Fifteen, with the average number of children per woman ranging from 1.37 in Estonia to 1.17 in the Czech Republic. In spite of the recent fertility decline in central Europe, the proportion of elderly people (13.3%) is still smaller than that observed among the Fifteen, though it is increasing. Lastly, mortality remains higher than in western Europe, with an average life expectancy at birth of under 70 years for men and of 78 years for women (compared with 75.7 years and 81.8 years, respectively, among the Fifteen).
3 – European integration and harmonization of demographic regimes
23 Is the harmonization of demographic regimes in western Europe a consequence of European integration, with demographic convergence going in tandem with economic convergence (Coleman, 1992; Monnier, 2000) ?
24 Concerning the factors of natural increase — fertility and mortality — the different national situations at the time of joining the Community and their subsequent evolution can be appraised using Figure 4, which maps total fertility and life expectancy at birth in the various countries at the key dates in European construction. Three remarks are in order. First, between 1973 and 1995, the differences between old and new members are not very large and the scatters of points are relatively compact. Thereafter, these configurations tend to draw closer together (this is particularly clear between 1973 and 1986) at the same time as they undergo a coordinated shift, reflecting the common demographic trends (reduction of mortality and decline in fertility) experienced by most of the countries involved. Finally, the distinctive character of the last enlargement is particularly clear on the diagram for the early-2000s, which can safely be taken to prefigure the situation in 2004. None of the previous enlargements had involved countries where fertility and, especially, mortality levels differed so much from those in existing member countries.
Total fertility and mean length of life (men and women) at successive enlargements of the European Union
Total fertility and mean length of life (men and women) at successive enlargements of the European Union
25 The convergence between countries observed over recent decades has, very broadly, been oriented, in that the fertility and mortality trends were not independent of the starting points. The countries where mortality was higher than average have tended to move towards conformity with the more favoured countries (and not vice versa); likewise, in the countries where fertility was highest it has fallen, whereas recoveries in fertility have remained the exception (the case of Sweden). Thus it appears particularly appropriate to study this movement of convergence for the countries where fertility (measured by the total fertility rate) and mortality (measured by the mean length of life or by the infant mortality rate, more widely available) were the highest in the 1950s and 1960s. Of the fifteen countries that joined the European Union before 2004, three were selected for their high fertility (Spain, Ireland and Portugal) and six for their particularly high mortality [2] (Austria, Spain, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal).
26 To determine whether fertility and mortality in these countries have converged on the average for member countries before or after their accession, we have calculated the differences between each annual indicator and the average indicator for the existing members of the EEC and later of the EU, along a time scale on which zero corresponds to the date of accession (1973, 1981, 1986 or 1995 depending on the countries).
27 The results of these calculations suggests that, in most of the cases examined, the convergence of fertility or mortality occurred essentially before entry into the European Community. This is particularly clear for fertility in Portugal and Spain (Figure 5a): for these two countries, which joined the EEC in 1986, the distance between the total fertility rate and the average for the member countries began to narrow ten years before their entry. On the other hand, fertility in Ireland did not start to decline until after the country had joined the EEC, in 1973, but Figure 5b, where the fertility rates are presented by calendar year, shows the close parallelism between the falls in period fertility in all three countries. The conclusion suggested by these observations is thus that in the three countries where fertility was highest in the 1950s and 1960s, its evolution depends less on the date of entry into the Community “mould” than on the period.
Difference between total fertility for each country and average total fertility for the European union, by number of years before or after membership (number of children per woman)
Difference between total fertility for each country and average total fertility for the European union, by number of years before or after membership (number of children per woman)
Total fertility (number of children per woman)
Total fertility (number of children per woman)
28 In the countries chosen to appraise the convergence of mortality (Figures 6a and 6b), the closing of the gap between infant mortality rates and the average rate for the member countries began even earlier. In Spain and in Austria, this average level was reached approximately five years before entry. The infant mortality rate for Portugal still lagged slightly, by five points, when the country joined, but spectacular improvement had been achieved prior to that. Italy, like Ireland in respect of fertility, registered a decline in infant mortality after joining the Common Market, but, as in the example above, the parallelism between the evolution of infant mortality in Italy and that in Spain (entry in 1986) or in Austria (entry in 1995) confirms that there is no obvious, direct link between European integration and demographic convergence.
Difference between the infant mortality rate for each country and the average rate for the European union, by number of years before or after membership
Difference between the infant mortality rate for each country and the average rate for the European union, by number of years before or after membership
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)
29 Turning lastly to migration, the situation of former emigration countries that have become ones of immigration warrants attention. Figure 7 displays the net migration rates for Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece by the length of time between the year of entry and the year of observation, and confirms that in the last three countries the reversal of migration flows began before entry. Here again Italy seems to be a special case, but an examination of net migration rates by calendar year shows that Italy acquired a positive migration balance at around the same time as the other countries, that is, in the 1990s.
Net migration rate (per 1,000 inhabitants) by number of years before or after membership, by 5-year periods
Net migration rate (per 1,000 inhabitants) by number of years before or after membership, by 5-year periods
30 All in all, the countries that presented the most considerable differences relative to the other countries of the Community have seen them decrease over time, either — more often than not — before they joined, or afterwards, but, whatever the case, this movement of convergence seems more closely linked to general trends than to their entry into the Community. Accession to the European Union in fact assumes an economic and social development that goes in tandem with low levels of fertility and mortality.
4 – Complementary population pyramids
31 The population pyramids of the twenty-five member countries of the European Union give an image of the long-term history of these coun-tries [3]. The mark left by the First World War is beginning to fade, though the shortfall of births caused by the Second World War remains clearly visible for the countries where the number of births declined sharply during the conflict. For the second half of the twentieth century, birth rate changes are responsible for a series of bulges and depressions in the pyramids, but these variations reflect national circumstances that do not have the Europe-wide dimension of the two world wars. These variations cancel out and are not visible in the pyramid for the EU as a whole (Figure 8), which is marked chiefly by a major and generalized phenomenon: the sharp fall in fertility observed from the 1960s, at varying dates depending on the country.
Population pyramid of the Europe of Twenty-Five, 1 January 2003
Population pyramid of the Europe of Twenty-Five, 1 January 2003
III – The European Union in the global context
32 In 2000, the twenty-five countries that currently make up the European Union represented around 7.5% of the world population estimated at over 6 billion, but their proportion varies widely by age group: 4% of young people under age 20, 16% of persons aged 60 and over (Table 4). One in seven of the world’s elderly people thus live in the EU, which counts slightly more elderly people than the Americas, and more than twice the number in Africa. This high proportion of elderly people explains why the mortality rate in the European Union (9.8 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants) is higher than in Asia and one point higher than the world average, although the health situation of the Union is the most favourable, at the scale of such a large population. The situation of the European Union relative to that of the other continents can also be appraised by comparing levels of natural increase: in the world, the surplus of births over deaths in 2000 was in the region of 80 million (132 million births less 53 million deaths). The EU accounts for only 0.4 million of this total. In relative terms, the rate of natural increase for the world stands at 13 per 1,000, which is sixteen times that of the EU !
The Europe of Fifteen in the world in 2000 (populations in millions)
The Europe of Fifteen in the world in 2000 (populations in millions)
33 The twenty-five countries of the European Union together contained in 2000 slightly more than 60% of the population of continental Europe, estimated at 728 million and which included, in addition to the Russian Federation, the European states issued from the collapse of the Soviet Union (the three Baltic States — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania — and Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova).
34 The last ten years have seen the establishment of a new balance of population growth in Europe. Since the 1990s, the population has been falling in central Europe, eastern Europe and Russia, primarily through an increased deficit of births to deaths and through emigration. In 2000, the natural decrease reached 0.9 million in Russia, causing this vast country’s population to fall by 0.7 million inhabitants, since the positive migration balance (0.2 million) far from compensated the birth deficit. In this context a growth differential has developed, with a growth rate for Russia of – 5.1 per 1,000, as against + 3.2 per 1,000 for the Twenty-Five (Table 5).
Population of the European Union, Russia, United States and Japan, around 2000
Population of the European Union, Russia, United States and Japan, around 2000
35 Around 2000, the population of the twenty-five countries that today make up the European Union represented three and a half times the population of Japan, and one and half times that of the United States. Yet the demographic dynamism of the EU appears modest compared with that of the latter country, where the growth rate reached 9.1 per 1,000 due to a natural increase 8.5 times that in the Union (rates of 6 per 1,000 and 0.7 per 1,000, respectively). It can be noted that while growth from migration is almost as high in the EU as in the United States (2.5 per 1,000 and 3.1 per 1,000, respectively), it accounts for only one third of total growth in the latter as against three quarters in the former. Relative to Japan, population growth is higher in the EU because of a stronger migration growth which compensates for a lower natural increase.
Overview
36 The enlargement of the European Union in 2004 is the most important in terms of absolute numbers since the setting up of the EEC. Most of all, however, it involves countries whose demography differs in major respects from that of the western European countries which composed the Europe of Fifteen. The origins of these differences lie in the history of central and eastern Europe over recent decades, and in particular the social, political and economic upheaval that marked the 1990s. Within the European Union two groups of countries can now be identified that are contrasted in terms of mortality (higher in the new continental member countries) and fertility (lower in the same countries), but also as regards their migration regimes, the old members all being immigration countries while the new members have migration balances that are negative or only slightly positive (excepting Cyprus and Malta).
37 This enlargement is likely to have major demographic implications, whether for the new members alone or for all the countries of the Union. Three subjects in particular will interest observers in the years to come. First, attention must be given to mortality trends in the new members from central and eastern Europe, all of which are lagging seriously behind those in the Europe of Fifteen. Success in closing this gap will be seen as the sign of an improvement in the health situation and more generally in the living conditions of the population. The second focus of attention will be fertility, currently very low in these same countries, to see whether improving economic and social conditions and a less uncertain future cause it to recover, to remain the same or indeed to decline still further. It is worth recalling that entry into the EU of the southern European countries (Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal) was not accompanied in their case by a recovery in fertility. Lastly, migration is an issue for the entire Union. When the freedom to move and settle in all the states of the Union is eventually accorded to residents of the new member states, will it result in large movements of population towards the wealthiest western countries, foremost among them Germany ? As for the eastward shift of the frontier of the European Union, it inevitably places a heavy responsibility on the countries — the Baltic States, Poland and Slovakia — who have the task of policing the Union’s eastern borders.
Bibliography
REFERENCES
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- Coale Ansley J., Watkins Susan C. (eds), 1986, The Decline of Fertility in Europe, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 484 p.
- Coleman David, 1992, “European demographic systems of the future: convergence or diversity ?”, in Le capital humain européen à l’aube du 21e siècle, Luxembourg, Eurostat, pp. 137-181.
- De Beer Joop, van Wissen Leo, 1999, Europe: One Continent, Different World Population Scenarios for the 21st Century, Dordrecht/Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers (European Studies of Population), 189 p.
- Festy Patrick, 1979, La fécondité des pays occidentaux de 1870 à 1970, Paris, INED/PUF (Tra-vaux et documents, Cahier n° 85), 392 p.
- Meslé France, 1991, “La mortalité dans les pays d’Europe de l’Est”, Population, 46(3), pp. 599-650.
- Monnier Alain, 2000, "La convergence : réalité et limites d’une notion’, in Régimes démographiques et territoires : les frontières en question, Paris, AIDELF, pp. 629-636.
- Monnier Alain, Rychtarikova Jitka, 1992, “The division of Europe into East and West”, Population: An English Selection, vol. 4, pp. 129-159.
Notes
-
[*]
Institut National d’Études Démographiques, Paris.
Translated by Godfrey I. Rogers. -
[1]
This text is an updated extract from a paper given at the Chaire Quetelet (November 2003) and intended for publication in the proceedings of that symposium. We are grateful to the organizers for granting permission to publish it in Population.
-
[2]
These countries are characterized by a mean length of life less than 70 years or a rate of infant mortality over 30 per 1,000 during the 1960s.
-
[3]
The population pyramids for each of the 25 member countries of the European Union can be consulted in issue 398 (February 2004) of Population & Societies available on-line on the INED web site (http:// www. ined. fr/ publications/ pop_et_soc).
