Syrians in Lebanese towns and cities

7In May 2015, there were nearly 1.03 million UNHCR-registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon, and this number is likely to have further increased since then. [9] Syrians can be found in all regions of the country, but are concentrated in the main cities and their surrounding areas (figure 1). Within urban areas, high concentrations are frequently linked to a high proportion of low-income or poor communities. In Tripoli, the Fayhaa Union of Municipalities (UoM) reported 71,145 officially registered Syrian refugees in October 2014, but they are in fact estimated to number nearly 259,000, with 148,000 living below the poverty line (officially set at €3 per day). [10] The same can be seen in Bourj Hammoud, in the eastern suburbs of Beirut, where 17,591 refugees were registered in October 2014, a figure that is likely underestimated. According to data gathered during field research by UN-Habitat in 2015, the neighborhood had a total population of 75,866 inhabitants, with 8,500 of them living below the poverty line. [11]

Figure 1

The location of refugees in Lebanon (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, June 30, 2016)

The location of refugees in Lebanon (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, June 30, 2016)

8There are several reasons for this pattern of distribution. First, UNHCR was prevented by the Lebanese authorities from setting up refugee camps in the country (Buccianti-Barakat 2016, 263). Second, many Syrian migrants lived and worked in Lebanon after the end of the civil war in 1990, coming and going between the two countries depending on the economic cycle. When war broke out in 2011, it is estimated that several hundred thousand such Syrians already working in Lebanon were unable to return to Syria and thus “automatically” became displaced persons (Buccianti-Barakat 2016, 263). This meant that many Syrian families already had a relative or friend on the ground when the violence led to them fleeing their country, and until January 2015 they were able to enter Lebanon without specific formalities. During the first three years of the conflict, there were thus no barriers to Syrians entering Lebanon, as there were no measures in place to limit their entry or movements.

9In such a context, individuals decide where to settle based on their support networks, potential access to housing, jobs, or economic activity, proximity to a shared community (religious, political, linked to a profession or social group), and the ability of international organizations to support them (Fawaz 2014). This phenomenon, which can be seen in many different contexts, has specific features in the case of Lebanon that are worthy of closer examination.

10Beyond the specific case of Syrians, several studies have demonstrated the arrangements negotiated between migrants and Lebanese people for access to housing or trade (Deboulet 2008; Hily 2009). These studies offer a new understanding of the sociospatial determinants of access to urban infrastructure, revealing “forms of interaction, but also of avoidance” (Doraï 2007). [12] This observation can be easily applied to Syrians, with growing validity as the migration flows have increased. These arrangements mean that middle-class Christians from Damascus are likely to live in the Mount Lebanon area, while Alawites tend to settle in Shiite areas or those under Hezbollah control. [13] These spatial rules are not without their exceptions, including Beirut and its suburbs, whose favorable economic conditions are attractive to Syrians who do not have a support network to provide them with access to housing or employment. Beirut is the natural choice for these refugees as it offers more economic opportunities, which supersede the factor of socioreligious identity. [14]

Policies toward Syrian migrants: Four phases between 2011 and 2015

11Between March 2011, when significant migration began, and December 2016, various political, social, and economic constraints were imposed on Syrian refugees. Their legal status and living conditions in Lebanon have been downgraded, affecting their access to the city (figure 2).

Figure 2

Table outlining the Syrian presence in Lebanon, broken down into four phases

Conditions of entry Conditions of residence Approximate number of refugees (at end of period) Source: UNHCR Sociopolitical context Phase 1: March 2011 - February 2013 Free entry with passport. Checks at the border. Form granting a 6-month stay. Six months renewable upon visit in person to the offices of the General Security Directorate. Symbolic financial contribution. 188,000 Low level of support from the Lebanese people. Syrians considered to be refugees with their movements restricted by some local authorities. Phase 2: March 2013 - April 2014 1,045,000 200,000 Syrian refugees between February and March 2013. The threshold of one million refugees triggers international awareness. Phase 3: May 2014 - December 2014 1,170,000 Tensions rise following the Syrian presidential elections, in which Syrian refugees in Lebanon participate. The number of entries slows down. The government limits the movements of Syrians with passes required across the country. Phase 4: January 2015 - December 2016 Entry restricted. Some categories of refugees are still however accepted (young graduates, artists, high-income individuals. Christian Syrians are preferred in some districts). One year, renewable under very restrictive conditions. The entry visa cost reaches 200 USD, on top of varying additional fees. 1,033,000 Restrictions are put placed on the conditions of stay, and the kafala system is extended to Syrians. Syrians are placed under the personal authority of a Lebanese sponsor. Decrease in the number of registered refugees.

Table outlining the Syrian presence in Lebanon, broken down into four phases

12In the first few months, refugees were able to enter the country without a visa, and other than a few isolated incidents (private disputes), the primary constraint was financial. In this initial period, Syrians were not therefore in a significantly different position from other economic migrants. Their geographic distribution closely corresponded to that of their relatives or friends, with this key factor guided by the opportunities for identification and social recognition they might find in certain cities, such as Tripoli. Until February 2013, the 190,000 Syrians who had arrived in Lebanon only had a marginal impact on the social, political, and regional equilibria. They were not considered to be refugees by the Lebanese authorities, and their entry to the country was subject to common law regulations.

13In February 2013, the Syrian conflict took a turn for the worse as the opposition movement was heavily repressed, and the war became increasingly violent. The flow of migrants increased, with thousands a day crossing the Lebanese border. [15] During the month of February alone, 160,000 additional migrants were registered. Until April 2014, when the threshold of a million Syrians was reached, entries grew to over 60,000 a month. The symbolic figure of a million was a shock to Lebanese public opinion, leading to another change to the situation.

14The intensification of the Syrian conflict also increased tensions within Lebanon. The substantial humanitarian aid made available to Syrians was resented by the poorest Lebanese citizens, including those living in Beirut, whose already precarious situation became even more difficult when the rent control system came to an end on April 1 (Marot 2014–2015). Syrians had almost entirely settled in urban areas, putting further pressure on the already inadequate capacity of infrastructure and utilities. Another symbolic threshold was reached in spring 2014, when Syrian migrants outnumbered the Lebanese citizens in some communities, such as Zeitoun in Tripoli (UN-Habitat 2015). From then on, due to the urgency of the situation, the government definitively took charge of dealing with refugees, taking over from humanitarian organizations (Boustani et al. 2016).

15In June 2014, Syrians in Lebanon were invited to vote in the Syrian presidential elections. Votes had to be cast in the embassy, located in a suburb of Beirut, and Syrians travelled there in loud convoys, with some chanting their support for Bashar al-Assad. [16] These events definitively impressed upon Lebanese public opinion the burden of Syrian migration. Beyond their quantitative numbers, Syrians were now politically visible, reminding Lebanese people of the dark days of the occupation. The episode was extensively reported in the media, and directed the way in which the various sectors of Lebanese public opinion subsequently saw Syrians. [17] Under pressure from public opinion, the government abandoned its laissez-faire strategy and attempted to stop the flow of refugees, and to reduce the visibility of Syrians who had already settled in the country.

Tensions and concealment

16In a country whose national cohesion rests on a fragile balance between many different socioreligious groups, a 25 percent increase in the resident population has naturally had an impact. Conscious of the fact that their presence is likely to trigger sociopolitical instability, Syrians have tried to make themselves invisible, blending in as much as possible with Lebanese urban residents. Many of them have therefore developed the ability to change their accent, and alter their posture or clothing. More significantly still, they are quick to “play both sides”, sometimes agreeing with criticism of Syrian refugees by Lebanese citizens, as the following story illustrates:

17

A Lebanese woman entered the clothing store where my daughter works as a sales assistant, clearly annoyed about something. When my daughter asked her what was wrong, the woman asked whether she was Lebanese or Syrian. My daughter did not tell her the truth and said she was Lebanese. The angry woman then revealed why she was annoyed: “All the sales assistants are Syrian! I’ve had enough, they’ve taken our jobs and our children’s jobs.” My daughter replied: “I hope we’ll be rid of them as soon as possible.” Just like that, I swear!

18Syrians have quickly grown used to this kind of attitude: concealing their nationality in order to be able to live in the city, hiding among the local people as best as they can. Conscious of these practices, many Lebanese people like to play a game of “spot the difference,” and claim they can identify Syrians in the public space: “For example, someone who’s well-dressed but wearing sandals is a Syrian!”, confided a 24-year-old Lebanese man in a focus group (Tabbaneh, November 2015). This example illustrates the way in which Syrians are generally perceived by the Lebanese. With the exception of the educated elite or a few activist groups, the Lebanese people we met in the context of our research openly claimed that “the Syrians are everywhere.”

19

My wife likes the beach. A lot. But is there any chance of getting a foot on the beach at the weekend? None at all! The Syrians are everywhere. They’re very conservative and my wife doesn’t wear a veil. Syrian men look at Lebanese women in a very provocative way. It’s impossible to walk down the street, impossible to go for a stroll outside without the Syrians being there. I’ve stopped going to the Corniche because it’s full of Syrians. [19]
Q: So if you go to the Corniche at the weekend, you won’t find any Lebanese people?
Not a single one! It’s like being in Homs, Hama or some other city like that. [20]

20The rate of unemployment in Lebanon is high, and has been exacerbated by the reduced opportunities in the Gulf countries following the global financial crisis in 2008. Until then, the Gulf countries constituted a source of income for many families, regardless of their social position. The labor market, which was already under strain, has been made even more challenging by the arrival of the Syrians, who compete with native jobseekers, particularly in the retail and restaurant sectors (Longuenesse 2014-2015). Historically, Syrian migrants worked in the construction or agriculture sectors, in subordinate jobs that the Lebanese were reluctant to take on. [21]

21

Q: And what about work?
Well, you see, Syrians can do anything. They could move a mountain if they were asked to do it.
Q: And the Lebanese can’t?
The Lebanese have more pride, they want more than that. Syrians will take anything, under any conditions. A Lebanese man won’t accept [a daily wage of] 10,000 Lebanese pounds (€6). A Syrian would accept 5,000 [Lebanese pounds] (€3).

22The sources of tension are not limited to the area of employment. Lebanese urban infrastructure (roads and utilities) was significantly impacted by the civil war between 1975 and 1990, and the influx of Syrians has exacerbated what was therefore an already critical situation. Growth in urban populations has affected electricity and water distribution, and saturated road traffic and household waste collection capacity. This latter sector stirred strong emotions in July 2015, when images of roads drowning in uncollected waste circulated in the media and social networks. The difficulties are primarily due to collection measures becoming inadequate in the late 1990s, but the situation has grown worse following the sudden increase in urban populations.

Managing the crisis at the local level: Hostility gradually takes hold

23When the waves of migration first began, many Lebanese people showed solidarity with the suffering of the Syrian people, but this trend has been overturned by the increase in migrant numbers. Demonstrations of solidarity have become rare, and limited to certain groups: young activists or the educated elite, who are over-represented in Beirut (figure 3). Despite their persistence, these defenders of the refugee cause have been unable to hold back the tide of hostile reactions, which are sometimes accompanied by racist insinuations: “[…] protracted refugee situations also have indirect security implications. Tensions between refugees and the local population often arise as refugees are perceived to receive preferential access to social services such as health and education. Over time, competition between refugees and the host population over scarce resources can also become a source of insecurity” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014, 155).

Figure 3

Welcome message: “Syrian refugees and workers, welcome to Lebanon. We apologize for the actions of our racist compatriots” (back-translated from the French translation by DK).

24By way of example, in July 2016, a group of 200 people gathered outside the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the Achrafiyeh neighborhood of Beirut, to protest against the hosting and living conditions for refugees. [22] This group called for the prohibition of curfews affecting Syrians and condemned a “racism [that] threatens civil security.” The demonstration consisted of young urban residents, remained small, and was easily contained by the military forces.

25A photograph taken in 2012 by an activist collective, “Against the racism faced by Syrian refugees,” shows another form of protest against the curfews imposed on Syrians by certain urban authorities (figure 4). These protests were too small to have a significant impact, and were unable to prevent such measures from being implemented: in May 2014, they were implemented by the majority of urban authorities in the country, preventing Syrians from being out in public spaces after sunset.

Figure 4

Information on the curfew in Sin el Fil, Beirut: “All foreign workers living in Sin el Fil are asked to go to a police station before June 10, 2013 to obtain badges. They are also asked to obey the curfew between 9 in the evening and 6 in the morning” (back-translated from the French by DK.

26Another photograph (figure 5) shows how official limitations on the use of public spaces may be accompanied by more informal restrictions. In Bhamdoun, a town situated on the route between Beirut and Damascus, a sign displayed at the side of the road prohibits Syrians from leaving their homes between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. It is handwritten and has no official stamp. Since 2013, Syrians have been subjected to many restrictions on their movements, issued by local authorities or instigated by individuals assuming powers that they have no legitimate right to exercise. Circumventing the national and local authorities, these abuses have provoked protest at the leniency of the public authorities, who have done nothing to reduce tensions between Lebanese and Syrian residents in urban spaces. With many of them implementing such restrictive measures, local authorities have closed their eyes to the actions of some of their citizens attempting to dissuade refugees from settling (Bobseine 2016).

Figure 5

Curfew information for Syrian workers: “All Syrian workers are asked to observe a curfew in the town of Bhamdoun between 8.30 in the evening and 6 in the morning. Anyone not observing the curfew will be held responsible. Signed: Bhamdoun Urban Authority” (back-translated from the French by DK).

The kafala system: a tool for controlling Syrian migration

27In October 2014, the Lebanese government adopted a directive making the conditions of entry for Syrians tougher. This law, which came into force on January 5, 2015 (Council of Ministers of Lebanon, 2014, see Table 1), has made visas compulsory. All Syrians wanting to cross the border also have to have a residence permit. The directive states that, to obtain this permit, migrants must find a sponsor to whom they will be linked under the so called kafala system. This measure not only restricts those entering the country but also affects Syrians already present in Lebanon, and has had a direct impact on their living conditions.

28The kafala system, which is also used in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, previously affected foreign workers with a low level of education (such as female cleaning staff: Dahdah 2010). With the agreement of a Lebanese natural or legal person, or more rarely UNHCR, under the kafala system refugees are under the authority of a sponsor called the kafeel. This latter can end the contract unilaterally, with no legal requirement to provide a reason for doing so. Termination of the contract automatically ends residency approval, putting migrants at risk of expulsion. For Syrians living in Lebanon prior to the date of the directive, the kafala system has also become compulsory for every application to renew their residence permit.

29The kafala system has therefore become the main tool for controlling the flow of migration from Syria. Unlike the way in which it is used in the Gulf countries, the government directive specifies that it must be accompanied by a declaration certifying that the person under the kafala system will not undertake any paid work. Unable to take up formal employment, Syrians thus find themselves forced to accept illegal, and often poorly paid jobs. This directive has therefore weakened a population that was already struggling, imposing conditions that sometimes resemble those of forced labor.

30Furthermore, the procedure for entering the kafala system is not clearly set out in the official documents. Several Syrians we spoke to explained that, when they called the telephone information line set up by the Lebanese security forces, they often had to wait for several hours or call back several times before they received satisfactory answers. To fulfil the conditions of immigration, Syrians also have to endure extremely long waiting times in the offices of the General Security Directorate, which is responsible for dealing with migrants. These offices have specific queues for Syrians, and humiliating treatment is par for the course. Then there is the cost of the procedure which, according to the Norwegian Refugee Council, can be up to €60 for preparation of documents, on top of the €150 in fees to government officials. Once they have given their approval, it is not unusual for a kafeel to demand that refugees work for them illegally, or to force them to pay an additional sum of money in exchange for their support. Subjected to both red tape and demands from their kafeel, Syrians are therefore in a legally insecure position, both “outside the law and outside the protection of the law” (Frangieh 2014).

The impact of the kafala system on urban practices

31By altering residency status and making it difficult to obtain, the kafala system forces Syrians to restrict their use of urban spaces, in order to avoid causing problems for the kafeel who has put his trust in them. As his/her legal representative, the kafeel must be present at all public acts involving the Syrian that he “sponsors,” including police questioning or arrests, and is held responsible for any violations, such as working illegally, or even more serious matters such as theft or homicide. Many Syrians are unable to find a kafeel and fall into illegality, which forces them to lower their profile even further.

32Syrians are therefore caught between the insecurity of their legal position and enforced dependency on other individuals, but become accustomed to this untenable situation because they have nowhere else to go. As we were told on many occasions, the Syrian Embassy puts up multiple barriers to avoid granting passport applications from Syrian citizens. The information provided is opaque, the documents required for the application are difficult to obtain, and the administrative fees are high (€300 to €400). Under such circumstances, it is unsurprising that one of the main concerns of a significant proportion of the Syrians we spoke to was the renewal of their Lebanese residence permit. When it expires, their status becomes illegal and they risk imprisonment, or at the very least humiliation, at the hands of the security forces.

33

Q: What is your current residency status?
Well, I’ve just found out that it’s not really a residence permit. I’m not officially a resident, I only have sponsorship (by a kafeel). I found this out because I couldn’t get a visa for Cyprus. I wanted to go there for three days to attend a friend’s wedding, but the embassy rejected my application. My documents are not legally recognized. I don’t have the right to work but when I say I’m not working, none of the officials believe me. I do however have legal status to remain in Lebanon. It costs 300,000 Lebanese pounds a year (nearly €180). The first time I paid that amount, it was for a year, renewable in six months. But then I was asked for the same amount again because I hadn’t paid for 2014. So I paid retroactively even though the law didn’t come in until 2015. I didn’t receive a receipt, but I don’t think [the official] stole the money. There’s a system and everyone you know pays. The procedure is designed to restrict the number of Syrians.

34During our interview, Jad also recounted an incident similar to those experienced by several of his fellow Syrians. He was sitting on a cafe terrace when a police car pulled up next to him and an officer in the car told him that smoking was prohibited in public places—including a cafe terrace—and asked to see his identity papers. When he realized that Jad was Syrian, the official turned away to make some telephone calls. After waiting for a short while, Jad approached to ask what was going on. The police officer assaulted him verbally and physically before taking him to the station. He then asked him to bring in his kafeel. Fortunately, Jad has a good relationship with his kafeel, who has connections, including in the police force. After a few calls he was set free, though not without being threatened with overnight detention. Before leaving the station, he was forced to sign a declaration stating that he had not been assaulted and had been detained for refusing to answer questions from a public safety officer. Having admitted to defying an officer, Jad then had to endure legal proceedings and was sentenced to ten days’ imprisonment or payment of a fine equivalent to €180. However, Jad still felt he was in a better position than the majority of Syrians living in Lebanon, as he has a good relationship with his kafeel. He is able to work for himself, though of course illegally, and this work enables him to meet his needs. [23] His status is not internationally recognized, even though it is considered to be legal in Lebanon.

35Since the beginning of 2015, the Lebanese authorities have increased checks and carried out operations in several informal settlements in which Syrians are living. These have been accompanied by numerous curfews and other measures taken by urban authorities with a view to limiting the movements of Syrians, who have become unwelcome users of the urban public space, particularly at night. The effectiveness of these checks is strengthened by unprompted action by many Lebanese people, who monitor the arrival of Syrians.

36These difficulties have pushed Syrians to adopt two kinds of attitude: either making themselves invisible so that they are not identified as Syrian, or giving up on going out and remaining confined at home (Bobseine 2016). This second strategy is used in particular by those who are unable to renew their residence permit, either because they have not found a kafeel, or because they are unable to pay the money required to enter into a contract with one. Syrians still living in Lebanon are therefore under a doubly untenable bind: they have become unwelcome, but the majority of them do not have the resources required to leave the country.