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Résumé

Après l'arrivée au pouvoir en 2014 de l'actuel président égyptien Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, ancien général des forces armées, l'armée a gagné en puissance, en dominant encore plusieurs domaines, notamment l'économie, la politique et le récit national. À partir de matériaux primaires et de travail ethnographique, tels que les journaux et le discours politique des politiciens et des médias en Égypte, cet article répondra aux questions suivantes : Quels sont les changements politiques, économiques et discursifs mis en avant par Sisi depuis 2014 ? Comment cela a-t-il investi dans la construction d'une société militaire dominante ? En utilisant la description et l'analyse d'Anouar Abdel-Malek, de Gamal Abdel Nasser et de la société militaire des officiers libres, nous répondons aux questions susmentionnées tout en décrivant les processus et les procédures qui ont conduit à la domination actuelle de l'armée malgré la promesse initiale de Sisi que cela n'arriverait pas. Nous soutenons que le régime de Sisi a essayé d'incorporer l'appareil militaire dans tous les aspects de la vie sociale, économique et politique, tout en essayant de construire une société néo-militaire qui hégémone ces domaines. En utilisant le discours de Sisi, et ceux de personnalités politiques et médiatiques, nous fournissons des preuves discursives pour notre argumentation et notre analyse. Le travail de terrain étant presque impossible depuis 2013 en Égypte, nous mobilisons du matériel ethnographique collecté en ligne et à travers de nombreuses visites dans le Grand Caire.

Abstract

Ever since the current Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, a former general in the armed forces, came to power in 2014, the military has been gaining power, dominating several areas, including the economy, politics and the national narrative. Using primary material, such as newspapers and the political discourse of politicians and government representatives and media in Egypt, this paper will answer the following questions: What political, economic and discursive changes has Sisi made since 2014? How has this contributed to building a dominant military society? Using Anouar Abdel-Malek's description and analysis of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the military society of Free Officers, I answer the above-mentioned questions while outlining the processes and procedures that led to the current domination of the military despite Sisi's initial promise that this would not happen. I argue that Sisi's regime is attempting to incorporate the military apparatus into all aspects of social, economic and political life, while attempting to build a neo-military society that hegemonizes these areas. Using Sisi's discourse, and that of political and media figures, I provide evidence for my argument and analysis. As fieldwork has been almost impossible since 2013 in Egypt, I mobilize ethnographic material collected online and through numerous visits to Cairo, Egypt since 2014 and until 2021.

Introduction

Any analysis of the last ten years in Egypt with regard to civil-military relations needs to provide contextual information from the coming to power of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in February 2011 up until the most recent speeches by current president and ex-chief of SCAF, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Sisi was elected president in 2014, months after the ouster of president-elect and member of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), Mohamed Morsi. He is the embodiment of the continuity of military men as presidents since the founding of the Republic in 1952 until today, Morsi being the only exception. The June-July *coup d'État* orchestrated by Sisi – at the time general of the armed forces, head of the SCAF and Minister of Defense – came following mass mobilization against

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Brotherhood rule. The MB's attempt to fill the same neoliberal shoes once occupied by Hosni Mubarak, his sons, and their businessmen entourage was not welcomed by politicized people. The 2012-2013 demonstrations and their continuation until the ouster of Morsi were interpreted as a "delegation" (*tafiweed*) to the military to carry out the coup. Sisi had warned Morsi in 2013 in a public statement that he would remove him from power if he did not respond to the demands of the people (*al-sha'b*). The "delegation" was also to combat "terrorism" as Sisi stated in that same speech on July 24th, 2013.¹

With the 2013 coup came a term originally used to refer to the State founded after the 1952 coup. The 1952 coup was led by the Egyptian Free Officers, including three future presidents (Mohamed Naguib, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Mohammed Anwar al-Sadat), and brought about the "July State."² The 2013-2014 new "July State" as referred to in this article represents one of the means for answering the following questions: What political, economic and discursive changes has Sisi proposed since 2014? How has this invested in building a dominant military society? Despite recognition by the people and a populist discourse by Sisi and his regime, an abrupt return to brutal authoritarian practices followed, leading to the estrangement of the people from public discourse and politics altogether. This omission of the people came as a milestone in the reconstruction of a new "military society." Coined by Anouar Abdel-Malek in his analysis of the events and policies (economic, social, and public) following the 1952 Free Officers' coup,³ the concept explained the rise of this closed military society *vis-à-vis* the people. In reviving Nasserite discourse, the new "July State" founded by Sisi is based on and around the new military society in the making.

While dealing with these questions, I put forward a few key arguments. First, I argue that the discourse used since 2013 around the army enabled the process of domination over the State and society alike.

Second, I argue that once the revolutionary momentum had passed and the people conceded their consent to the army, a military society started defining and shaping civil-military relations.

My final argument is that the military society's construction and the current authoritarian regime's existence were based on the dismantling of Mubarak's elite – which included, but was not limited to, the Muslim Brotherhood. "*One either buys them [the nobility] or executes them*"⁴; that has been the strategy of the army, arguably since 2011, but more evidently since 2013.

This article aims to add to the current literature on the Egyptian army in power, and politics in contemporary Egypt. Given the ongoing state of

repression, research on Egypt – especially on the army’s involvement in politics since 2013 – has become less practicable for social sciences and humanities researchers. To mention a few, Italian researcher and doctoral candidate, Giulio Regeni was tortured and killed by Egyptian security forces in 2016;⁵ Egyptian researcher Ismail Alexandrani who worked on the Sinai Peninsula remains in prison after being arrested at the airport in 2015; and there are others.⁶ The crackdown on researchers, journalists, and those with similar professions has left few options and limited access to field research; this article is intended to contribute to filling the void by answering the main questions posed above.

I will first outline the unified discourse imposed since 2013 and the creation of the new “July State.” This section will include the use of “terrorism” as a means for neutralizing the opposition and creating the State’s official discourse. This process includes the legitimation by the people of actions that followed. The second section will cover the construction of a military society as per Abdel-Malek’s 1952 model, viewed comparatively.

A unified State discourse: towards a national narrative

“30 million Egyptians mobilized in the June 30 revolution to change the reality, and what happened on June 30 is unprecedented,” said Sisi in his interview with a group of journalists and media professionals, during the inauguration of a complex for animal and dairy production in Sadat city.⁷ This statement represents two aspects that I aim to cover in this section: first, the implication of the people in delegating legitimacy and paving the way towards the 2013 coup; and second, the insistence on creating a unified discourse around a “revolution” and not a coup.

Delegation by the people for a “war on terror”

The idea of being “delegated” by the people has been a consistent element of Sisi’s discourse in constructing the State narrative around the 2013-2014 events. Whether it was the June coup or the dispersal of the Muslim Brotherhood’s supporters’ sit-in on August 13th, 2013, “*tafiweed*” (delegation) remains a crucial aspect of the current regime’s policies and legitimacy. On August 13th, 2013, security forces dispersed the Rab’a Adweya sit-in of Muslim Brotherhood supporters. The claimed “delegation” was to counter the MB’s “terrorism.” The number of casualties remains unknown almost a decade later, lying between 500 and 5 000 deaths.

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Shortly after this event, in December 2013, the MB was officially declared a terrorist organization and hundreds of its members were either put in jail or sentenced to death, a *déjà vu* of similar events in the 1950s under Nasser's regime. In 1956, a shooting took place during Nasser's speech in al-Mansheya Square in Alexandria and was interpreted as an assassination attempt. Nasser's regime pursued MB members and leaders following the incident, with the front page headlines of the State newspaper, *Al-Ahram*, reading "terrorists" in allusion to the MB organization. Among the most prominent people imprisoned and persecuted at the time were Hassan Al-Hudaybi (MB Supreme Guide), Sayyid Qutb (prominent MB member with some of the most radical and/or radicalized thinking) and Zeinab al-Ghazali (founder of a women's Islamist organization). The link between those prosecuted in the 1950-1960s and those prosecuted since 2013 is in the use of the discourse of "terrorism" employed by the regime. After al-Mansheya, the Egyptian State newspaper *Al-Ahram* spoke of "terrorists" (*irhabiiun*) on its front page. In 2014, Sisi's presidential campaign slogan was: "together against terrorism." He thus provided continuity to the current regime's narrative, basing it on historical as well as symbolic elements.

Connections between the Nasserite and the current regime's discourses are found in numerous instances, and the idea of being "delegated" is one of them, with a few differences. Sisi demanded and used this delegation, in narrative and in practice, to include the mobilized segment of the population in his rise to power. The first time was when he directly demanded a delegation by the people as Minister of Defense – mentioned earlier in this article – and the second as presidential candidate in 2014, among other occasions. "*Fawadnak*" (we authorize or delegate you) were the words repeated in some instances of mobilization in support of the 2013 coup. The term eventually became a popular upbeat song performed by Gharam and Hanin.⁸ After the 1967 defeat of the Egyptian army during the Six-Day War, *al-naksah*, people took to the streets to ask Nasser to remain in power. Handing Nasser authority to remain in power represents a common point with Sisi's *tafiweed* to come to power. However, the delegation for Nasser's continuity in power is not the same as that for Sisi to carry out the 2013 coup and embark on the "war on terrorism." In Sisi's case, the recurrence of the idea of a delegation puts forward the process by which the people are made to take responsibility: they were designated as those who willingly handed over power to the current regime in 2013.

Before Sisi became president in 2014, head of the Constitutional Court Adly Mansour was put in power as interim president after Morsi's removal. This shuffle was crucial to maintaining international aid and financial

support from the West, which would have been halted if the army had remained in power directly after the coup. This is also one of the reasons the events – the coup included – from June 30th to July 3rd, 2013, are referred to as a “revolution” (*thawra*) and not a coup in the discourse of media and State. The word ‘coup’ or *inqilab* became more of a taboo in public discourse because it implied being on the side of the “*enemy of the State*,”⁹ the MB.

In March 2014, Sisi gave a speech in military attire to announce his candidacy for the 2014 presidential elections.¹⁰ His appearing in uniform to announce his duty to “*safeguard the nation*” as demanded by the people, marks the beginning of the main elements that characterize the new “July State.” The authoritarian practices and increased visibility of the army in various fields followed and are part of the civil-military dynamics in Egypt. Legitimacy and power were considered as having been handed over by the people, and allegedly for the people. In point of fact, the people are currently on the margins of or outside the political field because of the repression that is taking place, as will be discussed later in this article.

Finally, Sisi’s rejuvenation of the discourse of terrorism dovetailed with his presidential campaign slogan “*together against terrorism*.” Using the same notion of delegation, repeatedly referred to until today, legitimizes the use of violence and the prosecution of thousands of civilians under the pretext of their “*belonging to a terrorist organization*.” Most political prisoners are accused of this same crime. Among the most prominent activists and political prisoners who face this charge are Alaa Abdel Fattah and Abdel Moneim Abul Futuh. Thus, making the use of the terrorism discourse has become a pillar for the current regime’s authoritarian practices.

“*Al-Sisi did enjoy a substantial degree of popularity, and a considerable segment of the citizens unconditionally delegated their authority to him on various occasions*,”¹¹ according to Zeinab Abul-Magd in her book, *Militarizing the Nation*. She supports Robert Springborg’s argument that Egypt is currently a “*delegative authoritarianism*”¹² based on a popular demand. One must however add that it is the lack of options that united popular opinion in 2013 around Sisi. The absence of viable presidential candidates and fear of the army’s authoritarian backlash in 2014 left Sisi facing Hamdeen Sabbahi, politician and ex-head of al-Karama political party, and leader of the Egyptian Popular Current (founded in 2012), during the second round.¹³

A new “July State”

The “July State”, resurrected with the *coup d’État* that removed Morsi in 2013, has its continuity in Sisi’s regime, notably with his announcement of

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the founding of a new administrative capital, representing the “new Republic.”¹⁴ The rise of a new State or Republic was frequently linked to the new administrative capital by Sisi and prominent media figures. The references are often with regard to the introduction of policies or decisions by the Cabinet of Ministers that are viewed as “*in line with the new Republic*,”¹⁵ an officers’ Republic. The narrative was created and is maintained with practical means to guarantee the continuity of the army in power, through further militarization of life in Egypt. The army’s presence thus transcends the mere discourse of ‘protecting’ the nation and delves into a Nasserite model – and beyond – of monopolizing the State. Sisi made this clear during one of his pre-presidential interviews, stating: “*the delegation is to the State and not to me personally*,”¹⁶ making sure to place himself outside the State apparatus despite belonging to the military, an institution of the State.

“*A State within a State*” was a phrase used in reference to the army under Nasser, which could be applied to the current regime’s State model. The increasing number of military personnel occupying various positions within the State apparatus is only a first step towards other forms of hegemony – administrative, economic, and social. Numerous governors and ministers currently in office are either military or ex-military personnel. There are three ministers with a military background in the current Cabinet of Ministers, a stable ratio since Sisi’s coming to power. However, a first with regard to military personnel penetrating the judicial system in Egypt must be underlined. Indeed, this summer, a major general of the armed forces was appointed as the new deputy head of the Supreme Constitutional Court.¹⁷

With the continued militarization of the State came the need to reinforce the necessary propaganda to support it and maintain the created discourse of Egypt’s last ten years of history. The Ramadan television series seemed to represent a perfect opportunity to reach the wider public with a tailored narrative, since during this holy month, viewership is high for Egyptian soap-operas. *Al-Ikhtiyar (the Choice)* series aired for the first time during the month of Ramadan 2020 with sequels, finally forming a trilogy. The show presents a sequence of choices made between good and evil; supporting the army or the Brotherhood; the State or terrorism. The series was supported – and sponsored – by the Military’s Moral Affairs Authority, which provided the producers with equipment and uniforms for the *mise en scène*.¹⁸ More importantly, the contributions by the security apparatus in providing ‘leaks’ of footage filmed by hidden cameras enabled a more realistic interpretation of the constructed narrative. This includes the documentary footage, supplied by the security apparatus, showing attempts to “*ikhwanize*” (“Brotherhoodize”) the army and police under Morsi.¹⁹ Members of the

Parliament and media presenters, such as media ally to the regime Mostafa Bakry, outlined how the series portrays the reality of what took place in 2012-2013 – in reference to *the Choice 3*. The social media and media reactions to the trilogy also played a role in diffusing the narrative. Social network accounts were made for each part of the series, which replayed the documentary footage and added quotes that were uttered by Sisi's character in the most recently played episode.

Finally, the State apparatus's hegemony and maintaining political leadership represent a milestone for the army, which was sidelined during the last 10 years of Hosni Mubarak's rule. The "*new Republic and State*"²⁰ announced by Sisi on Martyr's Day, in March 2021, marks the beginning of a new era for civil-military relations in Egypt as they bring forward the rise of a neo-military society.²¹

Construction of a neo-military society

The "*Administrative Capital for Urban Development wants to rent the government district out to us for four billion Egyptian Pounds per year,*" stated Sisi during a speech at an inauguration of projects of the Communications Ministry on July 6th, 2022.²² The Administrative Capital for Urban Development Company is dominated by the army, which means that the State would be paying the army for the rent of its own administrative buildings in the administrative capital, meant to be the symbol of the "new Republic." I argue that the army has been growing its economic strength since 2011, more so since 2013, while working towards establishing a military society, in Abdel-Malek's words 'a neo-bourgeoisie' to accommodate this strength and keep it intact. Meanwhile, the Mubarak bourgeoisie had to be dismantled to create the necessary elite reshuffle loyal to the regime, as Nasser once did according to Abdel-Malek's analysis with the landowners after 1954.

Egyptian researchers working on the history of the military establishment pointed out during informal conversations that took place between 2015 and 2017 in Cairo that the army personnel's salaries more than tripled since 2011. The appearance of men in military attire in elitist international schools in New Cairo was rare before 2013, these slots having belonged more or less to the middle or upper-middle class depending on rank. This means that officers are penetrating the upper class, or the 0.5 to four percent of the population who could afford these schools.²³

However, after 2014 and Sisi's coming to power, the military's already established economy developed even further with numerous projects – in-

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frastructural projects and acquisitions of existing businesses – carried out by the institution and its branches. Two examples are the Egyptian Armed Forces Engineering Authority (EAFEA) and Military Production, which increased the number of projects they carried out after 2014. This reality could be deduced given the number of billboards carrying their names on numerous sites in Egypt – not just Cairo. The EAFEA, for example, took on numerous projects among which are infrastructure around New Cairo, and the project to be carried out in place of what was the National Democratic Party's building on the corniche, among others.²⁴ These economic plans by the military establishment should not be regarded as solely for the sake of monopoly over the State and economy, but also a form of coup-proofing strategy for Sisi.²⁵ Sisi's son, Mahmoud al-Sisi, was a senior official within the General Intelligence Service (GIS) in 2019 until he failed to control the September 2019 protests, after which he was sent on a long-term mission to Moscow.²⁶ These protests were called for by the actor and businessman who worked with the EAFEA, Mohamed Ali; he is now self-exiled in Spain.²⁷ In providing the army personnel with incentives – economic or political – Sisi is able to maintain the support of the military institution.

The army being part of the State apparatus means that its economic activities are still to be considered State interference in the economy. During the first half of 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) commented on the infiltration of the military establishment in the economy, arguing that there is a continuous diminishing of the private sector.²⁸ In Abdel-Malek's analysis of the construction of a neo-bourgeoisie during the Nasser era, he highlights the economic facet of the military society as a privileged one.²⁹ The procedures, however, of the construction of the military society and neo-bourgeoisie in Abdel-Malek's work is the part that is most worthy of comparison with the current regime. The dismantling of the old bourgeoisie, as per Abdel-Malek, allowed for the construction of a new one accompanied by the founding of a "*social class structure*."³⁰ Similarly, the current Egyptian regime is in the process of dismantling and reorganizing the economic elite of the Mubarak era – which includes the MB businesses. In 2014 Sisi had a businessmen's Iftar event during the month of Ramadan to discuss ways of supporting the country's economy. Businessmen like Safwan Thabet who have been active since the mid-1980s attended. Thabet has been imprisoned since December 2020 and his son, Seif, since February 2021, despite 'donating' around 50 million Egyptian pounds to the Tahya Masr Fund.³¹ The Tahya Masr Fund is the State sponsored funds collection campaign to collect donations and/or funds for State projects. This is a further indication that the Mubarak bourgeoisie were to be either dismantled or 'nationalized'

in one way or another. The social class structuring or restructuring came about with the rise of the quality of life of army personnel, with gated communities specifically designated for predominantly army member residents. On one of my visits to Cairo, one of the gated communities in New Cairo were referred to as a “military barracks” with new technology controlling all entry and exit points. It can thus be no surprise when, in the face of this dominance over social, economic, political, and State structures that the IMF demands changes before providing more funds to the country.

The IMF loan is blocked pending a motion by Sisi’s government to invite more of the private sector in the economy and civil society into political life. This is not the first time that the IMF referred to the state of isolation of civil society from the political field. The current regime has been moving forward towards creating the necessary changes demanded by the IMF, especially with the rising food and water security crisis that Egypt might be facing soon given the Russian invasion of Ukraine.³² However, the changes risk being superficial, which is further detailed in the coming section.

The regime has already started discussing the listing of some companies that belonged to the State – some directly by the army – on the stock exchange. In following Egyptian Arabic news outlets, one detects a form of discourse by the current Cabinet over the past two years around encouraging private sector – and foreign – investments. Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbuly has been consistent with this discourse.

In the coming section, I finally outline the most recent motion by the current regime to follow the IMF directives in including civil society in the political field.

The national dialogue and prospects of de-militarization?

In April 2022, during the Egyptian Family Iftar, a gathering organized during the holy month of Ramadan in the presence of Sisi and the government, Sisi demanded the construction of a national dialogue that would include members of civil society. The Iftar was attended by two prominent politicians, one of them is Sabbahi – Sisi’s ‘competition’ during the 2014 presidential elections – and Khaled Daoud, journalist, ex-president of al-Destour Party and ex-détainé.³³ Even though the Iftar was followed by the release of several prisoners, many remain in jail, solitary confinement, and difficult conditions. “*We need a new political dialogue that is consistent with the concept of building the new Republic,*”³⁴ stated Sisi during the event. The idea of the “new Republic” founded on the principles highlighted earlier in this article remain an important element in the current regime’s narra-

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tive, but also in securing foreign funds, from the IMF or other foreign allies. Is the dialogue an attempt by the regime to reconcile with civil society? The answer for now is no, given the continued militarization of life in Egypt from education to legislature to entertainment; the number of political prisoners until today; and the continued pursuit, arrest – and re-arrest – of journalists, scholars, and activists.

Sisi's demand for a "new political dialogue" has its prerequisites. Members of civil society who join should not "*have blood on their hands*," a reference to the MB in particular. This also directly intersects with the MB's continued unwillingness to accept the reference to the "June 30 revolution" – as opposed to a coup – as per the regime's discourse. This means that the MB needs to acknowledge the current regime and State to reintegrate Egyptian civil society. There were questions and speculations for weeks after the April event as to whether the MB and April 6 movement will be joining the dialogue. As Egypt renewed ties with Qatar and Turkey this year, both countries have already started to take measures to limit Brotherhood activity on their soil, with Turkey halting the renewal of residencies and businesses for MB members. Meanwhile, Qatar's *al-Jazeera* is to be reauthorized in Egypt after years of being banned because the news channel had continued to diffuse the Brotherhood's discourse after 2013. Investment from the Gulf country is flowing into Egypt to mend diplomatic ties broken in 2017.³⁵ The adoption of a Brotherhood ban – or limitations in Qatar – was a necessary step towards the rejuvenation of diplomatic relations, providing consistency with the Egyptian State narrative.

The opening of the opportunity for old and new members of civil society to join the political field and carry out negotiations with the regime seemed like daydreaming since Sisi's first mandate as president. However, the success of the national dialogue remains uncertain with many of the members aligning with the regime, thus not providing a platform for the opposition.³⁶ A national dialogue committee was formed, and Diaa Rashwan, head of the Journalism Syndicate was appointed Secretary General. The first meeting of the national dialogue's board of trustees' members was held in July.

Conclusion

Since 2013, the army has been integrated and involved in all aspects of life in Egypt, including entertainment, but with politics at the forefront. This militarization by Sisi is becoming more and more embedded in governance and military education; colleges and faculties are becoming more

attainable for students graduating from high school this year. This attests to the formation of a new type of military-affiliated society with no room for prospects of de-militarization. The question remains whether the fine line that exists between the State and the army will result in the further melting of one in the other.

“*A State within a State*” still stands with the addition of a joke that has been circulating since 2011 that says: “*States have armies, but Egypt has an army that has a State.*” The importance of the narrative in the construction of a neo-military society has been a crucial element in shaping civil-military relations for decades to come. The domination by the army is clear. As of 2022 and due to IMF pressures, however, there is a possible silver lining in the form of the possible superficial integration of civil society, provided the narrative of the State is intact. Finally, the delegation arguably acquired from the people is one of the main elements of strength of the current regime and its “legitimacy.” Without a common narrative and a united discourse, the military economy and Sisi’s power continuity would not have been possible, for the reasons outlined in this article. The people have been made accomplices to the reaffirmation of the State and an authoritarian regime based on their delegation to the army.

Notes

- 1 “*el-Sisi yutaleb al-masriyeen al-ithshad l-manhuh tafweed l-mowaghat al-irhab wal-'onf al-mohtama'*”, Cairo, *Akhbar El yom TV*, July 24th, 2013. www.youtube.com/watch?v=AGB-aoh3DeNM
- 2 July State as a term was explained by historian and professor Khaled Fahmy. Khaled Fahmy, “Revolutionary Socialists’ meetings: 3”, Giza, *RevSoc TV*, 2020. <https://youtu.be/rP27URiufyk>
- 3 Anouar Abdel-Malek, *The Egyptian Society and the Army: 1952–1967*, Cairo, Mahrousa Centre for Research, 1998
- 4 Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, population: lectures at the college de France, 1977–1978*, New York, Springer, 2007, *cit.*, p. 270
- 5 Kevin Koehler, Isabell Schierenbeck, Ilyas Saliba, Ellen M. Lust & Jannis J. Grimm, *Safer field research in the social sciences: A guide to human and digital security in hostile environments*, Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications, 2020
- 6 Alexandrine Dupras & Sara Tonsy, « L’Égypte et la Jordanie : terrain ‘sensibles’ ou impossible ? La recherche dans des contextes autoritaires », in *L’enquête de terrain en milieu « sensible » : Ficelles méthodologiques, dilemmes éthiques et juridiques*, à paraître.
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- 8 Haroon Siddique & Ben Quinn, “Egypt: Deaths as rival rallies clash - As it happened”, London, *The Guardian*, July 26th, 2013. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/26/egypt-show-down-army-supporters-muslim-brotherhood-live>
- 9 Marie Vannetzel, *The Muslim Brothers in Society: Everyday Politics, Social Action, and Islamism in Mubarak’s Egypt*, Cairo, American University in Cairo Press, 2020
- 10 “*khetab tarashoh el-Sisi lel-re’asah kamelan*”, March 26th, 2014. www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Yqn6U55q9o
- 11 Zeinab Abul-Magd, *Militarizing the nation: The army, business, and revolution in Egypt*, New

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York, Columbia University Press, 2017.

12 Robert Springborg, "President Sisi's Delegative Authoritarianism", Rome, *Istituto Affari Internazionali*, 2015

13 Worthy of note, for the 2018 presidential elections, ex-Lieutenant Samy 'Anan, who was part of the SCAF before Morsi forced him and Tantawi to retire, was going to run as candidate against Sisi, along with lawyer and activist Khaled Ali. Both were imprisoned until they dropped their candidacy.

14 "El-Sisi: Egypt is witnessing the birth of a new Republic with the opening of the New Capital", Cairo, *Al-Masry al-Youm*, March 9th, 2021. www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/2278335

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