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Stages, Turning Points, and Crises. Negotiating Military Base Rights, Spain and the United States[1]

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A framework for the analysis of processes of international negotiations is described. It construes the process as an unfolding set of stages in which turning points and crises mark passage from one stage to another. This sequence is driven by certain factors that influence negotiator activities and rhetoric. The framework is applied to the bilateral negotiations between Spain and the United States over military base rights (1975-1976). A pattern of influences and events is shown to resemble a balancing process, alternating between an intensifying influence (lack of coordination within a delegation) and a moderating influence (high-level meetings to produce a framework agreement) on the conflict. Content analysis of the discussions suggests an indicator of forthcoming impasses: A large difference between the delegations in hard or soft behavior preceded an impasse in the next round. This pattern of responsiveness has been observed in other negotiating contexts and is referred to as "threshold-adjustment." Implications of these findings for a general model of negotiating behavior are discussed.

International negotiation is a process consisting of political, economic, and legal decisions, some of which have "side effects" (e.g., making comprehensible relationships among nations in the international system). It serves the preformulated interests of governments, as reflected in manifest foreign policy, and the process and consequences of negotiations force governments to reconsider policy options and to act in ways contrary to previous policy directives (see Druckman and Mahoney, 1977). These considerations suggest that the negotiation conference

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2. Author's Note: Views expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be interpreted as the official views of the U.S. government, Departments of State or Defense. Portions of this article were presented to the negotiation seminar at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, and to the symposium on case studies in international negotiations and conflict management at the Foreign Service Institute's Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs. Thanks go to Bill Zartman, Michael Viahos, and John McDonald for their constructive comments. Gratitude is also extended to Terry Hopmann, Robert Slater, and Craig Sherbrooke for suggestions on indices and analyses.

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is the primary forum for defining and redefining relationships among nations, whether they are friends or enemies. However, an explanation for the unfolding events in negotiation remains a challenge. Its importance demands that efforts be made to develop a framework that provides an explanation for developments, enables one to order and organize the flow of activities, and makes evident a characteristic rhythm that may prevail in "all" negotiations. This article is presented as one attempt to construct such a framework.

The framework is an attempt to capture developments in the literature, including theoretical and case-study analyses, as well as insights gained through interviews with delegates to a variety of conferences[3]. Various aspects are described in an earlier chapter by Druckman (1983). In the discussion to follow, framework concepts are interwoven with examples from various cases. Then the framework is used to capture the unfolding process of a bilateral negotiation, construed as "rhythms and patterns." Similar to the approaches taken by Haskel (1974), Ramberg (1977), and Tracy (1978), among others, this analytical strategy consists of superimposing more general concepts on case-specific details[4].

This article is organized into four parts. First, a general description of the negotiation process is presented in terms of stages, turning points, crises, and activities. These concepts are construed as components of a framework; each is defined for analysis. Second, an overview of the negotiation between Spain and the United States concerning military base rights precedes an analysis of the case. Third, a series of qualitative and quantitative analyses demonstrates an application of the framework. The qualitative analyses consist of demonstrating the progression of the negotiation through stages, internal and external influences on the process, and the pattern of negotiators' activities. The quantitative analyses are based on a content analysis of the discussions; indices are developed and correlations among the indices computed. Finally, some implications of the analyses are discussed and six lessons learned are advanced.

1. THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS: A FRAMEWORK

International negotiation is a process. Clues as to the nature of the final settlement are contained in the process, in addition to the initial preferences of one party or the other. Negotiators proceed usually with more attention paid to the process of

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3. Interviews were conducted by the author with some 25 delegates and support staff to such conferences as the Paris peace talks, SALT, MBFR, the threshold test ban, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the Law of the Sea Conference, and several bilateral negotiations concerning military base rights.
4. Other approaches to the study of international negotiation include taxonomies and schematic representations (e.g., Druckman, 1973; Randolph, 1966; Sawyer and Guetzkow, 1965), simulation models (e.g., Hopmann and Walcott, 1977; Winham, 1977), descriptive case studies (e.g., Talbott, 1979; Newhouse, 1973; Young, 1968), and a characterization of the process based on a juxtaposing of events, documented quotes, or personal experience (e.g., Lail, 1966; Ikle, 1964).

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negotiating than to where the process will lead. Serious thought is given to what is acceptable only after deliberations have begun. What is acceptable is a function of what is possible, and this is demonstrated in the act of negotiation. Over time the negotiation accumulates a settlement from the bottom up—a phenomenon referred to as "building a package" (see Druckman, 1977; Winham, 1977). Generally this consists of four stages: defining the scope of, or agenda for, the negotiation; a search for formulas or principles; flushing out the issues; and a search for the implementing details.

Stages are one element of a framework that attempts to capture an "ebb and flow" marked by key events and depicted as trends. Focusing primarily on the small group of negotiators, I highlight interaction processes reflected in activities and verbal statements. Viewing the interactions as dyadic, the analysis probes complex patterns of mutual responsiveness as these are influenced by, and influence, key events referred to as "turning points" and "crises." The insights generated by this analysis concern conditions for turning points, including the role played by external events and the causes and resolutions of impasses or crises. More broadly, the results underscore a need to explore further the conjunction between processes and events of international negotiation.

STAGES

Zartman (1976) cites the Vietnam peace negotiations as having passed through two distinct phases. The first concerned the U.S. attempt to find a formula acceptable to both sides: freezing the stalemate in place without removing either the North Vietnamese or the Saigon regime from South Vietnam, and then selling the idea to Hanoi. The second concerned a search for the details that followed from the agreed image, "a process that was closer to discovery than to convergence". On the other hand, he points out that there were a few cases of incremental decision making, such as the size of the International Control Commission, but these were rare. The SALT process has consisted largely of a search for referent principles and then for implementing details: The central problem has been one of shifting the parties' conception of nuclear parity from one permitting deterrence to one foreclosing coercion. Once the principle is agreed on, the details of disarmament can be hung on, such as a search for numbers of launchers versus missiles or quantity of warheads, or dividing the strategic force structure into first-line and second-line forces (see Zartman, 1975)[5].

5. Negotiating over details is an aspect of international negotiations that can probably be construed as a bargaining process. However, the assumptions of most bargaining models restrict their usefulness as a general characterization of international negotiating. International negotiators are not governed by a superordinate body analogous to the domestic agencies that regulate the range of agreements possible; they must often balance incommensurates on the way to an agreement; they can rarely agree on relative bargaining power; they do not define issues in the same way nor do they agree on utility and cost calculations made in terms of positions on issues or bargaining time; their (true) payoffs cannot be determined with precision, and they often misrepresent concessions in an attempt to create different impressions to opponents on the one hand and to constituents on the other.

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This distinction between phases suggests that certain conceptual problems must be resolved before bargaining on the details can take place. Problems at the conceptual stage are illustrated by negotiations as diverse as the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks and the Philippines military base rights negotiation. MBFR is an example of a negotiation that has not resolved key conceptual problems: It is not clear how to conceive offensive force strength, a necessary preliminary agreement before the detailed adjustments in force size are entertained (Ruehl, 1976, 1982; Dean, 1983). In the case of the Philip-pines, a lack of agreement on a general framework of principles to serve as guidelines prevented the two sides from proceeding to a discussion of specific articles. The negotiation was stalled at this stage. The Philippine delegation, in particular, insisted that an agreement on principles must precede detailed consideration of issues (Washington Post, January 25, 1977).

This process is set in motion around certain coordinating events referred to as "benchmarks." Such events as the signing of a declaration of principles, a framework agreement (see Ikle, 1964: 215-216), or an interim agreement signal progress. Progress can be depicted as passage from one stage to another, such as an agenda debate, a search for guiding principles, defining the issues, bargaining for favorable con-cession exchanges, and a search for implementing details (Druckman, 1983: Figure 3.1). Although these stages are presumed to occur in any negotiation, their relative duration is likely to vary from one case to another. This can be illustrated.

The extended agenda debate in the Seabed arms control negotiation (see Hopmann, 1974; Ramberg, 1977) is set off against the first-round agenda agreement obtained in the Spain military bases negotiation (see below). The strong influence of previous agreements serves to provide precedents for such negotiations as the renewal of cultural exchanges and the extension of status-of-forces agreements among allies. The previous agreements limit the area of dispute to one of merely updating those agreements. These negotiations move quickly to the bargaining stage (e.g., adjustments in compensation, taking account of inflation) and then the provisions-implementing stage. Similarly, trade negotiations consist for the most part of bargaining to work out an acceptable exchange ratio. In sharp contrast to these types of forums are the various arms control negotiations. The examples of SALT and MBFR, suggested above, illustrate the tedious process of achieving an agreement in principle. Even when this stage is accomplished, the search for implementing details delays the attainment of an agreed package.

In all of these cases, progression from one stage to another is accompanied by turning points, just as stalemates are accompanied by crises. Both turning points and crises are caused by identifiable events: One is regarded as a breakthrough; the other as an impasse that threatens the sustenance of the talks. The speed with which a negotiation progresses toward an agreed package depends largely on the incidence of turning points relative to crises. Anything that negotiators can do to increase the size of this "ratio" should move the talks along[6].

6. Procedures for moving a negotiation along have been suggested. One prominent example is the "region of validity" procedure suggested by Rapoport (1960) and assessed experimentally by Druckman (1968). This technique could help opposite-number negotiators define more precisely

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Other renditions of the stage concept appear in the literature. Gulliver's (1979) eight stages model is the most elaborate proposed to date. Pruitt's (1981) distributive/coordinative distinction may be the most basic (see also Morley and Stephenson, 1977). Certain elements are found in each of the schemes, including the following: (1) sequential progression in chronological and conceptual time; (2) alternating antagonistic and coordinative behavior within and across stages; and (3) partially overlapping stages rather than rigid and precise steps toward an outcome. Less agreement exists on whether the stages are prescriptions for attaining outcomes or descriptions of processes observed in diverse cases.

The stage concept can be a useful conceptual device for negotiators and analysts. It can be used to chart progress, to identify disjunctures in the process, and to provide a recognized pattern of expectations and behavior. Gulliver (1979) and Pruitt (1981) note the necessity of experiencing stages to know what is possible and to evaluate alternative agreements. According to Gulliver (1979: 177): "The parties need to experience the process and gain the experience of each other and of themselves so that they come to accept a particular outcome as satisfactory." It is also a tool for managing cognitive complexity, a function of particular relevance to multilateral international conferences (Haas, 1980).

TURNING POINTS

The process of moving from formulas to details can be characterized in terms of "turning points"[7] Taking the process through several turning points reveals the buildup of a momentum toward agreement (see Zartman, 1975). The first consists of the point at which both (all) sides agree that negotiations are realistic because they perceive each other's expectations to be within range. This may take the form of a declaration of principles, reinforced by repeated statements of agreement to adhere to those principles or to continue to negotiate in good faith. This stage is more problematic in innovative negotiations in which there is no precedent for renegotiating or continuing previous agree-ments (compare MBFR or SALT with military bases). Agreement in principle leads to the preparation of an agenda for the talks. This achievement is less problematic in talks between friendly nations who seek to reinforce and extend their relationship. It is more of a problem in negotiations between nations seeking to redefine their relationship. A second turning point occurs when an agreement has been reached on the interpretation of the problem. This leads to an attempt to negotiate a framework from which details can be deduced. Agreement on a framework is a third turning point.

the differences between them in order to move from a discussion of general principles to specific issues. Other examples are the various calculation aids that could facilitate the bargaining of later stages by permitting the negotiator to assess the likelihood of a concession from his opposite number (Midgaard and Underdal, 1977).

7. The concept of "turning points" is used by McClelland (1972) in his analysis of the Taiwan Straits Confrontations, 1950-1964.

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At this point, each side estimates the range of concessions needed to reach an agreement and acknowledges a commitment to see the negotiations through to a final document. This is when the parties proceed point by point to reconcile their different positions; this process is more like incremental convergence as each party adjusts its expectations in favor of what is needed to get an agreement. In the Spain talks, this stage occurred during the process of drafting of the documents, including the articles of agreement and the supplementals. It occurred during the Kennedy round of the trade negotiations among 82 nations, between 1963 and 1967, when the delegates developed calculation formulas based on the percentage tariff cut and the volume of imports. Such measures as the weighted-average depth of cut and the 50% equivalence ratio facilitated comparisons of tariff reductions leading to necessary compromises (Winham, 1977). It is contended that these turning points occur in all negotiations; precisely when they occur varies from case to case.

Two types of turning points are those that occur after a period of no progress and those that occur after a threat to the sustenance of the talks. The former, a period of no progress, is defined as an impasse; the latter, a threat to talks, is regarded here as a crisis. Both types of turning points are inflections in a trend, or "upturns" that represent either sudden progress or a return to a period of stability. The progress that occurs after an impasse often signals passage to a new stage of the negotiation. However, the recovery that follows a crisis or threatened breakdown usually does not signal a new stage. The new stage occurs during the period of stability after the recovery. The case described below provides an opportunity to examine periods of recovery following crises.

A smooth negotiation process is one that moves through the stages with few impasses and no crises. Whether smooth or difficult, however, most negotiations reach a critical juncture during the period of stability: The talks must progress to the next stage, or an impasse will occur. The subsequent analysis provides indicators that can be used to chart progress and to forecast impasses or impending crises. This is regarded as a first step toward suggesting efficacious strategies.

ACTIVITIES

As the negotiations proceed through the "turning points," negotiators engage in two general types of activities, monitoring and strategizing. Monitoring consists of determining the extent to which various parties maintain an interest in the negotiation process. The parties consist of the opponent, the executive department that is being represented, legislative committees that have to ratify the agreement, and other nations with a stake in the outcome. The interest of these agencies in the negotiation might be considered feedback variables. This is an assessment problem that emphasizes the representational aspects of negotiating: The negotiator must weigh the interests, but must also attempt to have an impact on those interests by the way he or she communicates the process of negotiating. This is a matter of strategy. Strategic variables involve the tactics used in moving the negotiations

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along. These consist of actions taken to influence the course, including tabling a position, decomposing and aggregating relevant information, packaging issues, deciding on the order of discussion of issues (simultaneous, successive, and so on), and proceeding point by point to reconcile the different positions of the parties.

These activities occur predominantly during different stages and are influenced by different types of variables (see Table 1). Although the monitoring and coordinating functions occur throughout, these are the primary activities during the early rounds of the negotiation. Negotiators are less spontaneous and more cautious in the earlier rounds than in the later sessions; each side searches for indications from the other's behavior that negotiations are being conducted in good faith, and both sides are reluctant to entertain new proposals without instructions from the home office. As the negotiation moves on, the teams engage one another in polemical discourse intended to give shape to a framework from which details can be derived. This conceptual stage of the negotiation culminates in an agreement in principle. Having attained such agreement, the parties are ready to consider the shape of the eventual package. Persuasive debating is interspersed with bargaining as the negotiating teams begin to define and refine the issues. At this stage, details are worked out by exchanging concessions on tangible items and by haggling over the wording of the agreement. Posturing considerations for exchanging concessions are entertained.

TABLE 1
Activities of Negotiators

Activity	*Process*	*Stage*	*Critical Influences*
Monitoring and coordinating	Seeking feedback: Is performance in line with instructions? Are they negotiating in good faith?	Occurs throughout but emphasized in early rounds	Team composition Channels of communication
Persuasive debate	Resolving conceptual differences toward an acceptable definition of purpose or an agreement in principle	Stages 2 and 3: middle rounds	Issue priorities and objectives Cultural and ideological differences
Bargaining	Building a balanced package by trading on preferences or utilities; involves deducing the details from the agreed principle	Stage 4: later rounds	Relative power Audiences External events

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The above discussion suggests stages of a negotiation, turning points, and activities engaged in by negotiators. These are components for a framework. Each can be defined for analysis. There are, however, other aspects of international negotiation that should be included. Two in particular are (a) factors that influence the course of developments, including those contextual, structural, social psychological, and bureaucratic variables that "drive" a conference, and (b) the behavior of the parties as revealed in the rhetoric of the deliberations, including such verbal expressions as threats, commitments, promises, and accommodations.

INFLUENCES

The forces that drive a negotiation are construed as influences. Influences are of two types: facilitating effects and interferences on the negotiating process. The facilitating effects promote coordination and move a negotiation through turning points to an agreement. The interferences cause stalemates and crises, delaying progress toward an agreement. Both types of variables are found in each of the four categories of influences—contextual, structural, social psychological, and bureaucratic. Probable effects based in part on extrapolations from the negotiation literature are discussed in Druckman (1983). It is evident that different factors affect different aspects of the process, to wit, transition to a new stage, activities of negotiators, tendencies to cooperate or compete. Some examples (see Druckman, 1983: Table 3.3) serve to illustrate relationships.

Studies of international negotiation have paid particular attention to contextual and bureaucratic influences. External events and the inter-national climate are two contextual factors of interest: For example, the level of soft or hard bargaining in the test-ban talks was shown to vary with the level of tension in the international atmosphere (Hopmann and Smith, 1978). Problems of interagency coordination may be reflected in negotiating behavior, as when internal bargaining causes delays and when unresolved internal differences are exploited by the other side (see the experiment described by Evan and MacDougall, 1967). Other relevant factors are differences in culture, bargaining power, and issue priorities or objectives. A number of experiments on cultural styles have shown strong effects on such aspects of the process as trends in cooperative and competitive behavior and on bargaining strategies (see the Druckman et al., 1976, study for a review). Effects have also been observed for differences in bargaining power, defined in terms of consequences of deadlock; the side that can least afford a stalemate is more likely to make a concession in order to get an agreement (Midgaard and Underdal, 1977). And differences between the teams in issue priorities were shown by Bonham (1971) to be a problem in attempts to make progress in the early talks on disarmament. However, most of the results obtained to date are more suggestive than conclusive. It is not clear just how these variables relate to one another, at what rate they are likely to change, and the precise nature of their influence on negotiating behavior. Effects on various aspects of the process are demonstrated in the subsequent case analysis.

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VERBAL BEHAVIOR

The range of statements made during the course of a conference can be categorized in terms of apparent intent. One type of categorization is presented in Table 2. This system derives from earlier work on the analysis of small-group interaction processes (e.g., McGrath and Julian, 1963). It consists of categories that take account of the unique aspects of international negotiation as one form of small-group interaction (e.g., Hopmann, 1974). Some of the categories are based on the Bargaining Process Analysis system developed by Walcott and Hopmann (1975, 1978; see also Hopmann and Walcott, 1977). Others are similar to codes developed by McClelland (1972) for the World Events Interaction Survey. An elaboration of the rationale for certain aspects of the system can be found in the earlier articles.

The categories can be combined in various ways to form indices. One particular aggregation is the distinction between "hard" (retractions, commitments, threats, accusations) and "soft" (initiations, accommodations, promises, praise) behaviors. The extent to which negotiations are hard is indicated by the ratio of hard to soft statements or by the percentage of all statements coded as hard. The decision to use this particular index is based on the assumption that soft behavior moves a negotiation toward an agreement, whereas hard behavior reduces the chances of attaining an agreement. Preliminary work suggests the usefulness of this distinction for depicting movement in a negotiation from one stage to another (Hopmann, 1974). The application reported below provides further evidence for the usefulness of the system.

Other indices can be constructed from the categories. One of these is the difference(s) between the negotiating teams in percent hard. The trend of the differences would highlight the extent to which the teams are making the same kinds of statements at different junctures. Another index is based on the number of categories used per negotiating session. The trend of "variety" would highlight the extent to which negotiating behavior is characterized, at different junctures, by few of many categories. These indices could also be coordinated to various types of benchmarks, including transitions of different stages, turning points, and crises.

The verbal codes can be used to probe fundamental patterns of interaction between negotiating teams. A basic issue in this domain is the extent to which opposing representatives are interdependent. In the parlance of negotiation theory, interdependence is referred to as "responsiveness," to wit, a negotiator's behavior is contingent on what his or her opponent does, and vice versa. The extent to which opponents are mutually responsive is an empirical question of some importance. Implications for influence turn on the issue of benefits to be derived from matching or mismatching.

This issue has received considerable attention in both empirical and theoretical literatures. Patterns of responsiveness have been examined in explicit and implicit bargaining contexts, including laboratory bargaining (Banos, 1974; Druckman and Bonoma, 1976), arms control talks (Hopmann and Smith, 1978), American and Soviet foreign policy rhetoric (Tetlock, 1985), and counseling situations (Mercier and

TABLE 2
Definitions of Categories Used
to Code Negotiators' Verbal Statements

Category	Definition
Initiation:	Advances new proposal or states own position for first time (.67)[a]
Accommodation:	Expression of willingness to compromise a stated position or retract a proposal in the face of resistance (.66)
Promise:	Prediction of positive consequences if other behaves in the stated manner (.86)
Praise:	Commendation or gratuitous statement oriented toward other (.92)[b]
Retraction:	Taking back a previously made initiation or accommodation, or modification of previously stated positions to make them less agreeable (.70)
Commitment:	Reiteration of positions with statements that they will not change or declares own position nonnegotiable (.86)
Threat:	Prediction of negative consequences if other does not behave in the stated manner (involves sanctions or the withholding of potential reward) (.95)
Accusation:	Assign responsibility or blame to other (.96)[b]
Agreement or revealed similarity of positions:	Expressions of agreement with the other's statement, whether or not the statement was a retraction or an accommodation (.82)
Disagreement or revealed dissimilarity of positions:	Expressions of disagreement with other's statement, irrespective of type of statement (.98)
Procedural statement:	Behavior designed to move the discussion along, to organize the debate, or to suggest procedural innovations such as a suggestion to move to another agenda item (.68)[b]
Question/answer	(.98 / .93)
Restatement of position[c]	

a. Intercoder reliabilities as computed by Walcott and Hopmann (1978); all significant below the .001 level.
b. Variants on the Walcott-Hopman categories of positive affect, negative affect, and subject change, respectively.
c. Not included in the earlier versions of the bargaining process analysis system.

Johnson, 1984). Trends have been charted for offers and concessions (Druckman and Bonoma, 1976), as well as for specific words (Mercier and Johnson, 1984), linguistic structures (Tetlock, 1985), and influence tactics (Hopmann and King, 1976). The findings make evident a process that is more complex than action-reaction and may, in fact, take different forms at different stages of a negotiation. Those forms seem to be the outcome of complex delayed adjustment processes involving expectations and evaluations (Coddington, 1968; Druckman, 1978). It is these processes that lead to either impasses or acceptable agreements. The following analysis addresses the issue of responsiveness, focusing in particular on the ways in which observed patterns relate to crises and turning points.

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2. MILITARY BASE RIGHTS: SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

BACKGROUND

In 1970, the U.S. government (USG) and the government of Spain (GDS) signed an Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation (AFC). Among other things, this agreement defined for both nations the use of four military bases located within the Spanish borders, the amount of compensation paid, over a five-year period, by the USG for the operation of these facilities, personnel, weapons, equipment, and other related matters, including customs and taxes. (See Tracy, 1978, for background and analysis of these talks.) The AFC expired on September 26, 1975, at which time a one-year transitional period began. In preparation for the renegotiation of this agreement, a Joint Declaration of Principles was issued on July 9, 1974 (Department of State release no. 291). The Declaration consisted of 10 articles that reaffirmed the "existing cooperation—based on firm friendship" between the two nations. Shortly thereafter, a USG delegation, led by Ambassador-at-Large Robert J. McCloskey, was assigned the task of negotiating an extension of the 1970 agreement. Other permanent members of the USG delegation included representatives of various agencies in the Departments of State and Defense. The GDS delegation was led by the Hon. Juan Rovira, representing Foreign Minister Cortina. Other permanent members of the delegation included representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. The USG delegation entered the talks expecting that they would be concluded rather quickly. They were prepared merely to carry out the business of extending the provisions of the 1970 agreement. An extension of the earlier agreement would be consonant with the long-and short-term objectives of USG policy regarding the bilateral relationship. The first round began on November 4, 1974, in Madrid.

OVERVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION

Expectations that the negotiation would be brief were frustrated. The deliberations were long and difficult, lasting 14 months. During this period there were 10 plenary sessions, referred to as rounds. Each lasted for about four days, and there was usually a one-month interval between rounds. The business of the talks was either transacted or reflected in these sessions. The rounds alternated between Madrid and Washington. During the interval, on the U.S. side, internal working committees were organized to prepare for the next session.

The plenary was the essential forum for the talks. This format was supplemented during the summer rounds (Rounds 7-9) with bilateral working committees, which were organized for the intensive discussions of separate issues. The five committees were concerned with military matters, science and technology, implementation, cultural matters, and taxes and customs, and the committee members were experts in these fields. In each case, the committee chairman submitted recommendations to the plenary sessions. The work of the committees paved the way for a framework agreement, which was drafted in private meetings between

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Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Cortina, during the period of September 15 to October 4 (New York Times, September 24, 1975). The final plenary session (Round 10) was convened in October 1975 to consider this document. The deliberations culminated in the five-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which was signed in Madrid on January 24, 1976 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1976; see also Washington Post, January 25, 1976) and ratified by the U.S. Senate on June 21, 1976.

This seemingly smooth progression belies its difficulties. The negotiation was beset with ultimatums, stalemates, and crises, and the flow of events could be characterized in terms of alternating valleys and peaks. Just as one crisis was resolved, a new one would begin to surface. A threatened stalemate during Round 4 led to an impasse at the end of Round 5 (Washington Post, May 7, 1975). The progress achieved in Round 6, following an extended recess between Rounds 5 and 6, was threatened by a digression in Round 7 (Washington Post, June 2, 1975). The return to progress, achieved in Round 8, was threatened by a stalemate in the middle of Round 9 (Washington Post, September 15, 30, 1975). The ultimate crisis occurred in Round 10 following the major breakthrough of the talks: The GOS delegation refused to acknowledge the framework agreement authorized by both Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Cortina (New York Times, December 18, 1975). Presumably, it was the drama of events that followed, culminating in Franco's death, that forced Spain to reconsider this posture. With a new course decided on, the talks moved quickly to the drafting of the articles of agreement.

The major problem of the talks was a difference in objectives. The USG wanted to extend the previous agreement, making minor adjustments to take into account inflation and perhaps some relocation of equipment. The GOS aimed at redefining its role in the Western Community. It sought to do this either by gaining admission to NATO or by obtaining security guarantees on a bilateral basis from the USG. The talks were seen by the GOS as a vehicle for achieving these goals. The conflict over objectives surfaced early and permeated the entire substance of the talks (Washington Post, November 8, 1974). The basic difference was overriding: The GOS held other issues hostage to its resolution. From this brief overview we now turn to an analysis of the negotiation in terms of the framework presented above.

3. ANALYSIS OF THE NEGOTIATION

STAGES, TURNING POINTS, AND CRISES

The negotiation passed through the stages outlined above. Passage from one stage to another was signaled by turning points, and the progression of the talks through the turning points was slowed by intermittent crises. These stages, turning points, and crises are depicted in Table 3.

Staged movement from formula to detail, discussed earlier, characterized this negotiation. Agreement on the purpose of the negotiation had to be reached before bargaining on details could take place. This was a difficult transition. The U.S. image

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of an extension negotiation (namely, keeping the bases and adjusting the payments) was in sharp contrast to the Spanish image of redefining their role in the European security community by admitting them to NATO or attaining security guarantees from the United States (Washington Post, May 7, 24, 27, 1975). Because an agreement on this definition eluded the negotiators, they were not ready to work out the details: Even a change to a working-committee structure, in order to hammer out agreements on the specific issues, did not lead to an overall agreement. A number of pressures, to be discussed below in the section on influences, finally forced Spain to accept the U.S. definition of purpose, and the United States also converged toward the Spanish image, paving the way to working out the details of a package that correlated facilities with the size of the payments.

Key turning points are those that aided the transition from agreement on formula to bargaining over details. One of these occurred halfway through the negotiation when the United States was willing to consider a new defense relationship and Spain was willing to move to a working-committee structure. Spain had trusted the United States to make the necessary arrangements for redefining the nature of the bilateral defense relationship, including the possibility of entry into NATO. The United States expected progress toward reaching agreements in the working committees. Progress did not occur until it became obvious to Spain that their own demands on a new defense relationship were non-negotiable. This then led to another turning point, consisting of a framework agreement from which bargaining points could be deduced (New York Times, September 24, 1975; see Table 3).

Formulas and details, conceptual issues and bargaining, weaved through the four stages of this negotiation. The talks moved quickly through the first-stage agenda debate, and acceptance of the agenda indicated a willingness by both sides to proceed with an orderly discussion of the issues. The extended debate at the second stage was at times incisive, at times vague. It made apparent the basic conflict of objectives that threatened in Round 4 to halt the deliberations. Partial reconciliation of the conflict indicated a willingness by both sides to try to make the issues negotiable. The committee structure of the third stage was designed to flush out the issues for bargaining, but disagreement over the framing of the issues (Round 9) threatened to deadlock the deliberations. Interim activity produced a framework agreement that indicated a willingness by both sides to work out the details of an acceptable package. This document made it possible, for the first time, to project the shape of an agreed package, with the details to be decided on by the delegations. The bargaining over details of the fourth stage was interrupted by another crisis caused by problems of coordination between the GOS delegation and the foreign minister's office. A reconciliation of this problem, combined with external events, signaled a move to reconvene in order to work out the details and to prepare provisions for implementing the agreement. The ensuing activity led quickly to a final document.

The model suggested here reveals a pattern for the analysis of this negotiation. The key elements are the stages, turning points, and crises. Turning points are signs indicating passage to the next stage. Crises disrupt an orderly progression from stage to stage. Between these turning points and crises, and within the stages, are activities. Different activities were emphasized at different stages, as depicted in Table 3 and discussed below.

TABLE 3

The Spain Military Bases Negotiation: Processes and Influences

	Stages of Negotiation				
	Agenda Debate	*Formula Search*	*Flushing Out Issues*	*Bargaining*	
Chronology	Rounds 1-2	Rounds 3-6	Rounds 7-9	After Round 10	
Crises		Round 4: threats/ counterthreats; commitments	Round 9: stalemate as GOS rejects each point of USG proposal	Round 10: breakdown as GOS refuses to acknowledge framework agreement	
Turning points	Agenda accepted early Round 2	Joint accommodation middle Round 6: USG accepts GOS definition; GOS accepts a move to working committees	Framework agreement signed between Rounds 9-10		Executions; Franco's death after Round 10
Influences	Differences in objectives	Differences in objectives; cultural differences	Bureaucratic coordination; cultural differences	Internal coordination (GOS)	External events; bargaining power
Activities	Opening speeches: disagreement over interpreting Declaration of Principles surfaces	Debate: steering by GOS to maneuver USG into accepting their definition of negotiation; monitoring of GOS by USG to determine what is necessary to move GOS to accept a working committee structure	Monitoring of GOS bureaucracy by delegation to determine what positions it is to take; USG attempts to construe issues in bargainable form	Monitoring by GOS delegation to ascertain its own posture	Bargaining
Behaviors	Procedural statements; initiations; questions and answers	Proposals, disagreements, restatement of positions (Round 3); threats/ counterthreats and commitments (Round 4); tabling of positions (Round 5); accommodations (Round 6)	Offers/counteroffers; rejections; amended offers/counteroffers; threats/counterthreats (Round 9)	Accommodations (USG)-accusations (GOS)	

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INFLUENCES ON THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS

In this negotiation, facilitating effects included the international climate, external events, and interim activities between officials who were at a higher political level than the delegates. Interferences included the issue priorities and objectives of the two parties, cultural differences, intrateam coordination, and delegation/ bureaucracy coordination. These factors produced different types of effects: Each affected the process at a particular juncture and had an impact on a particular aspect of the negotiation (see Table 3). These effects are summarized in terms of the crises and turning points.

Crisis 1, Round 4. Apparently irreconcilable differences in issue priorities presented problems of synchronization of activities and behaviors leading to the threatened stalemate (Washington Post, May 7, 1975). These differences in objectives were aggravated by stylistic differences: The GOS preferred to argue in terms of broad generalities, whereas the USG preferred to focus on specific, tangible items. Stylistic preference may be due to a more basic difference in culture between the parties (see Young, 1968).

Turning Point 1, Round 6. Interim activity included a visit to Madrid by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger (Washington Post, June 1, 1975), and their discussions led to a joint accommodation: The USG accepted the GOS objectives by promoting NATO membership in Brussels; and the GOS expressed a willingness to move to a committee structure that would facilitate working on the details of specific issues.

Crisis 2, Round 9. Lack of coordination within the GOS prevented the delegation from responding affirmatively to the concrete proposals of the USG. And the coordination problem was aggravated by disagree-ments within the GOS delegation between the diplomatic and the military delegates over posture. The resulting confusion was reflected in the synchronization problem depicted above and led to the impasse at the end of round 9 (Washington Post, September 15, 1975).

Turning Point 2, Round 10. The impasse was resolved by the framework agreement, which was produced as a result of high-level interim meetings between Secretaries Kissinger and Cortina (New York Times, September 24, 1975). The GOS accommodation could be regarded as an acquiescence to the “realities” of their situation. External events and relative bargaining power prevailed. Prospects for admission to NATO were dim. The cooling off of detente and the impending change of government in Spain forced Cortina to strive for a new agreement. The alternative for GOS would have been to pass up opportunities for modernizing its military and to forfeit the security provided by the U.S. bases. The USG bargaining position prevailed.

Crisis 3, Round 10. This crisis was caused by a lack of coordination between the GOS delegation and the foreign minister’s office. The negotiation breakdown warranted private discussions between McCloskey and Cortina. (McCloskey briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on these developments; New York Times, October 23, 1975.) Another plenary did not take place.

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Turning Point 3, January 1976 Meetings. The death of Franco and reactions by Western Europe to the executions in Spain precipitated a return to the table (New York Times, December 18, 1975); bargaining ensued. Differences in bargaining power ensured an agreement that was favorable to the USG (Washington Post, January 24, 1976). Con-ceivably, the GOS could have attained a better agreement earlier in the negotiation, but concessions that the USG was willing to make earlier were unnecessary at the end.

The pattern suggested by these influences is one of countervailing effects. Through the course of the negotiation, the interfering effects of one type of variable were offset by the facilitating effects of another. The differences in issue priorities or objectives of the earlier rounds were moderated, after an impasse, by the joint accommodation achieved during the interim. The disjointed or "out-of-phase" negotiation behavior in later rounds was offset by accommodations made during private high-level political discussions. The facilitating effects of the high-level interim meetings were aided by external events that pressured the sides into compromising their interests and goals. This pattern resembles a balancing mechanism, alternating between an intensifying influence and a moderating influence on the conflict. When changes over time are taken into account, the pattern takes the form of a dynamic equilibrium model. Such a model has been proposed elsewhere as a conceptualization of the interplay between interests and ideologies in political decision making (Druckman and Zechmeister, 1973; Hopmann and Druckman, 1981).

ACTIVITIES OF NEGOTIATORS

The negotiators' activities conformed generally to the pattern described in an earlier section. Aside from speeches and security briefings, the predominant activities in this negotiation were persuasive debate and monitoring. The bargaining that occurred was limited, for the most part, to private discussions that led to a framework agreement and to the January meetings, during which attempts were made to draft the articles of agreement.

The contrasting USG and GOS postures produced a pattern of activity that could be considered "out of phase." Debate and monitoring were used at different times by the two delegations. The USG posture consisted essentially of attempts to move the negotiation to a format that would facilitate bargaining. In the early rounds, this took the form of monitoring the GOS delegation to determine how they could be persuaded to accept a working-committee structure. In the middle rounds, the posture took the form of persuasive arguments designed to define the issues in such a way as to permit bargaining. The GOS posture consisted largely of efforts to move the negotiation in the direction suggested by their primary concern. In the early rounds, this posture took the form of persuasive appeals designed to maneuver the USG into accepting the GOS definition of the negotiation. In the middle rounds, the posture involved monitoring the Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry bureaucracies in order to coordinate government policy with negotiating

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positions. This activity continued through the later rounds as confusion developed over just what posture the GOS delegation was to assume (see Table 3).

This "out-of-phase" pattern of activity precipitated the three crises indicated in Table 3. The first crisis (Round 4) resulted from a lack of coordination between the delegations: The USG did not accede to the GOS steering attempts, and the GOS resisted the USG attempts to ascertain what was needed (e.g., the gestures) to move the negotiation to a working-committee structure. A similar lack of coordination pre-cipitated the second crisis (Round 9). The USG offered a concrete proposal for consideration; but the lack of consistent GOS policy caused confusion within the delegation, leading to a rejection of each point in the proposal. The third crisis (Round 10) occurred as the USG delegation prepared to bargain over the details of the framework agreement. Communication problems within the GOS prevented their delegation from engaging in bargaining. Yet in spite of these crises, the negotiation eventually did move to a bargaining format. Each time a crisis occurred, interim activities or external events precipitated turning points (see Table 3), which kept the deliberations on course. Bargaining presumably occurred during the critical intervals. Clearly, there was bargaining over the wording of the agreement during the January meetings.

The above appraisal suggests that progress in negotiation depends in part on the synchronization of activities within and between teams. But progress is also likely to depend on how these activities are executed. This is revealed in the rhetoric of negotiation—the types of statements made by negotiators at different junctures. Persuasive appeals can consist of threats and commitments, or promises and accommodations. Tough bargainers are unyielding and make demands; soft bargainers are compromising and willing to consider the other's point of view; and so on. The stance taken may reveal a negotiator's intentions. Negotiators react to their perceptions of the other's intentions (Druckman and Bonoma, 1976). And the course of deliberations seems to be influenced by this kind of action-reaction dynamic. It should be possible to project, on the basis of the kinds of statements made by negotiators, how a negotiation will progress through stages, turning points, and crises. First, however, it will be necessary to demonstrate a correspondence between statements and the course of events.

NEGOTIATING RHETORIC: CONTENT ANALYSIS OF STATEMENTS

The coding system described in Table 2 was applied to the records of the plenary sessions[8]. These consisted of verbatim statements, or elaborate summaries of statements, made by the principal negotiators on both sides. The records are relatively complete and accurate. Moreover, the delegates who were interviewed claimed that informal discussion and interim activities were reflected in the formal proceedings.

8. Special thanks are extended to Linda Orloski for coding assistance.

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From the coded statements a number of indices were constructed. These include the following:

(1) Percent Soft or Percent Hard: the number of statements coded as soft or hard relative to the total number of statements coded in these categories for a defined time period, that is, a session or a phase.

(2) Percent Agree or Percent Disagree: the number of statements per time period in the agree or disagree category relative to the total across the two categories.

(3) Difference in Percent Hard: the absolute difference between the teams in the percentage of statements per time period that are coded as hard.

(4) Variety Index: a measure, based on information theory, used to determine the way that responses fall into a fixed number of alternative categories. It is calculated according to the following formula:

$$H(p) = -\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i \log p_i$$

where pi is the proportion of statements coded in each category relative to the total number of statements coded for that time period. H(p) is a measure of uncertainty and has been referred to as the entropy of the distribution (p1, p2, . . pn) or of the variate X having p, as the probability of its being equal to i (see Morse et al., 1959: chap. 9). Put in another way, if there are ten categories, and events fall equally into those categories so that each occurs 10% of the time, the score is 1. This condition is one of complete uncertainty or randomness, in which no category is any more predictable than any other. Conversely, if all events occur in only one category and the other nine are empty sets, then the score is 0. Here, one has complete certainty about which category will occur and thus perfect predictability.

The variety index is similar to Hrel, a ratio that was introduced to the international relations literature by McClelland (1972: 92), who describes the index as follows:

> “A common sense way to view a series of Hrel numbers is to think in terms of a ‘fanning out’ toward equality of the distribution across the category system with the larger figures and a ‘channeling in’ of the distribution toward relatively frequent occurrences in fewer categories with the smaller figures. As the ratio approaches 1.000, it suggests not only that almost everything that could happen has been occurring but also that behaviors have shown increasing signs of dis-orderliness. The information measures do not tell us what the particular lack of ordering is, but they do give us a technical indication of a large amount of ‘variety’ in the emissions.”

It is the “variety” notion that renders the index appropriate for the purposes of this project[9].

9. The variety notion is also represented in another index, used to measure behavioral stereotypy (Druckman et al., 1974). The two indices are conceptually similar and highly intercorrelated (r = .95,

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(5) *Crisis! Turning Point Index*: the occurrence (per time period) of a crisis, turning point, or neither, scored as crisis (1), period of stability (.5), and turning point (0). The index is based on the assumption that a given time period (session) can be characterized as primarily one or another of these three events. The difficulty of construing the variable as "amount of crisis/ turning point" renders the index as one of three points separated by the same interval. The events are identifiable. A crisis results in a deadlock: Both sides acknowledge it by calling for a recess or by refusing to proceed to the next item of business. A turning point is a recovery from a crisis or a breakthrough: Both sides acknowledge the turning point by reconvening after a resolution, obtained during the recess, or by signing a framework agreement or other document that indicates progress toward a final settlement. A period of stability is one that is characterized by neither an identifiable crisis nor a turning point. For this case, seven of the sessions were classified as crises, four were turning points, and eleven were periods of stability[10].

Trends in Soft/ Hard Behavior

Overall Trend. Figure 1 shows the values of percent hard over the course of the negotiation. The trend is charted for the 22 coded sessions of Rounds 3 through 10. (The decision to exclude Rounds 1 and 2 from the analysis was based on incomplete data for Round I and the fact that Round 2 consisted mostly of a lengthy security briefing.) For this analysis, all statements coded in the "soft" category (initiations, promises, accommodations, and so on) for both the GUS and the USG negotiators were aggregated for each session. Similarly, all statements coded in the "hard" category (e.g., retractions, threats, and commitments) for both teams were aggregated for each session. Each point represents a percentage calculated for each session within a round. The higher the score, the harder the behavior. The trend does correspond to the course of events. In particular, the following observations may be made:

(1) The upward trend from the first session of Round 3 to the middle of Round 4 indicates increasingly hard behavior, culminating in the crisis of Round 4. This crisis threatened to stalemate the negotiation.

(2) The recovery is reflected in increased soft behavior, which continued until the third session of Round 5. The increase at that point preceded recognition, by both sides, of an impasse.

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based on the data of this study). The preference for Hrel is based on its formal justification and on its use for assessing behaviors in international crisis situations.

10. The classification of events as crises or turning points was independent of the coding of negotiators' verbal statements. The former decisions were made by the author on the basis of an events chronology; the latter decisions were made by the coders who only read the transcripts. Note the slight discrepancy between this classification of crises/ turning points and that shown in Table 3. The difference is one of session classification, used here for purposes of analysis, as opposed to benchmark events, used in the chronology for organizing the case for purposes of description. The benchmark events, discussed in the section on influences (3 crises and 3 turning points), occurred both during sessions and during interim periods.

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

Figure 1: Trend in Percent Hard Behavior for Both Teams Across the Negotiating Sessions

3) Following the two-month recess between Rounds 5 and 6, there was a dramatic decrease (increase) in hard (soft) behavior, which reached a low point at the second session of Round 6.

(4) The digression that occurred during Round 7 is reflected in the sudden increase in hard behavior indicated for the second and third sessions of that round.

(5) The return to progress is reflected in increased soft behavior comparable to the low point attained in Round 6.

(6) The upward trend reached a high point at the end of Round 9. This increasingly hard behavior culminated in another impasse.

(7) The hard behavior of Round 10 reflects the crisis caused by the GOS delegation's unwillingness to acknowledge the authenticity of the framework agreement. Additional findings related to the overall trend are based on correlations computed among the various indices. The set of correlations is discussed below.

These observations suggest that the types of statements made by the negotiators correspond to the course of events. The behavioral trend either signaled a crisis or reflected a turning point: An upward trend always preceded a crisis. A downward trend usually preceded a turning point or a recovery. These observations are bolstered by the strong correlation between hard behavior and events ($r = .64$). Harder behavior occurred during crises than at other times (see Figure 1). Further insights into the process are derived from an analysis of the separate trends for the GOS and the USG teams.



Figure 2: Trends in Percent Hard Behaviors for the Spanish and American Teams Across the Negotiating Sessions

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Separate Trends. The separate trends are presented in terms of the percentage of total statements per session that are coded as hard. The USG and the GOS trends are illustrated in Figure 2. A comparison of the two trends suggests the following:

(1) Overall, one pattern could be characterized as the inverse of the other. USG soft behavior was accompanied, for the most part, by GOS hard behavior, and vice versa. A correlation of -.59 between USG and GOS percent hard substantiates this observation.

(2) Similar trends appear only for the later sessions of Round 4 and the first session of Round 5.

(3) The inversion is strongest during the later rounds of the negotiation, being most apparent at the middle of Round 8.

(4) Overall, the GOS delegation had a higher percentage of statements coded as hard. Moreover, the GOS team made more statements in most categories: They made three times as many threats, accommodations, and agree and disagree statements as the USG team. The two teams were approximately equal in number of commitments, with most of these statements coming during the early rounds (Rounds 3 and 4 = 35; Rounds 5-9 = 18). Finally, the teams did not differ in frequency of "questions," "answers," or "procedural" statements[11].

11. The possibility of a biasing tendency is allowed. The coders were U.S. citizens and were aware of the countries whose behavior was being coded. We were not able to recruit coders from other countries and blind coding of the transcripts was not possible because the content of statements made apparent the national identities of the speakers. Factorial variation of coders' nationality (e.g., United States versus Spain versus another country) and blind versus nonblind coding would permit an assessment of biasing tendencies.

TABLE 4

Correlations Among Indices of Negotiating Behavior

	CRISIS (t + 1)	CRISIS (t)	VARIETY	USG HARD	GOS HARD	TOTAL HARD	DIFF HARD
CRISIS (t + 1)							
CRISIS (t)	06						
VARIETY	.05	30					
USG HARD	.37*	30	.41*				
GOS HARD	.27	29	32	.59**			
TOTAL HARD	-.07	.64**	.19	.64**	.25		
DIFF HARD	.45*	.17	.45*	13	.12	.04	

*p < .05; **p < .005.

Additional findings related to the separate trends are based on correlations computed among the various indices. These include the following:

(5) A stylistic difference between the sides is suggested by the correlations between percent hard and the variety index. USG hard behavior was accompanied by a small number of statements (primarily commitments); GOS hard behavior was accompanied by a large number of statements (e.g., threats, commitments, and retractions). The percent hard/ variety index correlation for USG is -.41; the GOS correlation is .32 (see Table 4).

(6) The correlation between the difference in percent hard and the variety index, reported in Table 4, is - .45: The larger the difference between the teams in percent hard, the fewer the variety of categories emitted by both sides.

Crises, Turning Points, and Negotiating Behavior

An attempt was made to predict crises and turning points on the basis of negotiating behavior that occurred in the period preceding the event. To do this, a crisis/ turning point variable was constructed. Each session was coded for the occurrence of a crisis (1), a period of stability (.5), or a turning point (0). Lagged correlations were computed between this index and each of the five indices of negotiating behavior, also coded for each session. These are reported in Table 4. The crisis/ turning point index (CRISIS) at time t + I was correlated with each of the indices of negotiating behavior at time t. The behavioral indices were (a) total percent hard (TOTAL), (b) USG percent hard (USG HARD), (c) GOS percent hard (GOS HARD), (d) the difference between USG percent hard and GOS percent hard (DIFF HARD), and (e) the variety of statements emitted (VARIETY). The set of intercorrelations is reported in Table 4.

The significant correlation obtained between DIFF HARD and CRISIS (t + 1) ($r = .45$, $F(1,19) = 4.9$, $p < .05$) indicates that the larger the difference between the sides in percent hard, the more likely that a crisis would follow; conversely, the smaller the size of the difference between the sides, the more likely that a

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turning point would follow. The size of the difference was largest just prior to a crisis session ($\bar{X} = .40$), smallest just prior to a turning-point session ($\bar{X} = .09$) and in between prior to a period of relative stability ($\bar{X} = .31$). The differences among these means were significant as tested by the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance ($H = 8.63$, 2df, $p < .02$). Additionally, it is interesting to note the direction of difference prior to a crisis: The USG team was softer (r USG hard / crisis = -.37) whereas the GOS team was harder (r GOS hard / crisis = .27) in the period preceding the crisis.

These results are suggestive. They suggest a possible indicator of forthcoming crises or turning points. Behavior was less synchronized prior to a crisis than at other times. Other lagged correlations were negligible. However, some patterns suggested by the contemporaneous (i.e., same point in time) correlations are worth noting. These are also reported in Table 4. The contemporaneous correlations among DIFF HARD, TOTAL, and CRISIS indicate that the difference between the teams, during crisis periods, in percent hard was very small (r DIFF HARD/ CRISIS = -.17), and both teams were hard (r TOTAL/ CRISIS = .64). This is in contrast to the lagged correlations, which indicate a strong relationship between DIFF HARD and CRISIS (r = .45) and a weak relationship between TOTAL and CRISIS (r = -.07). Taken together, the two sets of correlations suggest that the large difference in percent hard prior to the crisis decreased during the crisis and both sides were hard. The softer side (usually USG) became harder. A plausible interpretation of this finding is that the discrepancy in hard/ soft behavior caused the softer team to increase its level of hardness. Hard behavior on both sides resulted in an impasse or deadlock, regarded here as a negotiating crisis.

Finally, although more speculative, the results obtained from analyses of the variety index are worth noting. This index was derived in order to test hypotheses concerning the effects of tension or stress on negotiating behavior (Hopmann and Walcott, 1977). One prominent hypothesis is that the increased anxiety created by a crisis serves to make behavior less flexible (see Milburn, 1972). This hypothesis can be tested by examining the variety of types of statements emitted at different periods. Values for this index were compared for three periods: during crises, after crises, and during turning points.

The findings were in the predicted direction. Less variety of behavior was emitted during crises ($\bar{X} = .543$) than after crises ($\bar{X} = .669$) or during turning-point periods ($\bar{X} = .660$). Crisis periods were characterized by a low variety of behaviors, limited usually to the hard categories of commitments or threats. Following the crisis (and during turning points) was a “fanning out” effect: A large variety of behaviors was observed, including both hard and soft behaviors. For example, the high point of Session 3 (Round 4) consisted of five commitments and five disagreements; the recovery of Session 4 (Round 4) consisted of four commitments, two threats, three disagrees, two agrees, two accommodations, and two procedural statements. (Similar patterns occurred for Session 8, Round 5, and for Round 10.) Although these results are suggestive, the differences among the means were not statistically significant according to the Kruskal-Wallis one-way

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analysis of variance (H = 3.90, 2 df, p>10)[12]. The lack of significance could be due to the small number of points examined. Conceivably, a larger number of points and more cases could result in a statistically significant difference. The evidence of this case indicates the plausibility of the hypothesis that a restricted variety of behaviors will occur just after a crisis.

CONCLUSION

In this article, the rhythms and patterns of international negotiation took the form of stages, turning points, crises, and the activities and rhetoric of negotiators. Such a framework was used in an analysis of the base rights negotiation between Spain and the United States. As a result of this application we have learned something about both the case and the framework. The case analysis suggested the following:

(1) Frequent crisis and the observed lack of synchronization of behavior and activities on the part of both negotiating parties suggest that this was a difficult negotiation. The separate trend analyses for each side showed an inverted pattern of behavior. When one side was hard, the other was soft. Less formal observations indicated a similar pattern for the activities engaged in by the negotiating teams. When one side attempted to bargain, the other was involved in seeking information from its bureaucracy.

(2) A distinct pattern of behavior occurred around the crisis periods. Before the onset of a crisis, one team was hard, the other team was soft. During the crisis, the difference between the teams decreased, and both teams were hard. (The softer side increased its level of hard behavior.) The hard behavior on both sides resulted in an impasse. Moreover, during the crisis, negotiators showed less flexibility; after the crisis, they became more flexible, as was indicated by the large variety of categories of behavior. One implication of this finding is for warning. If observed in other cases, this pattern could be regarded as a warning indicator for forthcoming crises.

(3) The pattern of influences on the negotiating process alternated between an intensifying factor that produced a crisis and a facilitating factor that led to a turning point or recovery from a crisis. This pattern could be construed as a dynamic equilibrium model.

(4) Turning points were identified as benchmarks signaling passage from one stage of the negotiation to another. In this case, the turning points were considered as breakthroughs caused by high-level diplomatic activity or external events. Application of the framework suggests the following:

12. Note also the correlation in Table 4 between VARIETY and CRISIS (t). The borderline significant correlation (r = .30) indicates that there was a tendency to use a smaller number of categories during crisis sessions than at turning points or during periods of stability.

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(5) Rhythms and patterns can be discerned from trends in soft or hard negotiating behavior. The behavioral trends corresponded to such aspects of the negotiation process as turning points and crises.

(6) It should be feasible to compare different negotiations in terms of speed of passage through the stages, activities that are emphasized, and types of influences that drive the process.

(7) Several types of analyses of negotiating behavior can be computed, including (a) comparing different parties at the same point in time, (b) comparing behavior of a party at several points in time, and (c) prediction as short-term signaling (i.e., patterns that occur just before an impasse) or as long-term forecasting (i.e., a period of "incubation" between seeking instructions and making a proposal).

The lagged correlation between differences in hard behavior at t and crises at t + 1 suggests a pattern of responsiveness referred to as "threshold-adjustment" (Druckman, 1983, 1978). It consists of an adjustment made by one team following an evaluation of the perceived difference in negotiating behavior of both teams. The adjustment seems to be made when the size of the difference between the teams approaches a threshold value, to wit, when it is noticed. This process is similar to Coddington's (1968) decision/ expectation/ adjustment model, and has been observed in other negotiations: See the reanalyses of data (concessions, rhetoric) from studies by Jensen (1976) and Hopmann and King (1976) on the extended test-ban negotiations (Druckman, 1983: 72). Most recently, the pattern has been demonstrated in the SALT context by Jensen (1984). As in the case of the test-ban results, Soviet lagged concession scores were found to be related positively to the harder U.S. position as measured by the difference in concession rates. In this study the softer team (usually the United States) adjusted its rhetoric in the direction of harder behavior, serving to "close the gap." Taken together, the evidence suggests that threshold-adjustment may be a better model of responsiveness than simple models of reciprocity (e.g., Bartos, 1974). It captures more subtle features of the bargaining process, including both monitoring and decisions, as well as concessions and rhetoric.

Although the results reported here are encouraging, the validity of the framework depends on the outcome of further applications. The same analyses can be made on other base rights negotiations as well as selected conferences concerned with problems of arms control. These analyses should permit an evaluation of the framework along three dimensions: the extent to which it is capable of describing diverse cases, the extent to which it can organize information for different cases, and possibilities for prediction and forecasting. Comparing two or more negotiations, it would be possible to ascertain relative progressions through the stages. Different negotiations may "peak" and "valley" at similar (different) points; and they may display similar (different) problems with regard to the synchronization of activities and behaviors. These observations can then be organized into clusters of similar and dissimilar cases.

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LESSONS LEARNED

What is to be learned from this analysis? Six lessons are suggested:

(1) Expectations for an orderly progression of an extension negotiation may be thwarted: Extension agreements often have implications for the broader relationship between the countries; that relationship may become the central issue of the talks.

(2) Impasses may be the result of a lack of synchronization between the delegations: in preferences or objectives, in activities, in negotiating rhetoric.

(3) Crises may be functional: They may alert negotiators to problems that must be solved if progress is to occur.

(4) Shifting the talks to a higher level may be a useful tactic for resolving impasses and crises.

(5) Turning points are the result of timing and tactical maneuvering designed to bring them about.

(6) Events, domestic or international, external to the negotiation and not under the control of either negotiators or policymakers, can largely determine the outcome.

These lessons are the propositions to be tested in other contexts. Included among those "tests" is a precise evaluation of the effects of external events on the extent to which one or the other negotiating team is hard. Another is the extent to which the lack of synchronization, observed in this case, is a general problem for international negotiators, and how it can be managed.

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