Delegation by the people for a “war on terror”

9 The idea of being “delegated” by the people has been a consistent element of Sisi’s discourse in constructing the State narrative around the 2013-2014 events. Whether it was the June coup or the dispersal of the Muslim Brotherhood’s supporters’ sit-in on August 13th, 2013, “tafweed” (delegation) remains a crucial aspect of the current regime’s policies and legitimacy. On August 13th, 2013, security forces dispersed the Rab’a Adweya sit-in of Muslim Brotherhood supporters. The claimed “delegation” was to counter the MB’s “terrorism.” The number of casualties remains unknown almost a decade later, lying between 500 and 5 000 deaths.

10 Shortly after this event, in December 2013, the MB was officially declared a terrorist organization and hundreds of its members were either put in jail or sentenced to death, a déjà vu of similar events in the 1950s under Nasser’s regime. In 1956, a shooting took place during Nasser’s speech in al-Mansheya Square in Alexandria and was interpreted as an assassination attempt. Nasser’s regime pursued MB members and leaders following the incident, with the front page headlines of the State newspaper, Al-Ahram, reading “terrorists” in allusion to the MB organization. Among the most prominent people imprisoned and persecuted at the time were Hassan Al-Hudaybi (MB Supreme Guide), Sayyid Qutb (prominent MB member with some of the most radical and/or radicalized thinking) and Zeinab al-Ghazali (founder of a women’s Islamist organization). The link between those prosecuted in the 1950-1960s and those prosecuted since 2013 is in the use of the discourse of “terrorism” employed by the regime. After al-Mansheya, the Egyptian State newspaper Al-Ahram spoke of “terrorists” (irhabiun) on its front page. In 2014, Sisi’s presidential campaign slogan was: “together against terrorism.” He thus provided continuity to the current regime’s narrative, basing it on historical as well as symbolic elements.

11 Connections between the Nasserite and the current regime’s discourses are found in numerous instances, and the idea of being “delegated” is one of them, with a few differences. Sisi demanded and used this delegation, in narrative and in practice, to include the mobilized segment of the population in his rise to power. The first time was when he directly demanded a delegation by the people as Minister of Defense – mentioned earlier in this article – and the second as presidential candidate in 2014, among other occasions. “Fawadnak” (we authorize or delegate you) were the words repeated in some instances of mobilization in support of the 2013 coup. The term eventually became a popular upbeat song performed by Gharam and Hanin. [8] After the 1967 defeat of the Egyptian army during the Six-Day War, al-naksah, people took to the streets to ask Nasser to remain in power. Handing Nasser authority to remain in power represents a common point with Sisi’s tafweed to come to power. However, the delegation for Nasser’s continuity in power is not the same as that for Sisi to carry out the 2013 coup and embark on the “war on terrorism.” In Sisi’s case, the recurrence of the idea of a delegation puts forward the process by which the people are made to take responsibility: they were designated as those who willingly handed over power to the current regime in 2013.

12 Before Sisi became president in 2014, head of the Constitutional Court Adly Mansour was put in power as interim president after Morsi’s removal. This shuffle was crucial to maintaining international aid and financial support from the West, which would have been halted if the army had remained in power directly after the coup. This is also one of the reasons the events – the coup included – from June 30th to July 3rd, 2013, are referred to as a “revolution” (thawra) and not a coup in the discourse of media and State. The word ‘coup’ or inqilab became more of a taboo in public discourse because it implied being on the side of the “enemy of the State,” [9] the MB.

13 In March 2014, Sisi gave a speech in military attire to announce his candidacy for the 2014 presidential elections. [10] His appearing in uniform to announce his duty to “safeguard the nation” as demanded by the people, marks the beginning of the main elements that characterize the new “July State.” The authoritarian practices and increased visibility of the army in various fields followed and are part of the civil-military dynamics in Egypt. Legitimacy and power were considered as having been handed over by the people, and allegedly for the people. In point of fact, the people are currently on the margins of or outside the political field because of the repression that is taking place, as will be discussed later in this article.

14 Finally, Sisi’s rejuvenation of the discourse of terrorism dovetailed with his presidential campaign slogan “together against terrorism.” Using the same notion of delegation, repeatedly referred to until today, legitimizes the use of violence and the prosecution of thousands of civilians under the pretext of their “belonging to a terrorist organization.” Most political prisoners are accused of this same crime. Among the most prominent activists and political prisoners who face this charge are Alaa Abdel Fattah and Abdel Moneim Abul Futuh. Thus, making the use of the terrorism discourse has become a pillar for the current regime’s authoritarian practices.

15 “Al-Sisi did enjoy a substantial degree of popularity, and a considerable segment of the citizens unconditionally delegated their authority to him on various occasions,” [11] according to Zeinab Abul-Magd in her book, Militarizing the Nation. She supports Robert Springborg’s argument that Egypt is currently a “delegative authoritarianism” [12] based on a popular demand. One must however add that it is the lack of options that united popular opinion in 2013 around Sisi. The absence of viable presidential candidates and fear of the army’s authoritarian backlash in 2014 left Sisi facing Hamdeen Sabbahi, politician and ex-head of al-Karama political party, and leader of the Egyptian Popular Current (founded in 2012), during the second round. [13]

A new “July State”

16 The “July State”, resurrected with the coup d’État that removed Morsi in 2013, has its continuity in Sisi’s regime, notably with his announcement of the founding of a new administrative capital, representing the “new Republic.” [14] The rise of a new State or Republic was frequently linked to the new administrative capital by Sisi and prominent media figures. The references are often with regard to the introduction of policies or decisions by the Cabinet of Ministers that are viewed as “in line with the new Republic,” [15] an officers’ Republic. The narrative was created and is maintained with practical means to guarantee the continuity of the army in power, through further militarization of life in Egypt. The army’s presence thus transcends the mere discourse of ‘protecting’ the nation and delves into a Nasserite model – and beyond – of monopolizing the State. Sisi made this clear during one of his pre-presidential interviews, stating: “the delegation is to the State and not to me personally,” [16] making sure to place himself outside the State apparatus despite belonging to the military, an institution of the State.

17 “A State within a State” was a phrase used in reference to the army under Nasser, which could be applied to the current regime’s State model. The increasing number of military personnel occupying various positions within the State apparatus is only a first step towards other forms of hegemony – administrative, economic, and social. Numerous governors and ministers currently in office are either military or ex-military personnel. There are three ministers with a military background in the current Cabinet of Ministers, a stable ratio since Sisi’s coming to power. However, a first with regard to military personnel penetrating the judicial system in Egypt must be underlined. Indeed, this summer, a major general of the armed forces was appointed as the new deputy head of the Supreme Constitutional Court. [17]

18 With the continued militarization of the State came the need to reinforce the necessary propaganda to support it and maintain the created discourse of Egypt’s last ten years of history. The Ramadan television series seemed to represent a perfect opportunity to reach the wider public with a tailored narrative, since during this holy month, viewership is high for Egyptian soap-operas. Al-Ikhtiyar (the Choice) series aired for the first time during the month of Ramadan 2020 with sequels, finally forming a trilogy. The show presents a sequence of choices made between good and evil; supporting the army or the Brotherhood; the State or terrorism. The series was supported – and sponsored – by the Military’s Moral Affairs Authority, which provided the producers with equipment and uniforms for the mise en scène. [18] More importantly, the contributions by the security apparatus in providing ‘leaks’ of footage filmed by hidden cameras enabled a more realistic interpretation of the constructed narrative. This includes the documentary footage, supplied by the security apparatus, showing attempts to “ikhwanize” ( “Brotherhoodize”) the army and police under Morsi. [19] Members of the Parliament and media presenters, such as media ally to the regime Mostafa Bakry, outlined how the series portrays the reality of what took place in 2012-2013 – in reference to the Choice 3. The social media and media reactions to the trilogy also played a role in diffusing the narrative. Social network accounts were made for each part of the series, which replayed the documentary footage and added quotes that were uttered by Sisi’s character in the most recently played episode.

19 Finally, the State apparatus’s hegemony and maintaining political leadership represent a milestone for the army, which was sidelined during the last 10 years of Hosni Mubarak’s rule. The “new Republic and State” [20] announced by Sisi on Martyr’s Day, in March 2021, marks the beginning of a new era for civil-military relations in Egypt as they bring forward the rise of a neo-military society. [21]

The national dialogue and prospects of de-militarization?

27 In April 2022, during the Egyptian Family Iftar, a gathering organized during the holy month of Ramadan in the presence of Sisi and the government, Sisi demanded the construction of a national dialogue that would include members of civil society. The Iftar was attended by two prominent politicians, one of them is Sabbahi – Sisi’s ‘competition’ during the 2014 presidential elections – and Khaled Daoud, journalist, ex-president of al-Destour Party and ex-detainee. [33] Even though the Iftar was followed by the release of several prisoners, many remain in jail, solitary confinement, and difficult conditions. “We need a new political dialogue that is consistent with the concept of building the new Republic,” [34] stated Sisi during the event. The idea of the “new Republic” founded on the principles highlighted earlier in this article remain an important element in the current regime’s narrative, but also in securing foreign funds, from the IMF or other foreign allies. Is the dialogue an attempt by the regime to reconcile with civil society? The answer for now is no, given the continued militarization of life in Egypt from education to legislature to entertainment; the number of political prisoners until today; and the continued pursuit, arrest – and re-arrest – of journalists, scholars, and activists.

28 Sisi’s demand for a “new political dialogue” has its prerequisites. Members of civil society who join should not “have blood on their hands,” a reference to the MB in particular. This also directly intersects with the MB’s continued unwillingness to accept the reference to the “June 30 revolution” – as opposed to a coup – as per the regime’s discourse. This means that the MB needs to acknowledge the current regime and State to reintegrate Egyptian civil society. There were questions and speculations for weeks after the April event as to whether the MB and April 6 movement will be joining the dialogue. As Egypt renewed ties with Qatar and Turkey this year, both countries have already started to take measures to limit Brotherhood activity on their soil, with Turkey halting the renewal of residencies and businesses for MB members. Meanwhile, Qatar’s al-Jazeera is to be reauthorized in Egypt after years of being banned because the news channel had continued to diffuse the Brotherhood’s discourse after 2013. Investment from the Gulf country is flowing into Egypt to mend diplomatic ties broken in 2017. [35] The adoption of a Brotherhood ban – or limitations in Qatar – was a necessary step towards the rejuvenation of diplomatic relations, providing consistency with the Egyptian State narrative.

29 The opening of the opportunity for old and new members of civil society to join the political field and carry out negotiations with the regime seemed like daydreaming since Sisi’s first mandate as president. However, the success of the national dialogue remains uncertain with many of the members aligning with the regime, thus not providing a platform for the opposition. [36] A national dialogue committee was formed, and Diaa Rashwan, head of the Journalism Syndicate was appointed Secretary General. The first meeting of the national dialogue’s board of trustees’ members was held in July.