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Political Environmentalism: to What Purpose, and How?

Translated from the French by JPD Systems

Pages 93 à 100

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  • Villalba, B.
(2012). Political Environmentalism: to What Purpose, and How? Mouvements, No 69(1), 93-100. https://doi.org/10.3917/mouv.069.0093.

  • Villalba, Bruno.
« Political Environmentalism: to What Purpose, and How? ». Mouvements, 2012/1 No 69, 2012. p.93-100. CAIRN.INFO, shs.cairn.info/journal-mouvements-2012-1-page-93?lang=en.

  • VILLALBA, Bruno,
2012. Political Environmentalism: to What Purpose, and How? Mouvements, 2012/1 No 69, p.93-100. DOI : 10.3917/mouv.069.0093. URL : https://shs.cairn.info/journal-mouvements-2012-1-page-93?lang=en.

https://doi.org/10.3917/mouv.069.0093


Notes

  • [*]
    Professor of political science at Sciences Po Lille and member of the Center for Research in Political and Social Administration (Centre d’Études et de Recherches Administratives, Politiques, et Sociales, CNRS-UMR 8026). His research focuses on the sociology of the environment. His publications may be viewed at: http://droit.univ-lille2.fr/enseignants/villalba.
  • [1]
    R. Dumont, L’utopie ou la mort (Paris: Seuil, 1973).
  • [2]
    A more detailed presentation of the recent history of French political environmentalism can be found in B. Villalba, “La transmutation d’Europe Écologie-Les Verts,” in Les partis politiques français, edited by P. Bréchon, (Paris: La Documentation Française, 2011).
  • [3]
    J. Berry and G.?Frankland (eds.), International Encyclopedia of Environmental Politics (London: Routledge, 2002).
  • [4]
    A. Lipietz, Qu’est-ce que l’écologie politique?? La Grande Transformation du XXIè siècle (Paris: La Découverte, 1999).
  • [5]
  • [6]
    C. Duflot, Apartés: Entretien avec Guy Sitbon (Paris: Les Petits Matins, 2010).
  • [7]
    G. Sainteny, L’introuvable écologisme français?? (Paris: PUF, 2000).
  • [8]
    The report by Dominique Voynet is extremely interesting in what it reveals of the lack of institutional culture on the part of environmentalist political personnel and of the attempt to develop a review of the ministerial experience. See D. Voynet, Voix off (Paris: Stock, 2003). This work also contributed to strengthening the ideological contribution of the left around the environmental question. See also M. Löwry and J-M. Harribey (eds.), Capital contre nature (Paris: PUF, 2003).
  • [9]
    In 2007, with the financial situation still shaky, Cécile Duflot, already the national secretary of the movement, and CNIR refusing to sign the agreement with the Socialist Party for the legislative elections, the movement reduced its operating budget and implemented a voluntary departure plan for eight people among its staff at headquarters.
  • [10]
    As Europe Ecology’s Manifesto states: “We have arrived at this key point where things could take a tragic and irreversible turn […] It is urgent that we unite in order to act. Not tomorrow, not maybe. Now and resolutely!” (Europe Ecology, October 2008).
  • [11]
    S. Lavignotte, La décroissance est-elle souhaitable?? (Paris: Textuel, 2010).
  • [12]
    The theoretical differences are apparent upon reading the journals that nourish this movement. See for example La Décroissance and Entropia.
  • [13]
    P. Ariès, La simplicité volontaire contre le mythe de l’abondance (Paris: La Découverte, 2010).
  • [14]
    Y. Cochet, Antimanuel d’écologie (Rosny-sous-Bois: Bréal, 2009).
  • [15]
    “Altermondialisme Saison 2: De Seattle à Cochabamba,” Mouvements 63 (2010).
  • [16]
    S. George, Leurs crises, nos solutions (Paris: Albin Michel, 2010).
  • [17]
    Following his book, Pour un pacte écologique (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2006), Hulot published many books on the environmental issue, including two volumes of Syndrome du Titanic (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2004 and 2009), from which he also produced a film that reflected his gradual radicalization.
  • [18]
    B. Rihoux, P.?Lucardie, and G.?Frankland (eds.), Green Parties in Transition: The End of Grassroots Democracy? (Farnham: Asghate, 2008).
  • [19]
    A. Gunther, Hiroshima est partout (Paris: Le Seuil, 2008).
  • [20]
    J. Grinevald, La biosphère de l’anthropocène: Climat et pétrole, la double menace (Georg, 2008).
  • [21]
    D. Bourg and K.?Whiteside, Vers une démocratie écologique: Le citoyen, le savant et le politique (Paris: Le Seuil, “La République des idées” collection, 2010). Such reflection is the object of a major theoretical current in environmentalism in the English-speaking world. See A. Dobson, Green Political Thought (London: Routledge, 2007).
  • [22]
    Y. Cochet, Pétrole Apocalypse (Paris: Fayard, 2005).
  • [23]
    B. Villalba, “L’écologie politique face au délai et à la contraction démocratique,” Écologie et Politique 40 (2010), 95-113.
  • [24]
    “I will not be a member of a government that does not pursue these reforms [abandoning nuclear power and certain large construction projects, introducing proportional voting, etc.] at the very top of its platform, nor will any other member of EELV.” E. Joly, interview in Le Monde, October 19, 2011.
  • [25]
  • [26]
    On November 28, François Hollande stated that he would not apply the entire agreement between the PS and EELV but only “the most essential” measures (Le Monde, November 29, 2011).
  • [27]
    The future Notre-Dame-des-Landes airport was forgotten.
  • [28]
    As the agreement states, “This is why, based on the Stiglitz Commission report, we will establish a new indicator for human development. In addition to the traditional economic criteria for assessing GDP, it will measure social cohesion (income inequality, access to housing and healthcare, public services), individual freedom (access to higher education) and environmental protection (waste recycling and air and water quality).”
  • [29]
    R. Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992).
“The highest function of environmentalism is understanding consequences.”
Frank Herbert, Dune, 1965

1Let us consider the beginnings, even the very raison d’être of environmentalism. At the start of the 1970s, environmentalism arose from one improbable candidacy, that of René Dumont, the pro-third-world agronomist who turned from promoting productivist agriculture to a radical critique of the evils of global economic competition. His candidacy in the presidential election arose from the mobilization of a number of associations and high-profile individuals with a strong environmental awareness and a sense of urgency. He held his first press conference on April 11, 1974. Some memorable moments were his campaigning by bicycle as well as the glass of water and apple he presented as rare and precious resources in his television appearances. Dumont also addressed the issue of the contradictory nature of production costs (in particular where transportation was concerned). During this campaign, he wrote a book (L’utopie ou la mort – Utopia or Else) that included, prophetically but naturally, all the themes of environmental activism [1] He was aware of the need for environmentalists to develop a “shared economic, and thus political program to enable an exit from the profit society created by the market economy” and to “reconsider growth.” Yet he already exhibited the ideological contradictions of this new political environmentalism as he declared himself to be an anti-bureaucracy and pro-self-management socialist. He only entered the presidential race when he received the assurance that Charles Piaget, the popular self-management leader of Lip, who had the potential to gather the electorate of the left, the far-left, and the environmentalists, would not run. However, the CFDT labor union, which at the time was aligned with the Socialist Party (PS), prevented him from achieving this aim.

2This brief snapshot resembles a dramatic timeline that has since served as a reference for the actions of political environmentalists. Let us therefore summarize its four main features and how these relate to environmentalism today. [2]

A Political Platform under Continuous Construction

3The first issue facing environmentalists is not whether they are more radical than reformist or the reverse, but rather to define – or redefine – what makes political environmentalism unique in its overall content and interdisciplinary approach. In its general principle, environmentalism fosters a fundamental questioning, which is more cultural than socioeconomic in nature, of the development model of the industrial and technological era, based on the awareness that current modes of production and consumption, which are anchored in an individualist and accumulative model of society, will bring about the ruin of the planet and of humanity if it continues over time (what kind of earth do we leave to future generations?) and space (from North to South). [3]

4To date, Europe Ecology The Greens, the primary political environmentalist organization, does not have a homogeneous shared culture. Environmentalists do not share an identical understanding or analysis of the economy, and party members are either divided or undecided concerning certain economic issues (including lower social contributions by employers and the role and function of the State in economic action). However, positions are more specific in the area of cultural liberalism. The statement by Alain Lipietz, which was published in 1999, remains valid today: “Environmentalism as it stands today is no more than a project, and I count on all the men and women who are not with the Greens to help implement it.” [4] Meanwhile, various “Green Books” continue to compile solutions and attempt to find connections between the various elements constituting this environmentalist platform.

5The Manifesto for a Political Environmentalism (Manifeste pour une Politique Écologique), EELV’s founding text, [5] rekindled the desire to create a cultural majority around environmentalism (a position which was that of the Greens from 1986 to 1993). The goal was to form a credible alternative to the old left-right divisions [6] by transforming voters’ cultural and political references. The political offer was also more pragmatic. The manifesto benefitted from the political experience of the Greens. It supported the strategy of conciliation, implemented by the Greens starting in 1995, between two needs: to make electoral alliances, and to participate in government (at the local, regional, and national level). [7] This immersion in the requirements of public policy led to more moderate ideological positioning (as shown by the Greens’ participation in government in 1997-2002). [8]

Political autonomy continuously seeking its own space

6What kind of existence is possible within the French political space? From independence to coalition, the environmentalists have experimented with everything since entering politics, and the rules of the political game have gradually come to define the very framework of their existence. To exist is above all to be present electorally. This involves a compromise with the activist identity, and it requires mediating between activism and greater political effectiveness. Although the path is one of hesitations and retreats, it demonstrates the environmentalists’ ability to adapt their platform to the requirements of the electoral system, in particular the laws governing the public financing of political parties, which strongly impact the conditions for organizing internal nominations and electoral coalitions. [9]

7Such a change does not take place without fractures in the environmentalist movement. While some rejected the election-oriented evolution and chose to refocus on an associative approach, others shifted more overtly toward the left (the “forces for progress”) at the risk of causing schisms (as when Antoine Waechter left the Greens in 1994 to create the Independent Environmentalist Movement (Mouvement Écologiste Indépendant). Meanwhile, others tried to formulate an alternative to the semi-hegemonic position of the Greens on the left (Les Alternatifs, under many names but in small numbers), the right (Corinne Lepage who since 1966 has run the policy club Citizenship, Action, Participation for the 21st century (Citoyenneté, Action, Participation pour le XXIe Siècle), on the left or the right depending on electoral calendars (Génération Écologie, founded by Brice Lalonde, Jean-Louis Borloo, and Corinne Lepage in 1990 with the support of the French Socialist Party). Such scattering and confusing labels did not help the electoral performances of the environmentalist movement, whose results remained flat.

8The Greens gradually managed to establish themselves as the organization with the broadest presence across the country, with its network of elected politicians often present in local government coalitions. Europe Ecology (EE) was founded in late 2008 as a result of these efforts to unite environmentalists, though this time from the left to the center-right. Its secondary goal began with the observation that the party format is no longer the only organizational approach to political mobilization. Its third objective, which was more political, reflected the minimal agreement among all of these protagonists that it is now impossible to draw a boundary between day-to-day politics and environmental urgency. [10]

9Other movements expressed their hesitation to enter into the Greens’ sphere of influence, including the supporters of de-growth and the alter-globalists. De-growth supporters do not represent a political movement opposed to environmentalism per se, [11] nor can they be grouped into a single family, given how many differences there are among them in terms of theoretical framework and electoral strategies. [12] However, overall, their proposals are far more critical of the potential for reform of the current political system. [13] The Greens’ Yves Cochet shares the idea that de-growth will be necessary in practice and that environmentalists should therefore prepare politically and culturally for a de-growth society so that it can be chosen rather than imposed. [14] For their part, the alter-globalist movements are gradually integrating the environmental issue. [15] However, their dialectic conception of political conflict leads them to prefer an analysis in terms of relations of dominance, in which the environmental question is gradually gaining a place but does not yet constitute the center of gravity. [16] Finally, the media and political campaign orchestrated by Nicolas Hulot for the 2007 presidential election [17] disrupted the usual environmental rhetoric.

Seeking Acceptance of Leadership

10Who leads political environmentalism? How can political leadership be reconciled with maintaining a deep attachment to the radical political individualism that motivates environmental activists? Environmentalists only exist via the expression of a political will to install, among themselves and in the political sphere in general, a different (or alternative, or new, or other) way of doing politics, based essentially on the affirmation of principles of direct and participatory democracy. Reflecting on the party form means not only devising one’s relation with the internal political organization, but also asking oneself about the meaning of the relationship of political dominance created between the self and the organization and, more broadly, between the self and political power in its entirety. In other words, thinking about the modalities of party construction means taking account of the inevitable relationship of power that will take form – in the name of efficient collective action – between members and leaders. Creating a different movement thus means being able to foster a blossoming of individuals in their activism and citizenship actions, protect the autonomy and independence of each member, and ensure the democratic functioning of the community of activists. This is the reason for constant efforts to create statutes and internal regulations and for the importance of the internal procedures that are continuously reaffirmed, as if to compensate for the small infringements perpetrated at the same time.

11The environmentalist parties (from the Greens to Europe Ecology The Greens and including Cap 21 and Génération Écologie) remain organizations with small memberships. At the height of its political fame, EELV numbered no more than 20,000 activists (including members and collaborators). The internal culture remains reticent with regard to the professionalization of the political leadership, a mistrust that gains full expression during periods when the personalization of elections plays a major role, such as presidential elections. And yet, plurality over time and the plurality of offices (requested repeatedly) are no longer taboo within the party. An elite has now acquired specific expertise (electoral know-how, technical skills, negotiation skills, network mobilization, etc.), which means that it is professionalized and has developed the ability to integrate the movement’s theoretical issues with the requirements of managing the rules of politics. This professionalization is the result of two mechanisms: 1) the ability to transform activist skills into political expertise by entering into the electoral process over the long term (including the plurality of offices over time, for example), and 2) the propensity to reformulate the movement’s political discourse (as an internal as well as external representation) and thus to influence the content of this discourse and ensure continuity in the party’s political contribution. This occurs at both the national and regional levels. It is clearly necessary for building a political organization. Professionalization increased starting in 1995, with the arrival of activists with no reticence vis-à-vis politics. The 2000s then witnessed the political rise of new activists with greater academic training (university degrees, etc.) in environmental issues. Via a process of acculturation, which we have described in its main features, the activists transformed the relations that defined how they identified with their party. They shifted from a libertarian and egalitarian vision of their movement to a more disciplined and pragmatic culture in terms of political action. This process is the result of three factors: the education of the environmentalist leadership, updated political positioning starting in the mid-1990s, and a transformation in the origins and practices of Green activists. [18]

A Changed Political Outlook

12The primary aim of the environmentalist parties is to address the issues of today’s society, which is increasingly threatened by the emergence of global risks – environmental, of course, but also social and economic, generated by the rapid and profound transformations our societies are undergoing. The situation was already seen as serious enough in the early 1970s for environmentalist rhetoric to include the notion of a planetary crisis threatening the ability of many animal and plant species but also of the human species to ensure their own survival. The idea of an environmental crisis contains and extends beyond the notions of economic, social, and political crisis as a result of the planet-wide scope of the environmental analysis. It is also important to recall the risk, which is definitive and irreversible, of nuclear disaster. [19] Of course, the environmentalist platform is not reduced strictly to this alarmist proposal. It also contains a more felicitous perspective based on the local experimentation it wishes to extend and a healthy dose of belief in the ability of technology to resolve some of our difficulties. Yet, this environmental crisis determines the possibility of maintaining other perspectives. Dumont’s Utopia or Else summarized this delicate tension in a brief formula, which has in no way lost its validity as the planetary situation progresses. [20]

13The environmentalist platform is also highly political in the sense that it questions the representative system in terms of both its organization and its end. The democratic logic is built on precisely the long-term vision that is called into question by the environmental crisis. The difficulty for the deliberative democratic process to encompass an urgent perception of time has been the object of theoretical reflection. [21] It reveals a fundamental divide between how we imagine the long term and the material reality of environmental phenomena (such as climatic imbalance, energy shortages, [22] exhaustion of resources, loss of biodiversity, poisoned environment, exploding social inequalities, development of generalized surveillance, war for resources including oil in Iraq, etc.). In other words, it reveals the gap between our ability to create the conditions to prevent this long-term fate and our ingenuity in constantly putting off acknowledging how little time is left to us. [23]

14Yet, environmental degradation continues, and no international agreement seems able to seriously question the productivist logic of our economic model. From 1990 to 2007, emissions rose globally at an average rate of 2% per year, although there had been a plan to reduce them. Similarly, the absence of a new global approach and the expiration in 2012 of the Kyoto protocol are all expressions of insufficient cooperation when it comes to combatting climate change. In response, EELV decided to run its campaign for the 2012 presidential election under the theme of a “Clean Republic.” This campaign theme was selected after deciding that between the radical approach of the critical left (represented by Jean-Luc Mélenchon) and François Hollande’s social democratic positioning on the center-left, there remained a political space for EELV around the promotion of morality in politics. This could be seen as the continuation of the Greens’ original program built around “doing politics differently,” a platform based on the rejection of the professionalization of politicians and that made opposition to the plurality of offices, in particular, a priority.

15However, while nothing indicated that the Socialist Party had truly renounced its technical and productivist culture, an electoral agreement was reached between the two organizations. The selection of François Hollande as the presidential candidate complicated electoral negotiations. For example, Hollande had often expressed his reticence with regard to abandoning nuclear power. Although the PS appeared to accept the principle of closing down the oldest power plants (fewer than ten plants in all), it remained attached to maintaining a civil nuclear power policy. The electoral agreement between EELV and the PS serves to illustrate the difficulty that today’s political environmentalism faces in remaining true to a part of its heritage. On November 9, 2011, Eva Joly rejected any agreement with the PS that did not include an end to the EPR. [24] Following the agreement signed on November 15, 2011, [25] on November 19, Eva Joly was not present for the ratification (by a 74% majority) of the agreement with the PS at the EELV Federal Council. The distribution of electoral districts was also problematic, not only in terms of numbers but with the PS also reserving the right to approve the appropriateness of any given candidacy (such as Philippe Meirieu in the Rhône, for example). However, EELV was assured of forming a group in the National Assembly that would be elected in 2012. The election-oriented goal was thus fully embraced in the sense that it ensured the transferability of voters from one group to the other by minimizing those issues that could create tensions (nuclear power, growth policy, climatic change, and the need to take environmental imperatives with immediate policy relevance into account). The introduction of a degree of proportionality in the 2017 legislative election (which seemed still very far off) was addressed in a memorandum of understanding, although its application modalities remained to be defined (would there be 200 representatives selected on this basis, as demanded by the environmentalists, or 100 according to the socialists?). In the end, we must remember that a local electoral agreement is in no way a policy agreement since it does not include negotiation for ministerial positions, for example.

16This is evidence of a culture of negotiation that is bearing fruit and proving its ability to formulate contracts even against a background of underlying disagreements. [26] However, this agreement required a great deal of internal negotiation within EELV. Dissent arose within the committees (over energy and the economy, for example), reflecting a conflict between generations. The weight of the anti-nuclear faction was stronger in the Energy Committee, whose members continued to view this issue as an essential component of an environmentalist platform. Meanwhile, the younger activists in the Economy Committee were more strongly influenced by the issue of oil prices, whose impact on the economy and business was more obvious, an approach that was more compatible with the economic culture of the PS.

17The environmentalists did not obtain a promise to abandon nuclear power (although the agreement foresees a significant withdrawal), nor the closure of the Flamanville EPR plant (the third-generation nuclear reactor deemed to promote French policy in this area). [27] Concerning the energy facet, the environmentalists obtained, on paper, the closure of 24?reactors by 2025, no new nuclear plant construction during their term of office, the abandonment of the reprocessing and MOX sectors (which fuel the EPR), the introduction of a dismantling industry, and more globally an energy transition strategy based on energy efficiency and the development of renewable energies. However, the issue of military nuclear capacity was not on the agenda.

18This agreement perpetuates the vision of a growth-oriented society, [28] with a stronger accent on a quality-oriented approach (how energy is produced and used) as well as a strong redistribution facet. Although the notion of sustainable development is being increasingly criticized, it is an explicit basis for agreement, which states that “We propose a different approach based on innovation and quality, the only pathway to sustainable development that creates jobs.” However, the agreement offers no real critique of the productivist model, leaving open the assumption that technological improvement will help eliminate the contradictions between environmental limits and voters’ consumer appetites. Thus, the EELV/PS agreement does not question the irreversibility of the nuclear option. With the two partners not sharing the goal of bringing nuclear power to an end, we may be skeptical as to the potential for the more powerful partner to orchestrate a change of direction in its attitude toward the nuclear issue and the technological dream it represents. From the moment the continuation of the electro-nuclear program is allowed (through its technological improvement), we continue to subscribe to the hypothesis of the viability of a social project based on the possibility of producing more and more energy and on the ability of individuals to consume ever greater quantities even if the current state of knowledge still allows no possible reversal in terms of nuclear waste and the dismantling of nuclear power plants, if there is no guarantee that our societies will be able to survive the financial burden of the consequences of this energy policy (in terms of safety and maintenance), and our ability to formulate an awareness of risk over hundreds of years remains to be demonstrated.

19This is indicative of a degree of pragmatism, to the detriment of a long-term, demanding, and complex perspective that is difficult to impose politically and in the media, and even more so electorally. In the end, EELV is adapting to a society that does not question a vision of development based on technical innovation, to the detriment of more profound thinking about the conditions for equitably shared energy sobriety. This agreement moves environmentalism just a little further from the ecocentric vision that is best suited to create a framework for truly sustainable reconciliation between the human and the non-human. [29] This agreement ultimately confirms a vision of political environmentalism that is less and less focused on managing consequences and more and more on managing possibilities. Utopia is slipping further and further away.


Date de mise en ligne : 28/02/2012

https://doi.org/10.3917/mouv.069.0093