Many journalists and commentators consider the events that followed the American military invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 as part of a historical continuity and approach them in terms of a readily available interpretative framework: unruly tribes protesting against a weak central government whose control does not extend beyond the capital city. Two regimes have attempted to break this continuity by imposing a central government with a strong ideology: the Communists from 1978 to 1992 and the Taliban from 1996 to 2001. Afghanistan could not rid itself of its old demons, including warlords, rebellious tribes, and ethnic conflicts. And yet this commonly held perception of a country that was briefly the focus of media attention is not supported by an analysis of twentieth-century history. No Afghan today contests the reality of the central government, but the Afghan state remains highly dependent on international aid and the spectacular growth of the drug trade could drastically change the situation by creating a mass of resources that potentially bypass state control, possibly even exceeding its budget.