Are Income Contingent Loans for Students Importable into France ?

Nicolas Charles

In Revue française de sociologie 2012/2 Vol. 53 , pages 293 to 333
Publisher Éditions Ophrys

ISSN 0035-2969
DOI 10.3917/rfs.532.0293

R. franç. sociol., 53-2, 2012, 210-249

LATEST RESEARCH

Nicolas CHARLES

Are Income Contingent Loans for Students Importable into France?(1)

ABSTRACT

French students often have difficulty paying for their education, the real cost of which greatly exceeds tuition fees alone. A comparative analysis of student funding in France, England and Sweden indicates that income contingent loan (ICL) systems are relatively efficient and equitable. It would, therefore, seem socially just and legitimate to import such systems into France. However, in addition to the question of how to integrate an arrangement of this sort into the French student funding system, the equity of such arrangements depends on a set of specific social conditions, conditions that are found in England and Sweden. Taking into account these conditions, analysis of two simulations of "French-style ICLs" reveals that adapting the arrangements to the French social context would be at the cost of uncertainty as to the impact on social inequalities.

In many countries, public policies for student funding have evolved towards a new share between contributions from taxpayers, students and their parents for reasons of economic efficiency and equity. Of these new public policies, the most commonly considered system is that of income contingent loans (ICLs). Repayment of this type of loan, taken out by the student, is characterised by being deferred until the income of the borrower, i.e., the former student, reaches a certain level. In France, this system has been the subject of evaluation, and is often a recommendation of the Centre d'Analyse Stratégique (Ben-Jelloul, Liégey and Schaff 2009; Schaff, Ben-Jelloul and Liégey 2009), of various groups of experts (Colin 2008; Allègre, Marceau and Arnov 2010) and of economists (Trannoy 2006; Courtioux and Gregoir 2010).

(1) I would like to express my profound gratitude to F. Dubet for his support and valuable advice. I would also like to thank greatly M. Armagnague, R. Delès, G. Goastellec, F. Lung and G. Mesmin for their judicious suggestions and their encouragements that contributed greatly to the completion of this project. Finally, I would like to thank the review committee of the *Revue Française de Sociologie*'s members whose constructive comments allowed me to significantly improve this text.

While ICL systems have already been implemented in many countries, we propose focussing our analysis on two European countries in particular: Sweden and England. This is not an arbitrary choice: while the systems in the two countries are theoretically similar, the higher education systems into which they are integrated are radically different. In Sweden, higher education is relatively unified, tuition is free and the ICLs constitute only a supplement to universal grants. By contrast, English universities are highly hierarchialised, tuition fees are high compared to France and the ICLs represent the principal source of public support beyond means-tested grants. In France, the higher education system is highly segmented, tuition fees are relatively low and public support is essentially based on a system of means-tested grants. Since France seems, at first sight, to borrow from both the English and Swedish systems, and to achieve a similar level of participation as these countries, the implementation of a system of ICLs seems conceivable.

From the perspective of public policy analysis, three questions concerning ICLs suggest themselves: is the system efficient, equitable and importable into France? Current research has essentially concentrated on the efficiency aspect. As regards the equity of ICLs, this has been discussed in a less profound way. Finally, the conditions for the implementation of such a system in a French context have often been underestimated or ignored. While these three questions remain to be considered in various ways, an ICL scheme would, according to many promoters, be ideal both in terms of efficiency and equity and its importation into France would be completely conceivable. The efficiency of ICLs should be the object of a review of the economic literature but will not be treated *per se* in this article. Instead, we will concentrate our analysis on the two, until now under studied issues: to what extent and under what conditions do ICLs give rise to or reduce social inequalities?

In order to make a comparison of student funding in France, England and Sweden, this article will first investigate the social consequences of ICLs in terms of equality of opportunities and student financial autonomy. To this end, as well as a documentary analysis of the systems of funding in the three countries, the *Eurostudent III* survey was used, which investigated student experiences and one of the themes of which was the funding of studies. We will see that while ICLs contribute greatly to the equity of the funding system and make students more independent, their advantages rest on specific social conditions that are found in England and in Sweden. In light of the multiple issues raised by these systems we will evaluate to what extent the French context is favourable to these conditions. Finally, we will discuss the opportunity to import ICLs into France, showing that there are social rationalities that cannot simply be reduced to just economic rationalities.

Interest in ICLs in terms of equity and efficiency

The cost of higher education

Access to higher education is probably less dependent on the average level of tuition fees than on the capacity of students to finance their higher education, which entails many other costs. Students must, in effect, take on all living costs—food, housing, transport, etc.—but also the opportunity cost of studying (Trannoy 2006), that is to say the absence of an income from work consequent on the decision to study. While this latter cost is a theoretical cost, because it does not correspond to any concrete expenditure, two other costs seem essential from the point of view of students: tuition costs and the cost of living. On the one hand, tuition fees constitute an obvious and irreducible cost for students and their families since they are intrinsically linked to higher education. On the other, living expenses are more reducible and latent for students since they are often shared with families and are spread across various different types of expense. But the costs of living are very real, because if the students do not assume them their families must.

The average tuition costs for French students are hard to evaluate. According to the *Eurostudent III* study these tuition costs represent on average 5.4% of student expenditure. A study by Usher and Cervenan (2005)(2) showed that tuition costs reach on average €1,623 per year in France, which is 24% of student expenditure, but this average masks a great diversity of situations. Though the wide variation in tuition fees makes it difficult to be more precise, two identical findings nevertheless come from the two studies. Firstly, in European countries, tuition fees represent a minority share, between 0 and 25%, of the real costs that students face. Secondly, in particular in the case of France, the share of tuition costs of total student expenditure is lower than in other countries.

These expenditures, however, represent only one of the two sides of the financial concerns facing students. There are various sources of student income: grants (non-repayable), loans (repayable), students' own earnings (notably from part-time work) and family help. Student income can come from the state (part grants, part loans) or from private sources. Public funding is essentially distributed taking into account two criteria:(3) either means testing in order to reduce inequality of access to higher education or universally, thus giving all students the opportunity to finance their studies and all the same limiting the social inequality of incomes between students.

(2) Usher and Cervenan compare sixteen higher education systems, including that of France. They analyse two principal dimensions: the *accessibility* of education, a synthetic index of equity, and *affordability* of education, which relates to its financially affordable character. The data are aggregated and comes from the ministries in charge or higher education or other national or international surveys.

(3) Distribution could also be based on merit, but this is uncommon in Europe.

It seems pertinent to differentiate public sources of income, which reduce or limit inequalities, from private sources, which are distributed unequally. This is what Usher and Cervenan mean by *financial accessibility* in their analysis. This represents the total financial capacity to pursue higher education once tuition fees, living expenses and total financial aid to the student and his/her family are known. Thus, beyond just the cost of tuition, this indicator shows whether studies are more or less affordable by calculating what a student must spend pursuing their studies. The higher the private sources of income available for immediate expenditure, the less higher education is accessible in an equitable way.

Let us compare access to funding in the United States and France to understand the importance of different sources of income for the financing of studies. In the United States, the system of funding is based on a "high-fee high-aid" scheme (Johnstone and Marcucci 2010). If one only takes into account the tuition fees, this could seem very socially unequal. But when all sources of funding are taken into account, higher education seems more affordable in the United States than in France (Usher and Cervenan 2005). The share of grants in students' budgets is 18.9% in France and 25.2% in the United States. The sum of grants and loans represents only 27.6% of student incomes in France as opposed to 59.8% in the United States. While tuition fees are on average four times higher in the United States (25.7% of per capita GDP in PPP)(4) than in France (6.4% of per capita GDP in PPP), out of pocket costs—after accounting for the cost of tuition, the cost of living and student assistance—are relatively similar in the United States (18.9% of per capita GDP in PPP) and in France (21.2% of per capita GDP in PPP), a country in which student employment (Pinto 2008) and family support (Gruel 2009) are, moreover, socially unequal. In France, the more limited public student funding therefore means that students are more dependent on income sources that are more socially unequal.

In the French system, thinking in terms of the overall financing of education rather than just tuition seems all the more essential given the low share of public funding in student incomes. It is in this context that interest in the system of income contingent loans is discussed.

What is an ICL?

Numerous systems of deferred payment of the costs of education have been discussed in the economic literature (Chapman 2006; Johnston 2009): deferred payment with the risks shared by the taxpayer (England), of which a hybrid system of fixed cost loans with contingent repayment (Sweden) is a

(4) To harmonise the comparison, Usher and Cervenan (2005) report the absolute costs of tuition and public support in purchasing power parity (PPP), which allows a comparison of purchasing power in different currencies, but also the gross domestic product per inhabitant, which represents the average wealth of individuals in each country.

sub-category; deferred payment with the risk shared in common by the generation of graduates; a graduate tax; and deferred payment to private investors. In this study the term "ICL" is used to refer to deferred payment systems with risks shared with the taxpayer. This is the most common system internationally (Chapman 2006; Santiago, Tremblay and Basri *et al.* 2008a) and the one most frequently contemplated in France, notably by the Centre d'Analyse Stratégique (Ben-Jelloul, Liégey and Schaff 2009; Schaff, Ben-Jelloul and Liégey 2009), groups of experts like the Institut Montaigne (Colin 2008) or *Terra Nova* (Allègre, Marceau and Arnov 2010) and also by economists (Trannoy 2006; Courtioux and Gregoir 2010).

ICLs are loans taken out by students (and not their parents), the principal characteristic of which resides in the repayment conditions. The loans are repaid in a deferred way once the incomes of the borrowers reach a certain level. Repayment holidays are available in certain situations, such as unemployment or illness, and certain conditions, such as reaching a given age for example, give rise to a cancellation of outstanding debts. This system of student loans is quasi-systematically guaranteed by a public agency. The state guarantees the loans, with potential losses being assumed by the taxpayer. The rates of interest, often state subsidised, are lower than those of private banks, frequently a nominal zero rate (no interest), a rate of interest indexed to inflation, or the state borrowing rate.

The state fixes the rules for student eligibility: residence, citizenship, parents' earnings, age, type of student, etc. Generally, all students following all courses and at all institutions, borrow on similar terms. But the systems sometimes offer working-class students priority access and indeed better repayment conditions. The state also sets the characteristics of the loans: the maximum loans available, the terms, the levels of interest, etc. The loans cover living expenses, and where they exist, tuition fees. Students can borrow for a number of years fixed in advance or for the given period of education (Chapman 2006; Santiago, Tremblay and Basri *et al.* 2008a).

An efficient system for the allocation of public funds for higher education?[(5)]

From an economic point of view, ICL systems are primarily public policies that share the cost of higher education where the objective is principally to transfer part of the cost from taxpayers to students (Johnston 2004). For economists of education, ICLs thus represent, above all, an efficient mechanism for allocating public funds to higher education, notably because it allows tuition fees to be increased.

(5) For a more in-depth discussion, Eicher and Chevaillier (2002) and Johnstone and Marcucci (2010) can be usefully referred to on the economic arguments in favour and against the private funding of higher education; Trannoy (2006), Johnstone (2009) and Courtioux (2010a) on the interest in and the limits of ICLs in terms of efficiency; Garcia (2008) for a critique of the paradigm of the economic utility of education.

From the perspective of demand for education, participation of students in the cost of their education rests on the theory of human capital. For the adherents of this theory, students acquire, during their studies, skills and knowledge that are marketable in the labour market. They thus obtain private returns such as higher incomes and greater social status. The private returns(6) of higher education therefore legitimate the idea that students should finance part of the cost of their studies. Several elements, however, limit this reasoning. Firstly, the state also benefits from wider access to higher education: from an economic point of view the more education creates knowledge, the greater the tax returns and national insurance contributions; from a social point of view, higher levels of education favour greater social cohesion: less criminality, better public health, etc.(7) In this wider vision of the role of education, higher education could even have an intrinsic importance, its growth having a value in itself (Robeyns 2006). Moreover, the average private returns are only an average, they vary greatly between countries (OECD 2009), type of education, sex and also social origin (Asplund, Ben Adbelkarim and Skalli 2008). Given this, the share of private returns in the total benefits of higher education seems difficult to measure.

From the point of view of the education on offer, the sharing of the costs of higher education by students constitutes a factor in the improvement of the higher education system's performance. Firstly, provided that public support is maintained, it allows the higher education budget to be increased and to improve the quality of teaching. Moreover, in the case where a former student emigrates and no longer contributes to the public purse through taxation, they will have contributed to the cost of their education. Finally, universities will better adapt the courses they offer to the needs of society and students, who become more aware and demanding consumers through paying tuition fees. If the first two arguments seem real, it is, on the other hand, possible to put forward reservations concerning the third argument, that is the link between the payment of high tuition fees and student success, in France at least (Garcia 2008).

(6) The returns of higher education relate to "the relationship between education and earnings […].The overall benefits of this investment can be assessed by estimating the economic value of the investment, which essentially measures the degree to which the costs of attaining higher levels of education translates into higher levels of earnings" (OECD 2009:154).

(7) The public benefits, whether economic or social, seem, nevertheless, difficult to demonstrate. Indeed, analysis of indicators at the individual or aggregated level poses the question of the environmental paradox (see, for example, Dubet, Duru-Bellat and Vérétout 2010). If a correlation at the aggregated level between the expansion of higher education and economic growth exists, it is difficult to know whether this is the result of the fact that a large expansion implies that more educated people will individually create greater wealth—producing through aggregation an effect at the national level—, or whether, at the aggregate level, the large expansion is a positive factor for economic growth in itself.

The equity of ICLs: fiscal equity and equality of opportunity

The diversity of economic approaches requires a precise deconstruction of the economic arguments relating to the equity of ICLs. On the one hand, issues of equity are often subordinated to those of economic efficiency. Either the analysis of equity does not need to be theoretically distinguished from efficiency (Chapman 2006), or normative economic analysis(8) relegates it to a secondary place in its analysis. On the other hand, definitions of equity and the methods used are the concerns of very different levels of analysis.

The first arguments consider low tuition fees to be inequitable from a macrofiscal point of view (CERC 2003). In France, social inequalities of access to higher education are great, especially for the courses that are the best remunerated and most expensive for the public. Public spending on higher education thus benefits students from well-off families in a disproportionate way. Low tuition fees are therefore the result of an antiredistributive public policy. This approach to equity has, nevertheless, been called into question by Gary-Bobo and Trannoy (2005), and also by Van Parijs, for whom one must "firstly compare the disproportionality of the enjoyment of higher education to the disproportionality of its funding" (2004: 2). Truly evaluating the private returns of higher education remains, in effect, highly complex, as even the CERC admits (2003), the equity of public expenditure on education being intrinsically linked to an individual's life cycle (Allègre, Mélonio and Timbeau 2010).

The second argument rests on the fiscal equity of the ICL system in itself and not only on the increase in tuition fees. For some analysts, a scheme that associates tuition fees to ICLs would be more fiscally just than a no fee policy. Thanks to an ICL, a former student would only repay their loan once their income rises above a set level. Repayment of the loan thus proves to be proportionate to the private returns of higher education, thereby creating a redistributive effect *a posteriori* on the future earnings of individuals. The fiscal equity of the ICLs thus moves the question on from the student's fiscal household of origin to his future household where income will depend on higher education qualifications obtained.

While the first two arguments relate to fiscal equity, the third rests on equity in the sense of equality of opportunity. The argument goes that if an increase in tuition fees is compensated for by a parallel increase in ICLs then the growth in social inequalities of opportunities of access to higher education brought about by higher fees would be limited. This argument is based on three different methods. The first considers the theoretical effects of the implementation of ICLs. In economic theory, the move from free higher education to tuition fees entirely funded by ICLs would have no impact on

(8) See, for example, Gary-Bobo: "By normative analysis, it should be understood that we are searching to establish what should be done, in certain circumstances, taking into account certain ethical principles that were chosen at the start." (2006: 201).

inequality provided that the subsidy of the loans was equal to the instituted tuition fees (Gary-Bobo and Trannoy 2005). The second—econometric—method consists of simulating the private returns of higher education from actual incomes of individuals in France and acting "as if" ICLs were in place. This simulation shows that "the effect on returns [being] very weak, […] the implementation of this system should have a neutral effect on access to higher education for students from poorer families if they base their decision to participate principally on this measure of the utility of a degree" (Courtioux 2010a: 124). These two methods rest on two debatable hypotheses from a sociological point of view: 1) students possess exhaustive information on the diverse returns of higher education and they want and are able to use this to choose their studies; 2) the ICLs eliminate all aversion to risk(9) for students. The third—experimental—method consists of measuring the real impact of the implementation of ICLs on equality of opportunity by comparing the situation before and after the reform. The majority of recommendations of experts on ICLs are based on the "exemplar" Australian reform, a country where the introduction of tuition fees and ICLs did not engender greater social inequality of opportunities for access to higher education (Chapman 2006).

Research methods and materials

We propose to build upon the economic arguments developed to date by comparing the social consequences of the systems of public student funding in France, Sweden and England. We will set aside the question of fiscal equity because, as we have seen, there is no consensus on this approach among economists and it goes beyond the higher education dimension alone.(10) On the other hand, we will analyse the impact of ICLs in terms of equality of opportunities. According to the OECD, "equitable tertiary systems are those that ensure that access to, participation in and outcomes of tertiary

(9) Aversion to risk relates to the economic behaviour of an actor who prefers relatively safe returns to greater but more uncertain returns, knowing that he possesses a more or less precise level of information on the possible returns and incurred risks. From a more sociological perspective, aversion to risk in higher education proceeds from a fear of following an education in view of the social and economic difficulties that potentially stem from the costs of education, of its returns and of the means of funding it (of which borrowing is a part).

(10) As Landais, Piketty and Saez (2011) show, questioning fiscal equity is probably more pertinent at the society level than from the point of view of a public policy in particular. This limitation of the concept of equity is obviously debatable. We will not deal with two important questions here. In terms of intragenerational equity, why should students, as opposed to non-students, get particular support? A capital grant to all young people would probably be more fiscally just (Allègre, Marceau and Arnov 2010). In terms of intergenerational equity, "the working people of tomorrow, not content with paying the public debt left by their parents and financing their retirements, also have to repay the necessary costs of pursuing higher education, that their parents simply had given to them!" (Gary-Bobo and Trannoy 2005: 231). This contributes to adding new intergenerational injustices to those that already exist (Chauvel 1998).

education are based only on individuals' innate ability and study effort. They ensure that the achievement of educational potential at tertiary level(11) is not the result of personal and social circumstances, including of factors such as socio-economic status, gender, ethnic origin, immigrant status, place of residence, age, or disability" (Santiago, Tremblay and Basri *et al.* 2008b: 14). In addition to socioeconomic origins we will compare equality of opportunity according to age, which plays an essential role in the functioning of ICLs.

Beyond the question of equity, the analysis of student independence will serve to assess a second central issue of ICLs: student financial autonomy. Generally, for higher sums of money ICLs constitute an essential instrument for greater independence. For Sen (2009) social justice goes beyond equality of *capabilities*, namely to an equality of individuals' abilities to lead their lives as they wish. In other words, society should allow all individuals self-fulfilment and to be free to lead whatever life they choose. This objective translates into a better capacity for self-development and self-direction. In this respect, equality of access to relative financial independence during higher education would meet the demand for independence by young people (Van de Velde 2008).

Before responding to these two issues we will describe how public student funding works in the three countries. In order to harmonise the comparison, the systems described are those that were in place in 2008-09 and the sums in the three currencies—euros in France, pounds sterling in England and krona in Sweden—are expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP).(12) Next, to analyse the social issues of student funding, we will use data from the *Eurostudent III*(13) study concerning students in twenty-three European countries including France, England and Sweden. The comparison is based on "national profiles"(14) that combine the raw data, indicators and qualitative information on the variables of the study.(15) Only domestic students in general higher,

(11) We will focus on the question of access (vs. success or insertion in the labour market) to higher education (vs. different higher education courses). The impact of ICLs on inequalities of success or insertion in the labour market would be a possible hypothesis that we are not however in a position to test with the data at our disposal. As for the impact of ICLs on more qualitative inequalities in higher education, besides the lack of data, the hypothesis seems less plausible, at least in the case of Sweden and England, countries in which their use are more generalised.

(12) Purchasing power parity is used for comparing economic data in different currencies, but taking in to account the effective purchasing power of a currency. See http://www.oecd.org/std/ppa for more information. We use the 2005 data, the date of the *Eurostudent III* survey. The amounts in national currencies are thus give in "€PPP" by dividing them by 1.075 in France, 10.919 in Sweden and 0.741 in England respectively.

(13) We also use data from the OECD, Eurostat and national statistical surveys (DEPP 2010 for France; DCSF 2009 for England; SNAHE 2008 for Sweden).

(14) Accessible at http://www.eurostudent.eu/results/profiles.

(15) No document of aggregate data exists for all countries and the Swedish survey has now been removed and is thus no longer accessible. The pertinence of comparing the surveys was validated by relying on qualitative information from the "*national profiles*" (for the three countries) the final report of the national survey (England), analysis of raw data from the national survey (France) and contacts with those responsible for the surveys (France and Sweden).

non-doctoral, education were interviewed in the survey. It excluded foreign students, doctoral students and those doing short vocational courses. *Eurostudent III* in not a comparative study *per se* but brings together various national surveys with different methodologies and scopes: from France it draws on the "Conditions de vie" survey from the Observatoire de la Vie Étudiante; from Sweden, an ad hoc survey on students; and from England a survey on student finances (*Student income and expenditure survey 2004/05*). While *Eurostudent III* constitutes a third wave of bringing together national surveys and while the work carried out before creates favourable conditions for making comparisons there remain, as with all comparative approaches, problems of translation and with the construction of indicators, etc. In France, as in Sweden, the survey was carried out by mail, while the English questionnaire was completed in face-to-face interviews. The number of completed questionnaires collected and responses varied between France (18,825 respondents; 25% response rate), England (3,500; 21%) and Sweden (2,725; 54%).

While the English and Swedish surveys covered all students, this was not the case in France where only university students (not including students in IUTs [Instituts Universitaires de Technologie] and IUFMs [Instituts Universitaires de Formation des Maîtres]) and those in classes preparing for entry exams to the *grandes écoles* were included in this European comparison, which leads to several observations on the limitations of the scope of the analysis for France. On the one hand, if we hypothesise that the experiences of students at French universities vary more than those of all students, then the survey could accentuate the tendency for a great variation of experiences, a phenomenon that we will see is very marked in France. On the other hand, in the hypothesis of a polarisation of students at universities towards certain characteristics, the risk would be in a generalisation of their specific traits to all students. It seems, for example, probable, given that certain *grandes écoles* charge much higher fees than universities, that the average French student budget would be underestimated in the survey. Universities (excluding IUTs and IUFMs) and classes preparing for entry exams to the *grandes écoles* also make up 54.7% and 3.5% respectively of the higher education student population, and the social origins of university students, the principal population of the survey, are very close to those of all French students (DEPP 2010: 165, 189).

Concerning the data itself, it should be pointed out that the *Eurostudent III* survey included financial support to students for housing costs (*Aide Personnalisée au Logement* and *Allocation de Logement à Caractère Social* in France). In contrast, the survey does not take into account, for any of the three countries, any other form of indirect social action in favour of students. The latter, taking the form of subsidies of students' parents (notably fiscal benefits) or other actors in the lives of students (in France: CNOUS [Centre National des Oeuvres Universitaires et Scolaires], student mutual benefit organisations, universities, etc.), which are often intangible for students, so that their levels could not be measured in this survey of students themselves. This is why we can formulate two further limitations to this investigation, concerning France probably more so than for the other two countries. Firstly,

indirect social action in favour of students artificially decreases the level of student income, which thus does not reflect precisely their standards of living. Secondly, if one considers that this social action replaces some of the direct public support, one could assume that the survey underestimates levels of public support.

Swedish and English public funding of students: equitable ICLs and independent students?

We will first describe the system of public funding for students in France, England and Sweden; the reader can refer to the precise term-by-term comparison in Appendix 1. Then, we will compare five dimensions of student finance at the intersection of equity and autonomy: inequalities of opportunity of access to higher education related to aversion to borrowing; widening participation for adults; the average degree of financial independence of students; individual and social inequality of income among students; and levels of public support for students from poorer backgrounds.

Public student funding in France

The table in Appendix 2 provides a fairly comprehensive overview of the variety of tuition fees in France. Their average level is difficult to measure but *a priori* they are relatively low, taking into account the high number of students for whom tuition fees remain limited (notably in public universities). Government assistance to students consists principally of means-tested grants (Table 1). The amounts—up to €4,019 per year in 2008-09 (€PPP 3,740)—depend on parental income and a points system reflecting student characteristics, which vary according to distance from the place of study and according the number of children still in the care of parents. Students can receive grants for a maximum of seven years. Apart from exemptions, the continuation of this aid is conditional on at least partial success in studies.

Some students also finance their studies thanks to a system of loans, the organisation of which reflects the duality of the higher education system between, on the one hand the universities and on the other the *grandes écoles*. In the latter, students often find themselves offered loans by private banks to fund their studies. For the others, since 2008 a system of private bank loans guaranteed but not subsidised by the state (interest rates between 3.8 and 4.5%; up to €15,000; accessible to all) has replaced the CNOUS interest-free loans (interest free; up to €3,800; selection of social criteria).

If direct public support seems limited, the French model for financing students also includes a significant social action dimension in favour of them. Direct public aid for students thus represents only 30% of the total 5.5 billion

euros spent on social action in favour of students (DEPP 2010: 347). Beyond the direct support, other types of aid include, notably, housing support (24%), university facilities (7%), the health system (10%) and fiscal aid directed at parents of students (29%). These dimensions, probably less legitimate and widespread than in France, are not, however, absent in the English and Swedish models of public funding. For example, the Beveridgian characters of these two welfare states, that guarantee benefits to all members of society through taxation, greatly benefit students.

Swedish and English ICLs at the heart of student finance

In Sweden there are no tuition fees, the only financial obligation for students—a few dozen euros—relates to membership of their institution's student union. While tuition is free, the state also supports students to fund their living expenses. Each individual thus has access to six years of study grants—around SEK 25,700 per year (€PPP 2,350)—from which they can benefit up to the age of 54. These grants are not dependent on parental income, but cannot be combined with high salaries. They represent around 44% of public support for students (56% for the loan system).

In England,(16) the majority of full-time degree courses cost £3,145 per year (€PPP 4,200).(17) At degree level, students from poorer backgrounds receive a means-tested grant of up to a maximum of £2,835 per year (€PPP 3,800), aimed at financing living costs. Means testing for the under-25s is based on parental income, for the over-25s it is based on the student's own household income. Below earnings of £25,000 per year (€PPP 33,700) the state provides a full grant; for earnings up to £60,000 per year (€PPP 67,500), the amount of the grant declines in stages. Those receiving grants also receive a bursary from their universities to finance tuition fees. The poorest students receive a minimum of £310 (€PPP 420), but the amount of the bursaries can reach nearly £1,500 (€PPP 2,000) in some elite universities. The state also

(16) In this section we present the system in place in England in 2008-09. As for the results of the English survey these are based on the system in place from 1998 to 2005. The general mechanism is identical to the 2008-09 system but the amounts available were different (Callender 2006): before 2005, students paid around €1,500 in tuition fees (€4,450 today); the means-tested grant was up to €1,500 (€3,800 today); students topped-up their budgets, as now, with a public loan for living expenses and tuition fees. Moreover, the conditions for repayment of the ICLs were less attractive. As the preliminary *Eurostudent IV* data attests (Orr, Gwosc and Netz 2011), the evolution of the system has not had much impact on the statistics presented here, for example concerning the proportions of students receiving public support and the share of public funding—more specifically grants and loans—in student budgets.

(17) This sum (£3,300 per year) constitutes a "maximum" sum—fixed by the state—that universities can charge British and European Union students (students from outside of the EU pay much higher tuition fees) for a full-time undergraduate bachelor degree. Even though this sum is in theory the maximum it is in practice the fee that the quasi-totality of universities charges for higher education. Part-time students—of which there are many in England—pay tuition fees that are generally in proportion to the time spent studying. For postgraduate masters level courses universities are free to set their own tuition fees.

provides additional grants to single parents, student couples and for those with certain disabilities. Finally, the grants represent about 33% of public support for students, as opposed to 67% from the loan system.

TABLE 1.–***The share of different types of grants and public loans provided to students (in %)***

	Universal grants	Means-tested grants	Other grants	Loans
France	0	84	14	2
England	0	23	10	67
Sweden	44	0	0	56

Source: *Eurostudent III.*

There are three essential dimensions to ICLs: the methods of repayment—particular to these types of loans—, the characteristics of the loans (number of months, monthly repayments, interest rates, etc.) and the eligibility criteria.

The English system is an ICL system in the purest sense. Former students repay 9% of their incomes above an income limit of £15,000 per year (€PPP 20,200).(18) Repayments begin a year after studies are completed. Debts are written off if they have not been repaid after twenty-five years or if borrowers have reached the age of 65. In Sweden, the mechanism for public loans amounts to a hybrid fixed-schedule income contingent loan scheme (Johnstone 2009). To clarify, they are traditional loans, in the sense that repayments are fixed in advance, excluding *a priori* conditions for non-repayment. But they function as "income contingent loans conditional on needs" (Santiago, Tremblay and Basri *et al.* 2008a) since, at the request of a borrower in financial difficulties, repayments are reduced to a maximum of 4% of income. Repayments begin six months after studies are completed and unpaid debts are written off when borrowers reach the age of 68. Loans normally last twenty-five years and payments increase over time.

In both countries the ICLs fund all student expenses not covered by grants. In England, students, whatever their social background, can borrow up to the amount of their tuition fees ("fee loan"), being £3,145 per year (€PPP 4,200), and also borrow for their living expenses ("maintenance loan") up to a ceiling of £6,475 per year (€PPP 8,700).(19) Students can borrow for the duration of their degrees—in most cases three years—plus an additional year, and the

(18) If the income of the borrower does not reach €PPP 20,200 per year, the loan is not repaid. For those with incomes from €PPP 21,000 per year up, individuals repay 9% per €PPP 800 of income above a level of €PPP 20,200, being €PPP 72 per year.

(19) The amount borrowable is the result of multiple factors. It depends on type of accommodation and place of study–whether living in parents' home, in London or elsewhere. Moreover, students from wealthier backgrounds can only borrow 75% of the maximum loan. Finally the amount of the loan is reduced by the sum of the non-repayable grant received by students receiving it.

rates of interest are indexed with inflation. In Sweden, loans are for up to a maximum of SEK 49,200 per year (€PPP 4,500). The sums are greater for students who face exceptional costs relating to their studies, in particular for students who are parents or for those returning to education from employment. Each individual benefits from these two funding instruments (loans and grants) for twelve semesters and manages their educational capital throughout their life. It is possible to request a grant without taking out a loan or vice-versa, or to borrow only part of the maximum loan available. The interest rate is fixed each year at 70% of the state's borrowing rate.(20)

As for the eligibility criteria, students in each of the two countries, have to have been resident for several years and to be under an age limit: 45 in Sweden and 60 in England for the maintenance loans, though there is no age limit on fee loans. In terms of academic eligibility, given that private higher education barely exists in either of the two countries, students in practically all institutions and in all disciplines are eligible for public financial support (grants and loans). In Sweden, ICLs contribute to funding students in university and vocational higher education, adults in secondary education and courses in folk high schools. For university courses, students are required to have passed at least half of their exams in the previous semester to receive a loan for the next semester. Moreover, students must study at least half time. In England, the limiting of ICLs to the three years of an undergraduate bachelor degree (with an extra year where a student changes course) and to postgraduate certificate of education courses represents a form of regulation of the higher education system. Part-time and distance learning students are excluded from the loans system, but the state will pay for tuition fees for the unemployed and those on low incomes.

BOX.–***The reforms of student finance underway in England***

At the end of 2010 England witnessed the largest student demonstrations since the 1980s with students opposed to the tripling of tuition fees. Despite the demonstrations, the reforms will come into effect in September 2012, even if some negotiation is on going. The aims of the reform are three-fold: reduce public expenditure on higher education; improve teaching by giving universities greater freedom to adapt to student choices; to make the system more equitable.

In concrete terms, the new system fixes two levels of tuition fees for full-time students: £6,000 (€PPP 8,100) and £9,000 per year (€PPP 12,100). Courses wishing to charge more than the first level must increase their bursaries on offer to poorer students. The level of government grants and loans, has not, for the moment, been determined but the principles of ICLs (i.e., deferred cost of higher education) have been retained. Several evolutions of the system have already been announced: part-time and distance learning students have now been integrated into the ICL

.../...

(20) The state lends to students at a rate that is 30% below the rate at which it borrows on the international markets.

system; the minimum income limit after which loans have to be repaid is to be raised from £15,000 per year (€PPP 20,200) to £20,000 per year (€PPP 27,000). Other terms of repayment will potentially be modified (Thompson and Bekhradnia 2010).

An increase in social inequalities of access to higher education?

ICLs have a paradoxical impact on the risk students take in pursuing their studies. On the one hand, the mechanism limits this risk. In effect, by taking on board the unpaid debts of students who only achieve low incomes, taxpayers insure the final risk for the total debt, living expenses and tuition fees included. On the other hand, ICLs create an additional risk for students: they cannot estimate with certainty their future personal returns from their studies and thus their ability to be able to repay their loans. This risk aversion would be greater for working-class students (Duru-Bellat and Mingat 1979), so much so that ICLs could bring about social inequalities of access to higher education. Callender (2006) thus distinguishes for England three different attitudes towards student loans.(21) The first is a simple and free relationship, the loan being seen as a normal life experience. For these students, borrowing is not a problem as long as the prospects for repayment are good. The second group of students has moral attitudes towards debt: there are no good reasons to borrow and being in debt is a bad thing in itself. Finally, a third group fear borrowing: for these students once one begins to borrow it is very difficult to get out of debt. This last group has the greatest aversion to borrowing and among this group, students from poorer families are over-represented. Callender and Jackson (2005) show that fewer school leavers who are debt averse go on to higher education than those who have a more relaxed attitude to debt, even controlling for numerous other variables. In particular, it is young working-class people and those leaving technical secondary education for whom this aversion has the greatest limiting effect on the pursuit of higher education.

Two elements attest to the fact that debt aversion seems to have been overcome in Sweden as in England. On the one hand, Dearden, Fitzsimons and Wyness (2010) have shown experimentally(22) that the major 2005 reform in England—including a sharp rise in tuition fees, but also grants and loans—had no effect on general participation in higher education and on students from poorer backgrounds.(23) On the other hand, the evolution of the

(21) In Sweden, the absence of a question on student aversion to borrowing in the survey could be linked to the amount of the loan being lower than in England and in the generalisation of student loans, that is an experience that the generation of young students shares with their parents.

(22) In Sweden, this experimental approach is ineffective, the system having evolved progressively since the 1960s, with no great recent rupture.

(23) The methodological difficulties of such experimentation remain significant. To be effective, an experimental analysis requires parameters other than the funding system to be controlled. Yet, Dearden, Fitzsimons and Wyness (2010) were unable to take into account the evolution of the student population had there not been any reform in their model.

access for students from working-class backgrounds to higher education since the ICL reform was put into place seems fairly positive. In Sweden, since the progressive implementation of a student loan system in the 1960s and ICLs in the 1980s, the inequalities of access to higher education are somewhat weaker than elsewhere and seem to have diminished (Erikson and Jonsson 1996). In England, after the 2005 reform, higher education participation rates among school leavers rose from 32% to 36% between 2004 and 2009, inequalities of access between social classes strongly decreased at the same time (HEFCE 2010). Without being able to demonstrate it, one can make the hypothesis that the generalisation of student loans in England has worked in favour of a decline in debt aversion among the student population.

Access to higher education for older students

Aside from the fact that social inequalities of opportunities of access to education are not worsened by ICLs, this funding mechanism provides greater opportunities of access to higher education for people at different ages. Students aged 25 or older represent 18.4% of the French student population (DEPP 2010: 23, author's calculations), 44% in the United Kingdom(24) (DCSF 2009, author's calculations) and 53% in Sweden (SNAHE 2008). Figure 1 thus shows that higher education participation rates in France are the highest of the three countries for 20-year-olds, they decline rapidly and become less than those for Sweden for 22-year-olds and older and less than England from 26 years up.

FIGURE 1.–***Participation rates in higher education according to age***



Sources: Sweden (all ages), England (all ages) and France (from 18 to 28 years): Eurostat, "educ_ipart_s", indicator consulted at:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/education/data/database; France (30-34 and 35-39 years): author's calculations from DEPP data (2010: 23).
Year: 2008.

(24) England represents around 80% of the population, GDP, and student numbers, etc. of the United Kingdom. Taking into account the lack of certain statistics for England, we use some figures relating to the United Kingdom as a whole (see also Tables 7 and 8).

In England the extension of public funding to older students also reduces social inequalities of access to higher education, the latter more often coming from working-class backgrounds (Foster 2009). In Sweden where the ICL system can also be used for secondary education, the mechanism plays an important role in social inequalities in school prior to higher education. In both these countries the widening of participation to older students also represents widening participation to those from lower income families.

Are students more financially independent?

Aside from the question of equality of opportunity, student financial independence represents another social issue for ICLs. Because they cover a large part of student expenses not directly supported by the public sphere, ICLs favour student financial independence. The table below brings to light the fact that French students are rather less likely to receive public support, whether it is in the form of grants or loans. French students also benefit less often from grants than English or Swedish students. Likewise, only 0.7% of French students receive student loans, compared to 66.5% and 64% of English and Swedish students respectively. In France, the means-tested grant represents an essential public funding mechanism, but it does not amount to a large enough sum for students to attain true financial independence. The public student loan system, moreover, is not very widespread, not organised by a public agency and does not offer advantageous conditions: no subsidy, not contingent on income and no systematic postponement of repayments.

TABLE 2.–***The proportion of students receiving public support according to funding type (in %)***

	Universal grants	Means-tested grants	Other bursaries	Loans
France	0	31.9	9.8	0.7
England	0	56.4	5.6	66.5
Sweden	86.0	0	0	64.0

Source: *Eurostudent III.*

These public policies translate into greater average incomes in England and Sweden than in France. For students living away from home, the average incomes are 2.2 times greater in England (€PPP 1,373) and 1.4 times greater in Sweden (€PPP 839) than in France (€PPP 617). This data seems to be confirmed, but to a lesser degree, by a more recent report(25) in which the incomes of young French people were shown to have in part caught up with

(25) The report, taken from the fourth section of the *Eurostudent IV* survey, provides more recent data at our disposal, but poses two problems. On the one hand, in the case of France, the survey takes into account a different sample of the student population, enlarged to include the *grandes écoles* in engineering, artistic and business fields. On the other hand, in Sweden and England (but not in France), *Eurostudent IV* includes, for students living apart from their parents only, a monetary evaluation of the material contributions from parents, further increasing their level of incomes.

those of Swedish students (Orr, Gwosc and Netz 2011). ICLs thus grant greater financial independence to students vis-à-vis their parents, allowing them to lead more independent lives. Fewer French students live away from home (57%) compared to English (81%) and Swedish students (90%), at all ages, even if this difference is less marked for younger students. Finally, it seems that French students adjust their budgets and degrees of independence in the absence of a universal system of student funding.

TABLE 3.–***Indicators of financial independence and student autonomy***

	Proportion of 21-24-year-old students living away from home (%)	Proportion of all students living away from home (%)	Average income of students living away from home (€PPP)	Average income of students living at home (€PPP)
France	61	57	617	316
England	74	81	1,373	1,089
Sweden	87	90	839	449

Source: *Eurostudent III*.

In addition to average incomes, greater access to public funding also seems to reduce individual income inequality. Firstly, a not inconsiderable proportion of French students have very low incomes. According to the *Eurostudent III* data, the incomes of 20% of French students are no greater than €PPP 277 per month for students living away from home and €PPP 79 per month for those living with their parents. While few French students live in a "situation of grave and long-term poverty" (Gruel 2009), income levels of the poorest French students seem, despite the methodological limitations mentioned earlier, to be much lower than those in England and Sweden. The second decile of income—that separates the poorest 20% from the richest 80%—of students living away from home in France is thus 3.3 times and 2.3 times respectively inferior to England (€PPP 915) and to Sweden (€PPP 641). Secondly, the distribution of student incomes is greater in France than in the other countries. For students living away from home the interdecile ratio, which measures inequalities in income distribution between the poorest 10% and richest 10%, is 6.8 in France, 2.7 in England and 2.8 in Sweden. With universal public student funding, the variation of student incomes is much less in Sweden and England than in France.

TABLE 4.–***Indicators of student income inequality***

	2nd decile of monthly income for students living at home (€PPP)	2nd decile of monthly income for students living away from home (€PPP)	Inter decile ratio of income for students living away from home
France	79	277	6.8
England	653	915	2.7
Sweden	228	641	2.8

Source: *Eurostudent III*.

Student incomes that are less socially unequal?

While loans seem to bring financial independence within reach of the great majority of English and Swedish students, social inequalities of student funding are not, however, any greater as a result. The structure of student incomes, presented in Table 5, varies greatly according to country, in particular with respect to two sources of income. Familial support represents a more important part of student incomes in France (37%) than in England (21%) and Sweden (13%). In contrast, loans only contribute 1% of the incomes of French students against 26% in England and 34% in Sweden. In these two countries, the generalised use of ICLs seems to replace, at least in part, familial support.

TABLE 5.–***Average share of different sources of income for students living apart from parents (in %)***

	Family/Partner	Paid work	State (loan)	State (grants and benefits)	Other
France	37	31	1	31	0
England	21	31	26	13	9
Sweden	13	23	34	27	3

Source: *Eurostudent III.*
Note: In England, other income relates to sales of personal belongings (books, computer equipment, etc.), share of rent, contributions from private organisations to student budgets and social benefits.

In the three countries, the level of student incomes varies little according to social background. In contrast, Figure 2 shows appreciable variations in the structure of those incomes according to social background. In France, familial support does not just represent the most widespread resource for students, it seems to be more socially unequally distributed than in the two other countries. Thus, students whose parents did not receive an upper secondary education received relatively little aid from their families (19% of incomes) compared to students whose parents received higher education (48% of incomes). Public support in part compensates for these differences in resources, but the share of paid work remains much greater for students from poorer backgrounds (41% of incomes) than for their wealthier peers (27% of incomes). In England, familial inequalities seem less great, but they are also poorly compensated for by public support, even if paid work seems as unequally shared as in France, as Casta (2010) has already demonstrated. In Sweden, by contrast, social background has relatively little influence on the structure of student incomes.

FIGURE 2.–***Share of different sources of incomes of students living away from home according to social background***



Source: *Eurostudent III*.
Note: In England the data does not make it possible to distinguish the familial backgrounds for parents who received anything less than a higher education.

Independence against redistribution?

Insofar as ICLs are available to all and not as a function of parental incomes, do they not have an antiredistibutive effect? We have seen that public funding policies do not adopt the same balance between the two allocation principles: means testing and universal. Public support is mostly means tested in France, universal in Sweden and a balance between the two in England. Examining Table 6, the French model appears strongly redistributive: students whose parents who left school before upper secondary education (*lycée*) receive 2.3 times more public support than those whose parents

received a higher education. This ratio is barely greater than 1 in England[26] and Sweden indicating an absence of redistribution of direct public support to students. In the case of France, housing benefits constitute a central factor favouring the relative universalism of public funding, thereby explaining the relative high level of support granted to students from well-off backgrounds. Note, however, that fiscal aid given to parents of these students is not accounted for here and that other studies have shown, moreover, that the tax system greatly reduces the redistributive character of the French system (CERC 2003).

TABLE 6.–***Proportion of students receiving public support (grants, benefits, loans) and average sum received per month according to the highest qualification received by their two parents***

	Up to lower secondary school	Upper secondary and post secondary	Higher education
France	65% (€PPP 362)	59% (€PPP 265)	43% (€PPP 154)
England	86% (€PPP 533)	86% (€PPP 533)	86% (€PPP 464)
Sweden	86% (€PPP 665)	88.5% (€PPP 646)	88% (€PPP 641)

Source: *Eurostudent III.*
Note: The English study does not distinguish qualifications below higher education level.

Reading the columns of Table 6 reveals a paradoxical effect of the French system: while it is strongly redistributive, the French state seems to support fewer poorer students and less generously than in England and Sweden. On the one hand statistically more of these students are supported in Sweden (86%) and in England (86%) than in France (65%), simply because a quasi-totality of the former benefit from public support. On the other hand, the absolute monthly sums paid in public support of poorer students prove to be higher in Sweden (€PPP 665) and England (€PPP 533) than in France (€PPP 362). The universal allocation of public support, a characteristic of ICLs, thus implies a less redistributive system, but greater direct support for poorer students.

ICLs, representing an essential share of public support for students in England as in Sweden, play a significant role in the social inequalities that result from student funding policies. Once again, let us recall that the comparative framework of the *Eurostudent* survey does not offer, despite the apparent objectivity of its statistics, a comparison that is free from methodological bias. Despite these important limitations, the wideness of the variations between France on the one hand and England and Sweden on the other, that are found in the final report of a more recent survey (Orr, Gwosc and Netz 2011), suggest that, in these two countries, ICLs are factors more for a

(26) This ratio is probably underestimated, since the English survey does not distinguish between the qualifications of parents below degree level.

reduction of social inequalities, contributing to both a limitation of inequalities of opportunities of access to higher education and to increased autonomy of all students. It seems, nevertheless, difficult to attribute this reduction of social inequalities solely to these methods of student funding and to the "nature" itself of ICLs. This is why it is necessary to examine the English and Swedish national contexts beyond student funding policies; in other words, the conditions in which the mechanisms saw the light of day and became generalised.

Under what social and cultural conditions are ICLs equitable?

Despite their differences, the English and Swedish ICLs support the equalisation of opportunities of access to higher education and greater financial independence for all students. Running through this analysis, we will observe that the English and Swedish ICLs, nevertheless, originate in social and cultural conditions that are favourable for a diminution of social inequalities: 1) the transparency of their higher education systems; 2) the high value conferred on student independence; 3) favourable contexts for the development of life-long education.

The transparency of the higher education funding system

A clear and transparent funding system, particularly in terms of costs and private utility of education, probably contributes to limiting aversion to borrowing. Both the English and Swedish contexts are favourable for this condition in their own ways. In Sweden, the higher education system is highly unified. There are just two different statuses according to institution size—universities and university colleges—, but this has no impact on their operating rules: tuition fees are free for virtually all courses; public funding is organised by a national agency and distributed to all students. The private returns of education are low (Table 7) and the utility of education is, above all, considered public. In addition, since inequalities of income in society are low (Gini coefficient of 0.25)[27] and the higher education system is not very hierarchialised (Erikson and Jonsson 1996), there is very little differentiation in the private returns of education (Table 8). Sweden is thus built on a very strong egalitarian culture (Nicaise, Esping-Andersen and Pont *et al.* 2005) that can be largely found in its higher education system. This institutional and normative framework guarantees the transparency of the system of costs and benefits of education.

(27) The Gini coefficient measures income inequality in a given society. The closer it approaches to 1, the more distribution is unequal. The data are from the United Nations Development Programme.

TABLE 7.–***Private rates of return of higher education***[28] ***according to sex (in %)***

	Men	Women
France	8.4	7.4
United Kingdom	14.3	14.5
Sweden	5.1	4.2

Source: OECD (2008: 196).
Year: 2004.

In England virtually all institutions have one and the same status—university—since the old universities were merged with the polytechnics.[29] The funding system that ensued is relatively simple: tuition fees are similar for most courses (around €4,000 per year) and public funding is organised at a national level. The private returns of education are on average very high (Table 7). As inequalities of income (Gini coefficient of 0.36) are comparatively high and the hierarchy of universities relatively steep, the individual returns from higher education are also strongly differentiated (Table 8). The English, essentially private, conception of the utility of education is the foundation of the 2005 and 2012 reforms of the higher education system (Thompson and Bekhradnia 2010). Since private returns are dependent on courses chosen, the state's objective is to organise fair competition for access to these private benefits by producing evidence of the value for money of these courses and by reducing information bias (Giddens 1999). To this end, it organises an annual survey of student satisfaction and makes public a precise evaluation of degrees for each discipline and each university: e.g., the number of graduates in unemployment, further studies or employment; the numbers in graduate jobs and in specific occupation groups. While the systems of higher education in Sweden and England are very different, they do, nevertheless, have one common characteristic, the high transparency of the costs and returns of education.

(28) The rate of private returns of higher education takes into account the average economic interest an individual has in pursuing higher education. It is calculated by the relationship between the costs of education and the returns in the form of remuneration. More precisely, "the economic returns to education are measured by the internal rate of return (IRR), which is the discount rate that makes the present value of the income stream equal to zero, or in other words, the interest rate that makes the net present value of costs of investing in education equal to the benefits. […] The private internal rate of return for the individual is estimated on the basis of the additions to after-tax earnings that result from a higher level of educational attainment, net of the additional private costs (private expenditures and foregone earnings) required to attain the higher level of education. In general, living expenses of students (housing, meals, clothing, recreation, etc.) are excluded from these private expenditures" (OECD 2008: 194).

(29) Only the University of Buckingham and some short professional courses, with only a small number of students, have different statuses.

TABLE 8.–***Distribution of general higher education graduates aged 25 to 64 by level of earnings (in %)***

	At or below half of the median	More than half the median but at or below the median	More than the median but at or below 1.5 times the median	More than 1.5 times the median but at or below 2.0 times the median	More than twice the median
France	7.0	18.9	26.8	20.6	26.6
United Kingdom	11.8	13.6	19.6	24.1	30.9
Sweden	10.5	22.5	36.1	14.9	16.0

Source: OECD (2008: 179-81).
Years: 2005 in Sweden; 2006 in France and the United Kingdom.

An emphasis on the independence of young people

Granting student independence a value in itself is a necessary condition for a system of ICLs to cover tuition fees and all living expenses and thus permit true financial independence. In England and Sweden, this is firstly born out at the level of student funding. The role of parents is to alleviate the difficulties in the transitions of their children and not to finance their education in principle or systematically. The two countries have put into place tuition fee policies where parents are not called upon to play a central role: either because tuition fees are free (Sweden) or because they are paid for in a deferred way by the individual (England). The distinction between the three principal higher education funders—the individual in England, the state in Sweden and the family in France—relates, in the end, to Esping-Andersen's (1990) classification of welfare states as liberal, social democratic and conservative societies. Schwarz and Rehburg (2004) take this analogy further and characterises French students as *young learners* taken care of by their parents or in the case of need by the state. In England, students are, according to them, reduced to the role of *investors* since they are responsible for their own futures. In Sweden, the state considers students more as *responsible citizens* for whom it must guarantee financial independence. This typology thus brings out a common characteristic of the English and Swedish systems: parents are not considered the principal funders of higher education.

The limited role of parents in the financing of education rests essentially on how much the independence of young people is valued. For young Swedes, whose experiences are very similar to the young Danes studied by Van de Velde (2008), the experience of youth is founded in a rationale of personal development, on an ethic of individual autonomy. Put simply, young people must find their own voice, something that requires a certain amount of autonomy of action. In England, young people are more involved in a process of individual emancipation and have a duty of independence vis-à-vis their families. Becoming independent by leaving home at a young age and becoming

financially self-sufficient is thus considered a very positive choice. If the experience of youth is very different in England and in Sweden, one point in common is essential: independence is not only desired by students, it is also highly valued by families and encouraged by public policies.

The value assigned to life-long learning

If it were not for the value assigned to individual autonomy, ICLs would probably not target the development of life-long learning, which is, however, a source of widening participation. Let us recall that 44% and 53% of English and Swedish students respectively are aged 25 or over (18.4% in France). The development of life-long learning is based on "the construction of paths adapted to the diversity of individual progression" in Sweden, and in England on an "organised market" in which individuals manage their "diverse portfolios of skills" in a free and responsible manner (Verdier 2008). If permanent education is based on two different rationales in England and Sweden, it remains highly valued in both countries.

The value assigned to life-long learning is part of a more general conception of individual liberty. In Sweden, the development of continuous education is underpinned by the value assigned to the social autonomy of individuals, education being considered one of the ways of attaining this autonomy. Permanent education also contributes to the quest for *trygghet*, i.e., the feeling of social security that allows the self-fulfilment of everyone in a risk society (Nicaise, Esping-Andersen and Pont *et al.* 2005). In England, the model of life-long learning is based on the idea that individuals should, at all stages in their lives, have the opportunity to become integrated in and make progress in society. This liberty, permitted by so-called "positive" social support, is nevertheless the subject of individual responsibility vis-à-vis their own career paths. It is supported by a belief that it is in the interest of society to favour the development of human capital, whose principal utility is individual (Giddens 1999). The model of life-long learning founded on the value assigned to individual liberty, be it in the form of social autonomy in Sweden, or of the opportunity to be integrated into society in England, thus contributes to the equity of ICLs.

Finally, the development of English and Swedish ICLs as equitable mechanisms rests on the specific national contexts that notably include the transparency of their student funding policies and on the social value of student independence and the development of life-long learning. No system of ICLs has been implemented in France, but various experts have already simulated the development of this public policy. Thus, we will now look at to what extent the French context might be favourable to the three conditions for the importation of ICLs as an equitable system.

Towards the implementation of ICLs in France?

Based on an analysis of the Australian experience, various economists propose implementing a "French style" ICL system. In light of sociological research on France we will, firstly, discuss the French societal context, notably relating to the three dimensions examined previously. Secondly, we will see that the existing simulations of the implementation of ICLs in France, that translate a particular experience, that of Australia, into a singular higher education system, that of France, implies an approach to this mechanism that is in part opposed to the most equitable dimensions of the English and Swedish ICLs.

The costs and benefits of a very diverse education system lacking in transparency

Student funding is clear, both in England, where the transparency is established as an absolute value, and in Sweden, where the strong homogeneity of the system dispenses with the need for detailed evaluation of the private returns of education. In contrast, the costs and benefits of education in France are neither homogenous and egalitarian, nor truly transparent. In addition to the simple dichotomy between universities and *grandes écoles*, the French system is characterised by a great diversity of institutions and tuition fees (see Appendix 2). The level of income inequality in society (Gini coefficient of 0.33) as well as the level and overall distribution of private returns from education (see Tables 7 and 8) are rather less high in France than in England. Conversely, the complex hierarchy of education institutions in France leads to very varied private utility depending on type of education. The private returns and general conditions for insertion in the labour market vary greatly according to whether one studies in a *BTS/IUT*, a *grande école*, receive an undergraduate level university education or even a master's degree (Calmand, Epiphane and Hallier 2009; Courtioux 2010b).

Noting the diversity of costs and benefits of different qualifications, France does not follow the English ideal of absolute transparency of the private utility of education aimed at informing students. For the business and engineering *grandes écoles*, various rankings precisely detail the cost of education and expected insertion in the labour market, but they are all produced by the business press and not by the authorities. These rankings, based notably on starting salaries, seem to attest to highly differentiated returns at the heart of these types of education. At university, no true public evaluation of the returns of degrees exists(30) and the specific effect of universities on these returns seems very weak (Giret and Goudard 2010). The

(30) In October 2010, the ministry of higher education published the first national evaluation of the rates of employment of university leavers. The methodology used was strongly criticised, notably because the data was not presented as "all other things being equal."

evaluation of the private utility of higher education is therefore neither realised in systematic manner, nor made available to students, even though the returns appear to be highly differentiated between the broad types of education and even within certain types of institution. The French higher education system, in which the costs and benefits of education are both diverse and untransparent, would complicate the implementation of ICLs as an equitable and independence-granting system.

The undervalued independence of youth

In England and Sweden, the limited role of parents in financing of higher education is based on the high value assigned to the independence of youth. In contrast to these two countries, parents play a more central role in France. No only, as we have seen, is the level of direct public support for students low, but actually the conception of this public policy is the transfer of the role of principal funder to parents. For the most part, the support mostly benefits "younger students" (low university tuition fees,(31) guaranteed loans, tax exemptions) or "young students in need" (grants and student facilities from the CNOUS).(32) The authorities thus partially support young students whose families cannot cover the costs of higher education. Part of the public support is actually directly paid, in the form of tax exemptions, to the parents of students, legitimising even more their intermediary role in student finance. Social action in favour of students originates more in the social assistance to young people in general than support for the financial independence of students.

This essential role played by parents in the funding of education in France rests on the low valuation of the independence of youth. Young French people live in a state of "schizophrenic" dependency as result of a tension between two contradictory norms, the injunction of individual independence and that of the financial responsibility of parents for young people (Van de Velde 2008). Since parents support their children for the longest time possible in their education, they are less inclined, when compared to English and Swedish parents, to grant them true independence. Neither is independence supported by youth policy, which, like the system of public support of students presented above, is based on "hybrid, even contradictory, modes of intervention" and "the institutionalisation of age thresholds in discontinuous trajectories" (Van de Velde 2007: 328). The low value assigned to the independence of youth and the crucial role of parents in funding education seems at odds with the enabling dimension of English and Swedish ICLs.

(31) The university tuition fees of students in continuing education represent a large share of the real costs of their studies. In most cases, this cost is paid for by a specialist organisation such as *Fongecif*, by *Pôle Emploi*, or by regions, etc.

(32) As for loans, grants and CNOUS (student facilities), these are reserved for students under 28 years-of-age (with some special exceptions).

The importance of initial education

In English and Swedish societies, life-long learning is, as we have seen, highly valued. Conversely, the French higher education system is primarily an "academic system," where a university education is completed before people reach 25 and where companies then adapt the skills of individuals to their needs through vocational training. The system of life-long training is thus very far from "favouring support of individual paths in a universalistic process: no deferred right to education [...]; no second chances" (Verdier 2008: 218). Analysing the French elite, Bauer and Bertin-Mourot (1995) even speak of a *tyranny of initial education*. But France seems more generally to hold a unique position in terms of the *grip of school* (Dubet, Duru-Bellat and Vérétout 2010). Compared to other OECD countries, qualifications play a decisive role in the labour market, educational inequalities are pronounced and social reproduction is relatively strong. This grip that degrees have also extends beyond graduates' insertion into the labour market, the inequality of opportunities for access to different occupational categories tend to persevere over time (Chauvel 1998).

The French experience of a tight grip of qualifications on social positions could explain the importance given to initial education, and in contrast, the weakness of life-long learning. It seems illusory to know precisely to what extent the French school system with its multiple streams transforms "social classifications into educational classifications and creates hierarchies that are not experienced as purely technical, and thus partial and unilateral, but as total hierarchies based in nature, and thus having some effect on identifying social value and 'personal value,' educational dignities and human dignity" (Bourdieu 1979: 451). Moreover, the rational anticipation of a lack of second chances could push students to invest everything in their initial education, even if it means that in their "urgency and anxiety not to be left behind" (Van de Velde 2008), it limits even more any recourse to life-long learning, the development of which is, moreover, one of the conditions of the equity of ICLs.

Simulations of "French style" ICLs prove unfavourable for the conditions for the equity of ICLs

An empirical analysis of two simulations of the implementation of "French style" ICLs concretises the preceding more theoretical questioning of the importation of an ICL system into France as an equitable system. But for us to look at the way in which the groups of experts and economists have envisaged ICLs might be imported requires, firstly, that we present the Australian experience with ICLs. According to Courtioux, the Australian case, the most frequently cited by experts and economists in France and in the international literature, constitutes a sort of paradigm of ICLs, and this is for several reasons: "(1) no tuition fees existed before ICLs were brought in; (2) a

sufficient sample for this country is available to observe the directions of the reforms of this system; (3) the case of the introduction of ICLs to Australia is generally considered a success" (2009: 13). The Australian system differs in part to the public policies adopted in England and Sweden. In particular, the amount of the loan only takes into account tuition fees (not living costs) and these vary according to discipline, the objective of which is to make the rentability of the courses correspond to the levels of tuition fees. The rate of repayment varies between 0% and 8% of incomes depending on their level, and there are no specific situations in which debts are written off. There is no age limit or other eligibility criteria beyond being resident in the country.

Following several preliminary studies (notably Gregoir 2008 and Courtioux 2009), Courtioux and Gregoir (2010) simulated, for France, the implementation of an ICL system that was strongly inspired by the Australian experience. The authors proposed that students would contribute to the real cost of their education to the community, tuition fees varying from one course to another,(33) with these being up to 30% of the cost (scenario 1) or 100% of the cost (scenario 2). In their simulation, real interest on the loans was zero, i.e., the rate of inflation, and they were repaid when incomes reached the first quartile (€12,720/year in 2005) and were progressive as a function of income: from 5% of income between €12,720 and €15,982/year up to 30% of incomes above €28,284/year. While the reform seems conceivable for all disciplines, the authors proposed experimenting with this public policy for the most prestigious engineering schools.

As for the Centre d'Analyse Stratégique (Schaff, Ben-Jelloul and Liégey 2009), it evaluated the possibility that each student might borrow €500 per month for a maximum of sixty months. The seven scenarios elaborated varied according to repayment threshold (1.3 and 1.5 times the minimum wage), debt moratorium (twenty-five or thirty years after graduation), rate of interest during and after studies (zero, rate of inflation or commercial bank rates) and the level of repayments above the threshold (20% or 30%). The authors explained, in their conclusion, that the resources hereby released to students could be used to increase tuition fees.

Without entering into the technical aspects proposed, the two simulations of "French style" ICL systems relate back, in a concrete way, to the conditions for the equity of ICLs previously evoked. Firstly, the two studies do not envisage the opening of this system to all individuals, whatever their age. Secondly, the issue of living costs is not in itself considered. In the Centre d'Analyse Stratégique simulation, doubt remains about the expenditure targeted by the system—tuition fees or living costs?—if one considers that an amount of €500 per month would barely cover part of the two expenses for the majority of students. For Courtioux and Gregoir (2010), the ICL system

(33) Note that this exercise proves to be complex because the data on the cost of education are not public and to the knowledge of the authors and ourselves, no research has been carried out on this question since 2004.

simulated had the sole objective of transferring part of the costs of education assumed by the community to students, even if their living expenses are not mentioned in their system. Thirdly, the commonality of these two studies, brings to light the inherent contradictions of the implementation of ICLs at the heart of the French funding system. While the system advocated by the Centre d'Analyse Stratégique effectively guarantees the equality of treatment of students, it ignores all differences between students, rendering it blind to the onerous tuition fees that some students face. In contrast, the project presented by Courtioux and Gregoir (2010), even if it targets, out of a concern for equity, the disciplines that benefit from the greatest community subventions, would accentuate the complexity of the French funding system by adding a new loan system specific to certain courses.

Even though one could suggest that this goes beyond the aims of these two studies—they cannot be reproached for not taking into account student finance as a whole—, their treatment of the three conditions that favour the equity of ICLs illustrates the fact that the importation of a public policy into a particular national context is accompanied by a retranslation of the issues and transformation of the system. If the two simulations presented conserve the general principle of ICLs, i.e., the deferring of part of the costs of education, they still reveal that the adaptation of ICLs to the French context would be done at the price of uncertainty about the consequences of this public policy in terms of social inequalities.

*
* *

The financial equity of access to higher education does not rest solely on tuition fees: it depends on the system of student funding in its entirety. If one considers the totality of student expenses, the equity of the French student funding policy seems weak, even compared to other *a priori* inegalitarian countries. Various researchers and groups of experts propose the implementation of ICLs that would be both efficient and equitable. In England, as in Sweden, these would limit inequalities of incomes among students, grant greater financial independence to students and open the doors of higher education to older students.

However, these advantages prove contingent on institutional and normative contexts that can be found in England as in Sweden. First, an ICL is only equitable on condition that the system of student funding is relatively transparent and clear. But, in France, the current student funding policy, including the costs and returns of education, is much more complex than in the two other countries. This is why an aversion to debt risks having a greater impact on inequality of opportunities. Even more importantly, the low value given to the independence of youth is opposed to the "enabling" characters of English and Swedish ICLs, and the importance given to initial education in France is in contradiction with the opening up of higher education to older students, a condition for the equity of ICLs.

Perhaps even more so than for other reforms, the major risk in implementing an ICL scheme in France would be to only do it in a half complete way, that is to import the scheme while retaining the structures and current functioning of higher education policy and without rethinking the French normative environment surrounding young students and higher education. Following the example of the Courtioux and Gregoir (2010), such an approach would probably translate into an institutional arrangement around an ICL system that is both unequal depending on discipline followed, financially weak and accessible only to young students during their initial education. The positive impact of ICLs in terms of equity and student independence would thus by nil, while the aversion to the risk of loans, inherent in the introduction of the principle of borrowing to fund education, would probably be greater than in England and Sweden.

At the same time that an ICL system seems, for various groups of experts, to be a solution for the funding difficulties of French students, these groups also propose increasing the low levels of tuition fees in France. Let us recall that, following the example of Sweden, the introduction of ICLs does not necessarily require an increase in tuition fees. In England, the state and the individual share the costs of education, since it is taken as read that higher education brings significant private economic returns. In Sweden, the state finances the cost education and encourages individuals to study by way of a universal grant since it seems apparent that higher education essentially brings public benefits, be they economic or social. In the case of England, ICLs thus participate, along with an increase in tuition fees, in the institutionalisation of a "market" regime(34) of higher education, while in Sweden they are, taking into account free tuition, part of a "universalist" regime aimed at socialising the overall cost of higher education, including student living costs (Vinokur 2007). Finally, it is probably this option—whether or not to raise tuition fees—that is of the most significance for the potential implementation of an ICL system in France.

In this article we have suggested that various social and cultural dimensions could have an impact on the implementation of an ICL system in France. The new reform of student finance in England (see Box) perfectly illustrates the influence of ideas on public policies. The reform rests, in effect, on the idea that higher education should function as a market in the economic sense of the term. Finally, it pushes the English representation of private utility of education to its paroxysm. For all that, public policies are influencing thinking more in the opposite direction in the French higher education system (Musselin 2000). If the French institutional and normative context seems unfavourable to the implementation of ICLs as an equitable system, the latter could act a real tool for societal change. The issue would thus be whether this public policy could help rethink the experience of youth which is

(34) Our point of departure is two regimes ("market" and "universalist") identified by Verdier (2008) regarding education systems and life-long learning.

still less independent compared to northern European countries (Galland 2001) and the stifling role of education, particularly initial education, on individual outcomes (Dubet, Duru-Bellat and Vérétout 2010).

Nicolas CHARLES

Centre Émile Durkheim
Université Bordeaux Segalen
3 ter, place de la Victoire
33076 Bordeaux cedex–France

nicolascharles@laposte.net

Trans. Toby Matthews

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1.–*Comparison of tuition fees, and principal sources of public student funding in France, England and Sweden*

		Sweden	England	France
Tuition fees	***Regulation***	Level fixed by the state	Ceiling fixed by the state at degree level; deregulated at postgraduate level	Varies according to institution type
	Cost per year	Free	£3,145 per year (€PPP 4,200) maximum for a degree, applicable for most courses; around €PP 12,000 for a masters	Varies according to institution type (cf. Table 1)
Grants	***Type***	Universal	Means-tested	Means-tested*
	Amount per year	SEK 25,700 per year (€PPP 2,350)	Up to £2,835 (€PPP 3,800) (State) and £1,500 (€PP 2,000) supplementary (University)	Up to €4,019 per year (€PPP 3,740)
	Number of years	6 years	3 years of degree+1 additional year	7 years
	Individual eligibility	Aged less than 54	No age restriction Means testing: income of parents for those under 25 years/ household income for those 25 and over Full grant for under £25,000 of income per year (€PP 33,700); progressive reduction up to £60,000 of income per year (€PPP 67,500)	Under 28 years (without dispensation) Means testing: income of parents and system of "*points de charge*" notably based on distance of place of study, parents' dependent children
	Course eligibility	Passing of at least half exams from previous semester At least half-time student	Changing course possible after first year Undergraduate student and some masters courses (notably teaching) Full-time students and those on sandwich courses (a separate grant system is reserved for the latter)	A third year of the grant is offered if *bac*+1 is passed; a 4th and 5th if the *bac*+2 is passed; a 6th and 7th if the *bac*+3 is passed Eligible courses (excludes some degrees in private education)

*The precise conditions for the awarding of means tested grants can be found at http://www.education.gouv.fr/cid51570/esrs1008067c.html.

		Sweden	England	France
Public loan	***Type***	Hybrid system of loans contingent on income and at a fixed rate	Income contingent loan	Partially private loan (70% of the remaining capital of the loan, interest free) guaranteed by the state
	Amount borrowable	Up to SEK 49,200 per year (€PPP 4,500); more in particular need	Up to £3,145 per year (€PPP 4,200) for tuition fees Up to £ 6,475 per year (€PPP 8,700) for living costs	Up to €15,000 in total (€PPP 13,950)
	Number of years	6 years	3 years of degree+1 extra year	Borrowed in one go
	Interest rate	70% of the rate of state's borrowing rate	The minimum of the rate of inflation and the base rate plus one point	Market rate (3.8 to 4.5% in 2009)
	Type of repayment	Repayments fixed in advance and progressively increasing over time At the request of a borrower in financial difficulties, repayments reduced to a maximum 4% of incomes	9% of incomes above a level of £15,000 of income per year (€PPP 20,200)	Repayments fixed in advance (classical loan)
	Beginning of repayments	Repayments begin 6 months after studies completed	Repayments begin one year after the end of studies	Vary according to bank: Repayments begin immediately, except where a postponement has been negotiated
	Length of repayments	Repayments fixed for 25 years, but adaptable	Length of repayments contingent on incomes	Varies according to bank: maximum 10 years
	Debt write-off	When the borrower reaches the age of 68	25 years after completing higher education, or when the borrower reaches the age of 65	None

	Sweden	England	France
Individual eligibility	Not conditional on parental resources or guarantees Be aged less than 45	Not conditional on parental resources or guarantees Be aged less than 60 for the living costs element; no age restriction for the tuition fee element 75% of the sum for those from wealthier backgrounds; loan reduced by the amount of grant if received Type of housing and place of study	Not conditional on parental resources or guarantees Other conditions: vary depending on bank
Course eligibility	Passing of at least half exams from previous semester At least half-time student	Degree student Full time students and those on sandwich courses	Varies according to bank: normally no discrimination according to course

Note: The funding conditions are those of national students. Foreign students are treated differently in part.

APPENDIX 2.–***Tuition fees in different types of institution in France***

Institution type	**Status**	**Annual tuition fees**
Classes préparatoires	Public	Free
	Private under contract	From 1,000 to €2,000
	Private, no contract	Up to €8,500
Instituts Universitaires de Technologie (IUT)	Public	Around €200
Sections de Technicien Supérieur (STS)	Public	Around €200
	Private under contract	Around €1,000
	Private, no contract	Around €5,000
Universities	Public	From 150 to €600
	Specific status (private, Catholic, *Grand établissement*, etc.)	From 1,000 to €6,000
	Medical studies	From 150 to €600; progressive remuneration from the sixth year
Business schools	Tied to the local chamber of commerce and industry	From 7,000 to €12,000 (in general for 3 years)
	Private	From 4,000 to €8,000 (in general for five years)
Engineering schools	Public (*Établissement public à caractère scientifique, culturel et professionnel*; *Établissement public à caractère administratif*; within a university; etc.)	From 200 to €1,200; some schools pay for all or some of their students
	Tied to the local chamber of commerce and industry	From 3,000 to €6,000
	Private	From 4,000 to €8,000
Schools preparing students for the high functions of state (Polytechnique, other military schools, Écoles Normales Supérieures, etc.)	Public	In some schools students are paid as civil servants, in the others a few hundred euros
Other specialist schools*: *paramedical, journalism, architecture schools, etc.	Various	Various

Sources: Websites for the *Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale*, *ONISEP* and the *Conférence des Grandes Écoles*.
Note: Only the large masses of students are presented here. For example, some trade schools have a public status (e.g., *Telecom EM*, under the leadership of the Ministère de l'Industrie). Furthermore, there is some crossover between the "Schools preparing students for the high functions of state" and the "Engineering schools" category (e.g., Polytechnique).

REFERENCES

Allègre, G., Marceau, A., and Arnov, M., eds, 2010. "L'autonomie des jeunes au service de l'égalité." *Rapport*. Paris: Terra Nova: http://www.tnova.fr/sites/default/files/autonomiedesjeunes_0.pdf [available online June 26, 2012].

Allègre, G., Mélonio, T., and Timbeau, X., 2010. "Dépenses publiques d'éducation et inégalités. Une perspective de cycle de vie." *Document de Travail de l'OFCE*: 2010-06: http://www.ofce.sciences-po.fr/pdf/dtravail/WP2010-06.pdf [available online June 26, 2012].

Asplund, R., Ben Adbelkarim, O., and Skalli, A., 2008. "An Equity Perspective on Access to, Enrolment in and Finance of Tertiary Education." *Education Economics* 16(3): 261-74.

Bauer, M., and Bertin-Mourot, B., 1995. "La tyrannie du diplôme initial et la circulation des élites: la stabilité du modèle français." In *Le recrutement des élites en Europe*. **E. Suleiman, H. Mendras,** eds. Paris: La Découverte: 48-63.

Ben-Jelloul, M., Liégey, M., and Schaff, C., 2009. "Le prêt à remboursement contingent au revenu: une nouvelle piste pour l'autonomie financière des étudiants?" *La Note de Veille* 143 [Centre d'analyse stratégique].

Bourdieu, P., 1979. *La distinction. Critique sociale du jugement*. Paris: Éditions de Minuit.

Callender, C., 2006. "Access to Higher Education in Britain: The Impact of Tuition Fees and Financial Assistance." In *Cost-Sharing and Accessibility in Higher Education*: *A Fairer Deal*? **P. N. Teixeira, D. B. Johnstone, M. J. Rosa, and H. Vossensteyn,** eds. Dordrecht: Springer: 105-32.

Callender, C., and Jackson, J., 2005. "Does the Fear of Debt Deter Students from Higher Education?" *Journal of Social Policy* 34(4): 509-40.

Calmand, J., Epiphane, D., and Hallier, P., 2009. "De l'enseignement supérieur à l'emploi: voies rapides et chemins de traverses. Enquête 'Génération 2004.' Interrogation 2007." *Notes Emploi Formation* 43 [Céreq].

Casta, A., 2010. "La nouvelle condition des étudiants anglais: entre endettement et emploi." *Formation Emploi* 110(2): 19-34.

Chapman, B., 2006. "Income Contingent Loans for Higher Education: International Reforms." In Handbook of the Economics of Education, **E. Hanushek, F. Welch,** eds. Vol.2: 1435-503.

Chauvel, L., 1998. *Le destin des générations, structure sociale et cohortes en France au XX^e^ siècle*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Colin, N., 2008. "Pour une contribution plus juste au financement de l'enseignement supérieur." *Amicus Curiae Briefing Paper*. Paris: Institut Montaigne: http://www.institutmontaigne.org/medias/documents/amicus_enseigne_internet.pdf [available online June 26, 2012].

Conseil de l'Emploi, des Revenus et de la Cohésion Sociale (CERC), 2003. *Éducation et redistribution*. 3. Paris: La Documentation Française.

Courtioux, P., 2009. "Peut-on financer l'éducation du supérieur de manière plus équitable?" *EDHEC Position Paper*. Nice: EDHEC: http://professoral.edhec.com/servlet/com.univ.collaboratif.utils.LectureFichiergw?ID_FICHIER=1328885973118 [available online June 26, 2012].

—2010a. "Une contribution des diplômés du supérieur à leurs études est-elle envisageable?" *Revue Française d'Économie* 24(3): 121-65.

—2010b. "L'effet du système socio-fiscal sur les rendements privés de l'enseignement supérieur. Une analyse par microsimulation." *EDHEC Position Paper*. Nice: EDHEC: http://professoral.edhec.com/jsp/fiche_document.jsp?CODE=1267519458392&LANGUE=0 [available online June 26, 2012].

Courtioux, P., and Gregoir, S., 2010. "Les propositions de l'EDHEC pour réformer l'enseignement supérieur: les contrats de formation supérieure." *EDHEC Position Paper*, Nice: EDHEC: http://professoral.edhec.com/jsp/fiche_document.jsp?CODE=1283933658821&LANGUE=0 [available online June 26, 2012].

Dearden, L., Fitzsimons, E., and Wyness, G., 2010. "The Impact of Higher Education Finance on University Participation in the UK." *Research Paper*, 11. London: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills: http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/corporate/docs/i/10-1188-impact-finance-on-university-participation.pdf [available online June 26, 2012].

Department for Children, School and Families (DCSF), 2009. *Education and Training Statistics for the United Kingdom 2009*. London: Department for Children, School and Families: http://www.education.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/VOL/v000891/v01-2009.pdf [available online June 26, 2012].

Direction de l'Évaluation, de la Prospective et de la Performance (DEPP), 2010. *Repères et références statistiques sur les enseignements, la formation et la recherche.* Paris: Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale: http://media.education.gouv.fr/file/2010/16/9/RERS_2010_152169.pdf [available online June 26, 2012].

Dubet, F., Duru-Bellat, M., and Vérétout, A., 2010. *Les sociétés et leur école. Emprise du diplôme et cohésion sociale*. Paris: Le Seuil.

Duru-Bellat, M., and Mingat, A., 1979. "Comportement des bacheliers: modèle de choix de disciplines. *Consommation-Annales du CREDOC* 3/4: 245-62.

Eicher, J.-C., and Chevaillier, T., 2002. "Rethinking the Financing of Post-Compulsory Education." *Higher Education in Europe* 27(1-2): 69-88.

Erikson, R., and Jonsson, J. O., 1996. *Can Education be Equalized*? *The Swedish Case in Comparative Perspective.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Esping-Andersen, G., 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Foster, T., 2009. "Alternative Routes into and Pathways through Higher Education." *Research Paper*, 4. London: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills: http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/corporate/migratedD/publications/B/BIS-RP-004 [available online June 26, 2012].

Galland, O., 2001. "Adolescence, post-adolescence, jeunesse: retour sur quelques interprétations." *Revue Française de Sociologie* 42(4): 611-40.

Garcia, S., 2008. "Payer plus pour étudier mieux? Les vertus pédagogiques de l'investissement économique. *Revue de la régulation* 3/4: http://regulation.revues.org/index6023.html [available online June 26, 2012].

Gary-Bobo, R., 2006. "Éducation, efficacité économique et justice sociale: une approche rawlsienne." *Revue d'Économie Politique* 116(2): 199-228.

Gary-Bobo, R., and Trannoy, A., 2005. "Faut-il augmenter les droits d'inscription? *Revue Française d'Économie* 19(3): 189-237.

Giddens, A., 1999. *The Third Way. The Renewal of Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giret, J.-F., and Goudard, M., 2010. "Mesure des effets établissement sur le salaire des diplômés du supérieur." *Net.Doc* 72 [Céreq].

Gregoir, S., 2008. "Les prêts étudiants peuvent-ils être un outil de progrès social?" *EDHEC Position Paper*. Nice: EDHEC: http://professoral.edhec.com/jsp/fiche_document.jsp?CODE=1224582486388&LANGUE=0 [available online June 26, 2012].

Gruel, L., 2009. "Des étudiants rarement pauvres, mais une indépendance plus fréquemment associée à des tensions budgétaires." In *Les étudiants en France. Histoire et sociologie d'une nouvelle jeunesse*. **L. Gruel, O. Galland, G. Houzel,** eds. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes: 221-37.

Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), 2010. "Trends in Young Participation in Higher Education: Core Results for England." *Issues Paper*, 2010/03. Bristol: Higher Education Funding Council for England: http://www.hefce.ac.uk/pubs/hefce/2010/10_03/10_03.pdf [available online June 26, 2012].

Johnstone, D. B., 2004. "The Economics and Politics of Cost Sharing in Higher Education: Comparative Perspectives." *Economics of Education Review* 23(4): 403-410.

—2009. "Conventional Fixed-Schedule Versus Income Contingent Repayment Obligations: Is there a 'Best' Loan Scheme?" *Higher Education in Europe* 34(2): 189-99.

Johnstone, D. B., and Marcucci, P. N., 2010. *Financing Higher Education Worldwide*: *Who Pays*? *Who Should Pay*? Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Landais, C., Piketty, T., and Saez, E., 2011. *Pour une révolution fiscale. Un impôt sur le revenu pour le XXI^e siècle*. Paris: Le Seuil.

Musselin, C., 2000. "The Role of Ideas in the Emergence of Convergent Higher Education Policies in Europe: The Case of France." *Working Paper*, 73. Center for European Studies: http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/docs/pdfs/Musselin.pdf [available online June 26, 2012].

Nicaise, I., Esping-Andersen, G., Pont, B., and Tunstall, P., 2005. *Equity in Education Thematic Review. Sweden. Country Note.* Stockholm: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/5/35892546.pdf [available online June 26, 2012].

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2008. *Education at a Glance 2008. OECD Indicators*. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: http://www.oecd.org/education/highereducationandadultlearning/41284038.pdf [available online June 26, 2012].

—2009. *Education at a Glance 2009. OECD Indicators*. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: http://www.oecd.org/education/highereducationandadultlearning/43636332.pdf [available online June 26, 2012].

Orr, D., Gwosc, C., and Netz, N., 2011. *Social and Economic Conditions of Student Life in Europe. Synopsis of Indicators. Final Report. Eurostudent IV 2008-2011.* Bielefeld: W. Bertelsmann Verlag.

Pinto, V., 2008. '"Démocratisation' et 'professionnalisation' de l'enseignement supérieur." *Mouvements* 55-56: 12-23.

Robeyns, I., 2006. "Three Models of Education. Rights, Capabilities and Human Capital." *Theory and Research in Education* 4(1): 69-84.

Santiago, P., Tremblay, K., Basri, E., and Arnal, E., 2008a. *Tertiary Education for the Knowledge Society*. Vol.1: *Special Features*: *Governance, Funding, Quality*. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: http://www.nemzig.bme.hu/nki/OECD/OECD_1.pdf [available online June 26, 2012].

—2008b. *Tertiary education for the knowledge society*. Vol. 2: *Special Features*: *Equity, Innovation, Labour Market, Internationalisation*, Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/23/41266759.pdf.[available online June 26, 2012].

Schaff, C., Ben-Jelloul, M., and Liégey, M., 2009. "Le prêt à remboursement contingent au revenu (Annexe): simulations dans le cas français." *La Note de Veille* 144 [Centre d'Analyse Stratégique].

Schwarz, S., and Rehburg, M., 2004. "Study Costs and Direct Public Student Support in 16 European Countries. Towards a European Higher Education Area?" *European Journal of Education* 39(4): 521-32.

Sen, A., 2009. *The Idea of Justice.* Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Swedish National Agency for Higher Education (SNAHE), 2008. *Vilka är studenter*? *En undersökning av studenterna i Sverige*, 2008: 33R. Stockholm: Swedish National Agency for Higher Education: http://www.hsv.se/download/18.6d5fe98611d3f068f148000150048/0833R.pdf [available online June 26, 2012].

Thompson, J., and Bekhradnia, B., 2010. *The Government's Proposals for Higher Education Funding and Student Finance–An Analysis.* Oxford: Higher Education Policy Institute: http://www.hepi.ac.uk/files/1.50%20Government%20proposals%20for%20HE%20funding%20full.pdf [available online June 26, 2012].

Trannoy, A., 2006. "Financement des universités, financement des études." *Revue d'Économie Politique* 116(6): 745-82.

Usher, A., and Cervenan, A., 2005. *Global Higher Education Rankings. Affordability and Accessibility in Comparative Perspective*. Toronto: Educational Policy Institute.

Van de Velde, C., 2007. "La dépendance familiale des jeunes adultes en France. Traitement politique et enjeux normatifs." In *Repenser la solidarité. L'apport des sciences sociales*. **S. Paugam,** ed. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France: 315-34.

—2008. *Devenir adulte. Sociologie comparée de la jeunesse en Europe*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Van Parijs, P., 2004. "Est-il juste que l'Université soit gratuite? *Éthique et Économique* 2(1): 1-8.

Verdier, É., 2008. "L'éducation et la formation tout au long de la vie: une orientation européenne, des régimes d'action publique et des modèles nationaux en évolution." *Sociologie et Sociétés* 40(1): 195-225.

Vinokur, A., 2007. "Study Now, Pay Later. Endettement étudiant et restructuration de l'enseignement supérieur." In *Pouvoirs et financement en éducation. Qui paie décide*? **A. Vinokur,** ed. Paris: L'Harmattan: 219-45.