1The objective of this article is to investigate a simple but highly salient question in contemporary British politics: to what extent do the Labour Party’s elected representatives in the House of Commons (MPs), the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) and the Welsh Assembly (AMs) share common attitudes on the issue of Europe?

2It is a question worth considering for several reasons. Firstly, as part of its ideological reappraisal since 1983 the party has undertaken a volte-face in its approach to Europe. Party policy has shifted from endorsing withdrawal from the (then) European Economic Community (EEC) in 1983 to accepting pro-European policies. These policies have subsequently been pursued in office after 1997 to such effect that one scholar has claimed that “excepting only Edward Heath’s government, this Labour government can lay claim to being Britain’s most pro-European administration”. [1]

3Yet these and other ideological changes since 1983 were facilitated by an increased centralisation of power toward the party leadership and were accompanied by tightened intra-party discipline and a muting of public dissent within the party. Since Europe has always been an enormously volatile issue within the Labour Party we might therefore have cause to suspect that underlying formal changes in party policy statements and the tighter exercise of party discipline alternative dissenting perspectives toward Europe might continue to be found among Labour’s elected representatives.

4With the creation of devolved institutions in Scotland and Wales during the Blair administration’s first term in office the pattern of attitudes among Labour’s elected representatives towards Europe has become an even more complex and intriguing issue for research. Although the formulation and execution of European policy has remained a matter reserved to Westminster and Whitehall, Europe has thus far proven a far from peripheral issue for both the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. [2] Within the overlapping competencies created in a system of ‘multi-level governance’ the devolved institutions have been forced to confront the impact of European regulation, economic integration and structural funding. Indeed, these aspects of European integration have already provided the occasion for many of the most notable political events in the first two years of devolution. [3]

5Europe is therefore of grave importance to members of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly and for several reasons we could plausibly advance a hypothesis that the attitudes of Labour MPs, MSPs and AMs towards Europe should significantly diverge.

6Firstly, the Scottish and Welsh Labour parties operate in political environments which are distinctive from that confronted by the British Labour Party. In both Scotland and Wales Labour has had to be cognisant of the distinct national consciousness and political cultures of these nations. These have been engendered by the unique histories of these nations and symbolised and entrenched by the distinctive legal, educational, religious and media institutions in Scotland and by a Welsh-speaking minority in Wales. These distinct national contexts have provided the basis for significant nationalist parties in both Scotland and Wales. Moreover, both nationalist parties have developed pro-European strategies which aspire to ‘Independence in Europe’ in the case of the SNP and a more ambiguous call for ‘full national status in Europe’ from Plaid Cymru. The pattern of political and electoral competition in both nations has therefore diverged significantly from that in England where Labour’s principal political and electoral adversary has been an increasingly Eurosceptical Conservative Party. Accordingly, we might conclude that such differences in the general political environment would lead Scottish and Welsh Labour representatives to adopt perspectives which are different from those of their Westminster colleagues on European issues.

7Secondly, we might also expect to discover deviation in the attitudes of Labour representatives in Westminster, Edinburgh and Cardiff towards Europe given the characteristics of the political institutions created in Scotland and Wales. The Scotland and Government of Wales Acts of 1998 created devolved institutions which in their electoral systems, procedures and their patterns of party representation are distinct from the House of Commons. This institutional distinctiveness has corresponded with ambitions to introduce a ‘new politics’ in Scotland and Wales in which the elitist, confrontational and partisan design of Westminster politics would be displaced by an inclusive, participatory and consensual approach to politics. If such a ‘new politics’ has indeed taken hold its corollary may be the flourishing of distinctive attitudes and preferences among the members of these bodies.

8Thirdly, the characteristics of the Scottish and Welsh Labour parties themselves may lead us to expect divergent approaches from that of the party at Westminster. Both nations have radical and socialist traditions to which the Scottish and Welsh Labour parties have repeatedly laid claim. Moreover, it has been generally perceived that both parties have been less successfully ‘modernised’and as such are less whole hearted adherents to the ‘New Labour’ project than their English comrades. [4]

9Certainly, since the establishment of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly the Labour Party in London has found it difficult to relax its centralist reflexes with the result that there have been several high profile disputes between Labour in London and Edinburgh and Cardiff. The party in London has been accused of unwarranted interference in the selection of candidates for the Scottish Parliamentary elections [5] and the elections of the leadership of the Scottish and Welsh parties. [6] Consequently an attitude of some distrust has pervaded relations between Labour in the Celtic periphery and in London. [7] In this context we might therefore also expect to discover differences in the attitudes of Labour representatives in Westminster, Edinburgh and Cardiff toward European issues.

10Using data collected from two postal questionnaires conducted by the authors in 1998 and 2001 this article will explore whether the attitudes of Labour members of the House of Commons, Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly do indeed diverge on European issues. However, before outlining the methodology of our surveys and exploring the data in detail the transformation of Labour’s policy on Europe from the early 1980s will be briefly outlined.

The transformation of Labour’s European policies

11Since 1983 the Labour Party’s policy on European integration has incrementally, but no less dramatically, been transformed. The party entered the 1983 election committed to withdrawal from the (then) European Economic Community (EEC) within five years, arguing that the party’s Alternative Economic Strategy for economic growth, full employment and industrial policy was incompatible with continued membership of the EEC and irreconcilable with the Treaty of Rome. [8]

12After the party’s comprehensive defeat in the 1983 election however, there was a reappraisal of this position. The Labour Party Conference reconsidered the party’s European policy shortly after the election. Although the conference revisited concerns that the freedom of action of a future Labour Government would be compromised by continued EEC membership it also recognised Britain’s increasing integration into the EEC. Indeed, conference accepted the arguments of the party’s National Executive Committee (NEC) that the party should consider withdrawal not as an irrevocable objective but as an option contingent upon the future trajectory of the EEC. [9]

13Yet for some years this de-facto but grudging acceptance of membership of the EEC continued to be accompanied in the party’s policy documents by an insistent refusal to countenance European encroachments upon the UK’s sovereignty. Indeed, in 1986 the party opposed the passage of the Single European Act through the House of Commons and averred on several occasions that the obligations of membership of the EEC would not be permitted to curtail the economic strategy of a future Labour Government. [10]

14However, from 1988 party policy rapidly moved towards an emphatically pro-European stance. In February 1988, Neil Kinnock formally and unequivocally disavowed withdrawal from the EC. Likewise, the 1988 party conference endorsed a resolution which proposed that the party “must seek to use and adapt Community institutions to promote democratic socialism” [11]. Meet the Challenge, Make the Change of the following year confirmed for the party that “Britain’s future is in the European Community as it develops” [12] and the party successfully fought the 1989 European elections on a platform which emphasised the virtues of a ‘Social Europe’. Indeed, from 1989, Labour policy increasingly argued that the UK’s participation in European integration presented more opportunities than threats, viewing Europe as a vital forum in which sovereignty could be pooled in co-operation with other nations to ensure the realisation of its goals.

15The Euro-enthusiasm of the party after 1989 however has not been indiscriminate or uncritical however. Rather, Labour’s pro-Europeanism since 1989 has been tempered by a residual caution that has appraised developments within the European Union through the lens of pragmatic assessments of national advantage.

16Thus from 1989 party policy consistently repudiated any ambitions to construct a Federal Europe, viewing European integration instead as a process predicated upon closer intergovernmental co-operation between independent nation states rather than as an attempt to construct a United States of Europe. Likewise, from 1989 the party’s policy maintained that the UK’s national veto over defence, security, immigration, budgetary policy and international treaties and other areas of ‘national interest’ must be preserved.

17However, the party’s pragmatic pro-Europeanism was most evident in its attitudes towards Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and a European Single Currency. Despite the more positive approach to European integration expressed in Meet the Challenge, Make the Change (1989), Labour policy initially remained unenthusiastic about joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism. However, the following year these objections were abandoned and the party came to advocate entry at the earliest opportunity in the belief that membership of the ERM would “provide a stable framework for long-term investment and steady growth”. [13] A further year later and the party moved to a qualified acceptance of monetary union proposing British participation if genuine economic convergence were evident on monetary, employment and growth indicators. This position was again modified shortly before the 1997 election when a supplementary condition of the consent of the British electorate in a referendum was added to the party’s policy.

18Since taking office after its landslide electoral victory in 1997 the Blair government has largely pursued the kind of pragmatic pro-Europeanism which its policy documents promised in opposition. The Prime Minister and his colleagues have consistently repeated their desire for the UK to play a positive and constructive role in Europe. [14] This has seen the government rebuild relations with other members of the EU and end the UK opt-out from the social chapter negotiated by the Major government. In addition the Labour government has supported the enlargement of the EU, extensions in majority voting in certain areas where this has been deemed to be in the national interest and has sought to strengthen co-operation in foreign policy and defence while ensuring the primacy of NATO in collective defence. Yet equally, the government has tenaciously held onto UK vetoes on tax, social security and border controls and has insistently presented an inter-governmentalist vision of the future trajectory of the EU.

19Moreover, notwithstanding widely reported rifts within the Cabinet [15], the government has practised a positive but nonetheless highly pragmatic approach on the most contentious aspect of the European debate in Britain: membership of the single currency. In October 1997, the Chancellor, Gordon Brown, reaffirmed that, in principle, Britain should join a successful single currency. Yet Brown simultaneously pledged that the government would only recommend membership if such a course of action proved to be in the national economic interest. This was enshrined in five economic tests: evidence of sustainable convergence between the UK economy and the economies of the Eurozone, evidence of sufficient economic flexibility to cope with membership and evidence of positive effects of membership on investment, the financial services sector and employment. Such a strategy has allowed the Labour government to successfully postpone any decision on entry throughout Labour’s first term in office and, as we write, despite rumour and counter rumour, a recommendation to enter appears no closer in Labour’s second term.

20Nevertheless, as this brief review has hopefully demonstrated, Labour has transformed its policy on Europe, abandoning outright hostility for a pragmatic but nonetheless broad pro-Europeanism. Equipped with this understanding we can now turn to examine the extent to which such pro-European policy movements have been reflected in the attitudes of Labour’s elected representatives in the House of Commons, Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly respectively.

Conducting the Survey

21Our analysis of the attitudes of Labour MPs, MSPs and AMs towards Europe draws upon data collected from two postal surveys. The first of these surveys was conducted among all 659 members of the House of Commons in the middle months of 1998 (ESRC R00022397). The second survey, using a revised version of the 1998 questionnaire was distributed to the 129 members of the Scottish Parliament and the 60 members of the National Assembly for Wales in the early months of 2001 (ESRC R000223242). Both questionnaires were comprised of over 50 attitude questions on various aspects of European integration. 26 questions were common to both questionnaires.

22The overall response rate to the 1998 questionnaire was 39 per cent and 33 per cent of Labour MPs replied. The total response rate of the 2001 survey among members of the Scottish Parliament was 52 per cent and 50 per cent of Labour MSPs returned completed questionnaires. Finally, the total response rate among members of the National Assembly for Wales was 55 per cent with 50 per cent of Labour AMs replying. As these figures suggest, and as Table 1 shows, Labour respondents in all three institutions are slightly under-represented in all three institutions. However, in neither institution are these differences of a magnitude sufficient to cause us to doubt the reliability of our findings.

Table 1

Table 1 Response Rate N As% of As% of As% of Difference Parliamentary respondents MSPs, AM’s Party MPs Labour 138 33 54 63-9 MPs Labour 28 50 42 43-1 MSPs Labour 14 50 44 47-3 AMs

Attitudes to sovereignty, institutional and constitutional matters

23Given its governmental experiences and the influence of Britain’s political culture, the Labour Party has, for the greater part of its history, never been predisposed to extensive reflection upon the character of the British State. Rather the party has reflexively accepted the neutrality and transformative capacities of the British State. Moreover, “Labour politicians have been conditioned, as much by as Conservatives, by the Westminster model”. [16] As such the party has, in general, exhibited an extraordinary attachment to the sovereignty of the British Parliament and the British people. This combination of nostrums has, in the past, had profound consequences for Labour’s approach to European integration. As Jones and Keating have suggested, European integration long “proved intractable to Labour because it threatened the autonomy of the British state and the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament, two concepts and two institutions to which the Labour Party has been committed emotionally and strategically since its inception”. [17] As such it is only appropriate that the point of departure for our analysis should be to examine the attitudes of Labour MPs, MSPs and AM’s toward sovereignty, institutional and constitutional matters.

24Table 2 shows however, that such historic concerns about parliamentary sovereignty vis-à-vis European institutions fail to motivate most Labour representatives in Westminster, Edinburgh and Cardiff. As the responses to statement 2.1 make plain, there is little support among either Labour MPs, MSPs or AMs for the notion that the UK’s sovereignty is indivisible and cannot be pooled. Amongst Labour MPs and MSPs only 22 per cent strongly agree or agree with statement 2.1 while 21 per cent of Labour AMs adopt similar positions. Nevertheless, a greater proportion of Labour MSPs and AMs appear undecided on this statement (32 per cent and 36 per cent respectively) than their colleagues at Westminster. Such circumspection in Scotland and Wales means that while a majority (61 per cent) of Labour MPs disagree or strongly disagree with the proposition, such positions only attract the support of a plurality of Labour MSPs and AMs (47 per cent). Nonetheless, when taken alongside statement 2.2 this serves to underline the extent to which Labour’s elected representatives are dismissive of the constitutional objections against closer integration with Europe. A clear majority of Labour representatives in each institution evidently have no inclination to reassert parliamentary sovereignty vis-à-vis European legislation. Indeed, a slightly greater proportion of Labour MSPs and AMs disagree or strongly disagree with statement 2.2 (82 per cent and 78 per cent) than their Westminster colleagues.

25As noted above, one of the cornerstones of Labour’s approach to European integration has been a persistent opposition to any federalist ambitions for the future trajectory of the European Union. As such, the responses to question 2.3 are particularly intriguing. In the Scottish Parliament we discover a general correspondence between the attitudes of Labour MSPs and the axioms of party policy. Although 50 per cent of Labour MSPs appear undecided on this issue just 16 per cent are prepared to endorse a federal future for the European Union. In contrast however, this issue divides Labour MPs into two identically sized opposing camps (39 per cent). Yet while, as in Scotland, a large proportion of Labour members in the Welsh Assembly are apparently undecided on federalism (43 per cent), only 7 per cent disagree with embracing a federal Europe leaving the remaining 50 per cent to repudiate the party’s official line.

26However, although Labour members of the House of Commons, Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly exhibit differing levels of commitment toward a federal Europe they are nonetheless reunited on the final statement in Table 2. As noted above, perhaps the most dramatic aspect of the revision of Labour’s European policy since the early 1980s has been the replacement of a policy of withdrawal with an ambition to play a positive and constructive role in the EU. On this matter there is emphatic support among Labour’s elected representatives in the House of Commons and the devolved institutions. 96 per cent of Labour MPs and 97 per cent of Labour MSPs reject withdrawal from the EU. Amongst Labour AMs opposition to withdrawal is even more categorical: all either disagree or strongly disagree with statement 2.4.

Table 2

Table 2 Attitudes on Sovereignty, Institutional and Constitutional Matters Strongly Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Agree%%%% Disagree% 2.1 Sovereignty cannot be pooled Labour MPs 4 18 17 41 20 Labour 4 18 32 43 4 MSPs Labour AMs 0 21 36 43 4 2.2 An act of Parliament should be passed to establish explicitly the ultimate supremacy of the UK Parliament over EU legislation Labour MPs 5 8 22 50 15 Labour 0 0 19 78 4 MSPs Labour AMs 0 7 14 64 14 2.3 The UK should embrace the concept of a federal Europe Labour MPs 15 24 23 29 10 Labour 4 12 50 35 0 MSPs Labour AMs 14 36 43 7 0

2.4 The UK should withdraw from the European Union Labour MPs 2 2 2 23 73 Labour 0 0 4 29 68 MSPs Labour AMs 0 0 0 7 93

Attitudes towards the Single Currency

27As was noted above, amongst Labour MPs, MSPs and AMs alike there is general support for pooling sovereignty and little inclination to reverse the encroachments which EU legislation has made upon the UK’s parliamentary sovereignty. Membership of a European single currency however is another matter and would undoubtedly represent a novel and fundamental challenge to the UK’s economic sovereignty. Yet the responses to statement 3.1 reveal that there are few of our Labour respondents who fear that joining a single currency would mean the eclipse of the UK as a sovereign nation. Just 13 per cent of Labour MPs recorded that they strongly agreed or agreed with statement 3.1 and in Scotland and Wales such fears are even less apparent among Labour representatives. Amongst Labour members of the Scottish Parliament just 4 per cent agreed with this proposition while Labour members of the Welsh Assembly were even more emphatic: all our respondents disagreed or disagreed strongly with the notion that joining the Eurozone would fundamentally compromise the UK’s status as a sovereign nation.

28However, the British Left has exhibited a much wider range of concerns about membership of the European single currency than that of its impact upon the UK’s status as a sovereign nation. One of the most prominent and persistent of these has been the belief that membership will transfer control of monetary policy away from the Treasury and Bank of England toward an unaccountable European Central Bank irredeemably preoccupied with the precepts of monetary stability to the exclusion of all other economic objectives. Statement 3.2 serves to gauge the extent of this concern and reveals clear majorities among the Labour Party in the House of Commons, the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly that repudiate such arguments. Nevertheless, marginal differences do reveal themselves in this pattern of responses. In both the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly a greater proportion of our Labour respondents were apparently undecided or diffident on this question (21 per cent and 36 per cent) than among their Labour colleagues in Westminster. More strikingly however the relative proportion agreeing or strongly agreeing with statement 3.2 is significantly lower among Labour respondents in the Welsh Assembly (7 per cent) than either the Scottish Parliament or the House of Commons (21 per cent).

29As was noted above, while Labour’s policy has been in favour in principle of British participation in the single currency since 1991 this has been a commitment qualified by the insistence that membership must also serve the UK’s long-term economic interest and subsequently enshrined in Gordon Brown’s ‘five tests’. Statement 3.3 allows us to consider this very issue by illustrating the extent to which Labour’s elected representatives in the House of Commons, Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly agree that participation in the Eurozone is essential to the UK’s future prosperity. Indeed, our Labour respondents are revealed to be somewhat less unequivocal than the government with clear majorities in all three institutions agreeing or strongly agreeing that membership of the Euro is crucial to the UK’s future prosperity. Among Labour MPs and MSPs these majorities are clear enough (63 per cent and 67 per cent respectively). However, amongst our Labour respondents in Wales, a region hit particularly badly by the ‘branch plant syndrome’ recently [18] this approaches unanimity, with 92 per cent linking single currency membership to future prosperity.

30Finally, Table 3 also considers Labour’s commitment to hold a referendum prior to entry into the single currency. This was a relatively late addendum to the party’s European policy, being adopted shortly before the 1997 election and served both to place an already heavily divided Conservative Party under further pressure on the issue whilst simultaneously muting any rumblings of internal dissent within the Labour Party itself. Nonetheless, we might expect to discover dissent among Labour’s elected representatives over this commitment. Firstly, there are a series of well used arguments against the use of referenda that might inspire opposition within the party. These include arguments that a referendum would allow representatives to evade responsibility on such a difficult issue and that resort to such a device is incompatible with such nostrums of representative government in Britain as the mandate and the sovereignty of parliament. Moreover, we might expect to discover dissent of a more pragmatic character on this commitment among those members of Labour’s ranks who favour entry into a single currency. Opinion polls have consistently registered the opposition of a majority of the British population towards participation in the Euro. As such Labour’s pro-Europeans may be nervous lest the British public choose to follow the example set by the Danes in their referendum on membership of the single currency in September 2000. However, as Table 3 shows, the clear majority of Labour’s representatives in the House of Commons, the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly repudiate any suggestion that entry into the single currency should not be submitted for popular approval in a referendum.

Table 3

Table 3 Attitudes on the Single Currency Strongly Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Agree%%%% Disagree% 3.1 Joining the Single Currency will signal the end of the UK as a sovereign nation Labour 7 6 7 49 31 MPs Labour 0 4 4 68 25 MSPs Labour 0 0 0 50 50 AMs 3.2 The UK should never permit its monetary policy to be determined by a European Central Bank Labour 5 16 16 52 10 MPs Labour 0 21 21 57 0 MSPs Labour 0 7 36 43 14 AMs 3.3 Membership of the Euro is crucial to the UK’s future prosperity Labour 21 42 18 11 8 MPs Labour 11 56 19 15 0 MSPs Labour 21 71 0 7 0 AMs

3.4 There is no need for a referendum before entering a single currency Labour 2 10 7 38 43 MPs Labour 0 14 14 64 7 MSPs Labour 0 7 7 79 7 AMs

National Security

31Throughout the Labour Party’s history decisions on foreign policy and defence strategy have always had an enormous capacity to divide the party. [19] When such issues have been coupled to aspirations toward European integration and have seemed to threaten the Atlantic Alliance, as occurred most notably during the proposals for a European Defence Community as a solution to the difficulties of West German rearmament in the early 1950s, they have proven even more divisive. As such, the Labour government’s participation in the European Security and Defence Policy and its recent decision to provide 12,500 troops, 18 warships and 72 combat aircraft to the European Rapid Reaction Force were always likely to be controversial. Indeed, former Labour MPs Lord Healey and Lord Owen recently joined with Lord Carrington and Malcolm Rifkind to urge “the utmost caution in proceeding with this openly political project”. [20] Table 4 shows that there are indeed significant divisions on both a European Army and the use of qualified majority voting in the areas of foreign defence policy within the Labour Party in the House of Commons. Thus while 42 per cent of Labour MPs oppose blocking the use of QMV in foreign and defence policy, 37 per cent support such a proposal. Equally, the 35 per cent of Labour MPs who fear that a single European Army would undermine the UK’s security is only slightly outnumbered by the 37 per cent who disagree or strongly disagree. The responses of Labour MSPs and Labour AMs on these issues however prove somewhat different. Thus on both issues there are substantial proportions of Labour MSPs and AMs who are either undecided or neutral on these questions. 42 per cent of Labour MSPs fall into the ‘neither’ category on the question of QMV (statement 4.1) while the majority of Labour AMs (54%) respond in the same way. Likewise, on impact of a European Army on the security of the UK some 36 per cent of Labour MSPs are undecided. Nonetheless, in both the Labour Party in the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly the proportion of respondents adopting a ‘Eurosceptic’ position on these issues proves to be much smaller than amongst the party in the Commons. Indeed, it is striking that on the matter of a European Army a clear majority (86 per cent) of Labour AMs deny that such an innovation would threaten the security of the UK.

Table 4

Table 4 Attitudes on National Security Strongly Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Agree%%%% Disagree% 4.1 Britain should block the use of QMV in the areas of foreign and defence policy Labour 11 26 22 37 5 MPs Labour 0 15 42 42 0 MSPs Labour 0 8 54 39 0 AMs 4.2 A single European Army would undermine rather than underpin the security of the UK Labour 6 29 28 32 5 MPs Labour 0 7 36 54 4 MSPs Labour 0 0 14 86 0 AMs

Attitudes to European fiscal policy

32It was noted above that, since 1997, the Labour Government has been adamant in its determination to preserve a number of the UK’s national vetoes in Europe. One such veto that has been obstinately defended by the Blair administration has been in the area of taxation. Labour in office has consistently refused to yield over a period of several years to German proposals for an EU withholding tax on savings. Moreover, during the negotiations on the Treaty of Nice, the Labour administration successfully forestalled any surrender of the UK’s veto on taxation, much to the dismay of Romano Prodi and other members of the Commission. [21] Table 5 allows us to explore whether this degree of hostility towards the creation of a European fiscal policy extends throughout the Labour Party, not only in the House of Commons but in the devolved institutions also.

33The responses to statements 5.1 through 5.5 suggest that behind the intransigence of their government’s policy lies a pattern of attitudes among Labour’s MPs, MSPs and AMs which is somewhat more divided. The responses to statement 5.4 show that amongst Labour MPs, MSPs and AMs alike there is in fact a majority which supports the principle of harmonising environmental taxation throughout the European Union. Indeed, two thirds of Labour AMs support such a proposal. Similarly, amongst Labour MPs and AMs there is substantial support for the harmonisation of customs and excise duties in the EU (56 per cent and 50 per cent respectively). However, on this issue the plurality of Labour MSPs is opposed (40 per cent). Indeed, on the remaining proposals for the harmonisation of company taxation (5.1), VAT (5.2) and personal taxation (5.3) the greater proportion of Labour MPs, MSPs and AMs are all opposed. This opposition appears strongest among Labour’s representatives in all three institutions in regard to personal taxation, with 72 per cent of Labour MSPs, 65 per cent of Labour MPs and 64 per cent of Labour AMs either disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with this proposal. However, on the matters of company taxation (5.1) and VAT (5.2) where Labour MPs are almost evenly divided into opposing camps, a much smaller proportion of their colleagues in Edinburgh and Cardiff are inclined to support these proposals for harmonisation. Attitudes on budgetary matters

Table 5

Table 5 Attitudes on European Fiscal Policy Strongly/ Agree Neither Disagree Strongly/ agree Disagree 5.1 Company taxation should be harmonised within the EU Labour 8 33 16 37 5 MPs Labour 0 20 28 48 4 MSPs Labour 7 14 29 50 0 AMs

5.2 VAT should be harmonised within the EU Labour 7 33 16 39 5 MPs Labour 0 24 24 48 4 MSPs Labour 0 7 36 57 0 AMs 5.3 Personal taxation should be harmonised within the EU Labour 4 14 18 55 10 MPs Labour 0 4 24 64 8 MSPs Labour 0 7 29 57 7 AMs 5.4 Environmental taxation should be harmonised within the EU Labour 10 44 14 27 5 MPs Labour 0 50 21 25 4 MSPs Labour 14 50 21 14 0 AMs 5.5 Customs and excise should be harmonised within the EU Labour 10 46 14 26 5 MPs Labour 0 36 24 36 4 MSPs Labour 7 43 21 29 0 AMs

34The Blair Government has also been a consistent supporter of enlargement of the European Union and welcomed the Nice Treaty that will allow the first new members from post-Communist Eastern Europe to join the EU by 2004. Such a process of enlargement will, as the Nice Treaty recognised, have many consequences for the institutions and procedures of the EU but it will have a particularly significant impact upon the EU’s budget. Indeed, the accession of East European nations will push down the average income in the EU such that many of the current beneficiaries of EU structural funding will inevitably be judged to be above the threshold for EU assistance on the scale that they presently enjoy. Table 6 allows us to investigate the attitudes of our Labour respondents to these budgetary dilemmas and here we discover a somewhat contradictory pattern of attitudes. Amongst Labour MPs and AMs the majority clearly favour an increase in EU structural funds to accompany enlargement (68 per cent and 64 per cent respectively in statement 6.2). However, while only a negligible proportion of Labour MSPs oppose an increase in structural funding (7 per cent), the remainder are equally divided between support and a neutral position. A similar scale of division is also revealed among Labour’s MPs on expansion of the EU’s budget (statement 6.1): 35 per cent support a enlarged EU budget while 38 per cent are opposed. In turn, the majority (56 per cent) of Labour MSPs are undecided on the matter, while the plurality of Labour AMs (43 per cent) support increases in the EU’s budget.

Table 6

Table 6 Attitudes on the Budget Strongly Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Agree%%%% Disagree% 6.1 The EU’s budget should be enlarged Labour 8 27 27 31 7 MPs Labour 0 30 56 15 0 MSPs Labour 0 43 36 21 0 AMs 6.2 An increase in structural funds is essential for EU enlargement Labour 11 57 18 13 2 MPs Labour 0 46 46 7 0 MSPs Labour 7 57 14 21 0 AMs

Attitudes on Economic Policy

35Finally, it is important to recognise that accompanying the transformation in Labour’s European policy since the early 1980s have been a series of parallel changes to the party’s broader political economy. [22] Such changes have seen Labour abandon the dirigiste and protectionist ‘Alternative Economic Strategy’ advanced at the 1983 election in favour of a supply side strategy which repudiates traditional Keynesian macro-economic management, public ownership and other traditional nostrums of Labour’s political economy. Indeed, Tony Blair has been evangelical in his fervour to convert the rest of the European Union to the virtues of this economic approach and is reported to be preparing a White Paper on EU economic policy in advance of the Barcelona summit in 2002 which will assert this vision of economic liberalisation as a model for Europe. [23]

36As such, the responses to the questions posed in Table 7 prove to be especially intriguing for the insights that they provide about the extent to which New Labour’s political economy receives endorsement among members of the three institutions. On all three statements we discover that the majority of Labour MPs endorsed economic attitudes more consonant with the beliefs of ‘Old Labour’ than the political economy of ‘New Labour’. Accordingly the majority of Labour respondents in Westminster rejected the need to reduce social costs, rejected the proposal that labour market inflexibility is responsible for unemployment and reaffirmed their faith in the continuing relevance of public ownership. Nonetheless, the size of the significant minorities of Labour MPs who either adopted diametrically opposing positions or who proclaimed themselves diffident on these issues is striking. In total 35 per cent of Labour MPs endorsed or were neutral towards statement 7.1, 25 per cent supported or were neutral toward statement 7.2 and 41 per cent either opposed or were neutral towards public ownership as a mechanism of social justice.

37It was suggested at the outset of this article that there is a widespread perception that Labour parties in Scotland and Wales have been less than willing converts to ‘New Labour’. As such it is particularly interesting to note that among Labour MSPs and Labour AMs there are significant minorities, who like their colleagues in Westminster, refuse to endorse positions associated with Labour’s traditional political economy. Thus although the proportion of Labour MSPs and AMs who supported or were neutral to reducing employers social costs (22 per cent and 23 per cent respectively) is slightly smaller than the corresponding proportion of Labour MPs, on questions of labour market flexibility and public ownership very similar percentages proportions refuse to endorse Labour’s traditional stance. The one exception proves to be the responses of Labour AMs. Amongst these respondents 50 per cent either disagreed with or were neutral toward the proposition that public ownership is crucial to the achievement of social justice. On this evidence the Labour Party in the Welsh Assembly is much less the ideological descendant of Nye Bevan than the convert of Tony Blair.

Table 7

Table 7 Attitudes on Economic Policy Strongly Agree% Neither Disagree Strongly Agree%%% Disagree% 7.1 A reduction in social costs placed on the employer is essential for job creation in the UK Labour 3 15 17 54 11 MPs Labour 0 4 18 57 21 MSPs Labour 0 8 15 62 15 AMs 7.2 Inflexibility in European labour markets is the principal cause of unemployment Labour 2 8 15 54 21 MPs Labour 0 4 25 57 14 MSPs Labour 0 14 14 57 14 AMs 7.3 Public ownership remains crucial to the achievement of social justice Labour 19 39 13 24 4 MPs Labour 11 52 30 7 0 MSPs Labour 14 36 21 29 0 AMs

Conclusion

38The leadership of the contemporary Labour Party has long been haunted by the spectre of dissent and schism that served habitually in the past to thwart the electoral ambitions of the party. Indeed, the government’s reluctance to adopt a more positive and proactive approach to participation in a single currency has been seen, in part, as a necessary factor of party management given the evident caution of the Chancellor and his acolytes. Equally, the subtext of relationships between the central party and the parties in the devolved institutions has created an impression that the party in London fears that relaxation of central control will allow dissent to flourish and policies to diverge in the Labour parties of Scotland and Wales.

39At a general level, the pattern of attitudes that we have uncovered amongst Labour MPs, MSPs and AMs is striking. Across a broad range of the most salient European policies there is one general conclusion which is inescapable: the parliamentary elite of the Labour Party is now clearly and emphatically pro-European, not only at the centre but in the Celtic periphery alike. The vast majority of Labour MPs, MSPs and AMs have no fundamental constitutional objections to European integration. They repudiate any suggestion of withdrawal from the EU. They appear to have few reservations about membership of the single currency, indeed, the majority appear to view it as a prerequisite for the nation’s future economic prosperity. There is also a fundamental agreement that participation in the single currency must be preceded by a referendum.

40Nonetheless, other aspects of the European debate clearly prove more contentious and we have uncovered significant divisions and uncertainty on issues including the concept of a federal Europe, the consequences of European foreign policy and defence co-operation, attitudes towards tax harmonisation in the EU and the priorities for European economic policies.

41This article explored at its outset a number of potential reasons to suspect that the intersection of the institutional innovations of devolution with the contentious character of European issues would lead us to discover significant divergences between the attitudes of Labour MPs and their fellow partisans in the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly on Europe. Insofar as Labour MSPs and AMs have been shown to share the same broad pro-European inclinations as their colleagues in the House of Commons any suspicion of dramatic conflict between the Labour parties in London and the Celtic periphery must be immediately disavowed. Nevertheless, although the broad pro-European contours of attitudes in these institutions are similar they are not identical.

42Firstly, it would appear that indecision on many of these issues amongst Labour MSPs and AMs is somewhat more extensive than amongst Labour MPs. If we look at the 17 statements in Tables 2 through 6 we discover that the proportion of both Labour MSPs and AMs responding ‘neither’ is higher than that recorded amongst Labour MPs on 10 of these statements. Secondly, and more significantly however, analysis of these tables also clearly reveals a lower level of Euroscepticism in the Labour Party in Edinburgh and Cardiff in general than is evident in the party at Westminster. On 10 of these statements, the proportion of MSPs offering Eurosceptic responses is smaller than amongst the Labour Party in the Commons. In Wales the contrast is even more marked however, on 14 of these statements AMs record a lower level of Eurosceptic responses than their fellow partisans in the House of Commons. Given that the Eurosceptic minority is small in the Labour Party in the House of Commons to begin with, these differences are often slight. However, on three aspects of the European debate the attitudes of Labour AMs are significantly different. Thus Labour AMs are clearly more willing to contemplate a federal Europe, much more concerned that participation in the single currency is an economic necessity and significantly less concerned about the implications of participation in a European army.

43These broad conclusions will no doubt provide succour to the Labour Party in London. On the vast majority of these European issues at least, it should expect to encounter no greater degree of Eurosceptic opposition to its present policies and approach than it would expect to meet in the House of Commons. However, impressive though this consensus is between the parliamentary elites of Labour Party at the centre and in the Celtic periphery it should not be taken for granted. It has to be remembered that thus far the devolved institutions are but two years old. As the Labour parties in the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly gain experience and confidence and engage with no doubt contentious European issues a transformation of attitudes cannot be foreclosed. If for this reason only the attitudes of Labour’s Celtic representatives towards Europe should be kept under careful review.

Acknowledgments

44The Members of Parliament Project survey team would like to express their sincere thanks to those Members of the House of Commons, Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales who agreed to participate in the 1998 and 2001 surveys. In addition we would also like to thank the MPs and academics who sponsored our surveys. Without their endorsement and support the response rates would undoubtedly have been much lower. They are: Roger Casale, Jimmy Hood, James Plaskitt, Bill Rammel (Labour); Peter Bottomley, Julie Kirkbride (Conservative); Nick Harvey, David Heath (Liberal Democrat); John Swinney (Scottish National Party); David Marquand, Martin Holmes (Oxford University); Philip Norton (Hull University); Pippa Norris (Harvard University); Alice Brown (University of Edinburgh); Lynn Bennie (University of Aberdeen); Brian Girvin (University of Glasgow); James Mitchell (University of Strathclyde); Jonathan Bradbury (University of Swansea); David Broughton, J. Barry Jones, Denis Balsom (University of Cardiff); Richard Wyn Jones (University of Aberystwyth).