1This article concentrates on Mauritania’s difficult path to winning independence. Independent existence of this country was not so obvious in the period of the most intense decolonisation process, that is, in 1960. The artificially drawn borders within French West Africa gave rise to conflicts and ambiguities after decolonisation. The inviolability of colonial borders within the independent states of Africa was supposed to be the solution, which continues to this day. Nevertheless, it has not prevented the many armed conflicts waged in Africa since 1960.

2After Morocco had become fully independent in 1956, the country initiated territorial consolidations, which were considered part of its heritage. Having reclaimed the Spanish protectorate in Morocco, Rabat directed its attention to the south, towards Spanish Sahara and Mauritania. Initially, it was unable to gain the former due to the resistance of Madrid and Sahara clans that had been opting for the cooperation with Spain. As far as Mauritania was concerned, a favourable opportunity came to take it over in 1960, that is, during the decolonisation of French West Africa. The main point at issue in this article is the disagreement between the Mauritanian independence camp, the pro-Mauritanian parties, and the positions of Morocco and France.

3The author has also had the opportunity to trace back the above issue from the perspective of Polish diplomacy at the time through archival resources in Poland. This kind of procedure provides an overview of the general position of the ussr (a permanent member of the un Security Council), and consequently, the standpoints of the entire Communist bloc. At that time, the Central and Eastern European countries were politically dependent on the ussr. In key cases, their foreign policy could not be contrary to the policy of Moscow. In many cases, instructions were sent directly from the Kremlin and such countries like Poland were to carry them out. Although the author was refused any access to the Russian archives (due to the current hostile atmosphere between Warsaw and Moscow), it may be assumed that the policy of the ussr (and other countries of the Communist bloc) concerning the independency of Mauritania was identical to the Polish regulations.

4The author did not face any obstacles in accessing the Polish archives. Documents of the Polish diplomacy are kept in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland in Warsaw. Documents dated before 1989 are non-confidential and they are available for researchers to use. Nevertheless, there is a major problem caused by the considerable disorder in their cataloging and storage. Files concerning a particular country are placed in folders related to other geographical regions. It is an impediment to research and can be completely discouraging for foreigners who have no clear idea of the specifics of the then Polish diplomacy.

5These documents focus on the analysis of the relations between Mauritania and Morocco, the search for the source of the dispute as well as the development of further bilateral and multilateral relations. It should be noted, however, that Poland (and other countries of the Communist bloc) soon realized that Mauritania would be either under strong French protection or constitute part of anticommunist Morocco. There were, therefore, according to this research, no attempts made to establish a socialist government there. It was decided to hold a rally and monitor the development of the situation. For the same reason, it is difficult to find any “sensational” documents on the Mauritanian path to independence in the Polish archives. Communist countries were more interested in the situation within Congo, Angola or Algeria, where the socialist movement was strong.

6Within the French governmental environment, there were certain officials who were interested in Mauritania at the end of the nineteenth century. Xavier Coppolani, the French colonial administrator, initiated the plan for extending French control over Moorish tribes. However, he propagated peaceful infiltration of this area by means of agreements with the emirs and the leaders of the Muslim brotherhood. His assumptions turned out to be right. In 1903, southern Mauritania was proclaimed a French protectorate (Arnaud 1973: 16-17), with Saint Louis, in Senegal as its capital. The attempts at conquering Adrar massif in the north, however, resulted in failure. The intervention of Colonel Henri Gouraud in 1909 ended the stage of the conquest of Mauritania, but the pacification of the country lasted many years. Mauritania only officially became a part of French West Africa (Afrique occidentale française, aof) by ministerial decree in late 1920 (Truevcev 1987: 44-45). [1]

Characteristics of Mauritania up to Gaining Independence

7Mauritania was a poor and backward country throughout the whole colonial period. The African population from the right bank of the Senegal River mainly included farmers. The remaining inhabitants were mainly Arabs mixed with Mauritanians of Berber origin. They lived as nomadic camel and cattle farmers. The situation did not change much at the end of French rule. In 1957, Mauritania was an area of nearly 1,086 million km² inhabited by only 630,000 people. Such scarce population was a result of the fact that most of the area of the country was occupied by the desert. The land suitable for farming was located in the southern part of the country (along the Senegal River) and constituted about 6 per cent of the overall area. Breeding and fishing were the main sources of income. No natural deposits were exploited at that time, apart from rock salt (amsz, 1, fo. 67; Skotnicki 1963: 5).

8The ethnic diversity was initially the most important obstacle on Mauritania’s path to independence (Ould Daddah 2003: 201-202). The Mauritanian Progressive Union (Union progressiste mauritanienne, upm), under the leadership of Sidi el-Moktar N’Diaye, which supported the territorial integrity of the country, won the elections for the Territorial Assembly in 1956. The Mauritanian Entente party led by Horma Ould Babana, who supported incorporation into Morocco, was defeated. He questioned legal validity of the elections and decided to emigrate to Rabat as a sign of protest. There, he became the head of the National Council of Mauritanian Resistance during summer 1956. This organisation was totally devoted to the Moroccan authorities and claimed that both countries should be linked (Marchesin 2010: 96). At the same time, the Gorgol Democratic Bloc and Union of the Inhabitants of the River Valley emerged in the south with Black people who opposed Mauritania’s incorporation into Morocco. The French were aware of instability in the country, so they sent Moktar Ould Daddah to Mauritania. This man, educated in France as a lawyer, was a supporter of territorial integrity and decolonisation, as well as maintaining business relations with France. It was a metropolis operation, which in the form of M. Ould Daddah saw a kind of mediator between all forces in Mauritania and the interests of the metropolis. In May 1958, he managed to unify Mauritanian political parties into one—the Mauritanian Regroupment Party. He became the leader of this party, which executed his programme from that moment on (Caratini 2009: 17-18; Lukonin 1991: 105-107; Warner 1990: 21-23).

9The French crisis led to the referendum on the new constitution, giving rise to the Fifth Republic. The new basic law (loi-cadre), adopted in September 1958, also replaced the French Union with the French Community. France aimed at relaxing the political bonds in its dominions, but keeping the economic influence. As a result, on 28 November 1958, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania was created as an autonomous part of the Community. M. Ould Daddah and his party strived for full independence. That is why the Territorial Assembly was transformed into the Legislative Assembly whose aim it was to create the future constitution (de Chassey 1978: 174-175).

10At that time, the country was preparing for independent functioning. Up to 1957, the Senegalese city Saint Louis was the administrative capital of Mauritania. At the opening of the session of the Territorial Assembly, Governor A. J. Mourages stated:

11

[...] aussi bien, ai-je pensé qu’il n’était pour l’instant nécessaire que de transférer en Mauritanie, en un emplacement judicieusement choisi, point d’équilibre entre les deux parties Sud et Nord du territoire, facilement accessible de tous les points par la route ou par l’avion, l’état-major politique et administratif, en laissant à Saint-Louis tous les services communs qui peuvent, eu égard aux objets dont ils ont la charge et à leur structure, demeurer pour un temps plus ou moins long séparés du chef-lieu sans dommage [...] (Pitte 1977: 10).

12The construction of the new capital city near Nouakchott in the western part of the country started as late as in the beginning of 1958. [2] It was a French military post established at the beginning of the twentieth century. When the construction of the new capital city was started, Nouakchott was inhabited by only 3,000 people, had one cinema, one hotel and a small airport. There was no appropriate building, so the Mauritanian Territorial Assembly had to debate in a schoolroom. It was estimated that in 1961 the capital city had grown to about 7,000 inhabitants (amsz, 2, fos. 134-135). The construction of the new capital was supposed to bind Mauritania to France more strongly, and above all to create a sense of distinctiveness from Morocco. For this reason, however, it was necessary to act quickly, hence a noticeable rush when planning and building a new capital (Pitte 1977: 12-13).

13The rich deposits of iron and copper ore were discovered in Mauritania in the 1930s. However, the detailed geological research was conducted much later in 1948 by the French Society of Mining (Société française d’exploitation minière, sfem) and the American Bethlehem Steel Corporation. It revealed massive deposits of iron ore near Fort Gouraud, [3] in Kediet ej Jill mountain in the northern part of the country. The deposits were estimated at the level of 125 million tons. The ore was valuable, because it contained about 64-67 per cent of iron and smaller quantities of sulphur and phosphorus. The sfem did not have enough money for deposit mining, so the circle of shareholders was extended in 1952. A new company, Société anonyme des mines de fer de Mauritanie (miferma), was established. It comprised French, Italian, German, British and Spanish capital (Désiré-Vuillemin 1997: 617-618).

14This entity obtained a concession for further research and exploitation of mineral resources. In March 1960, the company obtained a loan of 66 million dollars from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for exploitation of the Mauritanian iron ore. The funds were allocated for purchase of opencast equipment, construction of a port in Levrier Bay, 10 kilometers from Port Étienne, [4] near the border with the Spanish Sahara, as well as construction of 640-kilometer railway connecting the port with the mine (amsz, 2, fos. 132-133; Bonte & Wedoud Ould Cheikh 2001: 40; Dobosiewicz 1963: 10-11; 1965: 15-16). The Moroccan ambassador in Washington protested against such a course of action and announced lack of support for this decision on behalf of the government in Rabat (Zakrzewski 1967: 26-27). M. Ould Daddah (2003: 204-205) mentions, however, that the decision to launch miferma had a big psychological effect on the internal consolidation of Mauritania and its inhabitants and was one of the factors dragging the North of the country from Morocco.

15Mauritania was one of the poorest countries in the world at the moment of gaining independence. The exploitation of metal deposits had not started. Lack of a real capital city might also be considered a sign of “backwardness” in this economic context. The annual per capita income amounted to only 5,000 French francs. The state budget was financed mainly with French grants and subventions from the general budget of former countries of French West Africa. Medical care was limited only to the cities, which means that it included about 25 per cent of inhabitants. Progress was made only with regard to French education, which means the area benefitted from teaching which was only conducted in French. Arabic education for the general population developed very slowly. On the other hand, women were not subject to compulsory education. In such an arrangement, only 7.2 per cent of young people were educated in schools (amsz, 1, fo. 68; Skotnicki 1963: 5).

Moroccan Claims

16Morocco gained independence in 1956. The independent country comprised the territory of former French and Spanish protectorates. The government in Rabat considered the then shape of the country reduced. However, not all irredentist ideas were revealed from the outset. Allal al-Fassi, a member of the Independence Party (Hizb al-Istiqlal) exiled in Egypt through 1956, was an exception. He announced the Great Morocco programme in 1949. The country was supposed to include the Western Sahara and reach the Senegal River in the south (Reyner 1963: 314-315). The concept of “Great Morocco” was picked up by King Mohammed v in 1958. He claimed even greater areas encompassing the territory of Algeria from Béchar, through to the basin of Ouadi as-Sawira River, up to the medieval city of Gao in Mali and to Senegal River in the west. Great Morocco was supposed to occupy a substantial part of western Algeria, north and western Mali, the whole of Mauritania, the Spanish Sahara, as well as Ifni, Ceuta and Melilla (the Spanish exclaves). The claimed territory of Great Morocco was to coincide with the territorial range of the medieval Almoravid empire from the eleventh and twelfth century (Łętocha 1973: 156).

17Initially, the Great Morocco programme was propagated only by the Istiqlal party, but other parties and the monarch soon figured out that this slogan was very popular. By propagating territorial revisionism, the government in Rabat tried to distract social attention from serious economic and sociological problems faced by Morocco at the time. Other factors also influenced the issue of territorial claims. At the end of 1957, relations between Rabat and France had significantly deteriorated. It was a result of breaking off the talks concerning conventions defining the legal framework with regard to French estate in Morocco. What is more, Paris was not satisfied with Rabat’s favourable attitude towards Algerian independence aspirations. The aforementioned factors combined with economic problems and increasing social support for territorial revision resulted in a reorientation of King Mohammed v’s policy in this direction (Ashford 1962: 642-646). Some Mauritanians said that Rabat’s interest in Mauritania was most closely connected to the discovery of iron ore deposits. The joke was repeated: “Tant qu’on a cru que cette région ne contenait que des cailloux, on ne nous l’a pas disputé!” (Désiré-Vuillemin 1997: 605).

18Initially, the Moroccan interest was devoted to Mauritania and the Spanish Sahara (in order to avoid border disputes with Algeria). Those countries were poor and scarcely populated, but they possessed massive deposits of iron and copper ore (Mauritania), as well as phosphorites (Spanish Sahara). The idea of the territorial expansion of Morocco was supported not only by the nationalist Istiklal party, but also by other organisations and movements, including communist parties (Essaouri 1961: 59-60). At the beginning of November 1957, the Directorate for Sahara was established in the Moroccan Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was to deal with the affairs of Mauritania and the Sahara. In April 1958, during the Spanish-Moroccan talks on the Tekna region, Rabat refused to recognize the border from the latitude 27°40' N (La République islamique de Mauritanie 1961: 9)

19Shortly before, King Mohammed v visited the southern part of the country on 25 February 1958, he emphasised the following: “Nous poursuivons Notre action pour le retour de Notre Sahara, dans le cadre du respect de Nos droits historiques et conformément à la volonté de ses habitants […]” (de La Serre 1966: 321). The claims were presented once more during the meeting with the Mauritanian aristocracy on 28 March 1958. The king emphasised the historical, ethnic and religious community of people inhabiting this area, which used to form one political organism. The aristocracy (together with the most important representative the emir At-Trarza from southern and western Mauritania) paid homage to the king (Łętocha 1973: 156-158).

20The puppet Mauritanian National Liberation Front in Morocco was established in 1956. This organisation initially propagated the neutral ideas of decolonisation, but did not determine the future character of the country. Its armed forces—the Saharan Liberation Army (L’armée de la libération du Sud, als)—were soon organised. The forces consisted mainly of Moroccans and some refugees from Mauritania (mainly from Reguibat separatist tribe) (Désiré-Vuillemin 1997: 606-608; Marchesin 2010: 97-99;). As the policy of Rabat towards the southern territory was revised, the units undertook numerous raids into Mauritania and Spanish Sahara during the next year. The French and Spanish forces eliminated this threat together as a result of the “Ouragan” operation as late as in February 1958. However, they had to keep significant forces in Mauritania in order to repulse the potential threat from Morocco (Bullard 1990: 158; Le Monde 1960a: 5; Zartman 1965: 164).

21The significance of the issue of Mauritania for the Moroccan government was expressed by its attitude towards all opponents of M. Ould Daddah’s rule. The group of Mauritanian oppositionists had stayed in Morocco since 1958 and were cared for properly. They were gathered in the Mauritanian National Liberation Front in Rabat led by Mohammed Ould Dah—the former emir At-Trarza—who paid homage to the king. Many Mauritanians held high positions in the Moroccan administration. For example, Hourma Ould Babana was a head of the Directorate for Sahara in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Dej Ould Siddi Baba was a director of the Africa Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Mukhtar Ould Bah was a general director of the Moroccan radio. What is more, he represented Morocco during various conferences of African countries (amsz, 3, fo. 69).

22At the same time, the Moroccan media launched an anti-Mauritanian campaign. The press called on the Mauritanians to rise up and revolt. False information was regularly distributed in order to weaken the government in Nouakchott. There were even threats of using force in order to liberate the “southern province.” The Moroccan radio broadcast a daily programme entitled “The Voice of the Moroccan Sahara.” In one of the programmes on 25 September 1958, the broadcaster speaking invited Mauritanian youth to join in the holy war. Such appeals appeared more frequently from that time on (de La Serre 1966: 325-326).

The Issue of Mauritania in the Global Arena and in the UN

23The revisionist policy of Morocco led to tensions in the relations with France. In 1960, the government in Rabat closed down the French consulate in Oujda, making it difficult for this country to control the Algerian National Liberation Front (fln). Moreover, French citizens entering Morocco were obliged to have a visa. Several people accused of spying were eliminated (amsz, 4, n.fo.). On the other hand, the French Republic’s ambassador was not present during the military parade in Marrakesh in honour of the king, and the government in Paris did not grant consent for lending several military planes to Morocco. The issue of the eastern Morocco border and claims for Mauritania were the particular sources of conflict (Glavier 1960: 5). In the face of the ongoing war in Algeria, the first issue mentioned was not relevant for a period of time. The outlet in the form of sand war emerged only in October 1963.

24Mutual retaliation became even stronger when the announcement of full independence for Mauritania was made. Rabat attempted to settle this problem as part of bilateral negotiations with Paris. Such a stand was justified by means of historical reasons and the alleged support of the Mauritanian people. However, the French government excluded a possibility of discussion with regard to this topic in advance (Dokumentacja Prasowa 1960a: 641). Given the circumstances, Rabat decided to undertake a diplomatic offensive. The Moroccan authorities sent their representatives to various European, Asian and even Latin America countries to familiarise them with their position (Dokumentacja Prasowa 1960b: 869). Such conduct was supposed to bring about support prior to the introduction of the issue at the United Nations. On 20 August 1960, during the public appearance on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of his return from exile, King Mohammed v announced that granting independence to Mauritania was equivalent to the territorial disintegration of Morocco and that France was the responsible party for this. That is why he was forced to submit a complaint to the un (Le Monde 1960b: 5). This took place two days later. A memorandum was presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld, where France was accused of separating Mauritania from Morocco in view of its refusal with regard to mutual negotiations (Dokumentacja Prasowa 1960a: 641; Łętocha 1973: 158-159).

25Morocco could count on the support of the League of Arab States. The conference of the foreign affairs heads of this organisation held in Chtaura near Beirut on 22-28 August 1960 dealt mainly with the issue of Palestine and Israel. Other issues, such as aid for Algeria or Moroccan claims towards Mauritania, were also tackled. The representative of Tunisia, which had troubled relations with the United Arab Republic (the uar), did not participate in the conference. Despite the appeal of M. Ould Daddah directed towards the Arabic leaders, all ministers present supported Morocco’s memorandum demanding the inclusion of the disputed territory and announced voting in this manner during the fifteenth un session (Le Monde 1960c: 2; Ould Daddah 2003: 211).

26Meanwhile, on 19 October 1960, the treaty on Mauritanian independence was signed in Paris. It was the last country of the French Community to gain full independence. The formal proclamation took place on 28 November during the ceremony in Nouakchott. This day was announced in Morocco as a day of national mourning. The ceremony was attended by French prime minister Michel Debré, president of Senegal Leopold Senghor, Maurice Yameogo of Burkina Faso as well as by the prime ministers of Ivory Coast, Niger and Dahomey. [5] The Arabic countries were represented only by the Tunisian minister of information, Mohammed Masmoudi. The head of the French government announced in his speech that Mauritania could count on the help of the former “mother country,” both civilian and military. The French military bases [6] were supposed to remain on the territory of the new country without any changes until such time as an appropriate agreement was concluded. This was to take place after the accession of Mauritania to the un (Dokumentacja Prasowa 1960b: 870, 1960c: 777, 1960d: 869). This decision was the result of mutual interest on the part of Paris and Nouakchott in ensuring security for unstable Mauritania, as well as in facing the real threat from Morocco.

27In the period between 24-26 October 1960, the conference of African Francophone countries was held in the capital city of the Ivory Coast, Abidjan. Apart from the hosts, the conference was also attended by the representatives of the following countries: Niger, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Dahomey, Mauritania, Congo-Brazzaville and Cameroon. The meeting was mainly organised in order to discuss the issue of Algeria and Congo. The representatives of the countries also expressed their opinion on the Moroccan claims towards Mauritania. They were considered groundless, and the country’s independence was supported. The country’s candidacy for admission to the un was also backed up. Despite the invitation, the Moroccan authorities did not send their representative and stated that they would not sit at the table with “the pseudo prime minister of the pseudo country Mauritania” (Dokumentacja Prasowa 1960e: 785-786; Ould Daddah 2003: 216).

28The articles in the Moroccan press struck a similar tone. Among the most frequently repeated slogans, one could find phrases about how France was perpetuating colonialism, its role in dividing nations, maintaining military and economic interests, draining raw materials, as well as accusations that France was intent on surrounding the Maghreb countries, especially Algeria, in the military manner. The Moroccan daily paper Al-Alam [7] published the following:

29

Those who support France rely on the past, serve the issue of colonialism and split between the nations. The pseudo independence of Mauritania is a real threat for the future of Algeria, because it will make it possible for the colonial forces to keep the base inside Maghreb (Hajnicz 1960: 3, all English translations are by author unless otherwise noted).

30As mentioned before, Tunisia was the only Arabic country that supported the independence. On 24 November 1960, the Tunisian Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Saduk Mukkadem, emphasised the fact that this decision was based on the rule of nations’ self-determination, which was closely adhered to by Tunisia. In fact, this stand was connected, in this way, to the issue of Algeria. If Tunisia had agreed with Morocco, due to historical reasons, it would have been easier for France to promote the same argument with regard to Algeria. Tunisia’s position triggered a backlash in Morocco. The Moroccan Minister of Information, Mulay Ahmed Alaoui, emphasised the fact that the consent for the separation of Mauritania from Morocco would be a dangerous precedent, and that keeping the French bases there would pose a threat to Algeria. As a consequence, the Moroccan ambassador in Tunis was recalled (Sitbon 1960: 3).

31The reaction of King Mohammed v was similar:

32

La pseudo-indépendance octroyée à la Mauritanie n’est qu’un leurre. Les auteurs de cette pseudo-indépendance n’ont qu’un but: celui d’arracher la Mauritanie à la mère patrie, d’exploiter ses richesses à leur profit et d’en faire une barrière artificielle entre nous et nos frères africains, alors que de tout temps la Mauritanie a été un trait d’union. Ils visent également à faire de la Mauritanie une base stratégique menaçant aussi bien la sécurité du Maghreb arabe que celle de l’Afrique tout entière (Le Monde 1960d: 3).

33In order to authenticate its claims, the Moroccan government published the White Book(Le Livre blanc) on 4 November 1960 (Ministère des Affaires étrangères du Maroc 1960; Marchesin 2010: 95-96). It contained numerous arguments justifying the rights of Morocco with regard to the whole territory of the Western Sahara, up to Senegal. The main thesis of the White Book, presenting Mauritania as part of Morocco, was based not on the rules of the international law, but on the Muslim concept of territory. According to the Muslim doctrine, the country is not limited to the territory it controls, but it stretches towards the area which is inhabited by the believers (Dar al-Islam). Due to this reason, the fact that prayer in Mauritania was recited on behalf of the sultan of Morocco became the central point of the argumentation. Each area inhabited by the believers was an indispensable property of the Muslims, even if temporarily subject to foreign rule.

34The White Book contained references to historical events and documents, which served as evidence that Mauritania had been a part of Morocco for centuries. The 1885 decree by Sultan Mulay Hassan stated that his country stretched all the way to the Senegal River was such evidence. However, the events from the beginning of the twentieth century constituted, without a doubt, the more important argument. In 1897, one of the Mauritanian religious leaders, Ma al-‘Aynayn, from Saguia al-Hamra in the northern part of the country went to Marrakesh to ask Sultan Mulay Abd al-Aziz to support his fight against the French and to assign a military commander to lead his forces. As a matter of fact, the Moroccan ruler appointed his cousin Mulay Idris Ben Abd ar-Rahman, who had fought several battles against the enemy together with Ma al-‘Aynayn, for this task. They both used the sultan’s seal and were subordinates of the Moroccan ruler (amsz, 3, fos. 68-69; Kowalska-Lewicka 1976: 324-326; Marchat 1957: 644).

35Most arguments in the White Book referred to the pre-colonial period. According to the contents of the paper, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the French obtained consent of the then superpowers to determine the borders of Morocco in a free way. Tindouf and Béchar were supposed to be taken away and incorporated into Algeria. In 1911, the secret French and Spanish agreement was concluded, which divided southern Morocco between those countries. The smaller part—the Western Sahara—fell to Spain, and the bigger one—Mauritania—became a part of the French colonial empire. This argument was very inaccurate, because the Western Sahara had already been ceded to Spain in 1885 during the Berlin Conference, and the French conquest of Mauritania had begun in 1903. The final conclusion of the White Book was that Mauritania was an artificial creation of the French colonisers (Eitner, Łętocha & Prokopczuk 1967: 182-183; Le Monde 1960f: 1). Indeed, in 1912 only an accurate division of French and Spanish colonies in Mauretania and protectorates in Morocco was conducted. Any previous actions undertaken by these countries in Mauritania took place with the participation of local emirs, and without consulting the Sultan of Morocco (Ficowska 1977: 197; Kowalska-Lewicka 1976: 320-326).

36Three days later, the Mauritanian government published the Green Book, which contained arguments opposite to Moroccan claims. The publication included the analysis of Moroccan and Mauritanian relations from the Middle Ages to the end of the nineteenth century when the first international resolutions concerning this area were adopted. Finally, Rabat was accused of imperialism (La République Islamique de Mauritanie 1961; Neue Zürcher Zeitung 1960: 2).

37The French support for independence of Mauritania resulted in closer relations of Morocco with the countries of the Eastern Bloc. Paris refused to lend its military planes, so the offer of the ussr was adopted. Morocco received mig planes. The offer was approved a few days before voting during the fifteenth session of United Nations General Assembly devoted to the accession of Mauritania to the un. It was supposed to be a message for Great Britain and the usa. If the position of France was supported by the Security Council, Morocco would tighten its cooperation with the Eastern Bloc (amsz, 5, n.fo.).

38Meanwhile, the debate of the un political committee on 15-26 November 1960 was very stormy. The discussion opened with a speech by the Moroccan delegate, Mohamed Boucetta. He based his address mainly on the arguments contained in the White Book. He claimed that France wanted to create an artificial country out of Mauritania, like the State of Katanga in Congo, only in order to maintain its military bases, exploit natural resources and conduct nuclear testing. Furthermore, the voting in Mauritania was conducted in an atmosphere of terror, and the election was rigged. The French delegate claimed that the debate was groundless because Mauritania had neither been a part of Morocco, nor had there been a mutual border. The Moroccan sultans did not attribute their power to this area. They determined the southern borders of their country at Noun and Draa (Deckraene 1960: 5; United Nations 1961a). Numerous francophone countries of sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Senegal, supported such as position. Its representative rejected the option of founding territorial claims on historical premises (Dokumentacja Prasowa 1960f: 870). This was the overall tendency supported by most African countries. After establishing the oau in 1963, the rule of maintaining the colonial borders was strictly adhered to.

39In such a situation, the delegates from Jordan, Libya and Indonesia made the following proposal: it was necessary to try to reach a consensus on Mauritania as per the French and Moroccan agreement of 1956, which resulted in the bilateral committee for drawing the borders of Morocco (Schwoebel 1960: 3; United Nations 1961b). This position was rejected by France. Its delegate claimed that Paris had assigned all independent rights to Mauritania and could therefore not decide on its borders. Moreover, the bilateral committee established in 1956 was supposed to correct the borders, not to draw them from scratch. In addition, the delegate from Afghanistan proposed that the words “France” and “Morocco” should be replaced by the words “interested parties” in the draft resolution of three countries, and that a referendum should be organised in Mauritania (Schwoebel 1960: 3; United Nations 1961c). This issue did not suit the representative of the ussr, Walerian Zorin. He supported the resolution of the three countries and amendments, as proposed by Afghanistan, but the reality was different. In line with the interests of Morocco, W. Zorin announced that the Soviet Union supported the decolonisation process, but in the case of Mauritania, the opinions of the surrounding countries, which were familiar with the issue, should be taken into consideration. The Soviet stand was clearly pro-Moroccan, but on the other hand, Moscow refrained from any attack on Mauritania. However, some Soviet daily papers mockingly depicted Nouakchott, which had become the capital city of an independent country with only two dozen new buildings. The huge divergence of positions in the un made the representatives cognisant of the fact that a consensus could not be reached at that moment. That is why voting on the motion was postponed (Dokumentacja Prasowa 1960f: 870; Tatu 1960: 4).

40Due to lack of agreement, the issue was discussed by the Security Council on 3 December 1960. Initially, W. Zorin proposed that the candidacy of Mauritania and Mongolia be put on the agenda. However, the motion was rejected and the members only discussed the first issue. The representative of Morocco, who reiterated his government’s position, was also present. The following countries supported Mauritania’s accession to un: France, the United States, Great Britain, Taiwan and non-permanent members of the Council: Italy, Ecuador, Argentina and Tunisia. Ceylon abstained from the vote. W. Zorin stated that the problem of Mauritania was more complex. Even though he supported decolonisation, the rights of a different country (Morocco) were limited. Moreover, he claimed that the French assurances of independence were not true, because the French military bases were still located in Mauritania. As a result, the ussr exercised its veto. Poland did the same thing as a non-permanent member of the Council (Dokumentacja Prasowa 1960g: 870-871; Le Monde 1960e: 4).

41This information was well received by the Moroccan public. The Minister of Information, M. A. Alaoui, stated that:

42

[…] the ussr remained faithful to the United Nations Charter by means of recognising the independence and territorial integrity of Morocco. The Soviet veto is not a tactic or procedural action. The ussr took a specific stand only because Mauritania is a part of a un member country […] (amsz, 5, n.fo.).

43Another meeting of the participants of the Abidjan conference was then organised. The talks were held in Brazzaville between 15-19 December 1960. Twelve representatives of African francophone countries were present. The permanent of the group, which was supposed to consult the opinion on the urgent problems of the “Dark Continent,” was established. The group took the pro-Western position, which was based mainly on cooperation with France. The group made a decision to adhere to the rule concerning lack of interference in internal matters of other countries. It referred to both military and non-military issues. This provision concerned Mauritania as the Moroccan claims were perceived as foreign intervention. This bloc was referred to as the Brazzaville Group after the meeting location (Łętocha 1970a: 108-109).

44The conclusions of the international conferences in Abidjan and Brazzaville were seriously alarming for Morocco. In order to counter these, the Moroccan government invited African countries to Casablanca for a conference, held on 3-7 January 1961, only two weeks after the end of the Brazzaville talks (Bouderbala & Duroselle 1977). The representatives of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the United Arab Republic, Algeria, Libya, and Ceylon (as observer) arrived in Morocco. The main issues discussed were the conflicts in Congo Leopoldville and Algeria. However, Rabat wanted to gain support with regard to the issue of Mauritania. Morocco succeeded in this regard, because the group announced that the independence of Mauritania was merely a ploy by France aimed at surrounding the countries of Western Africa and economic exploitation. The meeting gave rise to the so-called Casablanca Group which determined the common opinion of the countries on the issues of international politics, including the negation of Mauritanian independence (amsz, 5, n.fo.; Łętocha 1970b: 120; Rinehart 1985: 68).

45The Political Committee of the Arab League adopted a similar position, which held its session in Baghdad from 31 January-5 February 1961. The ministers of foreign affairs sustained their support for Morocco and announced that they would vote against accepting Mauritania’s candidacy for membership in the un. This resolution was not signed by Tunisia, which triggered Moroccan opposition to the candidacy of the representative of this country for the President of the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly (Dokumentacja Prasowa 1961: 123).

46Nonetheless, on 19 April 1961, two days before the end of the fifteenth session, the General Assembly voted in favour of accepting both Mauritania and Mongolia to the un. This was the result of a draft resolution submitted by several countries from the Brazzaville Group. Their position was based on the fact that both countries fulfilled the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations; eight members of the Council voted in favour, and only one permanent member voted against accepting both countries (United Nations 1961d). The behind-the-scenes negotiations led to the consensus, which resulted in accepting both countries at the Security Council session on 25 October 1961. The ussr decided not to veto accession of Mauritania in exchange for the similar decision of the West with regard to Mongolia. The vote of the General Assembly on 27 October 1961 was a mere formality. Mauritania became a member of the un as the 103^rd country. The Eastern Bloc mostly abstained from voting (including the ussr and Poland), and only thirteen countries voted against it (several African and Middle Eastern countries) (amsz, 6, n.fo.; Kostecki, Łętocha, et al. 1972: 181). It was a serious defeat for Morocco. Its representative stated in his speech that Mauritania was “[…] a puppet country and a product of French neo-colonialism” (United Nations 1961e).

47The ambassador of the Polish People’s Republic in Rabat was aware that the chances for Mauritanian incorporation into Morocco were faint by July 1960. This was mainly due to strong support from France with regard to the independence of this country, which was an important part of the French community. On one hand, Paris invested significant resources to extend Mauritanian infrastructure in order to exploit iron ore (amsz, 3, fo. 69). On the other hand, President de Gaulle was interested in improving relations with Morocco, which would be significant in the face of the future attitude of neighbouring Algeria towards France. In the Spring of 1961, during a Moroccan ambassador’s stay at the Élysée Palace, the President made the following offer: if Rabat accepted the independence of Mauritania, France could influence the kind of relationship this country would have with the royal crown (amsz, 7, n.fo.).

Further Evolution of Co-existence

48Rabat tried to take advantage of the lack of stability in Algeria in order to occupy Algerian Tindouf and Saf, which was also a disputable area. This would have allowed Morocco to gain a fragment of border directly connected with Mauritania. Army and officials were sent to Tinduf, but Algeria’s quick response resulted in abandoning this intent (amsz, 8, fo. 45). Morocco’s situation on the international arena started to deteriorate significantly and collapsed after the so-called “Sand War” with Algeria in October 1963. It concluded with the defeat of Morocco. This resulted in the serious isolation of Rabat from the rest of Africa. The situation was exacerbated by King Hassan ii who refused to participate in any summits which were also attended by the President of Mauritania. Only the presence of the ruler during the summit in Cairo, where the issue of the border dispute with Algeria was initially agreed upon, resulted in Morocco’s emergence from strict isolation (amsz, 9, n.fo.).

49During that time, the actions of Mauritania were quite opposite. The government in Nouakchott was gradually accepted by subsequent countries of the world. This made it possible for the country to participate in the creation of oau in 1963. In the period 1963-1964, relations with Mali were normalized, which until then had actively supported Morocco, but had begun hoping to include part of the Mauritania territory within its own country (Ould Daddah 2003: 210-211). The same steps were taken against uar and Algeria, thanks to the support of the latter in the dispute with Morocco. Nouakchott succeeded in deconsolidating the Casablanca Group consisting of countries hostile to the self-determination of Mauritania (Handloff 1990: 144).

50President M. Ould Daddah maintained an active policy to strengthen Mauritania’s position during every summit. Apart from the success on the international stage, the leader managed to eliminate pro-Moroccan guerrillas and ban the oppositionist political parties up to 1964. This strengthened the position of the government throughout the country and made it possible to create the image of Mauritania as a consolidated and independent state. The permanent support of France, the usa, frg and Spain, in exchange for concessions to exploit Mauritanian natural resources, was an additional advantage (amsz, 10, n.fo.).

51The success of the government in Nouakchott seriously dispirited the Moroccan claims and made them anachronistic and unreal. At the same time, maintaining these claims resulted in Morocco’s isolation and limited its foreign policy. As a consequence, the demands towards Mauritania reduced the prestige and authority of Moroccan diplomacy internationally. Rabat was aware of such problems and decided to undertake revising the former policy without the reputational damage. In the summer of 1964, the first serious talks between the ambassadors of both countries in Paris were held, and then continued during the conference of oau in Cairo. King Hassan ii agreed to sit at one table with President M. Ould Daddah for the first time. Meanwhile, Morocco expressed a token of good will. Morocco reorganised its government apparatus and liquidated its Ministry for Mauretania. What is more, the publication of bulletin of this ministry and anti-Mauritanian broadcasting on Tangier’s radio station were withheld. The government in Nouakchott also eliminated the anti-Moroccan broadcasts (amsz, 10, n.fo.).

52At the beginning of October 1964, the Moroccan Minister of Information visited Paris. His task was to conduct further talks with Mauritania. The representative of the king tried to gain as much as possible right from the start. Initially, the union of the two countries was proposed, and when representatives of Mauritania opposed this, Morocco proposed a looser association. However, this proposal was also rejected, and the whole mission of the Moroccan minister failed. Rabat envisioned how to gently withdraw from the territorial claims against Mauritania without reputational damage by establishing some kind of association between the countries. At that point, King Hassan ii cancelled his visit to Tunisia, where he was supposed to officially meet with President M. Ould Daddah, and the Moroccan media started to attack the government in Nouakchott again (amsz, 10, n.fo.).

53However, the conflict was short-lived. Rabat’s claims against Mauritania carried serious burdens, as mentioned above. In addition, Spain expressed its support with regard to the independence of Mauritania by constantly refusing to decolonise the Spanish Sahara, which it justified by the simultaneous claims of Nouakchott with regard to this area. Rabat was aware of the fact that the chances of obtaining this colony were greater than those of incorporating Mauritania, and the former policy stood in the way. Such hostile relations with Morocco were not favourable for the authorities in Nouakchott either. In the face of military danger, the country had to maintain the army, equipped and ready. This problem was a serious burden for the finances of the young country, because 25 per cent of the budget was allocated to military purposes (amsz, 10, n.fo.).

54It should be assumed that the regression of the mutual relations as a result of the failed mission of the Moroccan minister in Paris was supposed to maintain the image of Rabat’s policy. In the face of unconditional rejection of the Moroccan proposals by Mauritania, further conciliatory policy of Rabat had to be withheld. However, this was a short-term move. In the summer of 1965, the Mauritanian delegation participated in the international conference in Tangier. Many observers perceived this as Rabat’s acknowledging Mauritania (amsz, 11, n.fo.).

55During the subsequent two years, the international status of Mauritania was significantly improved. It managed to establish cooperation with some Arab countries, such as the uar, Tunisia, Algeria and Syria, which resulted in these countries acknowledging the independence of Mauritania. Such relations were a derivative of the relations these countries had with Morocco. They were not successful (apart from Tunisia) (de La Serre 1966: 330-331). Nouakchott’s relations with some of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa improved, particularly with Mali, which had initially supported the position of Morocco. The Kayes Agreement, ratified on 16 August 1963, specified the disputable section of border by determining it along 6^oW. As a result, Mali was no longer among the countries hostile towards Mauritania. [8]

56Mali gained support from Senegal, which served as an intermediary with regard to Mauritanian trade with other countries. [9] A mutual customs union was established for this purpose. The committee of four countries (together with Mali, Senegal and Guinea) was founded for the sake of regulating the issue of developing the Senegal River. In 1964, the process of bringing Mauritania closer to the Eastern Bloc was initiated. This was expressed by withdrawing acceptance for Taiwan and South Korea, and recognising the People’s Republic of China and North Korea. In return, more and more countries of the Eastern Bloc acknowledged the independence of Mauritania. Relations with Poland were established on 3 December 1965. However, despite these closer relations, Nouakchott did not withdraw from its pro-Western policy (amsz, 12, n.fo.; Szczepanik, Herman-Łukasik et al. 2010: 205).

57Finally, after many meetings, Morocco acknowledged the independence of Mauritania during the conference of the Arabic countries in Rabat on 26 August 1969.Algeria played an important role in this process, as it aimed at closer cooperation between Mauritania and Maghreb countries. The first ambassador of this country delivered letters of credence to King Hassan ii on 24 April 1970 (Pazzanita 1992: 282; Jackowski 1970: 2; Nostitz-Jackowska 1979: 117). Nevertheless, the government in Nouakchott was suspicious about Rabat’s intentions. These doubts became even stronger during the conflict with regard to the Western Sahara. The authorities in Mauritania initially claimed this territory, but withdrew from this plan later on. Nouakchott continues to support the existence of a buffer state (today, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic) in order to avoid borders with Morocco.

58The independence of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania has become a permanent fact. Indeed, the country owes its existence to the Republic of France. Given the latter’s interest in Moorish iron ore, it became easier to control a weak Mauritania than a strong Morocco. In this way, Moorish iron ore flowed into Europe in exchange for French assistance in developing the country though it has only increased dependence on France since 1960.

59Communist Bloc countries supported decolonization. However, this was not associated with a concern for the independent development of former French colonies. In the first place, this interest was generated by the goal of expanding socialism into new areas. Supporting those countries where socialists won elections and gained power, the Eastern Bloc was reluctant to enable strong conservative parties with policies of cooperation with the former metropolis. They were also interested in economic cooperation. It was hoped that after breaking away from France, independent African countries would become markets for goods produced in the Communist Bloc countries. Similar assumptions were made regarding Mauritania, but it soon became evident that the country intended to pursue a policy of close collaboration with France.

60In foreign affairs concerning Africa, the ussr was the main policy generator. Poland as a satellite country, only carried out the orders that were sent from Moscow. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Communist Bloc position is uniform in support of decolonization. At present, however, the author was unable to access Russian documents, which is the result of a cooling of relations between Warsaw and Moscow. It is important to note that researchers from Poland are not welcome in Russian archives, no matter what lengths they may go to for access. This is why, in the present study, based on Polish and other foreign archives, it can be assumed that documents bear similar overtones to what can be found in the Russian archives, at least for the period before 1989. This is due to Poland’s dependency on ussr, as mentioned. Over time, Poland, in relation to Mauritania, decided to pursue a policy of keeping its distance and not promising any particular objective. This changed only in the 1970s, which was a derivative of new politics and policies in both Mauritania and Poland.