Rail 2000: Infrastructure Modernization in the Light of the National Transport Policy
- By Mario Keller,
- Roman Frick
- and Fritz Sager
Pages 65 to 77
Cite this article
- KELLER, Mario,
- FRICK, Roman
- and SAGER, Fritz,
- Keller, Mario.,
- et al.
- Keller, M.,
- Frick, R.
- and Sager, F.
https://doi.org/10.3917/e.flux.072.0065
Cite this article
- Keller, M.,
- Frick, R.
- and Sager, F.
- Keller, Mario.,
- et al.
- KELLER, Mario,
- FRICK, Roman
- and SAGER, Fritz,
https://doi.org/10.3917/e.flux.072.0065
1Rail 2000 is the most comprehensive single extension and modernization project for railway infrastructure in recent Swiss history. This large-scale capacity expansion of the Swiss railway network became increasingly necessary since the introduction of the synchronized timetables in 1981 and was decided in 1987 with the acceptance of the Rail 2000 concept in a popular vote. Due to financial constraints, the realization of the project was split into two stages, the first of which (B21) was decided in 1995 and completed in December 2004, when the new offer was made available to the public. The central element of the newly built infrastructure is the new track between Mattstetten and Rothrist (cf. map), which is 45-km long and reduces the travel time Berne-Zurich by approximately fifteen minutes. The main goals of the concept are conveyed by the four claims of more frequent, more rapid, more direct, and more comfortable routes.
2In this paper, we discuss the first stage of Rail 2000 (B21) both at the project and at the policy level. That is, our subject is not the historical development and actual formulation of Rail 2000, nor the politics behind the decision to introduce the B21 project and its implementation, but rather the effects of the project and how these fit into Swiss federal transport policy. The study, thus, has the character of an impact assessment. Correspondingly, the basis of our study is the global evaluation of B21 (Keller et al., 2006). In the first section, we will set the stage by presenting the Swiss railway network and its usage in international comparison. In the following section, we will introduce the Rail 2000 project against this background. Next, we will assess to what degree the four objectives of Rail 2000 have been achieved by means of B21. Subsequently, we will discuss these results in the context of the overall goals of Swiss transport policy. We will conclude with the implications of our findings for the future extension and modernization of Swiss railway infrastructure.
The Swiss Railway Situation in Comparison to the OECD
3In the year 2000, 90% of the Swiss population from the age of 6 upwards participated in traffic every day. On average, each person travels about 17,000 km in a year (13,000 km in Switzerland and 3,800 km abroad). By far the most common means of transport is the car : 67 of every 100 km are travelled using this means of transport – while only 18 of every 100 km are travelled using public transport. While the Swiss road network encompasses about 71,000 km, the railway network has a length of about 5,063 km and serves 1,842 stops (numbers : Federal Office for Statistics). Table 1 shows Swiss railway traffic volume in terms of international comparison.
4In terms of passenger transport by rail per capita, the Swiss people are one of the most frequent railway users compared to other OECD-Countries. Only the Japanese travel by rail more often. On the other hand, Switzerland has only an average level of freight transport by rail, i.e. no more goods are carried by rail than in the other OECD-Countries.
5While well performing in international comparison, the Swiss railway infrastructure met its limits in terms of capacity in the 1980s (Andersen, 1993). The Swiss population’s mobility needs that have drastically increased since 1960 in conjunction with the advance of private motorization culminated in the first traffic pinch points on rail and road in the early 1970s. Transit corridors on rail through the Swiss Alps were overloaded and the traffic connections in the densely populated Swiss Midlands touched at their limits. The quest for unfettered individual mobility put the railway at a disadvantage and soon led to the first traffic jams on the road. The existing rail network that had remained virtually unchanged for over 100 years was to be revitalized.
6The increase in traffic over the last few decades has been accompanied by a shift in the proportions of individual modes of transport in the overall traffic volume (the “Modal-Split”). In passenger traffic (in Pkm), the proportion of railway traffic dropped from 30% to 11.6% between 1960 and 2003. In freight traffic, the railway had to accept a decrease in tonne-kilometres from about 67 to 30% throughout the whole of Switzerland.
7In the next section, we will introduce the Rail 2000 project against this background.
The Rail 2000 project : Concept and Goals
8After the Rail 2000 concept was approved at the ballot box in 1987, the Swiss population repeatedly voted in favour of further government bills on transport policy, all of which aimed at an increased shift of traffic from road to rail. At costs of around CHF 30 billion, the railways were to be fundamentally modernized in the course of the ensuing 20 years. Apart from the construction of two new base tunnels at the Gotthard and Lötschberg respectively, the packet includes also the connection of Switzerland to the European high-speed network, noise remediation of the trunk line network, and the two phases of the Rail 2000 concept.
9The political objectives of Rail 2000 are set out in general, qualitative terms in the Federal Council announcement of 1985 (Bundesrat, 1985). The revised Federal Council report of 1994 sets out the standards for the quantitative objectives, since in the meantime the decision was taken to implement Rail 2000 in stages (Bundesrat, 1994 ; cf. also Friedli, 2000). In addition, a distinction must be made between actual objectives and the expectations formulated by the Federal Council. Objectives are formulated above all with regard to improving the service offered. However, the question of more interest in terms of transport policy concerns changes in behavior or, as the case may be, changes in demand. Here, the announcements and reports primarily express expectations. Table 2 shows the objectives (improvements to services offered) and expectations (behavior, economy/environment) of Rail 2000.
10As explained already in the introduction, the decision to implement Rail 2000 in stages was made in the Federal Council report of 1994. Contrary to what was intended in the Federal Council announcement (Bundesrat, 1985), it was not yet possible to fully realize the principle of central hubs for all larger Swiss towns (above all not for Lausanne, Luzern, Biel, St. Gallen, cf. map). Overall, the Swiss Federal Transport Office (Bundesamt für Verkehr, BAV) expects assumed final costs of 5.82 billion Swiss Francs (Status 30.6.06) for B21. Thus, it is anticipated that there will be around 1.5 billion Swiss Francs residual funds left over from the original back-up facility of 7.4 billion Swiss Francs (1993 figures).
11In accordance with the Rail 2000 plan, with its three-pronged planning approach encompassing infrastructure, rolling stock and services offered, investments were made in these three component areas. The infrastructural core is the new Mattstetten to Rothrist route, which is approximately 45 km long. Other central projects are a third track, Coppet to Genf ; a new dual-track Onnens to St. Aubin ; a new tunnel Vauderens to Siviriez ; upgraded route Derendingen to Inkwil ; Adlertunnel Muttenz to Liestal ; dual-track Zurich to Thalwil as well as the extension of the Zurich Main station interchange (BAV 2005, cf. map). In total, 130 infrastructure-expansion projects were implemented in the course of B21. Huge investments were also made in rolling stock. Double-decker wagons and the Intercity-tilting trains are two obvious signs of B21.
12If one considers the most important steps in improving services offered as part of B21 during the implementation phase from 1996 to 2004, it becomes apparent that the measures prior to the timetable changeover in 2004 above all involved improvements in frequency (introduction of half-hourly services). Exceptions are the journey times between Zurich and Basel and at Jurasüdfuss in the North-West. In contrast, in the timetable changeover of 2004, the increase in speed through the opening of the new stretch of railway and the hourly direct trains to Bündnerland in the South-East are most important. With regard to directness, there were no material changes (with the exception of Zurich to Konstanz). On 12 December 2004, the first big milestone of Swiss transport policy was reached with the launch of the first phase of Rail 2000.
13In the following section, we will analyze to what extent Rail 2000 has, by way of these measures, achieved its goals and met expectations.
The promises of Rail 2000: goals achieved and hopes fulfilled by B21
14In this section, we will report the main findings of the overall evaluation of B21 (Keller et al. 2006). In terms of the methodology, the evaluation is based on a before-and-after survey of the Swiss population (2004: 5,097 persons, 2005 : 4,032 persons), a quantitative supply and demand analysis, as well as additional information (statistics, expert interviews). The period from 1996 to 2005 was examined with particular reference to the increase in services offered from 2004 to 2005.
15The results are structured according to the three objective areas : improving the service offered ; changes in demand ; and cost-effectiveness/environment. In each case, we have summarized the results in a table at the beginning ; explanations for each of the criteria follow.
Improvements to the Service Offered
16Table 3 provides an overview of the findings regarding the 5 improvements of the service provided.
17With regard to frequency, it was possible to attain the announced objectives of +13% train kilometers, or even to exceed these targets, with a +20% increase in frequency (in a model) and +30% train km (according to public transport statistics). The population is also clearly aware of the improvement, although this awareness is somewhat less pronounced than in respect of journey time gains. Regional distribution, however, varies. The biggest winners in terms of frequency are the Mittelland area (Greater Bern), followed by central Switzerland, Zurich and Eastern Switzerland. In North-West Switzerland and the Tessin region, the improvements were below-average, and it was hardly possible to achieve any increase in frequency for Western Switzerland.
18The survey confirms this picture as reported in table 4 for the estimation by regional transport users and in table 5 for the estimation by long-distance transport users. As reported in tables 4 and 5, West-Swiss citizens and those from Tessin have a less positive impression of the improvements in frequency than the German speaking Swiss. The principal reason for this inequality is the as-yet incomplete central hubs. With the introduction of stages of implementation for Rail 2000, however, in its Report of 1994, the Federal Council already stated qualifications to the original objectives set forth in the 1985 announcement (“the rail service is to be made more attractive for all regions”) ; namely, full hubs were not yet planned in the 1994 report for Lausanne, Biel and Luzern. On the other hand, certain sections have experienced greater volumes of traffic than provided for in the 1994 report.
19With regard to journey times also, it was to a large extent possible to achieve the stated objectives. Indeed, with reference to subjective perceptions, reductions in journey time are the most strongly perceived effect of all B21-criteria (cf. tables 4 and 5). It was also possible to improve public transport in direct comparison with roads : long-distance journey times in individual motorized transport decreased by only 4%, whereas in public transport the reduction was 7%. Journey time reductions also vary according to region : they are more pronounced for long-distance transport in the major regions of Mittelland and Zurich than in other regions. The survey of the population confirms this in the cases of Western Switzerland and Tessin. Those in Eastern and central Switzerland on the other hand, do not have a materially different perception of changes in journey time from the remaining German speaking Swiss regions (cf. tables 4 and 5).
20In the case of the frequency of changes, it should be noted that no quantitative objectives were set for the criteria “more direct”. Analyses show that in long-distance transport, on average, slightly more people changed trains than in 1996. At least in a relative comparison with journey times and frequency, the survey can also confirm the less-than-average level of positive perception with regard to “directness” (frequency of changes and waiting times between connections). However, positive perceptions still prevail (cf. tables 4 and 5). This lack of improvement does not surprise the experts questioned in this connection. According to them, it is practically impossible to optimize both journey times and directness across-the-board. While this may be the aim in individual cases, ultimately, customers’ reactions were said to be far more sensitive to frequency and journey times.
21According to the Swiss Federal Railway (Schweizerische Bundesbahn, SBB), statistics after this period show a slight improvement in punctuality, which was already at a high level, between 2004 and 2005. One-off interruptions during the business year 2004/05 are not reflected in the statistics. In the survey, however, such interruptions are likely to have had a greater influence on perceptions. This is apparent from the fact that, of all B21 criteria, the improvements with regard to “delays” was evaluated in the most neutral manner, in both rounds of surveys, and for both regional and long-distance transport (cf. tables 4 and 5). The responsible parties attribute the overall statistical improvement in reliability primarily to the fact that the timetable 2004/05 was designed in a totally new way, which facilitated considerable improvements. However, during a transitional period at least, two aspects caused new susceptibility to delays. On the one hand, new rolling stock had, in each case, to contend with teething-problems (above all with regard to the doors) ; on the other hand, the changeover from old signal boxes in the new operating centers required time for adjustment.
22During the B21 period, considerable funds were invested in new rolling stock. Above all, the ongoing installation of air-conditioning, as well as the introduction of the IC-2000 double-decker carriage (more seats, low-floor entrances) brought marked improvements. In addition, the standard carriages are undergoing a continuous “re-fit program” (interior decoration, closed toilet systems, etc.). The B21 survey also confirms a corresponding positive perception in this respect.
Changes in demand
23Table 6 presents an overview of the objectives concerning shifts on the demand side.
24With regard to overall demand for public transport, quantitative analysis shows an increase in demand for long-distance rail travel of +27.5% between 1996 and 2005. Hence, the expectations set forth in the 1994 report have been fulfilled. In terms of the overall growth, the largest portion falls in the period 1996-2004, at 20 percentage points, and 8 percentage points can be attributed to the timetable changeover 2004-05. Short-term growth 2004-05 in particular was slightly greater than SBB expected. It is apparent that the expected growth in long-distance transport of around +11-12% had already taken place within two years, instead of the anticipated three years. In regional terms, the following routes in particular showed large growth rates : Bern–Olten–Zurich, Bern–Spiez–Interlaken, Jurasüdfuss (North-West), Zurich–Chur and Winterthur–Weinfelden (cf. map). On the whole, there has been a good level of correlation between the expansion of B21-services offered and the growth in demand. In metropolitan areas, however, there are also routes with strong growth, even if the service offered has only improved slightly (e.g. Lausanne–Genf). At the level of the individual passenger, in comparison, the region of North-West Switzerland shows the most growth, followed by a group consisting of central Switzerland, Bassin Lémanique and Eastern Switzerland. The specific growth per person tended to be even further below the average in the Zurich and Mittelland areas. Here, the connection between improvements in the public transport services on offer and growth in demand cannot be so clearly derived. In the case of specific growth in demand in an entire metropolitan area, it is apparent that other factors are still decisive (such as, for example, the base level of public transport on offer, the relationship between road/rail services on offer or the structural dynamics). Halving the time between services has had the largest effect on the demand (between 2004-05 e.g. Bern–Interlaken). However, reductions in journey time have also led to noticeable effects on the demand, above all in the triangle Bern–Zurich–Basel and on the Jurasüdfuss line.
25With regard to the effects of B21 on the services offered, the model calculations have shown that slightly more than half of the increases in demand for long-distance transport can be attributed to structural grounds, i.e. can be attributed to developments in population, income and general developments in mobility behavior. Accordingly, slightly less than half of the changes in demand would be determined by the services on offer. This allocation corresponds roughly to the expectations set forth in the 1994 report (Bundesrat, 1994).
26With regard to the modal split and changeover effect, it is apparent that on the basis of counts taken on the motorway network, the growth in long-distance road travel is, at +19%, lower than in public transport, with +28% (1996-2005). Additional statistics also indicate a higher level of dynamism in the rail service. In the first instance, this means that it was possible for public transport to take up the additional traffic to an above-average degree. This corresponds with the expectations of the Federal Council announcement. In addition, however, the question arises whether shifts in usual traffic from road to rail also occurred as a result of B21. The model calculations show a choice of transport mode or changeover effect from individual motorized transport to public transport of barely 5% between 1996 and 2005. This means that the net effect of B21 on services offered, is composed to approximately 13% to 20% of those who have switched mode of transport and around to two thirds of new passengers.
Cost-effectiveness and the Environment
27Table 7 presents the evaluation’s findings with regard to the economic and environmental expectations of Rail 2000.
28The evaluation did not incorporate any separate calculation of the cost-effectiveness. However, an examination of the most important statistical parameters allows a cautious positive conclusion to be drawn : Although SBB’s operating income decreased temporarily, here, the effect of temporarily increased operating and maintenance costs (infrastructure and rolling stock) – which was expected in any case - coupled with simultaneous demand that is only responsive in the mid-term, can be seen. However, demand has responded positively and, in particular this year, has continued to respond. Break-even point is expected as soon as 2006. The federal subsidies for the entire public transport system have stabilized since 1999, after rising continuously during the 1990s.
29With regard to the environment, the three areas of energy, noise, and land-use were analyzed. Regarding energy, it was possible to attain presumed energy savings of less than 0.1 Mio t CO2 through shifts in favor of public transport. In view of the emissions target gap to comply with the Kyoto protocol for fuels (ca. 2.9 million tonnes CO2), this potential B21 contribution is on the modest side. If, however, one considers the development of the public transport system as a whole, and if this growth in demand for public transport had taken place on the roads, the carbon dioxide emissions (and thus the emissions target gap) would have been 0.3 million tonnes CO2 larger than expected today.
30Improvements in the area of noise are taking place less quickly, but at a continuous rate. The changeover to low-noise carriages has been achieved in passenger transport as far as possible. In the case of freight transport, as well as noise barriers, however, there is an urgent need for action. The noise control measures can only be indirectly attributed to B21, in that the renewal of rolling stock was accelerated. Finally, although land-use caused by B21 is not inconsiderable, developments in road traffic during the same period are much more significant.
31The following section will analyze how these achievements fit into the general Swiss transport policy and its overall objectives. On this basis, conclusions for the future development of the Swiss railway system will be drawn in the last section.
Putting things into perspective : the place of Rail 2000 in Swiss transport policy
32Swiss transport policy is motivated by the principle of sustainability. Accordingly, three areas of objectives have been formulated at the federal level (UVEK, 2001 ; Sager, 2007) : With reference to ecological sustainability, the reduction of environmental pollution to a level that is harmless in the long-term is at the forefront. This relates equally to air pollution, impact on climate, noise pollution, land use as well as damage to landscapes and habitats. In the area of economic sustainability, the overarching objectives are providing an efficient transport infrastructure, providing efficient services as well as increasing the self-sufficiency of the transport sector. Project Rail 2000 is at the centre of the expansion and modernization of Swiss rail infrastructure. As the preceding analysis shows, with the first stage it was possible to attain, and in some cases exceed, the objective of improving the service on offer. Thus, B21 made a considerable contribution to increasing the quality of the service offered by the railway. With regard to social sustainability, the country-wide provision of basic services, by way of which the intention is to secure access to mobility for all groups of the population and all parts of the country, is at the forefront. Below, the results of B21 will be measured against these objectives. The discussion follows the measures by which the higher-ranking objectives are to be achieved.
Modal shift and Co-ordination of Public Transport and Individual Motorized Transport
33Swiss transport policy is using various measures to work towards the objective of shifting traffic from individual transport by car to public transport, or from road to rail. With the improvement through B21 to the services offered, the intention is to alter demand, which is to be appreciated in the light of the modal split. This study shows that B21 has caused a modal shift, although this has proved to be relatively small. Slightly more than half of overall growth can be attributed to socio-economic structural factors, almost another half to B21 effects on the services offered. Of these effects on the services offered, one can assume a maximum of around a third representing real changeovers. The destination selection effect of B21 (e.g. longer or newly-arranged journeys due to improvement in services offered) is likely to be around twice as large as the modal shift away from road travel. At the same time, it is apparent that while expansion on the railways is greater than on the roads, road traffic is nevertheless growing more. This tends at least to shift the modal split towards public transport, which, in turn, corresponds with the intentions of B21.
34The conclusion that new travel offers generate increased traffic, which has been evidenced many times, was also confirmed in this study. The question then arises whether the additional traffic would also have occurred without B21. The Rail 2000 project, which was intended to cause a significant increase in the attractiveness of public transport, inevitably caused the generation of new traffic. According to popular economic understanding, the improved service offered and the associated increase in traffic brings an improvement in passenger welfare. This improvement in welfare would not have occurred had B21 not been implemented. From this point of view, the new traffic generated can be assessed positively.
35Nevertheless, in light of the effect of B21 on the services offered, the question of the meaningfulness of investments in public transport arises. The evaluation with regard to the proportionality between the service offered and demand shows that B21 is cost-effective. This finding does not, however, clarify the question of the intended overall development in transport. Considerations as to whether growth in the overall volume of traffic ought still to be encouraged in the future, and to what extent there are in fact alternatives, should be investigated within the framework of future strategies.
Agreement within the Overall Public Transport System
36Public transport constitutes an overall system encompassing various components. As a result, transport planning is based less on individual transport providers and more on transport chains. At the time of the original conception of Rail 2000 in the 1980s, this thinking was anchored by linking rail and road public transport under the title “Rail and Bus 2000”. Between the Federal Council announcement of 1985 (Bundesrat, 1985) and the Federal Council report of 1994 (Bundesrat, 1994), however, a conscious restriction was imposed here, in that the Federal Council made material statements only with regard to long-distance transport.
37In contrast to the long-distance transport focus of Rail 2000, the project ‘Rail Reform 1’ which incorporated the changeover to the procurement procedure in regional transport (encompassing both rail and bus services) followed an integrated system of thinking (Rieder, 2005 ; Walter et al., 2005). Rail Reform 1, however, brings with it the separation of regional transport from long-distance transport (cf. Narath et al. in this volume). The consequence of this separation is that the expansion of regional transport to a great extent becomes a question of political intent and the financial power of the Cantons as the principal in any procurement transaction (Bühler, Schmutzler, 2001). Correspondingly, political willingness to invest in regional transport varies. The overall development of the system thus becomes dependent on the funds and the political will in the Cantons and agglomerations.
38The entire public transport system depends both on long-distance transport and on distribution through regional transport systems. The principle of central hubs in Rail 2000 reflects these circumstances by focusing on the entire transport chain in an integrated way. However, one cannot overlook the fact that, in addition to the expansion of the rail infrastructure geared towards long-distance transport, residual capacity of the existing network is also used for long-distance transport. This leads in part to bottlenecks for regional transport, which can express themselves in route capacity as well as increasingly in nodal capacities. Overall, however, after the first stage, regional transport was not limited in a way that affected its functions. This analysis shows that journey frequency between 1996 and 2005 – even if less than in long-distance transport – also improved in regional transport. Nevertheless, following completion of the first phase of Rail 2000, the system is deemed to be working to capacity. An additional exclusive focus on long-distance transport may become problematic at a future expansion stage, because route capacity in regional transport would then be limited further.
39Overall, a certain correspondence between B21 and Rail Reform 1 is apparent, in that B21 is an infrastructure project with its main focus on long-distance transport, and at the same time the Federal State, by way of Rail Reform 1, involved the Cantons more in the financial responsibility vis-à-vis regional transport (Rieder, 2005 ; Walter et al., 2005). This separation is problematic since Rail 2000 has to be understood as part of the overall system of public transport. While separating the bus system within the framework of B21 does not retrospectively constitute a fundamental problem, these considerations show from a future perspective, that the step-by-step withdrawal of the federal state from regional transport may affect the functionality of the entire public transport system in the future.
Co-ordination between Spatial Planning and Transport Services
40Transport infrastructure cannot be subject to limitless expansion which implies the integration of transport and land-use planning (Sager, 2005 a/b ; Kaufmann, Sager, 2006). Consequently, Swiss transport policy provides for co-ordination with spatial planning. The nodal system of Rail 2000 corresponds with the Swiss urban system, and thereby creates the prerequisite for the connection of mid-sized towns with the internal regional transport systems of the agglomerations. Thus, there was co-ordination with the Swiss town and country planning rules within the sphere of what is possible for a long-distance transport project. The use by the connecting systems of the various agglomeration belts of the nodal system of B21 is the subject of the autonomous procurement process in regional transport. Whilst in certain regions (e.g. Zurich) rapid transit-connections were made more frequent, this step has not yet been taken in other regions. Here, the Cantons’ autonomous responsibility necessarily causes differences, due to diverging political emphases and financial considerations. Greater integration of regional and long-distance transport is necessary also in order also to achieve an overall effect of rail transport services offered on the development of settlements. The beginnings of this can be found in the Federal agglomeration policy, which intentionally encourages regional transport projects that are agreed in spatial planning terms and which serve inward consolidation (Kübler et al., 2003). In this way, the federal state has suspended or redefined its withdrawal from regional transport and with the agglomeration programs and infrastructure funds has created new vehicles for planning and financing.
Regional Distribution
41The transport policy objective of a basic level of state-wide service, which is to guarantee that all groups of the population and parts of the country have access to transport, raises the question of the regional distribution of improvements in service in the course of B21. Within the framework of the limitation of the project in the Federal Council report of 1994, it was decided to implement Rail 2000 in stages. Specifically, the realization of several full hubs was dispensed with (Lausanne, Biel, Luzern, St. Gallen). As a result, it was not possible to ensure equal regional distribution of improvements through B21. The Mittelland area and the region Zurich profited most directly. Less direct advantages resulted, on the other hand, for Western Switzerland and Tessin, but central, North-West and Eastern Switzerland also profited less than the average. As shown in Table 8, this is reflected by the survey. While the share of respondents whose expectations in Rail 2000 were met by B21 is above 50% in all German speaking regions, it only amounts to 40.5% in Western Switzerland and to 42.1% in the Tessin.
42The accusation of regional bias in the course of the first building stage is thus justified, also taking into account the fact that the central measures of B21 have indeed had a positive effect on the entire Swiss rail network. The phased introduction of Rail 2000 and the implementation of B21 entail an obligation for the future. This obligation arises from the awareness that B21 is only one part of the whole project and that its implementation does not yet complete the project Rail 2000. The improvement in the services offered outside the “golden triangle” (Bern – Zurich – Basel, cf. map) must therefore be a guiding principle for the future.
The eight core projects of B21 (Source: BAV 2006: 83). Key: 1-Coppet-Geneve; 2-Onnens-Gorgier-St.Aubin; 3-Vauderens-Siviriez; 4-Derendingen- Inkwil ; 5-Mattstetten-Rothrist ; 6-Muttenz-Liestal ; 7- Zurich Hub; 8-Zurich-Thalwil
The eight core projects of B21 (Source: BAV 2006: 83). Key: 1-Coppet-Geneve; 2-Onnens-Gorgier-St.Aubin; 3-Vauderens-Siviriez; 4-Derendingen- Inkwil ; 5-Mattstetten-Rothrist ; 6-Muttenz-Liestal ; 7- Zurich Hub; 8-Zurich-Thalwil
The International Context : Switzerland-Europe
43In view of the network of international infrastructure and travel flows, the co-ordination of Swiss and European transport policy is a central measure for achieving the objectives of Swiss transport policy. This prompts the final question of whether B21 is EU-compatible. The B21 project does not make any direct reference to the international context. However, B21 is of indirect importance for participation in the European transport network, in that it creates, through the greater capacity between Olten and Bern in the Mittelland area, the prerequisite for provision of services to the Lötschberg line. Thus, the policy is compatible with European transport policy. With regard to the networks of neighboring countries, for the future a greater level of coordination in any further implementation of Rail 2000 and the connection of Eastern and West Switzerland to the European high-speed train network is to be recommended.
Conclusion
44Viewed as a whole, both the analysis of the attainment of objectives, and the embedding in transport policy show the outstanding importance for Swiss transport policy attributed to the successful implementation of B21. As the evaluation showed, it was possible not only to achieve, and in some places even to exceed targets with regard to comprehensive expansion and with regard to the modernization of the rail infrastructure, one can also assume a changeover effect (albeit limited). Furthermore, in various regions the use of the improved long-distance transport connections for the expansion of regional transport services offered can be observed. B21 has also proved to be in agreement with the requirements of co-ordination between spatial planning and transport on the one hand, and EU-compatibility requirements on the other. Overall, therefore, B21 is worthy of a very positive evaluation in light of Swiss transport policy as a whole.
45However, the embedding of B21 in its political context has also thrown up questions for the future of the Swiss mesh. These questions relate firstly to regional distribution, secondly to the separation of regional and long-distance transport and thirdly to the intended future development of the transport system. These questions touch the very core of the question of the future of the Swiss infrastructure network and its territorial organization in that they not only address the issues of inter-regional distributive justice and multi-level coordination between different layers of service provision and governance, but also raise the fundamental material question about the substantial effects of this system’s capacities as well as the desirability of these effects (Boillat et al., 2006 ; Weidmann, 2006).
46With regard to the first question, that of regional distribution, the arguments underline the obligation for the future linked to the successful implementation of the first building stage : B21 is only one part of the whole project and the improvement of transport services on offer in the regions that have not yet profited is a central theme for the future. However, the demand pressure in the ‘golden triangle’ between Bern, Zurich, and Basel has remained consistently high. Resolving this conflict of purpose will therefore be a challenge, i.e. combining the claims of a regionally balanced improvement in services offered, with expansion at the place of the highest demand.
47Secondly, the evaluation shows the limits of separating long-distance and regional transport, as expressed on the one hand in the long-distance transport focus of B21 and on the other hand in Rail Reform 1. While, in retrospect, it can be said that this separation did not lead to any fundamental limitation to the functionality of the public transport system as a whole, there are indications of potential problems. These relate both to the use of infrastructure capacities, which can lead to a conflict between regional and long-distance demands, as well as to the dependence of the expansion of the regional services offered on political will and the resources in the Cantons and agglomerations, in line with the basic problem of federalism. Both could, in the future, lead to marked differences in the regional transport services offered, which could breach the transport policy principle of providing the same level of basic transport services throughout the country. Integrated public transport planning is therefore essential. However, this principle contradicts current developments, on the one hand with regard to the future financing of the Swiss public transport system, pursuant to which securing the maintenance of regional transport is to be placed more in the responsibility of the Cantons and regions ; on the other hand with regard to investments, in that the federal state e.g. in the case of future development of rail infrastructure concentrates primarily on long-distance passenger transport (and freight transport).
48Thirdly and finally, this study also confirmed the finding that new transport services bring with them new demand for transport. Even if, in the present context, this took place within the public transport system supported by transport policy and not on the roads, the question of what the intended future development of transport in Switzerland is arises. The challenge of making better use of existing capacity on both rail and road is likely to become increasingly important in the future.
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Uploaded: 10/28/2008
https://doi.org/10.3917/e.flux.072.0065