The French space conquest and its autonomous access to outer space

5 Before it became a space power in 1965, France had relied on cooperation. To begin with, it had benefited from the skills of German engineers in the aftermath of the Second World War. These engineers allowed for rapid progress on the French studies in rocket engines that were already in motion. [9] These technological developments were a military affair, given the historic context under which they took place. Though it had been initiated under the Fourth Republic, the French nuclear and space programme witnessed a new impulse after General Charles de Gaulle came to power in 1958. On December 19, 1961, the National Centre for Space Studies was created (CNES) – which constitutes the symbolic date of birth for French space policy. At the time, France still possessed a launching pad in the Algerian Sahara which it had built in the early 1950s, though it decided to vacate the area when the Évian Accords were signed on March 8, 1962, that set Algeria on its path to independence. Before this, however, it launched the Diamant space rocket on November 25, 1965, which put the Astérix satellite into orbit and converted France into the third space power of that time. The French departure then became effective in 1967. [10] At that point, France was left without a launching pad and had to rely on the United States for its satellite launches, until it built the Guiana Space Centre (CSG) in 1968. This arrangement was motivated in particular the reluctance of the Americans to allow commercial use of French satellites. As such, the former refused to send out all satellites that France could potentially trade-off with third-parties. In March 1964, the French government thus decided to build a launchpad at Kourou, in French Guyana, in order to be able to launch its own vectors. France’s general quest for strategic autonomy is therefore captured here in the idea of obtaining a free and open access to outer space.

Franco-American scientific cooperation

6 The scientific domain is illustrative of Franco-American space cooperation. Projects in this domain are carried out by each national space agency, namely the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Centre National des Études Spatiales (CNES). Partnerships and exchange programmes here are numerous and long-lasting. One can cite the Jason programme, [11] the discussions surrounding the issue of space debris in orbit, [12] and their joint initiative dubbed mission Curiosity that allowed them to send a rover to Mars on August 6, 2012. Civil cooperation is made possible by the pursuit of common scientific interests, and the strong trust relationship that scientists have established on both sides of the Atlantic through countless exchanges. Their shared missions and joint programmes provide clear testimonies in this regard. Hence, scientific cooperation seems quite simple to establish, even during periods of suspicion between the two states.

7 Conversely, space cooperation in the military domain is scarce because of how difficult it is to establish. Indeed, this particular subset of space cooperation touches upon national sovereignty by definition. Trust is therefore limited, even amongst allies, with military cooperation being used now more than ever as a bargaining chip. The dual civilian-military function of space surveillance is therefore of interest, since “non-sensitive” cooperation around shared databases can first be established before the states choose to scale their cooperation with the exchange of classified intel.

Dual function in cooperation: the political issue at stake for space surveillance

8 Since the Cold War, the “democratised” access to space technologies has enabled an ever-growing number of countries to conquer space. The amount of space objects, in this respect, has increased significantly. Currently, some 30,000 objects of at least 10 cm – including 1,400 active satellites – are floating in space, along with millions of small debris starting at 1 mm. [13] Active satellites represent an entire cohort of their own in need of regulation, known as space traffic management, while the corollary effect of this rise in orbital objects is the mathematical increase of the risk of collision. The exponential rise of space debris has been studied as far back as the 1970s by NASA engineers, and Donald Kessler in particular. In fact, the latter published an article back in 1978 [14] that marked a turning point for American policymakers in their recognition of the problem. What is more, the collisional cascading which he theorised was eventually named after him as the Kessler syndrome. The theory accounts for the proliferation of space debris in lay terms by explaining how these could reach a threshold after which space debris might begin to produce more debris on its own, thus causing a chain reaction that would put an end to human activity in outer space. This simplified take on the problem that resulted from a scientific theorisation has proven crucial for its widespread diffusion. [15] And yet the issue of space debris proliferation is not liable to disappear given the future projects that aim for a mega-constellation of satellites, as with the private initiative from One Web. [16] Private corporations behind the “New Space” [17] phenomenon now have a massive presence in outer space, even though such corporations give little consideration to the space debris that they generate. Beyond these risks, the users of outer space also face different threat models. The French Minister of the Armed Forces, Florence Parly, mentioned one of them in her address to the CNES on September 7, 2018. [18] According to her account, a Russian satellite seemingly came into close contact with a Franco-Italian military satellite that was in geostationary orbit. This apparent espionage attempt [19] illustrates what she refers to as a ‘miniature star wars’. [20]

9 The rest of her demonstration focused on the need to conduct operations in outer space. For this to be the case, space surveillance must be turned into a real issue, so as to pinpoint hostile action and provide an adequate response. She also noted that France still partially relies on American databases, though it aims to become autonomous, and that the GRAVES system [21] has allowed France to reach ‘a more balanced cooperation’ with its American counterpart. All of these reflections, one should note, were formalised in France’s Space Defence Strategy of 2019.

10 If space surveillance is slowly becoming a political issue at stake, it is because the usage of space services has become essential for the French society to properly function, and western societies in general. And yet, the means that have been put into place so far to protect these space services have not matched the degree of dependence that societies have on them. Such dependence proves a source of vulnerability as it exposes satellites to the existing risks and threats of outer space, which have risen these past couple years. While it constitutes the leading space power, the United States is the most dependent and for that matter the most vulnerable of all states in outer space. As such, it has been looking to strengthen its resilience by all means. [22] In this regard, the American willingness to further cooperate on space surveillance stems from its aim to raise its total number of sensors across the world. In this regard, the American strategist James Clay Moltz goes as far as to speak of a true ‘allied space network’. [23] To this end, their constantly-changing space surveillance network receives data from the French sensors of the GRAVES system and the SATAM [24] tracking radars. Aside for resilience, their goal is therefore to dissuade a potential assailant from taking action, since the latter would undoubtedly be detected.

11 While the two protagonists perceive the benefits of scientific cooperation as a positive-sum game, the benefits of security and defence cooperation are rather seen as a zero-sum game [25] – one loses what the other gains. As such, the transferred data does in fact reveal the solid technical capabilities of the French sensors. In this sense, the ‘more balanced cooperation’ which the French Minister evoked results from the progress that France has made in terms of its capabilities. Technological assets have thus become a diplomatic asset that fosters exchanges between the two nations. Though France is not a member of the Five Eyes, [26] its GRAVES system has come to reshape Franco-American relations in the area of space surveillance.

12 The GRAVES system, delivered to the French Air Force in December 2005, is capable of detecting all objects as little as 1 m² that pass over French territory bellow 3,330,000 feet. The procurement of these capabilities – at first meant for demonstration purposes – has allowed France to detect unreferenced flying objects. In this respect, the system has beaten all expectations, with its directory containing no less than 3,000 objects at the present time. This operational military asset thus became a diplomatic asset from the moment it proved capable of detecting unknown military satellites. Once a satellite is identified, it puts France in a position to initiate talks and strike deals with the relevant actor. Acquiring these technological surveillance capabilities has therefore reaffirmed France’s credentials as a space power. What is more, it has served as a bargaining chip that turns France into a credible partner with whom states do well to cooperate, at least to know what it is capable of detecting. This whole episode, in fact, constitutes the prelude to Franco-American space cooperation. Indeed, after two years of informal existence, the Franco-American Military Forum on Space Cooperation is unveiled on May 14, 2009. Thereafter, a declaration of principles is signed on February 8, 2011, between the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Alain Juppé and the American Secretary of Defence Robert Gates – the goal being to foster Franco-American cooperation in the area of space surveillance. In 2015, an accord on the exchange of confidential data is concluded. The French Minister of Defence, Jean-Yves Le Drian, follows up in 2016 by signing a common declaration of intent with his American counterpart, Ashton Carter, on military cooperation in general and space cooperation in particular. A final important step is taken in early 2020 when France becomes an integral member of the Combined Space Operations (CspO) initiative, which is meant to coordinate the efforts undertaken by each of the seven participating states in the field of space defence. Alongside these agreements, France has also been invited to partake in a number of exercises at the behest of the United States, despite these being initially restricted to the Five Eyes and Germany. The first one took place in 2014, named the Space Situational Awareness Table Top Exercise. The latest one to date was held in 2019, dubbed Global Sentinel, and gathered Germany, France, Japan, Italy, Spain, and Republic of Korea in addition to the Five Eyes except for New Zealand. Here, one might suspect that these exercises are pushing France to adopt international standards in the specific area of space surveillance. The simulated space events that are enacted during these exercises most likely put an emphasis on coordinated responses and interstate cooperation. As such, one can imagine that these exercises are meant to favour interoperability amongst the allies of the United States, to which France will have to abide by if it wishes to preserve its potential to cooperate with the United States and its partners.

The normative factor

14 The normative factor refers to the international harmonisation of juridical norms (see annex). It takes place when certain state actors encourage a group of states to adopt certain norms, sometimes with binding effects. Per Holzinger and Knill, international harmonisation comes about either when actors share interdependencies with each other, as is the case for France vis-à-vis the United States even if the reverse situation is less true; or when actors face common problems that are prioritised over some measure of independence for a greater good, as with the risks and especially the threats in outer space. [27] Concerning the security norms of outer space activities, multiple initiatives are being pursued at the international level. Two that aim for an international harmonisation in this domain are considered here: the European initiative, that is, a code of conduct regulating outer space activities, and the NATO initiative. In both cases, France has partaken in the discussions, with its closeness to the United States and the numerous exchanges generated by these initiatives contributing to Franco-American convergence in terms of their space policies, and in fine to Franco-American cooperation.

15 In addition to this, the steady rise of the overall population in outer space makes it that a certain group of states – for the most part comprised of space powers – seek to establish a new set of norms. With France at the helm, the European states thus came up with a proposal in 2008 to formulate a code of good conduct in outer space. However, this proposal stood at odds with the draft treaty that Russia and China had been pressing for, titled the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (abbreviated as PWPT). [28] Still, the Obama Administration chose to endorse the European proposal in 2012. But while the European states saw in the code of conduct a means to curb the proliferation of space debris, the United States rather saw in it a means to preserve a favourable and strategic status quo. The proposal was finally scrapped in 2015, however, as collateral damage to the worsening relations between the United States and Russia following the Russian interventions in Ukraine (2014) and Syria (2015). At this point, the United States feared the propagation of the Russian “anti-access” strategy, [29] with their diplomatic breakdown spilling over into the forums of the United Nations. Throughout his presidency, Donald Trump did not seem to favour the adoption of those international norms for outer space sought after by his French and European counterparts. However, in spite of being critical of NATO, Trump could have seen in it the ideal place to promote security norms for outer space activities, which could then have been imposed on other states as international norms. In this last respect, the Biden Administration might give a new momentum to the promotion of behaviour norms in outer space.

16 NATO is a multilateral institution restricted to the historic allies of the United States. Cooperation therein takes on an institutionalised form, and procedures have been put in place for the benefit of shared objectives. But even though it is an instance of multilateralism, NATO proves rather cost-efficient for the United States, since it implies deliberation among no more than 28 out of the world’s 200-odd states. These two dozen states, moreover, are not in stark opposition to the strategic concepts which are defined at each summit, as these are quite imbued with the American conceptual influence on these fluid environments. [30] Furthermore, smaller groups of NATO members can meet to form a common position before conveying it to all member states. One is then tempted to see in it a form of minilateralism [31] amidst a multilateral organisation, which might prove an effective method to propagate certain security norms for outer space activities.

17 If so, then the full reinstatement of France inside NATO’s military branch in 2009 – the corollary effect being the nomination of a general from the French Air Force to the position of Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) – can be seen as a real opportunity. To begin with, it constitutes one of the two highest positions in the organisation, alongside the Allied Command Operation (ACO) which is currently held by an American. The Allied Command Transformation (ACT), in simple terms, is the place where norms are defined, which means France is assured to exert influence. Though such an influence remains difficult to measure, even if Hubert Vedrine did write a report on this [32] back in 2012 at the behest of President François Hollande. Hence, in the context of NATO’s Space Policy adopted by Allies in 2019 and the recognition of space as a new operational domain, it is vital for France to adopt a firm stance when it comes to the defining the norms of behaviour in outer space, because of how important this objective is and the American tendency to monopolise it.

The political factor

18 The political factor takes the form of an imposition: a state or an international institution imposes its political viewpoint on another state. This situation of dependence and/or domination is the result of a power asymmetry, for the submissive state most of the time finds itself dependent on the resources of the dominant state or the international institution. [33] American superiority in the present domain partially reflects this situation. Having said this, the political factor also comes into play when new actors enter the scene, as the latter reshape existing power relations and incite political convergence.

19 Franco-American political convergence therefore draws on these two dynamics. Power asymmetry between France and the United States is real. What is more, the words of the French Minister of the Armed Forces point to this fact when she mentions in her 2018 address how the relation of cooperation in this domain has been rebalanced due to French technological progress. In fact, a report from the Parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of Scientific and Technological Choices (OPECST) had already reflected on these concerns back in 1991. [34] French legislators around then had been reflecting on the general stance of the United States towards Europe and France – one question being ‘vis-à-vis the United States, how should we turn a hegemonic situation into a partner status?’. [35] At the time, the authors of the report recommended efforts to encourage Franco-American cooperation as a whole. More specifically, they suggested that France cautiously get involved in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of the United States, [36] in exchange for its inclusion in the development of the Global Position System (GPS). [37] Nowadays, however, France and the United States no longer cooperate on those terms, especially given the emphasis that France places on cooperation with Germany and the European Union (EU) in order to strengthen its space surveillance. [38]

20 The United States therefore does not impose its political views on France in any strict sense, no more than it does on its other European allies. Having said this, French reliance on American support for its proposed code of conduct – given its status as the leading space power – does show how the latter nevertheless exerts influence on France. Furthermore, Franco-American convergence is undoubtedly linked to the emergence of new actors in the space environment, and certain state actors in particular.

The cognitive factor

21 The cognitive factor refers to both the nature of the problems that states are confronted with, and the manner in which those states confront them. Defining the problem and coming up with one or more solutions is eminently tied to how the actor perceives the situation and its causal links, along with the available options and their expected results. In the first part, I have shown that the United States and France share the same views of outer space as a congested, contested and competitive place, and come to think of it as a ‘field of confrontation’. [39] Russia, on the other hand, does not corroborate these views. It even calls the American view – that considers outer space to have become a ‘field of confrontation’ – a ‘dangerous’ one. [40]

22 Actors therefore arrange their perceptions of the problem in reference to these co-constructed cognitive images [41], before discussing possible solutions and formulating concrete proposals. Communication plays a key role in these processes of definition. [42] For one, it presupposes both an exchange of information and an act of communication between states, which Holzinger and Knill refer to as ‘transnational communication’. [43] The latter also note that communication is more easily established between states who share cultural, religious, linguistic, an/or historical ties. In this sense, the French and the Americans have “naturally” come closer to each other with their shared views of outer space as a place of confrontation. Thereafter, the two states have taken their views a step further by proposing a normative solution which includes formulating a code of conduct applicable to all space actors. This rapprochement has gained traction since the firing of a Chinese anti-satellite missile in January 2007 [44] and an orbital space collision in 2009, since both incidents produced a great deal of space debris and served as catalysts. Faced with this threat, but also with the problem of space traffic that is becoming more and more dense as well as competitive, the “old” space powers are progressively coming together.

23 Accordingly, the exchanges between France and the United States have grown in numbers, especially in the lead-up to American support for the code of conduct in 2012. Thereafter, the exchanges were carried on inside the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the American State Department. Franck A. Rose, as Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, was the one in charge back then of these issues pertaining to security in outer space. A number of informal meetings were even held amongst the partisans of a space code – which included France and the United Kingdom, but also Australia, Japan, India, South Korea, and Canada – in order to establish a strong common position before sharing it on the international scene. The Americans, however, ended up pursuing a form of ‘multilateralism à la carte’ in order to push forward their own agenda, while the Europeans played ‘the multilateralism card to make themselves heard’. [45]

The functional factor

24 The functional factor consists of promoting an international solution in the shape of a policy or a normative text (see annex). As I have previously shown, there are two solutions that oppose each other on the international scene. In schematic terms, there is the solution of the occidental camp, a code of conduct to secure outer space activities, and the Sino-Russian solution, the so-called PPWT treaty. The latter is still under negotiation in the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC), though it remains at a standstill because of how the committee functions. As for the code of conduct, it has benefited from a work of promotion or better said of socialisation across the world. Socialisation here refers to a process by which states are incited to alter their behaviour as they adopt the ‘preferred’ norms of an international society of states. [46] This approach has been adopted by national and international institutions, such as the EU via the European External Action Service and the particular efforts of a French diplomat at the United Nations, but also by non-governmental organisations, such as the Secure World Foundation.

25 The United States on its end has applied a form of ‘networked multilateralism’. [47] It consists of a series of ‘partnerships that the American government establishes with its allies, but also with non-state actors including civil societies and individuals, in order to better communicate the foreign actions of the United States in the broadest possible manner, and to encourage bottom-up support for its policies. [Multilateralism is then taken care of] by public diplomacy and communication’. [48] The numerous trips to India, Singapore, Indonesia, South Korea, Argentina, Chile, the United Arab Emirates, and even China, by the State Department representative during the Obama Administration illustrate this communicative diplomacy. Since then, the shelving of the code of conduct proposal and the arrival of Donald Trump at the White House in 2016 have put a halt to this momentum. In this respect, the new American presidency might inaugurate a change of course. As for China and Russia, the two states continue to promote their idea of a treaty, though without French support. [49]

26 The normative, political, functional and cognitive factors have therefore laid the grounds for political convergence between the two states and encouraged Franco-American cooperation. The latter is illustrated by their technical cooperation in the area of space surveillance, and their normative cooperation in promoting a non-binding text that defines the norms of behaviour in outer space. In fact, the proper application of these norms will require a space surveillance network to ensure compliance, meaning the two forms of cooperation complement each other. Let us now evaluate them in terms of their legitimacy and efficacy.

Political and juridical legitimacy

29 In accordance with the definition that has been laid out in the introduction of this special issue, I understand political legitimacy as something that stems from the support of the citizenry. There are three different ways, as such, that Franco-American cooperation can become legitimate. First, the popular view that ‘space is expensive’ [51] allows states to justify the need to share costs. At this point, it can appear legitimate for France to maximise its space surveillance capabilities not through the purchase of new sensors, but instead through the intake of American data. Second, the popularisation of the space debris problem – amplified by the recent cinematography [52] – is making the monitoring of outer space seem indispensable in order to palliate certain risks. And third, the recent disclosure of a suspected espionage attempt on a Franco-Italian military satellite by a Russian satellite [53] highlights the threats that weight on space systems, thus allowing states to turn space surveillance into a real political issue at stake. [54]

30 Such factors must also take into account the fact that the average French citizen is not much involved in the debates pertaining to outer space, and even less so in the ones that relate to military concerns in outer space. [55] In 2012, the general public was in fact deemed to show little interest on the topic, [56] in spite of the initiatives taken by the French Parliament and the Parliamentary Group for Outer Space (GPE) in particular. It is an understandable outcome, to some extent, given that the topic is deemed technical, [57] and that the ‘space culture’ remains paradoxically limited in France. Even those citizens who are familiar with Franco-American cooperation in outer space come to see it as something ‘natural’. [58] Indeed, this specific instance of cooperation is but an offshoot of the long-standing relations between the two states in light of their historic alliance.

31 As for juridical legitimacy, which is also discussed in the introduction of this special issue, it stems from the evaluation of defence cooperation according to the accepted norms of the international community. The stakes of Franco-American cooperation here are the elaboration of norms that the international community is willing to accept. Some states, however, caution against defining outer space as a field of confrontation due to the normative consequences that it entails – such as the invocation of legitimate defence in outer space. [59] This reverts back in schematic terms to the “two sides” that I have previously described, namely the United States and its allies versus China and Russia. In addition, it has been shown how the code of conduct has benefited from an active promotion on the international scene. Juridical legitimacy, therefore, is taken to form the consequence of a learning process.

32 Besides this quest for legitimacy, however, French and American state actors also wish to pursue useful hence effective forms of cooperation. So what about the forms of cooperation dealt with here?

The efficacy of Franco-American cooperation

33 Even partial access to the American surveillance network of outer space has allowed France to gain additional information on the events taking place in orbit. Otherwise, France might have had no knowledge of these events whatsoever, or in some cases less precise and/or posterior knowledge. Regardless, effective cooperation is being achieved progressively: the accords require technical adjustments for the exchange of data on space surveillance. An evaluation of the efficacy to these accords is therefore conditioned by progress on the latter.

34 When it comes to Franco-American cooperation on the promotion of norms of behaviour at an international scale, it has been a failure. The proposed code of conduct has been shelved and no similar alternative has come up until now. The sort of multilateralism that the French had sought to turn this code into a ‘regime’ [60] was reliant on American leadership. [61] The latter, indeed, was the sole actor to possess the necessary resources for creating and maintaining such a regime. And yet, the failure to create a code of conduct regulating space activities in spite of American support invalidates the hypothesis of hegemonic stability, for the United States’ hegemonic position in outer space was of no avail. Granted, Russia and China played a non-negligible role in discrediting the initiative, but American space hegemony was unable to surpass this power struggle and thereby create a space regime. In other words, the dominant state was unable to constrain the other states to endorse its code of conduct. It is difficult for us to determine whether the American hegemon really intended to put this space regime into place, or whether it entered the “support game” simply to avoid being accused of impeding space regulation efforts. The latter, in this regard, would corroborate the thesis that the United States favours a sort of multilateralism that is made of ad hoc coalitions, which in this case helps to enlarge its surveillance capabilities through the incorporation of allied sensors.