1Since the conclusion of the 2010–2011 electoral crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, which resulted in the forced removal of former President Laurent Gbagbo and the deaths of approximately 3,000 Ivorians, the peace established under current President Alassane Ouattara remains precarious. The Rassemblement des houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix (RHDP) (Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace)—the electoral coalition formed prior to the 2010 presidential elections between Ouattara’s Rassemblement des républicains (RDR) (Rally of the Republicans), the Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) (Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire) led by Henri Konan Bedié, and a number of smaller opposition parties—has come under increasing strain amidst debates over who should succeed Ouattara as the RHDP candidate in 2020 (Aboa 2017; Konan 2017). Additionally, the 2017 army mutinies and protests by soldiers and demobilised fighters illustrate Ouattara’s enduring tenuous control over the country’s military (Schiel, Faulkner and Powell 2017; Martin 2018).

2The fragility of Côte d’Ivoire’s post-2011 peace has been especially evident in north-eastern Côte d’Ivoire, in Bouna and the town’s surrounding rural environment. Since 2011, tensions between Peul pastoralists, Lobi farmers, and the indigenous Koulango population have grown. Access to and control over land are at the heart of these tensions. Conflicts over land have taken two interrelated forms. First, and not unlike elsewhere in West Africa (Bassett 1988; Moritz 2006), environmental change, population growth, and declining access to land have created conditions for land-related conflict in this part of Côte d’Ivoire, between Peul pastoralists and Lobi farmers. However, conflicts between farmers and herders have also been bound up with struggles over autochthony between the Koulango and Lobi, as a result of the massive influx of Lobi migrants from Burkina Faso over the course of the twentieth century. In late March 2016, struggles over land-use culminated in a violent confrontation between elements of the Lobi and Peul communities in Bouna that resulted in over 20 dead, 30 injured, and 1,000 displaced from their homes (Le Programme Alerte Précoce et Prevention des Conflits 2016; Le Cam 2016; Mieu 2016). Soon after this episode of violence, Ivorian officials—including President Alassane Ouattara—have visited the region, met with local leaders, and committed resources to peaceably manage these tensions. Nonetheless, interviews conducted in August 2017 suggest that hostilities between these groups have endured and renewed violence remains a real possibility in the future. [2]

3This paper explains Bouna’s post-conflict violence by focusing on evolving patterns of authority related to the governance of land, since the late nineteenth century and the integration of Bouna as part of Côte d’Ivoire and the French colonial empire. I argue that the development of what Catherine Boone (2014, 127-128) refers to as a ‘statist land regime’ in this region created social conditions amenable to the type of localised violence observed in Bouna in 2016. Statist land regimes represent cases of state-sanctioned population resettlement, where institutionalised private property rights or customary land tenure systems are weak or altogether absent. Access to land in these contexts is mediated by political processes and depends heavily on whether state agents are supportive or not of property claims. Where, as in Côte d’Ivoire, struggles over control of the state are pitched, ‘the specter of property expropriation and reallocation can provoke intense rural mobilization’ (Boone 2011, 3). In this paper, I show how state-sanctioned Lobi resettlement from southern Burkina Faso to north-eastern Côte d’Ivoire has limited the development of an effective local land tenure regime capable of regulating land conflict and channelling them into forums for non-violent dispute resolution. For the region’s Lobi population, their feeling is that, as non-autochthons, their rights are being overlooked amidst conflicts with Peul pastoralists over land use. From the perspective of Koulango authorities, massive Lobi migration and occupation of land in rural areas has occurred irrespective of their sanction and has weakened their authority over land overall.

4By focusing on the evolution of authority relations over the longue durée to explain the fighting in Bouna in March 2016, my argument contrasts dominant perspectives in the literature on post-conflict violence. Beyond Côte d’Ivoire, there is a large scholarship highlighting and explaining the limitations of externally sponsored peace processes and post-conflict transitions. This scholarship emphasises a number of causal factors tied to the quality of these interventions, such as the nature of power-sharing agreements (Walter 1999; Spears 2000, 2002; Lemarchand 2006; Mehler 2009), the use of elections as a post-conflict legitimising strategy (Reilly 2002; Lyons 2004; Höglund 2009), the absence or nature of institution building (Paris 2004; Paris and Sisk 2009), as well as the overwhelming national-level focus of peace-building efforts (Manning 2003; Autesserre 2010). These are examples of the types of causal explanations common in the literature on post-conflict transitions (Wittig 2016, 143) that Pierson (2004, 79) refers to as ‘quick/quick’ explanations, ‘where the causal process unfolds over a short time period and so does the outcome of interest’. In this body of research, the privileged cause of post-conflict violence (power-sharing, elections, institution building, or the disregarding of local conflict in peace-building) is almost always temporally proximate to the outcome of interest, specifically post-conflict violence. This paper combines what Pierson (2004, 82-83, 93) describes as structural (where there is a significant temporal gap between cause and effect) and cumulative (where effects are produced by gradual changes over time) explanations by emphasising changing patterns of authority relationships resulting from the destruction of the pre-colonial monarchical state based in Bouna and the reinforcement of the monarchy’s weakness over time through the promotion of Lobi migration. These types of causal accounts complement ‘quick/quick’ explanations by emphasising the conditions under which short-term catalysts prompt renewed violence in post-conflict environments (Pierson 2004, 102).

5To advance this argument, this paper draws from field research and interviews conducted in Abidjan, Bouna, and Doropo in 2010–2011 and 2017. This paper is organised in four parts. The first section briefly describes Bouna’s pre-colonial history, including its collapse as an independent political entity following fighting between Samory Touré and French armed forces. The second section of this paper explains how the weakness of the Koulango monarchy in Bouna was reinforced over time through the efforts of the colonial and post- colonial state to attract, settle, and ally with Lobi migrants. Section three examines how the conflict (between 2002 and 2011, when northern Côte d’Ivoire was controlled by the Forces Nouvelles) and post-conflict periods have reinforced tensions between Lobi migrants on one side and the native Koulango and Peul pastoralists on the other. The final section offers some tentative conclusions and evaluates the prospects for peace in Bouna in the future.

The Rise and Fall of the Koulango monarchy in Bouna

6Bouna was formed in the sixteenth century in response to the expansion of Mandé dominated trade networks across West Africa and the growth in intra-African and Afro-European trade in gold (Boutillier 1969, 4, 8; 1993, 22-24). Pre-colonial dynastic Bouna was organised in strict hierarchical terms: there existed clear social distinctions between the relatively small number of royal family members (descendants from Bouna’s mythical founder, Bunkani) and a numerically larger plebeian class which had no direct ties to the royal family. [3] Organisationally, power in pre-colonial monarchical Bouna flowed from the king, the Bouna isié. The kingdom comprised a set of nested provincial and territorial chieftaincies tying the authority of the king to chiefs at regional and village levels. The power vested in the king to appoint provincial and territorial chiefs and power sharing between royal lineages reinforced social control and political stability over time (Boutillier 1993, 213-216, 263; 1969, 4). The pre-colonial monarchy in Bouna was financed through a variety of sources including taxation on economic production, community labour obligations, the provision of public goods, booty derived from war making, and slavery. Dyula merchants comprised much of the commercial class in Bouna and played a key role in financing the monarchy (Boutillier 1993, 237-238, 343-344).

7By the late 1880s, Bouna found itself in a delicate political position, simultaneously confronting the French and English colonial empires, as well as the armed forces led by Samory Touré. Military competition between Samory and French and British forces represented a critical juncture for many of West Africa’s city-states. The fate of many of these city-states, including Bouna, was shaped by the positioning of their leadership vis-à-vis the three sides involved in this regional politico-military struggle.

8Although Bouna ultimately became part of France’s colonial empire, its first European contact was the British envoy, George Ferguson. Degbango, the sitting Bouna king, signed a treaty allying the kingdom with the British in April 1894 (Boutillier 1993, 114). Diverse interests motivated the kingdom’s decision to side with the British rather than the French. Close pre-colonial ties between Bouna and the Asante kingdom in present day Ghana was a motivating factor given the Asante’s earlier submission to the British. The decision also stemmed in part from the fact that Samory had already gained control of a number of other urban centres, including Kong, Dabakala, Mango, and Bobo-Dioulasso, along trade routes previously connected to Bouna to the west (Boutillier 1993, 116-117).

Map of the administrative Region of Bounkani, north-eastern Côte d’Ivoire

Map of the administrative Region of Bounkani, north-eastern Côte d’Ivoire

9In the end, Bouna’s alliance with the British was not enough to save the kingdom from Samory’s military advances. Samory’s forces captured and levelled Bouna in December 1896. The decision to attack Bouna was puzzling largely because Degbango and Samory had amicable relations in the period immediately prior to these attacks, between 1895–1896 (Boutillier 1993, 125-126). [4] Whatever the combination of reasons that shaped Samory’s decision, his attack ended the autonomous political and economic power of the Koulango kingdom. Much of the aristocratic class, including the king, were killed in the attack. Bouna’s population dropped from an estimated 10,000 inhabitants before the conflict to no more than an estimated 1,000 inhabitants in 1904. The majority of the surrounding villages simply ceased to exist; the overall drop in population in Bouna’s surrounding rural areas was equally precipitous (Boutillier 1993, 135-137). Bouna’s Islamic Dyula community, which tacitly supported Samory’s attacks on Bouna, was, for their part, spared from the violence. In the end, Bouna ultimately became part of French West Africa, as a result of accords signed between France and Britain in June of 1898 (Boutillier 1993, 141-155).

10Samory’s conquest of Bouna and Bouna’s subsequent formal colonisation by the French drastically weakened the autonomy of the old Koulango monarchy. By ending the slave trade and destroying Bouna’s trade connections to surrounding city-states, Samory’s war-making and French colonialism robbed the kingdom of its economic base (Boutillier 1971, 246-253). Variations in the impact that the fighting between Samory’s army and the French had on West African political systems highlights the significance of this period of Bouna’s history. Although other city-states such as Kong met the same fate as Bouna, others survived and some even used this context to expand their power. In Korhogo, presently the largest city in northern Côte d’Ivoire, the Tiembara chief Gbon Coulibaly allied with Samory. Instead of weakening his authority, this alliance served to strengthen Gbon’s position vis-à-vis other regional actors. The alliance between Gbon and Samory pressured others to submit to Gbon as a means of escaping the violence. After the fighting, Gbon was well positioned to negotiate with French and post-colonial administrators and became a key figure in the system of indirect rule developed in Korhogo (Bassett 2001, 34-44; Boone 2003, 248). In contrast, Bouna lacked any comparable ‘stable, reliable, hierarchical social system through which to negotiate or rule’ (Scott 2009, 209). The resulting weakness of indigenous social structures gradually pushed administrators in Abidjan to ally themselves with a different set of actors: Lobi migrants.

Land, power and Lobi migration in north-eastern Côte d’Ivoire

11‘Le pays Lobi’ historically represented an amorphous geographic zone crossing the contemporary borders of Ghana, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire. Most of the Lobi currently situated in north-eastern Côte d’Ivoire arrived beginning in the early twentieth century from Burkina Faso. Although they share many linguistic characteristics with neighbouring groups, particularly the Birifor (Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire) and the Dagara (Ghana), the Lobi constitute a distinct linguistic group (lobiri). Competing interpretations use the term ‘Lobi’ to demarcate specific geographic space or distinguish between groups organised according to bilinear rather than patrilineal descent (de Rouville 1987, 15-23).

12In contrast to the Koulango, Lobi society is distinguished by the absence of social hierarchy. Historically, Lobi governance has not included systems of authority that extended beyond the village level. Although religious (ditildar) and land chiefs (didar) exist within Lobi villages, the authority of these actors is circumscribed and has weakened over time (Savonnet 1962, 87, 1986, 12; de Rouville 1987, 14). The absence of centralised authority within Lobi society has made social mobilisation, social control, and the resolution of conflicts with Lobi villages a perennial challenge. As a result, social conflicts have typically been resolved through ‘social exit’ (Hirschman 1970), as disaffected parties typically choose to leave existing communities and establish new settlements elsewhere (Savonnet 1962, 87).

13Lobi history is defined in part by constant movement and migration. Lobi origins have been traced back to what is now Ghana, on the eastern side of the Black Volta. Since the late eighteenth century, the Lobi have migrated from Ghana into Burkina Faso and subsequently onto Côte d’Ivoire. Lobi migration to northern Côte d’Ivoire did not commence until the late nineteenth century after the Franco-Samory war (1882–1898) and the onset of French colonialism in Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire (Fiéloux 1980, 17). Colonialism was a significant reason for the migration of the Lobi into Côte d’Ivoire at the turn of the twentieth century. The pays lobi surrounding Gaoua (in southern Burkina Faso) was one of the last regions to resist French colonialism. Despite gaining formal control over this part of West Africa in 1898, by 1915 the French still had little administrative presence in the region. Lobi communities refused to pay taxes or obey French colonial law and continued to ambush trade caravans running through French West Africa (Kambou-Ferrand 1993, 17; Fiéloux 1980, 27). In response, the head French colonial officer Henri Labouret began a harsh pacification programme against the Lobi (Kambou-Ferrand 1993, 85-86). This prompted Lobi movement southward into Côte d’Ivoire, where the colonial presence remained limited and far less severe (Fiéloux 1980, 25).

14Drastic depopulation and the weakening of the Koulango monarchy in Bouna challenged the capacity of the French to integrate this part of Côte d’Ivoire into the colonial economy and presented difficult choices for French administrators vis-à-vis the question of Lobi migration and settlement. Encouraging the settlement of Lobi migrants was, on the one hand, necessary economically given Bouna’s depopulation after Samory’s invasion. Yet, on the other hand, politically controlling the Lobi and integrating them into colonial markets came with its own set of challenges. Indeed, Lobi migration into this part of Côte d’Ivoire initially threatened the colonial project. The Lobi took advantage of the absence of any credible political authority immediately following Samory’s invasion to enact revenge on former Koulango and Dyula slave traders and began raiding for slaves themselves (Boutillier 1993, 358). Overall, the Lobi hindered the development of the colonial economy by using violence to attack trade caravans, kill ethnic enemies (the Koulango and the Dyula), and seize cattle, slaves, and other economic assets (Boutillier 1969, 13-14).

15To control the Lobi, French colonisers relied on a variety of sometimes contradictory strategies. First, the French undertook an extensive village-to-village military campaign to disarm the Lobi and pacify the countryside surrounding Bouna (Boutillier 1993, 365; Fiéloux 1980, 27). The mixed results of the French pacification programme, [5] coupled with the growing realisation that it was only through encouragement of further Lobi migration that the colonial project could be economically viable, demanded other solutions to the problem of controlling the Lobi. Another strategy was to regroup the Lobi into larger settlements so that they could be more easily monitored, controlled, and taxed (Fiéloux 1980, 26). In the 1960s and 1970s, the post-colonial state continued this policy of Lobi resettlement through the creation of ZKB (zone Kolodio-Binéda), located just south of Bouna. ZKB was a state led villagisation plan that aimed to stem the tide of Lobi migration southward and promote economic growth. Directing Lobi migration towards ZKB appealed to state administrators because these lands, between the Kolodio and Binéda rivers, were previously scarcely populated. As a result, Lobi settlement in ZKB lessened conflicts over land between immigrants and the native Koulango. Lobi villages created by the state in ZKB were for the most part larger than Lobi villages found elsewhere in the Ivorian northeast, averaging between 1,000 and 2,000 individuals (Chaléard and N’Daw 1992, 263; Chaléard 1998, 479).

16The colonial and post-colonial state also strengthened its control over Lobi settlers by relying on the Koulango as political intermediaries. Despite the fact that Samory’s invasion and subsequent French colonisation drastically weakened the kingdom’s internal mechanisms of social control, the Koulango still retained some bases of political power that could be harnessed by the colonial administration. As Boutillier has argued, although the Lobi universally resisted the imposition of French colonisation, they did submit to the Koulango rather easily. Ideologically, the authority of the Koulango was underpinned by the widely held view—by both Lobi and Koulango—that the Koulango were the economically, educationally, and militarily superior group, and as autochthons, retained rightful control over the land (Boutillier 1993, 362). In addition, the Koulango fulfilled a number of institutional roles within the new colonial order that underpinned their continued political dominance. They were used to collect taxes directly from Lobi villages (Boutillier 1969, 15). In terms of land, Koulango land chiefs (sako tesié) played an important role in the installation of new Lobi villages. In Koulango territory, the sako tesié supplanted the role previously played by the Lobi regional authorities (didar) in the creation of villages. In usurping the role previously played by the didar, Koulango land chiefs also played a prominent role in mediating social conflicts within Lobi communities and performing ceremonial rites of passage. For all of these functions, Koulango chiefs could and often did demand payment (Fiéloux 1980, 141-142; Savonnet 1986, 24; 1968, 96; Boutillier 1993, 361-363).

17Despite the hierarchy between these groups that was inscribed within the heart of the colonial (and post-colonial) order, the relationship between the Koulango and the Lobi was not always contentious. Georges Savonnet labelled the period between 1900 and 1965 as one of ‘complementarity’ between these two groups: the Lobi required the blessing of the Koulango to remain on their land and the Koulango required Lobi settlement in order to finance the kingdom’s social and political functions (Savonnet 1986, 23-24). Yet, after 1965, there was a marked deterioration in the relationship between the Lobi and their hosts. The change resulted from a number of inter-related factors, including heightened competition over land, increased demographic pressures (as a result of the cumulative number of migrants that had settled in the region, particularly the Lobi), land degradation (stemming from overuse) and environmental change, particularly drought (Savonnet 1986, 25-26). Increasing Lobi migration from Burkina Faso after 1965 magnified the influence of these changes (Savonnet 1986, 51). Together, these factors contributed to increasing conflicts between these communities, particularly over land. Chaléard (1998, 482) reported that, in Nassian, the Koulango successfully chased the Lobi from living in the city after increasing tension over land use. Additionally, Koulango authorities punished Lobi farmers for using lands left fallow by the Koulango by demanding further payment, blocking access to land by planting cashew trees, or by blocking access to roads, which prevented Lobi farmers from bringing their crops to market (Savonnet 1986, 52; Chaléard 1998, 482). The tension between these communities was particularly acute where drought and land degradation were extensive and in contexts where Lobi and Koulango villages were geographically proximate to each other (Savonnet 1986, 50-51; Chaléard 1996, 421-422).

18Demographic and economic changes during the twentieth century also heightened the tensions between these two groups. Boutillier estimated (1993, 370) that between 1904 and 1980, the Koulango/Dyula population in the region of Bouna increased from 5,250 to 7,000. During this same period, the number of Lobi living in the region rose far more dramatically, from 5,000 to 45,000. Georges Savonnet (1986, 23) estimated that by 1975, 75,000 to 80,000 Lobi were living in Bouna-Téhini compared to 7,500 Koulango. The demographic disparity between these two groups grew over time as a result of growing Lobi migration, varying reproductive rates between these two groups, and the migration of many young Koulango to urban centres in the south, particularly Abidjan (Boutillier 1993, 371-372; Savonnet 1962, 98).

19These demographic shifts paralleled significant economic changes in this part of Côte d’Ivoire. The Lobi emerged as the dominant economic group, largely because of their demographic weight in the countryside. This dominance is most starkly reflected in the production and export of yam in the Ivorian northeast. By 1990, Chaléard reported that yam production from Lobi farmers accounted for approximately 98 percent of all profits from yam sales. Yam sales by Lobi farmers were 16 times greater than sales by Koulango farmers (1990, 133). At the turn of the twentieth century, yam represented an important commercial crop for the Koulango. However, their dominance in this sector was undercut when colonialism put an end to their system of forced labour (Chaléard 1990, 135).

20Subsequent efforts to renew economic development in this part of Côte d’Ivoire focused on the development of other crops, such as rice or cotton, because of how the production of these crops, unlike yam cultivation, can contribute to heightened political control over peasant populations. In the 1980s, the Ivorian government embarked on an extensive state-led development plan, financed by the World Bank, which drastically increased agricultural inputs to the region. The aim, argued Chaléard and N’Daw, was as political as it was economic: to ‘stabilize the Lobi’ (1990, 19). Investment in cotton production—fertiliser subsidies, the building of roads, bridges, and extensive irrigation systems—all sought to geographically fix Lobi economic production by rendering them dependent on inputs provided by the state. However, the development of the cotton sector ultimately failed because of high labour requirements, low crop prices, and the rising costs of inputs (Chaléard and N’Daw 1992, 20). The social environment confronted by the state also limited the potential for cotton production. Lobi society lacked actors capable of mobilising the labour and resources necessary for the development of a labour-intensive crop such as cotton (Savonnet 1986, 65-66). [6]

21Yam exports, on the other hand, grew at very high rates without any substantial government support. The Lobi relied on their numbers and a system of mutual aid to clear land, remove weeds, and plant yams far more efficiently than other groups, particularly the Koulango (Chaléard 1996, 428). The growth of yam sales also worked to undercut Koulango authority over land. Expanding yam cultivation fuelled Lobi encroachment onto Koulango lands. Yam sales provided Lobi farmers the economic resources to politically challenge Koulango authorities, by refusing to pay them or by usurping the role of Koulango chiefs in allocating land (Chaléard 1998, 482-483). More recently, Lobi economic superiority has been reinforced as a result of the growth of cashew nut production and marketing. In response to rising prices, many Lobi have transformed their farms into cashew nut plantations (Joseph and Koissy 2013, 343).

22Finally, growing national-level political support has reinforced the ability of the Lobi to politically challenge the Koulango. The wealth gained from yam and cashew production allowed aspiring Lobi politicians to establish connections with national-level actors and further circumvent the authority of the Koulango monarchy. Although yam production proceeded without extensive state intervention in the countryside, the backing of national-level actors was important for the Lobi community in the north-east given their position as ‘strangers’ (or non-natives) to this region. By the end of the 1980s, wealthy Lobi family heads began to occupy a growing share of the most prominent local political positions such as village chiefs, heads of collective work projects (the GVCs, [Groupements à Vocation Coopérative]), and the local branches of the then single party, the PDCI (Chaléard 1996, 425).

23These interrelated demographic, social, and political changes prevented the institutionalisation of an effective land regime governing land use in the rural areas surrounding Bouna. High levels of Lobi migration and settlement, economic development, and the emergence of the Lobi elite as the prominent political actors in this region all contributed to the weakening of the Koulango monarchy. However, the decision of the colonial and post-colonial state to control this region by allying with the Lobi did not result in the development of an alternative durable system of authority governing land use. The Lobi lacked legitimacy given their status as non-natives. More significantly, Lobi reliance on the state to reinforce their position in this part of the north rendered this system of rule fragile to political changes occurring at the national level. This created significant challenges to establishing political order during the conflict period (2002–2011), when northern Côte d’Ivoire fell under control of the FN, and during the post-conflict period after the removal of Laurent Gbagbo.

After Houphouët-Boigny: Political crisis and the struggle for belonging in Bouna

24In 1993, the death of Côte d’Ivoire’s long-time president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, heightened well-chronicled debates about belonging and citizenship in Côte d’Ivoire that continue to the present day (Banégas 2006; McGovern 2011; Piccolino 2011; Mitchell 2012). Since this watershed moment in Ivorian history, Bouna’s political class has positioned itself vis-à-vis these national level debates in counterintuitive ways. As discussed in the previous section, Lobi elites used their growing economic power to establish themselves as the principal regional political intermediaries for the PDCI during the single-party period. Many in the Lobi community continued to support the PDCI after Houphouët-Boigny’s death in 1993. However, many Lobi also became FPI party members during the 1990s leading up to the 1995 and 2000 presidential elections. Conversely, the Malinké and Koulango overwhelmingly supported the RDR. That the Malinké and Koulango would support the RDR made some sense given the important role Lobi elites played as representatives of the PDCI during the post-colonial period. Overall though, national divisions grafted themselves onto local divisions in highly counterintuitive ways in this part of Côte d’Ivoire: here allogènes (particularly the Lobi) backed the PDCI and FPI and autochthones (particularly the Koulango) supported the RDR.

25Local-national alliance patterns formed during the 1990s had significant implications for the practice of governance during the conflict period (2002–2011), when the northern half of the country fell under the military and administrative control of the Forces Nouvelles (FN). Thus when the FN—an organisation that was comprised primarily of RDR supporters fighting for the candidacy of Alassane Ouattara—gained control of the region in September 2002, many Lobi felt that the rebellion was ‘against’ them and ‘for’ the Koulango, Malinké and Peul. [7] This feeling was exacerbated by the behaviour of the rebels once they had successfully established military control over this region. Like other places in the north that fell under the military control of the rebels, they were often criticised for the elaborate system of taxation they established to finance the rebellion (Bassett 2011). As the dominant demographic and economic group, many Lobi felt particularly aggrieved by the FN’s tax regime. Additionally, many in the Lobi community felt that the rebellion created opportunities for the Koulango to check or reverse the gains made by the Lobi since independence. For example, many Lobi felt that the Koulango used the crisis period to reclaim authority over land lost as a result of Lobi migration and the creation of unsanctioned Lobi villages in rural areas. Lobi frustration with the rebellion culminated in an armed revolt against the FN organised by a small group of Lobi youth in October 2007. This group attacked a military checkpoint established by the FN on the road leading north from Bouna to Doropo. Many Lobi youth fled or were injured after the FN responded. Bouna residents refer to this day as ‘dimanche noir’ (Speight 2014, 231).

26Tensions between the Lobi community and the former rebels waned over time, in part because of the organisational reforms introduced by the FN following the armed revolt led by Lobi youth in 2007, and after the FN’s success in removing Laurent Gbagbo from power following the 2010–2011 electoral crisis. Since 2011, Morou Ouattara (who is Koulango, from Bouna), the former military com’zone [8] leader in Bouna, as well as other key elements of the FN military hierarchy, left the city after being appointed elsewhere as part of the post-conflict Ivorian military or political administration. And although the relationship between the Lobi community and the FN was strained in the early stages of the conflict, these tensions lessened as more and more Lobi joined the ranks of the rebellion. Some Lobi joined the FN as a means of softening relations between the rebels and this community. Increasing participation over time reflected changing attitudes of some in the Lobi community vis-à-vis the rebels and the fact that the FN established themselves as the dominant military organisation in the region. Growing Lobi participation in the rebellion is important as it contributed to the spread of weapons and the arming of Lobi dozos (traditional hunting associations), the organisations responsible for initiating the violence against Peul pastoralists in March 2016. [9]

27For some within the Lobi community, the post-conflict alliance between the Koulango, Peul, and Malinké has functioned similarly to the coalition formed between the Koulango and the FN during the conflict: it has allowed the Koulango elites to reassert authority over land, authority that had been weakened as a result of colonial era violence and Lobi migration and settlement. Peul pastoralists have settled in the rural areas surrounding Bouna in large numbers since the Sahel drought in 1973 that pushed the Peul southward from Burkina Faso in search of lands for pasture. Over time, increased Peul migration southward into north-eastern Côte d’Ivoire has heightened tensions with Lobi farmers over access to land. Competition for land sparked violence between the Lobi and the Peul prior in the 1990s (Association des Ressortissants Koulango résidant à Abidjan 2016, 6). Accusations by Lobi farmers that grazing cattle managed by the Peul have repeatedly trampled farms and destroyed yam and other crops represent the catalyst for Lobi-Peul conflicts that began in early 2016 and culminated in the high levels of violence observed in the region on 23–25 March 2016. This violence began following a recent spate of accusations that Peul cattle herds had destroyed several Lobi fields near Bouna. As a result, Lobi dozos attacked Peul herds and destroyed a number of encampments. In response, Peul herders attacked and destroyed a number of Lobi farms. Parts of Koulango and Malinké communities sided with the Peul, in part because some of them owned cattle killed or lost in the attacks led by the Lobi (Programme Alerte Précoce et Prevention des Conflits, 2016).

28In response, the Ivorian government, as well as the UN, sent armed forces to secure the region and disarm the local population (AIP 2016). Some leaders of Lobi dozos were arrested. Since this violent episode, national and local political leaders have met with each other and with their constituencies to appeal for calm. The Ivorian state, along with a number of NGOs and international development partners, has worked to resettle displaced populations (primarily the Peul) and rebuild farms and homes destroyed in the fighting (L’Intelligent d’Abidjan 2016). These actors have also made a concerted effort to demarcate and codify the limits of Lobi farms and villages as a means of reducing insecurity over land tenure and preventing violence in the future. [10]

29Overall, final estimations of the outcome of this two-day episode of violence differ. Observers approximate that it resulted in between 22 and 77 deaths and 30 to 40 injured (Programme Alerte Précoce et Prévention des Conflits, 2016; Le Cam 2016; Mieu 2016). Additionally, this violence forced many to flee their homes and take refuge at the headquarters of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) in Bouna, or in refugee camps on the Burkina side of the Burkina-Côte d’Ivoire border. By 25 March, over 700 people, primarily Peul, had taken refuge in a camp established at Batié, in Noumbiel Province, Burkina Faso, thirty kilometres north of the Burkina-Côte d’Ivoire border (Le Cam 2016).

30What explains the heightened strains between these groups in the post-conflict period? What explains the violence observed in Bouna in late March 2016? This paper suggests that these tensions and this violence are a product of a number of reasons related to the structural features of the system of rural governance installed after the conclusion of fighting between Samory Touré and French forces and reinforced over time as a result of high levels of migration to this part of the north during the twentieth century. Although the central proximate cause of this episode of violence was growing competition for land between Peul herders and Lobi farmers, it was also a consequence of growing nativist struggles surrounding authority over land between Lobi settlers and the autochthonous group, the Koulango. In the eyes of some within the Lobi community, the crux of the issue is that Koulango elites have granted both Lobi farmers and Peul herders access to land. Some within the Lobi community view permitting the Peul to graze their cattle as an intentional strategy to limit the creation and expansion of Lobi farms and reassert the authority of the Koulango monarchy. Koulango authorities view this issue less controversially. From their perspective, as the indigenous group, they are the rightful authorities over land and many of the Lobi farms impacted by Peul grazing are new farms created without the consent of Koulango authorities. Thus, more than an outcome of competition over land between pastoralists and farmers, the post-conflict violence observed in this part of Côte d’Ivoire reflected an inability of any legitimate authority to regulate conflict in non-violent ways. In response to this problem, since the 1990s, the Lobi have taken steps to establish alternative systems of governance, rivalling the Koulango monarchy. Ongoing efforts by some in the Lobi community to appoint unified customary leadership, to gain recognition as part of the Chambre Nationale des Rois et Chefs traditionnels de Côte d’Ivoire, and, more recently, to build a palace in Bouna as a base for a centralised Lobi leadership have only exacerbated the rivalry between the Koulango and the Lobi.

31Respondents in interviews conducted in Bouna and Doropo in July and August 2017 commonly understood the underlying source of the challenges in north-eastern Côte d’Ivoire in a similar way, as a problem in, or absence of, political leadership. The indigenous Koulango community is now a numerical minority in the north-east and the Koulango elites lack the political and economic clout of their Lobi counterparts. However, Lobi leaders have proven equally incapable of resolving tensions between the Lobi on the one hand and the Koulango, Peul, and Malinké on the other. During the conflict period, when the north-east fell under the control of the FN, the FN marginalised Lobi leaders as a result of their ties, as PDCI or FPI party members, to the political system the rebels were intent on overturning (Speight 2014).

32Since 2011, divisions within the political class—paralleling current pro-Soro and pro-Ouattara factions within the ruling RDR—have handcuffed the ability of elites to resolve the enduring tensions between the Lobi, Koulango, and the Peul. In the 2011 legislative elections, Philippe Hien—a young Lobi politician, former FESCI student leader, and member of the FN—sought to run as the RDR candidate in Bouna. The party’s leadership disagreed and selected Nialé Kaba, a Malinké and long-time RDR party activist (and current Minister for Planning and Development), as the party’s candidate in Bouna. Hien ran as an independent and appeared to have won the seat until, at the last minute, a single ballot box swung the outcome of the vote in Kaba’s favour. The outcome of this election angered many within the Lobi community and prompted renewed efforts for the establishment of an independent Lobi political hierarchy (Miran-Guyon 2016, 2). As a candidate, Kaba has sought the support of the Koulango monarchy and has been more supportive of the Koulango publicly (Ministères 2016). She is also an ally of Hamed Bakayoko (and current president Alassane Ouattara) within the RDR nationally. Conversely, Hien, who has since been elected president of the Conseil régional du Bounkani in 2013, is supported by many in the Lobi community and is viewed as being close to former FN leader, Guillaume Soro (Kouadio 2016). These alliances and divisions—running from the local level up to the heart of national politics—have predictably limited the capacity of political elites to resolve the local conflicts in any meaningful way.

Conclusion

33In north-eastern Côte d’Ivoire, tensions between the Lobi community and the Koulango, Peul, and Malinké have intensified since the conclusion of the political crisis in 2011. These tensions culminated in the herder-farmer violence observed in this region in March 2016. What explains this violence? Why has this region been susceptible to inter-communal conflicts during the post- conflict period?

34This paper has argued that the important structural causes of the conflict trace back to the period when Bouna was absorbed into colonial Côte d’Ivoire, at the end of the nineteenth century, when fighting between Samory Touré and French forces resulted in the violent destruction of Bouna as an autonomous city-state. These events drastically weakened the authority of the old Koulango monarchy based in Bouna, particularly over the allocation and use of land. This weakness was reinforced by decades of Lobi migration and settlement encouraged by the colonial and post-colonial state. Changes in the demographic composition of this region, corresponding alterations in the balance of power between the Lobi and the Koulango, and ties of Lobi elites to Abidjan-based political networks to maintain power created a political system that was highly vulnerable to dislocations at the national level.

35The political crisis that divided Côte d’Ivoire in two for nearly ten years and the current post-conflict environment has created an environment where Koulango authorities could attempt to recover power lost since the Samory wars through alliances first with the FN, and later with Peul pastoralists. This paper contends that this is why this conflict should be understood less as a farmer-herder conflict and more as a conflict over authority, community membership, and belonging. In making this argument, this paper draws attention to causal factors operating over the longue durée that influence the prospects for post-conflict peace (or violence), that have been downplayed in the literature on post-conflict peace-building.